Gully, Jr. v. Hundley et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 4/18/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RONNIE GULLY, JR., # B-88170,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DEREK HUNDLEY,
TRENT RALSTON,
RANDALL D. BAYLOR,
EARL DIXON,
JEFFEREY MOLENHOUR,
MS. BASINETTE,
GIVENS,
JANA CARIE,
ELDON COOPER,
and NICOLAS LAMB,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18-cv-539-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections currently incarcerated at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), has brought this pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims, which include retaliation, deliberate indifference to
medical needs, and imposition of punishment without due process, arose during his confinement
at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). The Complaint is now before the Court for a
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the
line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith
v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same
time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff’s claims survive
threshold review under § 1915A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff suffers from asthma and high blood pressure. On October 11, 2017, he told C/O
Ralston that he was short of breath, having sharp chest pain, and needed medical attention. He

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told Ralston that he had standing medical orders to get a breathing treatment when he got short
of breath. (Doc. 1, p. 79). Ralston indicated he would see if a lieutenant could take Plaintiff to
health care after the inmates returned to the housing unit from the chow line. At Plaintiff’s
request, Ralston secured Plaintiff in the shower area so he could watch him until the lieutenant
arrived.
About an hour later, Lieutenant Hundley came to take Plaintiff to health care. Plaintiff
had previously sued Hundley over a December 2016 disciplinary ticket. (Doc. 1, p. 80); Gully v.
Hundley, et al., Case No. 15-cv-211-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill.). Hundley ordered Plaintiff to cuff up
and asked why Plaintiff hadn’t locked up when his officer ordered him to do so. Plaintiff
protested that he had never been given such an order, and that Ralston had locked him in the
shower. Hundley yelled for Plaintiff to cuff up, and Plaintiff did. (Doc. 1 p. 81). Hundley
threatened to write Plaintiff “another ticket” if he was lying about his orders for breathing
treatments. Plaintiff claims that Hundley intentionally delayed getting him to health care against
prison policy that called for a “code 3 medical emergency” response to symptoms of chest pain
and breathing problems. (Doc. 1, pp. 80-81).
Nursing staff found that Plaintiff’s blood pressure was “exceptionally high.” (Doc. 1,
p. 81). Hundley and Baylor disrupted Plaintiff’s treatment, yelling to the nursing staff that
Plaintiff was faking. (Doc. 1, p. 82). Plaintiff yelled back, and the nurse told them to get out.
Hundley and Baylor then took Plaintiff to segregation. (Doc. 1, p. 83). When Plaintiff protested,
Hundley said he would “bury [Plaintiff’s] a** under the seg unit.” Id. When they got to
segregation, Hundley added, “I’ll be getting back to you shortly[,] my reach is very far.” Id.
Hundley, Dixon, Baylor, and Ralston issued five separate disciplinary tickets to Plaintiff
based on the events of October 11, 2017, including disobeying a direct order, intimidation,

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threats, and dangerous disturbances. (Doc. 1, pp. 39-40, 83-84).
On October 16, 2017, Basinette (Mental Health Associate) fabricated a report that
Plaintiff was suicidal, despite Plaintiff’s “relentless” arguments that he did not want to kill
himself. (Doc. 1, p. 84). Givens threatened to call in the Orange Crush team to force Plaintiff out
of his cell, so Plaintiff ultimately agreed to go to the suicide housing unit. He was placed in a cell
that had urine, feces, and blood smeared on the walls, semen stains on the mattress, and a terrible
foul odor. (Doc. 1, p. 85). Later that day, Basinette came and told Plaintiff that she put him on
suicide watch to teach him a lesson, because she heard of his situation with her friend Hundley,
who has “a far reach.” Id. Plaintiff remained in the contaminated watch cell for 48 hours, without
clothes to protect him from the cold. Plaintiff asserts that Basinette’s purpose was to harass,
degrade, and torture him, and that her actions amounted to intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (Doc. 1, p. 86).
On October 31, 2017, Plaintiff’s disciplinary tickets were heard by Carie and Cooper.
Plaintiff requested to call an Internal Affairs officer as a witness, but the witness was never
called. (Doc. 1, pp. 86-87). Plaintiff submitted a written statement in his defense and pled not
guilty to all charges except for a threat to Hundley. (Doc. 1, pp. 41-53; 86-87). Carie made
comments to the effect that Plaintiff was not believable, indicating to Plaintiff that the hearing
committee was not impartial.
Carie and Cooper found Plaintiff guilty. (Doc. 1, pp. 76-78). He was punished with an
extra 30 days on his sentence before he would be eligible for supervised release (Plaintiff
explains that he does not have “good time” to revoke, because he is serving a sentence at 100%).
(Doc. 1, p. 88). His punishment also included 90 days in segregation and 180 days’ loss of gym,
phone, recreation, and commissary privileges. Plaintiff’s segregation cell was infested with

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spiders and rats, and he was not provided with cleaning supplies or personal hygiene items. He
was then moved to Pinckneyville, a transfer which he characterizes as “retaliatory.” (Doc. 1,
p. 89). The transfer was listed among the punishments resulting from the disciplinary action.
(Doc. 1, p. 77). Plaintiff seeks to hold Warden Lamb responsible for the alleged due process
violations because he signed off on these punishments, and for the unsanitary segregation
conditions. Id.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. (Doc. 1, p. 90).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Ralston
and Hundley, for delaying Plaintiff’s medical treatment for his
breathing problems and chest pain;

Count 2:

First Amendment retaliation claim against Hundley, for
intentionally delaying Plaintiff’s medical treatment and issuing a
disciplinary ticket because Plaintiff sued Hundley;

Count 3:

First Amendment retaliation claim against Basinette and Hundley,
for placing Plaintiff in a filthy suicide-watch cell to punish him for
suing Hundley;

Count 4:

State law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against Basinette, for placing Plaintiff in a filthy suicide-watch cell
when he was not suicidal;

Count 5:

Eighth Amendment claim against Basinette and Givens for housing
Plaintiff in a suicide-watch cell contaminated with human waste
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and bodily fluids;
Count 6:

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Hundley, Dixon,
Baylor, and Ralston, for filing false disciplinary charges, and
against Carie, Cooper, and Lamb, for finding Plaintiff guilty and
punishing him in violation of procedural requirements;

Count 7:

Eighth Amendment claim against Lamb for confining Plaintiff in a
vermin-infested cell while he was in segregation.

Count 1, a portion of Count 2, and Counts 3-5 shall proceed for further review in this
action. For the reasons explained below, however, Counts 6 and 7 fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and will be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 1 – Deliberate Indifference – Ralston & Hundley
In order to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, an inmate
must show (1) that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) that the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that condition. A medical
need is “serious” where it has either “been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or
where the need is “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
“Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows of a
substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk.
Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if such delay exacerbated the injury or
unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842
(1994); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015). The Eighth Amendment does
not give prisoners entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only
requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112

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F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
In this case, Plaintiff’s chest pain and shortness of breath were objectively serious
symptoms, and a lay person would understand the need for prompt medical attention. Further,
Plaintiff’s condition was serious enough for his medical providers to issue a standing order for
him to receive a breathing treatment when he experienced shortness of breath. The Complaint
thus satisfies the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. The remaining question is
whether the Defendants acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to a known risk of
serious harm.
Plaintiff states that due to Ralston’s and Hundley’s “lethargic” response time to his
request for medical care, he was not taken to see a medical professional until more than an hour
and a half after he reported his symptoms. (Doc. 1, pp. 79, 81). Plaintiff further asserts that
Hundley deliberately delayed taking him to health care, while he was wheezing and having
severe chest pain. (Doc. 1, p. 80-81). At this stage, Plaintiff has stated a deliberate indifference
claim against Ralston and Hundley that merits further review, and Count 1 shall proceed.
Count 2 – Retaliation – Hundley
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, lawsuits, or
otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680
F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v.
Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). The issue in a retaliation claim is whether the plaintiff
experienced an adverse action that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and
if the First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the defendants’ decision to
take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009). “A complaint

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states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events from which retaliation
may plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Hundley in February 2017 (Case No. 17-cv-211-DRHSCW) that was pending at the time of the events described in this Complaint. Plaintiff alleges
that Hundley delayed taking him to get medical care because of a desire to retaliate against him
for pursuing the lawsuit. Such retaliatory action could violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
thus this portion of Count 2 may proceed for further consideration.
Plaintiff also claims that Hundley wrote him a disciplinary ticket as another form of
retaliation for Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff includes a ticket signed by Hundley, charging him
with 106-Indimidation or threats, and 215-Disobeying a direct order, for their October 11, 2017,
encounter. (Doc. 1, pp. 36-37). Those charges were combined with charges filed by other
officers and heard together by the Adjustment Committee. (Doc. 1, pp. 76-78). Plaintiff pled
guilty to the “Intimidation or Threats” charge (classified as a 206 offense on the final
disciplinary report) for his statements to Hundley. This undermines his claim that the disciplinary
charge was false and brought only as retaliation.
Furthermore, as discussed below under Count 6, the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), dictates that Plaintiff cannot obtain damages arising out of a disciplinary
“conviction” where the punishment affected the length of his sentence, if an award of damages
would imply the invalidity of the disciplinary action. Heck bars a prisoner from pursuing such an
action for damages unless the disciplinary action has been overturned and the sentence credits
restored. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51 (2004); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641 (1997); Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011) (“the ruling in a prison

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disciplinary proceeding is a conviction” for purposes of the Heck analysis).
The theory that Plaintiff’s disciplinary “conviction” was improper – because Hundley
issued the ticket to retaliate against Plaintiff – amounts to an attack on the validity of the
disciplinary action. There is no indication that the guilty finding or Plaintiff’s punishment has
been reversed or invalidated. To allow Plaintiff to seek damages for this alleged act of retaliation
would therefore violate Heck. Accordingly, the portion of Count 2 that is based on Hundley’s
issuance of the October 11, 2017, disciplinary ticket is dismissed without prejudice.
Count 3 – Retaliation – Basinette & Hundley
Plaintiff alleges that after Basinette forced him to go on suicide watch in spite of his
protests, she told him that she knew he was not suicidal, but her “objective was just to teach
[Plaintiff] a lesson.” (Doc. 1, p. 85). She then said that she knew about Plaintiff’s conflict with
Hundley, he was her friend, and “he does have a far reach[,] you see where you are today huh?”
Id. These comments indicate that Basinette’s placement of Plaintiff in the suicide watch cell
under onerous conditions was an act of retaliation for Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Hundley.
Further, it suggests Hundley’s involvement in the placement. At this stage, Plaintiff may proceed
with the retaliation claim in Count 3 against Basinette and Hundley.
Count 4 – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
This claim is based on the same facts underlying Count 3 – that Basinette placed Plaintiff
in the filthy suicide-watch cell without adequate clothing in chilly temperatures in order to “teach
him a lesson” – not because he was truly suicidal. Where a district court has original jurisdiction
over a civil action such as a § 1983 claim, it also has supplemental jurisdiction over related state
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long as the state claims “derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact” with the original federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512

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F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). “A loose factual connection is generally sufficient.” Houskins v.
Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72
F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)). That connection is present here, and the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against Basinette.
Under Illinois law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress covers only acts
that are truly “outrageous,” that is, an “‘unwarranted intrusion . . . calculated to cause severe
emotional distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities.’” Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164
(Ill. 1961) (quoting Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla.1958)). See Honaker
v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir. 2001). The tort has three components: (1) the conduct
involved must be truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor must either intend that his conduct
inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct
will cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional
distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988). To be actionable, the defendant’s
conduct “must go beyond all bounds of decency and be considered intolerable in a civilized
community.” Honaker, 256 F.3d at 490 (citing Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201,
211 (Ill. 1992); Campbell v. A.C. Equip. Servs. Corp., Inc., 610 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993). Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged on an objective standard, based on
the facts of the particular case. Honaker, 256 F.3d at 490.
Plaintiff’s Complaint arguably alleges each of the components of this state-law claim,
including that his placement in the filthy watch cell caused him to be in a “more depressed
hopeless state” than before. (Doc. 1, p. 85). The claim in Count 4 against Basinette for
intentional infliction of emotional distress also survives § 1915A review and shall proceed.

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Count 5 – Unsanitary Suicide Watch Cell
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and punishment grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Two elements are required to establish a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause with regards to any conditions of
confinement in prison. First, an objective element requires a showing that the conditions deny the
inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the
inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective
conditions must have resulted in an unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs
such as food, medical care, sanitation, or physical safety. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The second
requirement is a subjective element – establishing a defendant’s culpable state of mind, which is
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate from those conditions.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. The deliberate indifference standard is satisfied if the plaintiff
shows that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm from the conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. It is well-settled
that mere negligence is not enough. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
Plaintiff states that Basinette and Givens forced him into the suicide-watch cell, which
was contaminated with human waste and blood smeared on the walls, had semen stains on the
mattress, and reeked of a foul odor. He was left there for two days without any clothing, in cold
temperatures. These conditions appear to meet the objective factor of posing an excessive risk to
Plaintiff’s health. See Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (prisoner held in
cell for three to six days with no working sink or toilet, floor covered with water, and walls

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smeared with blood and feces); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (inmate
held for three days in cell with no running water and feces smeared on walls).
As to the subjective component of his claim, Plaintiff does not explicitly state whether he
informed Basinette or Givens of the unsanitary conditions or requested clothing or blankets to
protect him from the cold. But Givens presumably saw and/or smelled the cell when he placed
Plaintiff there. Basinette was also present at the cell when she spoke to Plaintiff about teaching
him a lesson, and she may have been there when he first entered the cell. If Plaintiff can show
that either or both of these individuals were aware of the conditions but kept Plaintiff in the cell
anyway, this would indicate that they were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm to him.
Count 5 may therefore proceed.
Dismissal of Count 6 – Due Process
Under certain limited circumstances, an inmate punished with segregation may be able to
pursue a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law. See Marion v.
Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff claims that some of
the disciplinary charges brought by Hundley, Dixon, Baylor, and Ralston were false. He further
alleges that Carie and Cooper failed to follow due process requirements when they denied his
request to call a prison staff member as a witness, and because they were biased against him. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974) (to satisfy due process concerns, inmate must
be given advance written notice of the charge, the right to appear before the hearing panel, the
right to call witnesses if prison safety allows, a hearing before an impartial panel, and a written
statement of the reasons for the discipline imposed).
Even if the disciplinary hearing was procedurally flawed, Plaintiff would still have to
show that his 90-day confinement in segregation imposed “atypical and significant

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hardship[s] . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” in order to state a
constitutional claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process. Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98.
But in this case, the Heck doctrine precludes any consideration of his civil rights claim
for damages based on this disciplinary action. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck
directs that a plaintiff may not seek damages based on an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, unless the conviction or sentence has first been reversed on appeal, expunged, or
otherwise invalidated. A claim for damages that implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence
cannot be maintained so long as the conviction or sentence still stands. Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. at 486-87. Such a claim must be dismissed without prejudice, so that it may be filed again in
the event that the conviction or sentence is reversed or invalidated in the future. See Polzin v.
Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2011).
In the context of a prison disciplinary action, a ruling imposing punishment is the
equivalent of a “conviction.” Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011). The Supreme
Court applied Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings where the punishment includes loss of
good conduct credits, which have the effect of extending the term of imprisonment. The Court
ruled that claims which “necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of [the prisoner’s]
good-time credits” are not actionable under § 1983 unless the prison disciplinary decision has
been invalidated, even though the restoration of credits is not sought as a remedy. Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-68 (1997). See also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004).
In this case, Plaintiff’s punishment included the extension of his sentence for an
additional 30 days. (Doc. 1, pp. 78, 88). The Complaint indicates that this punishment has not
been reversed or expunged. Therefore, under the authority discussed above, Plaintiff cannot

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maintain an action seeking damages based on this disciplinary action. Count 6 shall be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Dismissal of Count 7 – Unsanitary Segregation Cell
Plaintiff alleges that his segregation cell was infested with spiders and rats. He was not
given sufficient hygiene supplies (toothbrush and dental floss), and he was not given cleaning
supplies. The noise from fellow segregation inmates who screamed and banged on the metal
doors deprived Plaintiff of sleep and elevated his blood pressure. These conditions might violate
Eighth Amendment standards. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Budd v.
Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (denial of access to “adequate sanitation and personal
hygiene items” may demonstrate a deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities”); Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2012) (depending on severity,
duration, nature of the risk, and susceptibility of the inmate, prison conditions – such as vermin
infestation – may violate the Eighth Amendment if they caused either physical, psychological, or
probabilistic harm).
However, Plaintiff fails to connect this claim to any Defendant who was directly
responsible for the conditions in his segregation cell. As such, the Court cannot evaluate the
subjective component of the claim, that is, whether any prison official knew of the conditions yet
failed to correct them. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Plaintiff does not
allege that he informed any official of the conditions that may have placed his health or safety at
risk. While he asserts that Warden Lamb is ultimately responsible for the cell conditions because
the prison is under his control, this is not sufficient to impose liability on Lamb. The doctrine of
respondeat superior (supervisory liability) is not applicable to Section 1983 actions. Sanville v.
McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not claim to

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have had any communication with Lamb that would have put him on notice of the conditions.
For these reasons, Count 7 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Dismissal of Molenhour
Plaintiff names Internal Affairs Officer Molenhour among the Defendants, but does not
mention him at all in the statement of claim. (Doc. 1, pp. 3, 79-89). Plaintiffs are required to
associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that defendants are put on notice of the
claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not
included a defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately
put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. Furthermore,
merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that
individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Molenhour
will be dismissed from this action without prejudice.
Pending Motion
The motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 3) is TERMINATED
AS MOOT. No such motion is necessary for a Plaintiff who has been granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court shall order service on all defendants who remain in the
action following threshold review. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Disposition
The portion of COUNT 2 based on Hundley’s alleged retaliatory disciplinary charge is
DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The remainder of the retaliation claim in COUNT 2 (delaying Plaintiff’s transport to health care)

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shall proceed as described above.
COUNTS 6 and 7 are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
BAYLOR,

DIXON,

MOLENHOUR,

CARIE,

COOPER,

and

LAMB

are

DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for HUNDLEY, RALSTON, BASINETTE, and
GIVENS: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and
(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will
require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate

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Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 18, 2018

__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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