Robinson v. Manskem et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 3/27/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JARROD ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CRAIG MANSKEM, and
JAMES MOUNT,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18−cv–531−JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jarrod Robinson, a detainee at Chester Mental Health Center, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.

In his

Complaint, Plaintiff claims, among other things, that Defendant Manskem subjected him to
excessive force. (Doc. 1). This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers

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to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to allow this case to proceed past the threshold stage.
The Complaint
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff makes the following allegations1: Plaintiff was
assaulted by Officer Ewing on December 9 of an unspecified year. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff’s
hand was sliced open to the bone. Id. Officer Ewing, Yandel, Haang, Zuhlke, and Hanes said it
appeared to be a minor contusion and asked Plaintiff why he did it to himself. Id. After Ewing
and other officers exited and returned, they asked Plaintiff to put his hands behind his back, even
though he was severely bleeding, so that he could be taken to medical for medical attention. Id.
Plaintiff believes the seriousness of the injury suggested that he should have been taken to the
emergency room. Id. The Shift Commander, Hanes, was advised that all was well.2 Id.
Gary Edmisson brought Plaintiff things to treat his wounds, but he continued to lose
“massive amounts of blood and started to feel sick and lightheaded.” (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff
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Plaintiff’s Complaint, at times, is not legible. It also has blocks of text written in the margins, some of
which are written vertically as opposed to horizontally, or exceed the visible margins. Plaintiff has also included
what appears to be an Information from the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Jefferson County, State of
Illinois, with handwritten notes on it in the margins and throughout, without indicating why he may have done so.
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Plaintiff lists various names at the bottom of page 2 of the Complaint in an area separated from the main
text. It is unclear what these names are associated with. The names include: Mary Jo Connoway, Jake Robinson, Lt.
Edwards, Jennifer Roberts, Casey Merlott, Jesse Garcia, Shawn Hoang, and Nelson Drew.

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hit his emergency button and discovered later that day that Jeffery Clark had isolated his
intercom. (Doc. 1, p. 4). On December 11, 2017, Plaintiff was punched in the face by Craig
Manskem on camera. Id. He suffered multiple “abrasions, contusions, and many other injuries.”
Id. He was choked and beaten severely by Manskem. Id. C/O McKinnies tased Plaintiff as
Jesse Garcia attempted to place him in metal restraints. Id. Plaintiff claims there was no
justification for his being tased or struck in the face. Id.
Plaintiff pressed his emergency button to notify someone that he was in need of
immediate medical attention. (Doc. 1, p. 5). He lost consciousness and hit his head. Id.
Plaintiff was put on a stretcher and into an ambulance. Id. Plaintiff arrived at an emergency
room. Id. It hurt for him to breathe. Id. Plaintiff received a CT Scan, and he was told by a
doctor that everything appeared normal but that they were still awaiting certain lab results. Id. It
was discovered that Plaintiff’s heart enzymes “were way off the chart.” (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Page 9 of Plaintiff’s Complaint is covered in notes of various sizes and orientations.
(Doc. 1, p. 9). He lists various individuals he claims to be pursuing legal proceedings against,
including Doctor Lochard, Walther Hughes, and Catherine Durbin. Id. A large portion of page
10 is illegible. (Doc. 1, p. 10). One legible portion notes that “Robinson” has been subjected to
multiple aggravated assaults and battery and that Plaintiff has been subjected to cruel, unusual,
inhumane, and unsanitary living environments. Id. Page 10 comes after what appears to be
Plaintiff’s signature page on which he wrote “End of Narrative” in very large print. Id. It is
unclear whether Plaintiff intends for it to be included as part of the statement of claim. Id. Page
11 is the previously mentioned Information with handwritten notes in the margins and
throughout. On page 12, Plaintiff recounts in the margins of the Information when he was hit by
a car, died, and was sent back as a prophet. (Doc. 1, p. 12). Plaintiff also included his signature

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and the date at the bottom of page 12. Id.
Discussion
Before analyzing Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court finds it appropriate to address
Plaintiff’s failure to include specific allegations against Defendant James Mount (Captain at
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office) in the body of his Complaint, despite his having listed him
among the defendants. Plaintiffs are required to associate specific defendants with specific
claims, so that defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they can
properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not included a defendant in his statement of claim,
the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if
any, are directed against him. Furthermore, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is
not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334
(7th Cir. 1998). And in the case of those defendants in supervisory positions, the doctrine of
respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,
740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Mount is “personally responsible for the
deprivation of a constitutional right,” and a defendant cannot be liable merely because he
supervised a person who caused a constitutional violation. Id. Accordingly, Mount will be
dismissed from this action without prejudice.
Further, to the extent Plaintiff sought to bring claims against individuals or entities not
included in the case caption, these individuals or entities will not be treated as defendants in this
case, and any claims against them should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See Myles
v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendants must be “specif[ied] in the

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caption”). Because Manskem is the only named defendant that Plaintiff included allegations
against in his statement of claim, the only claims the Court will consider herein will be the
claims against him. Any claims not addressed herein should be considered dismissed without
prejudice from this action.
Turning to the relevant allegations, the Court finds it convenient to designate a single
count in this pro se action. The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of this count does not constitute an opinion regarding its merit.
Count 1 –

Manskem subjected Plaintiff to excessive force in violation of the Eighth
or Fourteenth Amendment on December 11, 2017.

As discussed in more detail below, Count 1 will be allowed to proceed past threshold.
Count 1
The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against a prison inmate without
penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and is actionable under § 1983. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). An
inmate must show that an assault occurred, and that “it was carried out ‘maliciously and
sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.’” Wilkins,
559 U.S. at 40 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). An inmate seeking damages
for the use of excessive force need not establish serious bodily injury to make a claim, but not
“every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559
U.S. at 37-38 (the question is whether force was de minimis, not whether the injury suffered was
de minimis); see also Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2001).
Given that Plaintiff was detained in the Jefferson County Jail during the time period
relevant to the Complaint, it is possible that he was a pretrial detainee rather than a sentenced
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prisoner when his claim arose, in which case the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment
would apply to his claim. To prevail on a claim of excessive force, “a pretrial detainee must
show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively
unreasonable.”

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73 (2015).

“[O]bjective

reasonableness turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” including “the
relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the
plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the
severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 2473 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff claims that Manskem punched, choked, and beat him without justification.
Under either the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment standard, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is
sufficient to survive threshold review. Count 1 will therefore proceed against Manskem.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for a decision.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against MANSKEM.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MOUNT is DISMISSED without prejudice from
this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for
MANSKEM: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms,
a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendant’s place of

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employment as identified by Plaintiff. If the defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the defendant, and the Court will
require that the defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter shall be

REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

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independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 27, 2018
s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

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