Mays v. Santos et al

Filing 42

ORDER denying 38 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 7/12/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TIBERIUS MAYS, # N-92625,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VENERIO BENERRO SANTOS,
ROBERT MUELLER,
STEPHANIE WAGGONER,
LISA KREB/KREBS,
KEVIN KINK,
and R. WEGMAN,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18-cv-181-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for “Relief from
Judgments Denying Motion for Reconsideration and Order from Initial Screening,” filed on June
29, 2018. (Doc. 38).

The motion invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), and

challenges, for the second time, the Court’s threshold screening order of March 21, 2018 (Doc.
9). That order severed some of Plaintiff’s claims into two separate actions, and dismissed two
counts. 1 Plaintiff previously brought a motion seeking to rejoin the severed cases with this
original action (Doc. 13), which was denied on April 18, 2018. (Doc. 16). The instant motion
shall also be denied.
Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from an order or judgment based on the
following grounds:
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The severed cases are: Mays v. Singler, et al., Case No. 18-cv-596-SMY-RJD (containing Counts 4 &
5), and Mays v. Shah, et al., Case No. 18-cv-597-DRH-RJD (containing Counts 8-10). Counts 1, 6, and 7
remain in the instant case. Counts 2 and 3 were dismissed. (Doc. 9).

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1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
4) the judgment is void;
5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Notably, the reasons offered by a movant for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b)
must be something that could not have been employed to obtain a reversal by direct appeal. See,
e.g., Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000); Parke-Chapley Constr. Co.
v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 1989) (“an appeal or motion for new trial, rather than
a FRCP 60(b) motion, is the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law committed by the trial
judge, as distinguished from clerical mistakes caused by inadvertence”); Swam v. U.S., 327 F.2d
431, 433 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964) (a belief that the Court was mistaken as a
matter of law in dismissing the original petition does “not constitute the kind of mistake or
inadvertence that comes within the ambit of rule 60(b).”).
While Rule 60(b) provides grounds for ordering relief from a final judgment, this Court
has employed the framework of Rule 60(b) to evaluate pro se motions seeking reconsideration of
a non-final order, such as the threshold order Plaintiff challenges here. See, e.g., Obriecht v.
Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493-94 (7th Cir. 2008) (post-judgment motions should be analyzed
based on the substance of the motion); Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994) (a
motion challenging the merits of a court order must fall under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)) (internal
citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit instructs district courts to look at the substance of a
motion to reconsider, not at the label attached by a prisoner. Terry v. Spencer, 888 F.3d 890,
893-94 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court has the ability to reconsider non-final orders, both as
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an exercise of its own discretion, id., and pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 2
In Plaintiff’s case, he references the “catchall” provision of Rule 60(b)(6) as grounds for
the instant motion.

Indeed, no other section of Rule 60(b) is applicable to the orders he

challenges. But despite the broad language of Rule 60(b)(6) – “any other reason that justifies
relief” – a reprieve from a final judgment under this section “is an extraordinary remedy and is
granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620 F.3d 747, 759 (7th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)). Whether the
circumstances in a given case are “extraordinary” is within the sound discretion of the court.
Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 123 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s new motion primarily rehashes the same points he presented in his “Motion to
Rejoin Severance” (Doc. 13), which was denied by the undersigned Judge on April 18, 2018.
(Doc. 16). It does not set forth any exceptional circumstances or issues that the Court has not
already considered, and nothing in the motion convinces the Court that the severance of claims
outlined in Doc. 9 was erroneous. The Court has already explained the reasons why severance
was appropriate, and shall not reiterate those matters here. (See Doc. 9, pp. 11-12; Doc. 16, pp.
2-4).
Plaintiff also takes issue with the denial of his motions to amend the Complaint in this
action, and argues that he should be able to join Wexford Health Services, Inc., (“Wexford”) as a
Defendant. (Doc. 18, p. 2). This matter cannot be addressed in the context of the instant motion
seeking reconsideration of the threshold order, however. Plaintiff never included Wexford as a
Defendant in the original Complaint, so the threshold order (Doc. 9) did not address whether
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Rule 54(b), in pertinent part, states that “any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties
and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment[.]”

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Plaintiff stated any claim against Wexford or whether Wexford’s inclusion might have affected
the severance decision. Thus, any issue regarding a non-party such as Wexford is outside the
scope of a motion seeking relief from the initial screening order or the order denying
reconsideration. Plaintiff’s attempts to amend his Complaint were rejected because the first
proposed amended complaint failed to comply with local rules (Doc. 18), and the second
proposed amended pleading improperly included matters that had been severed into a separate
action. (Doc. 25).
To summarize, the motion does not present any grounds within the scope of Rule 60(b) to
justify relief from the initial screening and severance order (Doc. 9), or the order denying
Plaintiff’s motion to rejoin the severed claims (Doc. 16). Furthermore, upon reconsideration in
light of the Court’s authority to revisit its non-final orders pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Court
confirms that the severance of Counts 4-5 and Counts 8-10 into separate actions as outlined in
the order at Doc. 9 was proper.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Relief from Judgments Denying
Motion for Reconsideration and Order from Initial Screening (Doc. 38) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 12, 2018

s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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