Duncan v. Waskom et al

Filing 9

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2 ) is DENIED. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice and all pending motions are DENIED as MOOT (Docs. 3 and 4 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 5/2/2018. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DIAZ DUNCAN
Plaintiff,
vs.
REBECCA WASKOM and MARION
COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT DIVISION,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18-CV-460-SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Diaz Duncan has filed ten separate lawsuits in this Court between February 21,
2018 and March 27, 2018 1. In eight of the cases, as best as the Court can discern from the
Complaints, it appears that Duncan seeks to alter, amend, or otherwise relieve himself of various
child support obligations imposed by an Indiana court. Duncan names as defendants the Marion
County Child Support Division, Sarah Johnson, and Rebecca Waskom.
In his other two cases, Duncan is attempting to annul his marriage to a former spouse that
occurred in Indianapolis, Indiana. He names the Marion County Marriage License Division and
its office manager, “Ms. Mimms” as defendants. In each lawsuit, Duncan has filed motions for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). For the following reasons, Duncan has failed to state
a cognizable claim in any of his lawsuits and, thus, the motions are DENIED.

1

The cases are all pending before the undersigned District Judge: Duncan v. Waskom et al, Case No. 18cv-460; Duncan v. Johnson et al, Case No. 18-cv-461; Duncan v. Waskom et al, Case No. 18-cv-502;
Duncan v. Johnson et al, Case No. 18-cv-503; Duncan v. Waskom et al, Case No. 18-cv-536, Duncan v.
Johnson et al, Case No. 18-cv-537; Duncan v. Johnson, Case No. 18-cv-575; Duncan v. Waskom et al,
Case No. 18-cv-576; Duncan v. Mimms, Case No. 18-cv-595; and Duncan v. Mimms et al, Case No. 18cv-627.
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent party may commence a federal court action without
paying required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit asserting the inability “to pay
such fees or give security therefor” and stating “the nature of the action, defense or appeal and
the affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section 1915
is meant to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts, and applies
to non-prisoner plaintiffs and prisoners alike. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
Duncan has demonstrated his indigence in this case. In his motion and accompanying
affidavit, Duncan states that he is currently employed by The Home Depot in Marion, Illinois.
His gross wages are $567.00 bi-weekly and, after taxes, his take-home wages are approximately
$200.00 bi-weekly. He has no other income and no savings. Duncan supports his wife and
minor children. In addition, he has significant debts, including child support garnishment,
student loans, and delinquent federal and state taxes. Based upon this information, Duncan is
unable to pay the costs of commencing his lawsuits.
The Court’s inquiry does not end there, however, because § 1915(e)(2) requires careful
threshold scrutiny of a Complaint filed by a plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP. Thus, the Court
may dismiss a case if it determines the action is clearly frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim, or is a claim for money damages against an immune defendant.

28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges
have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus
save everyone time and legal expense”).
In conducting the § 1915(e)(2) screening, the Court is required to determine if the
Complaint presents any potentially meritorious factual and legal grounds. The standards for
deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the

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same as those for reviewing claims under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dewalt
v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 611-12 (7th Cir. 2000).

As such, the Complaint must contain

allegations that go beyond a merely speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). A complaint “that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
While Pro se plaintiffs’ allegations are given particular lenience and need not be artfully
pled so long as they present a basic story that holds together, if the lack of organization or
coherence is too confusing to determine which facts allegedly constitute wrongful conduct,
dismissal is appropriate. See e.g. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010);
Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding the plaintiff's complaint was too
verbose and convoluted to justify allowing it to proceed beyond screening even if it did present
potentially meritorious claims buried as a needle amongst a haystack).
Duncan's eight Complaints against Defendants Marion County Child Support Division,
Waskom, and Johnson are substantially similar:
•

18-cv-460 and 18-cv-461: Duncan alleges that from 2012 to the present, Defendants have
violated his constitutional rights by "false claims which led to excessive debt; inability to
challenge or modify debt; inadequate standards of living; inability to support four
dependents within household; financial, mental, emotional, employment, and physical
damages incurred; illegal garnishment practices." He seeks an order requiring
Defendants to cease collections to prevent further damages and to prevent imminent
homelessness to his family.

•

18-cv-502 and 18-cv-503: Duncan alleges that Defendants have violated his rights as
follows: "debt has created inadequate standards of living; inability to support four
dependents within household; collections threatens dependents educational progress;
Illinois State taxes from 2011, 2015, 2016, and 2017 are still due; federal taxes from
2015, 2016, and 2017 are still due; student loans have gone into default; inpatient hospital
bill for a nervous breakdown and major depression in 2013 are still outstanding."
Duncan asserts that he cannot continue offsetting state and federal tax payments and his
children's biological fathers have been incarcerated (no incoming child support). Duncan
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seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000 and punitive damages in the
amount of $250,000.
•

18-cv-536 and 18-cv-537: Duncan alleges that a Restraining Order was issued denying
parenting time. He moved to Illinois and the distance created the eventual dissolution of
his relationship with his child. This resulted in emotional damages. Duncan further
alleges that the judge stated in the hearing that parenting time could not be issued. When
Duncan tried to pursue parenting time in 2015, "father obtained a copy of the restraining
order and a statement was written on the copy that the judgment will not interfere with
parenting time." He asserts that the only gain from the order was financial. Duncan
claims financial, emotional, mental damages along with reoccurring homelessness over
the course of 7-8 years prevented him from being able to file suit. Duncan seeks an
award of compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000 and punitive damages in the
amount of $500,000 due to Defendants' interference created by false claims, emotional
damages, and the dissolution of his only traceable line of familial descent.

•

18-cv-575 and 18-cv-576: Duncan alleges that he is still feeling the effects from his
nervous breakdown from 2013. He currently has to deal with gossip at work due to child
support agency informing the HR Department of his excessive financial demands.
Duncan fears information received from potential employers from his background and
credit checks due to his inability to repay medical bills and creditors. He further alleges
that, although he has a degree, he had to relocate to Illinois and does not have assistance
from career services at his school to help him find gainful employment. Duncan alleges
that he has anxieties from not being able to pay monthly bills and fears of declining
educational opportunities for his three step-children. He asserts paranoia from threats
alluding to suspension of driver's license, garnishments, tax liens, and incarceration along
with depression from the loss of his only bloodline. Duncan claims suicidal thoughts,
isolation from family, loss of sleep, and dependency on sleeping pills. He alleges the
Defendants are the cause of his ailments. He seeks compensatory damages in the amount
of $500,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $750,000.
A careful review of Duncan's Complaints fails to reveal a claim for which relief may be

granted by a federal court. Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Moreover,
Rule 8(a)(2) warrants dismissal because the requirement that the statement of a claim be “plain”
necessitates that it be intelligible. Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2011).
From what the Court can discern, Duncan's allegations arise from decisions made by an Indiana
court regarding child support payments and garnishment. Duncan does not articulate how the
Defendants were involved in the underlying actions or why he has named them in his lawsuits.

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His allegations have no basis in fact or law, rendering the Complaints legally frivolous. Thus,
dismissal is appropriate.
Additionally, it is well-established decisions under the principles of abstention and what
is commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to meddle in certain state court decisions. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a
federal district court may not grant relief from a plaintiff’s injury that “stems from the state
judgment—an erroneous judgment perhaps, entered after procedures said to be unconstitutional,
but a judgment nonetheless.’” Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996). Duncan's
allegations are all sourced to state court actions. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain his claims.
Based on the foregoing, Duncan fails to present any factually or legally meritorious
grounds for his lawsuits to proceed before this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaints are
DISMISSED with prejudice and his motions to proceed in forma pauperis are DENIED.
As Plaintiff has filed 10 Complaints thus far in this Court, further discussion is warranted.
Specifically, Plaintiff is ADVISED that under Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312 (7th Cir.
1997) and Support Systems International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995), courts have
inherent authority to protect themselves from vexatious litigation by imposing fines and filing
bands. In Alexander, the Court warned that if the petitioner filed any further frivolous petitions,
he would be fined $500; the fine would have to be paid before he could commence any other
civil litigation, and any action would be summarily dismissed thirty days after filing unless
otherwise ordered by the court. Plaintiff should keep Alexander and Mack in mind before filing
any additional actions related to his Indiana state court child support and child custody
proceedings in this Court. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 2, 2018

s/ Staci M. Yandle______
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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