Stanton v. Wexford Health Source, Inc. et al

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/16/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RODNEY STANTON,
#B65491,
Plaintiff,

Case No.18−cv–399−DRH

vs.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
INC.,
CHRISTINE BROWN, and
KAREN JAIMET,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Plaintiff Rodney Stanton, an inmate in Pinckneyville Correctional
Center (“Pinckneyville”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.

In his

Complaint, plaintiff claims the defendants have been deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical issues in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.

(Doc. 1).

This case is now before the Court for a

preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
which provides:
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(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if
feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court
shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”
(1989).

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325

Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim

that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209
F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at
557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint
are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting
exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to allow this case to proceed
past the threshold stage.
The Complaint
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), plaintiff makes the following
allegations: on November 1, 2017, plaintiff was experiencing terrible
chest pains. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff wrote to Christine Brown and
filed numerous sick call requests with the Health Care Unit about
these pains. Id. The plaintiff made clear that he had a defibrillator
pacemaker that needed to be serviced every 90 days.

Id.

This

information was sent to the defendants on numerous occasions before
November 1, 2017. Id.
While at Dixon Correctional Center in October 2017, plaintiff
“experienced several episodes where the pacemaker had fired off.” Id.
The medical personnel at Dixon contacted Christine Brown in order to
retrieve the box that sets the defibrillator, but their request was
ignored. Id. Plaintiff also wrote to Wexford regarding the need for his
defibrillator to be set properly, but Wexford never responded. Id.
On February 1, 2018, plaintiff had not yet had the box set. Id.
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He was “rushed to the Pinckneyville emergency room for chest pains,”
because plaintiff’s defibrillator had not been properly maintained. Id.
According to the cardiologist, the last time plaintiff’s box was set was
April 27, 2015. Id.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages and for his defibrillator to
receive proper maintenance. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it
convenient to designate a single count in this pro se action.

The

parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings
and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this
Court. The designation of this count does not constitute an opinion
regarding its merit.
Count 1 – Defendants showed deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s serious medical need involving his
pacemaker and chest pain associated therewith in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
As discussed in more detail below, Count 1 will be allowed to
proceed past threshold. Any other intended claim that has not been
recognized by the Court is considered dismissed without prejudice as
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inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Count 1
The Eighth Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment. See Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010).

The Supreme Court has

recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners”

may

constitute

cruel

and

unusual

punishment.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam).

To state a claim, a prisoner

must show that: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical
need; and (2) state officials acted with deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s

medical

need,

which

is

a

subjective

standard.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
This Court finds that the heart issues plaintiff alleges are
sufficiently serious so as to satisfy the objective standard at this stage.
With respect to the subjective standard, plaintiff claims that he alerted
Brown that his pacemaker would need servicing every 90 days.
Despite this, he claims that it was not serviced. He also claims that
Dixon medical personnel contacted Brown in an effort to obtain the
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equipment needed to service plaintiff’s pacemaker when he was
experiencing chest pain, but they were ignored. Plaintiff has therefore
sufficiently alleged that Brown was deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs, and Count 1 will proceed against her.
With respect to plaintiff’s claims against Wexford, a corporation
can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or
practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right.
Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th
Cir. 2004). See also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766
n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though it were a
municipal entity in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff has not alleged that any
of the defendants either acted or failed to act as a result of an official
policy espoused by Wexford. Therefore, plaintiff cannot maintain a
deliberate indifference claim against Wexford, and Count 1 shall be
dismissed as against it.
Finally, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Jaimet.
Plaintiff did not specifically mention Jaimet in his statement of claim,
despite his having listed her among the defendants.

Plaintiffs are

required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that
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defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and
so they can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a
plaintiff has not included a defendant in his statement of claim, the
defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice of which
claims

in

the

complaint,

if

any,

are

directed

against

her.

Furthermore, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not
sufficient to state a claim against that individual.
Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998).

See Collins v.

Similarly, “[v]ague

references to a group of ‘defendants,’ without specific allegations tying
the individual defendants to the alleged unconstitutional conduct, do
not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to those
defendants.” See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777-78 (7th
Cir. 2008) (citing Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2003)).
And in the case of those defendants in supervisory positions, the
doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 actions.
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted).

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For these reasons, Jaimet shall be dismissed without prejudice
from this action.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3)
which is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for a
decision.
Plaintiff's Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense
(Doc. 4) is DENIED as moot. Waivers of service of summons will be
issued and served on the remaining defendant as ordered below.
Plaintiff is advised that it is not necessary for a litigant proceeding in
forma pauperis to file a motion requesting service of process by the
United States Marshal Service or other process server. The Clerk will
issue summons and the Court will direct service for any complaint
that passes preliminary review.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED
against BROWN and is DISMISSED without prejudice as against
WEXFORD and JAIMET for failure to state a claim upon which relief
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may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that WEXFORD and JAIMET are
DISMISSED without prejudice from this action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNT 1, the Clerk of
Court shall prepare for BROWN: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the
defendant’s place of employment as identified by plaintiff.

If the

defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on
the defendant, and the Court will require the defendant pay the full
costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the
work address provided by plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the
Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
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defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only
for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by
the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court
file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant Brown is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate
responsive pleading to the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a
United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2)
and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against plaintiff, and the judgment
includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, plaintiff will be
required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact that his
application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing
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obligation to keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party
informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts.

This shall be done in

writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay
in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of
this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2018.03.16
05:06:29 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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