Lezine v. IDOC et al
ORDER granting 107 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 101 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, Defendants IDOC, Jaimet, and Baldwin's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. At th e close of the case, the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants IDOC, Jaimet, and Baldwin, and against Plaintiff James Lezine. Defendants Reeder and Wexford's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 9/8/2021. (arm)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, )
RHONDA REUTER, and
Case No. 18-cv-505-DWD
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants Illinois Department of Correc
and the motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendants Wexford Health Sources and Kimberly Reeder (Doc. 101). The case is
to Wexford Health Sources, Inc. on the docket sheet.
Summary Judgment, Defendant Baldwin is no longer the Acting Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (Doc. 108-5), and Defendant Jaimet is no longer the Warden of Pinckneyville Correctional
Center (Doc. 108-6). Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to add Rob Jeffreys, the current Acting Director
of the Illinois Department of Corrections, and Michael Monje, the current Warden of Pinckneyville
Correctional Center as Defendants in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P 25(d). Defendants Baldwin and Jaimet
remain in this matter in their individual capacities (Doc. 53).
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 2 of 18 Page ID #1683
currently stayed against Defendant Rhonda Reuter (Doc. 96). Plaintiff filed responses in
opposition (Doc. 114, Doc. 115) and Defendants Wexford and Reeder filed a reply (Doc.
116). For the reasons set forth below, the IDOC Defendants are granted judgment as a
matter of law. The Motion filed by Wexford and Reeder is denied.
Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff James Lezine is a disabled inmate in the custody of the Illinois
ff alleges violations under the
42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794, and the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1; Doc. 7). Following a threshold review
C. § 1915A, counsel was recruited for Plaintiff
(Doc. 8). On June 1, 2018, Magistrate Judge Stephen Williams found Plaintiff to be
incompetent and appointed a guardian ad litem for Plaintiff (Docs. 35, 38). Plaintiff filed
an Amended Complaint on May 29, 2019 (Doc. 53). Plaintiff now proceeds on two counts:
Count 1 alleges violations under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act against the IDOC
Defendants and Count 2 alleges deliberate indifference against all Defendants (Doc. 53).
Preliminary Injunction Hearing
On April 26, 2018, the Court held a hearing on
injunction (Doc. 28). The Court heard testimony from Plaintiff and his former roommate,
Tirnell Williams 2 (Doc. 28). The Court also heard testimony from Christine Brown,
(Doc. 28). The Court continued the hearing
Mr. Williams assisted Plaintiff will the initial filing of his Complaint in February 2018 (Doc. 1).
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 3 of 18 Page ID #1684
to June 1, 2018. At the June 1, 2018 hearing, th
then roommate, Larry Traman, along with Defendants Nurse Reuter and Nurser Reeder.
At the hearing, Nurse Reuter testified that Plaintiff could dress and bathe himself, and
change his own diapers (Doc. 102-4, p. 17), but acknowledged that Plaintiff suffers from
short-term memory loss and is generally unable to retain certain information (Doc. 1024, pp. 20-22).
Nurse Reeder testified similarly (Doc. 102-4, pp. 25, 27). Specifically, Nurse Reeder
represented that she would assist Defendant if he soiled himself and arrange for baths
for Plaintiff if they were needed (Doc. 102-4, p. 25). Reeder further testified that nurses
were not required to be present when Plaintiff bathed, and healthcare porters were in
charge of assisting Plaintiff into the bathtub (Doc. 102-4, p. 25). If the healthcare porters
were not available, Nurse Reeder stated that officers would assist Plaintiff (Doc. 102-4, p.
29). Reeder further testified that Plaintiff would receive assistance from someone in his
room or another nurse if he needed assistance cleaning himself (Doc. 102-4, p. 28).
Finally, Reeder testified that security was in charge of ensuring Plaintiff was offered
baths, and that the information was noted in
30). However, Reeder stated that she did not ensure Plaintiff was actually taking baths
regularly and would not be present when he bathed (Doc. 102-4, pp. 25, 29-30).
The Court also heard testim
2018. Mr. Traman testified gene
cal needs appeared to be
currently met, and that Plaintiff could assist himself with his hygiene.
emphasized that the testimony from Mr. Traman, conflicted with the prior testimony the
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prior roommate in February 2018, Mr. Tirnell Williams. The
equivocally that there were deficiencies in
r, the testimony offered at the June 1, 2018
did not support a finding that Plaintiff was currently being treated improperly.
Accordingly, Plaintiff withdrew his request for preliminary injunction, and the case was
from May 2017 through 2018. Magistrate Judge Williams also raised concerns of who
was in charge of making sure that Plaintiff is bathed regularly (Doc. 102-4, p. 33). Finally,
Magistrate Judge Williams appointed a guardian ad litem for Plaintiff based on the
testimony concerning his mental deficits.
The following facts are not genuinely disputed for purposes of summary
judgment. In or about May 2017, Plaintiff suffered a stroke. Plaintiff suffers from right
side paralysis and cognitive memory loss. On May 16, 2017, Plaintiff transferred to
l records indicate that his self-care is
Plaintiff uses a wheelchair. Pinckneyville
Christine Brown 3, represented that Plaintiff was prescribed his wheelchair from a
medical doctor, and that Plaintiff never communicated that he had any issues with this
Plaintiff has not named HCA Christine Brown as a defendant in this matter.
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 5 of 18 Page ID #1686
ion (Doc. 108-4). Generally, Plaintiff can
transfer in and out of his wheelchair, change his own diapers, and was regularly educated
regarding the call button above his bed. Plaintiff has used the available call light on a
few occasions. Plaintiff rarely asks for assistance, and frequently states that he was doing
See generally, Doc. 108). Plaintiff primarily uses diapers. Occasionally, Plaintiff
expresses embarrassment when he needs his diapers changed (See generally, Doc. 108).
Plaintiff is offered baths regularly, although the nurses do not assist Plaintiff with his
baths. The prison officers and/or inmate porters oversee bath schedules and inmate
bathing at Pinckneyville.
Plaintiff stayed in the infirmary from May 16, 2017 through February 28, 2018,
when he was briefly discharged from the infirmary to the general population. HCA
Brown represented that Plaintiff requested to be housed in the general population (Doc.
108-4). On multiple occasions, from May 16, 2017 through February 28, 2018, Plaintiff
made various statements regarding his stay in the infirmary (See Doc. 108, pp. 15, 34, 43,
81, 87, 335, 435, 454). On some occasions, Plaintiff questioned why he was in the infirmary
or otherwise made statements suggesting he was confused or struggled with memory
loss (See Doc. 108, pp. 15, 34, 43, 81, 87, 335, 435, 454). On February 27, 2018, Plaintiff
rged to the general population on February
28, 2018 and placed in an ADA compliant cell with an ADA attendant (Doc. 108-4).
Plaintiff was admitted back to the infirmary on March 9, 2018 (Doc. 108-4, at ¶ 4).
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 6 of 18 Page ID #1687
s Complaint, Defendant John Baldwin was
the then Acting Director of IDOC (Doc. 108-5) and Defendant Karen Jaimet was the
Warden of Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Doc. 108-6). Baldwin and Jaimet both
stated in sworn affidavits that (1) they had no personal recollections of Plaintiff, (2) were
not involved with the day-to-day decision making for medical treatment at Pinckneyville,
s required plans of care (Doc. 108-5, Doc.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A
idence is such that a reasonable jury could
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014). In assessing
a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable
to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. See Bunn, 753
F.3d at 682 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d
542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014).
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 7 of 18 Page ID #1688
the unnecessary and
Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). This
or delaying access to medical care or
negligence in the provision of medical care does not constitute a violation of the
nable measures to meet a substantial
v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
dissatisfaction with a
treatment does not give rise to a successful
deliberate indifference claim unless the treatm
evidence intentional mistre
Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996).
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff
must show: (1) that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2)
that the individual defendant was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent to that
condition. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 50,
205 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2019). A
diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 8 of 18 Page ID #1689
Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pyles v. Fahim,
771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)) (internal markings omitted). None of the Defendants
es and paralysis rise to the level of being serious medical
needs; regardless, his documented ongoing medical needs are sufficient to establish that
Plaintiff has objectively serious medical needs.
Prevailing on the second prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official
disregard that risk. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 653 (7th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff need
aware of the condition and either intentionally or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v.
ng more than negligence or even
Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409. Assessing
the subjective prong is more difficult in cases alleging inadequate care as opposed to a
lack of care. Without more,
judgment cannot be deliberate
Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). The
Seventh Circuit has explained:
cannot evince deliberate indifference because professional judgment
implies a choice of what the defendant believed to be the best course of
treatment. A doctor who claims to have exercised professional judgment is
effectively asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpable mental state, and
if no reasonable jury could discredit that claim, the doctor is entitled to
Id. (citing Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2016)). However, a medical
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 9 of 18 Page ID #1690
violating the Eighth Amendment where the treatment is known to be ineffective but is
chosen anyway. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010).
The IDOC Defendants
that the division of labor within a prison necessitates that non-medical officials may
Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
prisoner is under the care of medical experts...a non-medical prison official will generally
Id. (quoting Greeno v. Daley,
414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005)). However, non-medical officials can be held liable for
deliberate indifference if they ha
tual knowledge) that prison
Giles, 914 F.3d at
1050 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)).
An inmate's correspondence to a prison official may thus establish a basis for
personal liability under § 1983 wh
condition was not being treated by prison medical providers, yet the official took no
action to assist in obtaining care for the prisoner. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
As for medical administrators who are not directly
responsible for providing medical care, they can be held liable as supervisors if they know
of and facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind eye to medical personnel providing
inadequate treatment. Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017).
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 10 of 18 Page ID #1691
Plaintiff argues generally that the IDOC Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs by deferring to other individuals to ensure Plaintiff was
properly bathed, by transferring him to the general population in February 2018, and by
generally failing to provide meaningful care, adequate living conditions, and safety from
known risks of falls or other injuries.
medical needs because they had insufficient
personal involvement in his medical care. Section 1983 makes public employees liable
Burns v. Fenoglio, 525 F. App'x 512,
515 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009)).
level administrators are entitled to delegate to others the responsibility for specific prison
medical experts ... a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing
Giles, 914 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005)). Non-medical prison officials can be held liable for deliberate
indifference, however, where they have actual knowledge or a reason to believe that
prison medical staff are mistreating or failing to treat a prisoner. Arnett v. Webster, 658
F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 525 (7th Cir. 2008))
medical defendants cannot simply
Here, there is no evidence that the IDOC Defendants had actual knowledge of
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population, or any complaints of alleged medical deficiencies or problems with his
medical care or accommodations. Indeed, the only IDOC employee that appears to have
whom Plaintiff has not named as a defendant in this matter. Whereas Defendants
Baldwin and Jaimet affirmatively stated in their affidavits that they had no personal
recollections of Plaintiff and were not involved with the day-to-day decision making for
(Doc. 108-5; Doc. 108-6). Plaintiff has not
offered any evidence to dispute these statements or to create a material dispute of fact
There is also no evidence that the IDOC
The IDOC Defendants cannot be held liable solely because they were in charge. E.g.,
Lennon v. City of Carmel, Indiana
vicarious liability in a suit under section
should be granted summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim in Count 2.
Wexford and Nurse Reeder
Defendants Wexford and Nurse Reeder do not challenge that Plaintiff has
objectively serious medical needs.
Thus, the issue presented by their motion for
summary judgment is whether their conduct with respect to the treatment of Plaintiff
constituted deliberate indifference.
negligence and it approach
Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff,
700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012); accord Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir.
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 12 of 18 Page ID #1693
intentional or reckless conduct, not
gligence, even gross negligence
McGowan v. Hulick
the context of medical professionals, the
deliberate indifference standard has been
standard. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008).
Under this standard, in order for a prison medical professional to be held liable
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate
that the person responsible
512 F.3d at 895. In other words, a prison medica
treatment decisions unless no minimally competent professional would have so
Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011)
see also Holloway
, but rather a range of acceptable courses
Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697
(7th Cir. 2008))).
Plaintiff contends that Nurse Reeder was deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs by generally deferring to other individuals to ensure Plaintiff was properly bathed,
d physical conditions. As for Wexford,
Plaintiff argues that Wexford failed to provide appropriate training to its employees, and
specifically maintained a practice or policy of not ensuring that patients, like Plaintiff,
received regular bathing or hygiene care and cleaning following accidents involving
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 13 of 18 Page ID #1694
medical needs because she provided him with his medications, consistently examined
Plaintiff, taught him to use the call button, assisted Plaintiff in changing his diapers or
cleaning up if they were soiled, and took steps to ensure Plaintiff was offered baths. In
sum, Reeder suggest that there is no evidence that Plaintiff was receiving insufficient
care, and that Plaintiff never expressed needing additional assistance.
Wexford also argues that there is no evidence showing either an express policy or
widespread practice resulting in a constitutional depravation or injury so to sustain a
claim against it pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Under controlling precedent, a private corporation that contracts to provide
essential government services can be held liable under § 1983, but not under a theory of
., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1024 (2015). The corporat
Id.; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. Therefore, in order to recover against Wexford, Plaintiff
ed by a Wexford policy, custom, or practice
of deliberate indifference to medical needs, or a series of bad acts that together raise the
Shields, 746 F.3d at 796. Here, Plaintiff is arguing that Wexford
maintained a policy or custom that resulted in its nurses deferring to third-parties or
other non-health care providers to ensure the proper hygiene and bathing of patients with
physical and mental defects.
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health defects, a reasonable juror could
statements in determining whether Plainti
Further, viewing all of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonably jury could infer that Defendant Reeder substantially
care professionals in charge of his bathing
genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendant Reeder was merely
negligent or whether her conduct was reckless or intentional. Similarly, a reasonable jury
could conclude from the evidence presented that Wexford maintained a widespread
practice of failing to properly ensure regular bathing schedules for inmates with physical
and mental defects, and that practice caused Plaintiff to suffer unnecessary pain. As such,
Defendants Reeder and Wexford are not entitled to summary judgment.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act
Plaintiff contends that the IDOC Defendants violated the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act by failing to provide him with reasonable accommodations.
generally that he was denied access to proper hygiene and an adequate wheelchair, which
also argues that Defendants have failed to provide Plaintiff with meaningful care,
adequate living conditions, and safety from known risks of falls or other injuries, and that
his transfer to the general population in February 2018 denied him access to meaningful
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care and adequate living conditions.
a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits any
agency that receives federal funds from excluding, subjecting to discrimination, or
denying the benefits of any of their programs to otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
facie case of discrimination under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by showing:
(1) he is a qualified person; (2) with a disability; (3) the Department of Corrections denied
him access to a program or activity because of his disability or otherwise subjected him
to discrimination; and (4) the denial or discrimination was by reason of his
Farris v. Kurr, No. 16-CV-272-SMY-RJD, 2018 WL 3036130, at *3 (S.D. Ill. June
19, 2018) (citing Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012)).
imination by presenting evidence that the defendant
intentionally acted on the basis of the disability, the defendant refused to provide a
Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Assoc., Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 847
(7th Cir. 1999).
While the failure to make reasonable accommodations to ensure
participation in the public entity's programs or services by a person with a disability
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A);
, 684 F.3d
t be perfect or the one most strongly
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 16 of 18 Page ID #1697
preferred by the plaintiff, but it still must be
Meyer v. Walthall, --F.Supp.3d--,
2021 WL 1326565, at *23 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2021) (internal citations and markings
Evaluating the reasonableness of a particular accommodation in the prison context
is particularly fact-intensive and determined on a case-by-case basis by balancing the cost
to the defendant and the benefit to the plaintiff. Golden v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., No. 12-CV7743, 2016 WL 5373056, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2016) (citing Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269
F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001); Holmes v. Godinez, 311 F.R.D. 177, 226 (N.D. Ill. 2015)).
ncerns, and administrative exigencies [are] important
Id. (citing Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558,
561 (7th Cir. 1996)). The key question is whether the inmate was able to participate in the
activities in question, given his disability, with or without reasonable accommodations
from the prison. Love, 103 F.3d at 560.
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability and
that IDOC is a public entity. Thus, the only question is whether the IDOC denied him
access to a program or activity because of his disability. The IDOC Defendants argue that
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was discriminated against based on his
disabilities. Further, the IDOC Defendants contend that Plaintiff was provided with
appropriate accommodations for his disabilities based on medical recommendations.
Specifically, the IDOC Defendan
wheelchair was prescribed by a medical professional and that Plaintiff had never
complained of any problems with his wheelchair (Doc. 108, p. 10). The IDOC Defendants
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 17 of 18 Page ID #1698
assistance cleaning and/or bathing when re
access to a call button and has scheduled shower/bath times each where he is assisted
during the transition from his wheelchair to the tub by inmate porters (Id. at p. 10).
Plaintiff also has more access to showers than other offenders in the event he soils himself
Plaintiff asserts, on the other hand, that a reasonable juror could find that the IDOC
failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by relying on other inmates rather than
care professionals to assist Plaintiff with his accidents or falls, and by transferring Plaintiff
to the general population in February 2018. To the extent Plaintiff claims that he was
denied access to proper hygiene or other activities during his brief transfer to the general
population, Plaintiff has developed no record to refute the sworn statements provided by
Defendants proffer that Plaintiff asked to be housed in the general
population and received clearance from a medical professional to do so. Further, Plaintiff
was transferred to an ADA complaint cell with the assistance of an ADA attendant (Doc.
Similarly, Plaintiff received his wheelchair from a medical professional, and
Plaintiff has offered no evidence that his wheelchair is deficient apart from his summary
conclusions (Doc. 108-4).
allegations; Plaintiff must create a material dispute of fact. Accordingly, there is no
indication in the record that the IDOC Defendants denied Plaintiff access to any specific
programs or activities or failed to provide him a reasonable accommodation for his
Case 3:18-cv-00505-DWD Document 122 Filed 09/08/21 Page 18 of 18 Page ID #1699
Plaintiff has not otherwise articulated what programs or activities he was denied
access to. Nor has Plaintiff argues that any of the IDOC Defendants intentionally
discriminated against him because of his disability. In sum, Plaintiff has not provided
any evidence that the IDOC Defendants actually discriminated against him, and Plaintiff
has not provided any evidence to refute the sworn statements provided by the IDOC
population were reasonable accommodation
professional judgment of medical providers.
Accordingly, the record here does not
establish a violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, the IDOC Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Plaint
the Rehabilitation Act.
For the above-stated reasons, the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 107) filed
by Defendants IDOC, Baldwin, and Jaimet is GRANTED. The motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants Wexford and Reeder is (Doc. 101) is DENIED.
Dated: September 8, 2021
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
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