Smadi v. True

Filing 23

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Hosam Smadi's Petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 (Doc. 1 ) is DENIED; all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 8/24/2020. (beb)

Case 3:18-cv-00555-SMY Document 23 Filed 08/24/20 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #207

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HOSAM SMADI, # 39482-177,
Petitioner,
vs.
D. SPROUL,
Warden, USP Marion,
Respondent.

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Case No. 18-cv-555-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Petitioner Hosam Smadi is a federal inmate incarcerated at the USP-Marion. He filed this
habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the loss of 27 days of good conduct
credit against his sentence, imposed as a disciplinary sanction. (Doc. 1). Respondent filed a
Response to the Petition (Doc. 7) and Smadi replied (Doc. 19). For the following reasons, the
Petition is DENIED.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
Smadi is serving a 24-year sentence for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.
United States v. Smadi, Case No. 09-cr-294-M-1 (N.D. Tex., Doc. 88). As of the time of
Respondent’s Response, his projected release date was January 11, 2031. 1 (Doc. 7, p. 2).
The disciplinary sanction Smadi challenges resulted from a March 5, 2017 email he sent to
his sister, in which he wrote: “What about teachers, are they nice. Tell everybody of them, that I
say take care of my little sister with good scores or I blow up the shit!! ha ha.” (Doc. 1, pp. 1, 6).

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According to the Bureau of Prisons website, Smadi’s current projected release date is April 19, 2031.
Https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited August 10, 2020).

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Smadi was charged in Incident Report 2958966 with making threats/threatening statements
(Prohibited Act Code 203) 2. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 4). On March 23, 2017, the disciplinary hearing
officer held a hearing at which Smadi was present with a staff representative. He was found guilty
and 27 days of his earned good conduct time was revoked. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-7).
Discussion
Inmates retain due process rights in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings.
However, such proceedings “are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights
due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974). The minimum due process requirements for such proceedings are: (1) receipt of written
notice of the charges in advance of the hearing; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision maker; (3) the right to call witnesses and present evidence where the same will not be
unduly hazardous to safety or correctional goals; and (4) a written statement as to the evidence
relied on and the reason for the decision. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66; Henderson v. U.S. Parole
Commission, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
The decision must be supported by “some evidence in the record.” Superintendent v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445 (1985); see also Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). The “some
evidence” standard is a low bar, which the Seventh Circuit has described as a “meager threshold.”
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007) (“once the meager threshold has been crossed
our inquiry ends”). The Court does not reweigh the evidence or determine credibility. Meeks v.
McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 1996). Nor does the Court “assess the comparative weight of
the evidence underlying the disciplinary board's decision.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652
(7th Cir. 2000). The “relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

2

Prohibited Act 203 is “Threatening another with bodily harm or any other offense.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.3
(Table 1).

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support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56
(emphasis in original). Only evidence that was presented to the hearing officer is relevant to the
determination of whether there was “some evidence.” Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346
(7th Cir. 1992). As such, this Court can overturn the decision “only if no reasonable adjudicator
could have found [petitioner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.”
Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077.
During the hearing, Smadi’s defense to the charge was that he was only joking with his
little sister in a private email conversation, and in his country (Jordan) that sort of talk was normal
and would have been understood as a joke. (Doc. 1, p. 5-6, Doc. 7-3, p. 4). The hearing officer
acknowledged Smadi’s explanation, but noted the conversation was not private as it was monitored
by staff, that Smadi was not back home in his culture, and that a reasonable person could believe
the threat was valid. (Doc. 7-3, p. 2).
Smadi argues that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights because
although the hearing officer found that he lacked the subjective intent to threaten someone, the
officer improperly applied an objective test to determine whether the statement was a threat. He
also argues his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because there was no evidence he intended
to make a threat and the hearing officer failed to consider his serious mental health issues. 3 (Doc.
1, p. 2).
The hearing officer’s determination that Smadi’s statement amounted to a threat was
supported by “some evidence” – the email itself. This is sufficient to sustain the disciplinary
ruling. And, the hearing officer’s conclusion that “Given [Smadi’s] current offense a reasonable

3

Smadi asserts that he suffers from severe mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, and depression. (Doc. 1, p. 1).

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person would believe there is validity to this threat” (Doc. 7-3, p. 2) was not improper or
unconstitutional. Smadi points out that in some instances, this Court has required evidence of the
prisoner’s culpable mental state (mens rea) to support a disciplinary sanction. But those cases are
distinguishable as they involved the question of whether knowledge of the presence of contraband
can be imputed to an inmate merely because he occupied the cell where it was found. Here, there
is no dispute that Smadi wrote the email containing the offending statement. The disciplinary code
prohibits inmates from making threats and does not require a showing of any particular mental
state such as would be necessary in a criminal case. 4 The hearing officer was not required to make
a finding that Smadi had the subjective intent to make a true threat.
Finally, Smadi asserts that the hearing officer should have considered his mental condition
before finding that he knowingly transmitted a threat. Respondent argues Smadi has waived this
issue because he did not raise it in the hearing or in his administrative challenges to the disciplinary
decision. As Respondent notes, Smadi did not mention his mental illnesses in the hearing or during
his administrative appeals. He appealed on the bases the email statement was a joke and protected
speech and that the hearing officer was biased against him because he is Arab and because of the
nature of his conviction. (Doc. 7-5, pp. 77-78, 80, 85). It has long been settled that a “federal
prisoner challenging a disciplinary decision within the federal institution must exhaust his
administrative remedies before seeking federal habeas relief.” Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694,
699 (7th Cir. 1986). Smadi failed to do so with respect to this issue.
Disposition
Hosam Smadi’s Petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED;

4

Smadi’s reliance on criminal cases including United States v. Dutcher, 851 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2016), is
inapposite, because their analysis of what constitutes a “true threat” applies only in the criminal context,
not in a prison discipline case. (Doc. 19, pp. 4-6).

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all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and this case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
It is not necessary for Petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from this disposition
of his § 2241 Petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000). If Petitioner wishes
to appeal, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1(A). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) may toll the 60-day appeal deadline. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more
than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be
extended.
A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) must identify the issues Petitioner
plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Petitioner does choose to appeal
and is allowed to proceed IFP, he will be liable for a portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee
(the amount to be determined based on his prison trust fund account records for the past six
months) irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.

See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181
F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 24, 2020

s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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