Smadi v. True
ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 4/11/2018. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Case No. 18-cv-0555-DRH
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Petitioner, currently incarcerated in U.S. Penitentiary Marion, brings this
habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the loss of
good conduct time based on discipline he received at Marion on April 25, 2017.
(Doc. 1, pp. 1-2, 7).
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District
Courts provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court
judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must
dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of
those Rules gives this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas
Petitioner lost 27 days of good conduct time based on Incident Report
2958966, which charged him with a violation of Prohibited Act 201, “threatsthreatening statements.” (Doc. 1, p. 2).
The subject event took on March 5, 2017 when Petitioner sent an email
to his sister in which he said, “What about the teachers, are they nice. Tell
everybody of them, that I say take care of my little sister with good scores or I
blow up the shit!! ha ha.” (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner received the disciplinary
report the next day on March 6, 2017; the hearing was held on March 23,
2017. (Doc. 1, p. 2).
Petitioner alleges that his due process rights were violated when he was
deprived of his good conduct credit because the hearing officer did not have
some evidence that Petitioner possessed the necessary intent to threaten
anyone, improperly applied an objective standard, and failed to adequately
consider Petitioner’s mental health issues.
(Doc. 1, p. 2).
affirmatively stated that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Id.
A petition seeking habeas corpus relief is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 when challenging the fact or duration of a prisoner's confinement.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).
A claim for restoration of
wrongfully revoked good conduct credit is properly brought in a § 2241 action.
Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2011); Waletzki v. Keohane, 13 F.3d
1079 (7th Cir. 1994).
Petitioner alleges that he was not given due process when deprived of his
good conduct credit.
In the context of a prison disciplinary hearing, due
process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) written notice of the claimed
violation at least 24 hours before hearing; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence (when consistent with institutional safety)
to an impartial decision-maker; and (3) a written statement by the fact-finder of
the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. See Scruggs
v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
A disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” to
satisfy due process. Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 941 (quoting Superintendent, Mass.
Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (revocation of good conduct
credits must be supported by “some evidence” in order to satisfy due process
concerns)); Austin v. Pazera, 779 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2015); Grandberry v. Smith,
754 F.3d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 2014).
Petitioner’s request for restoration of good conduct credit is properly
raised in the habeas petition. Jones, 637 F.3d 841 (presenting due process
claim); Waletzki, 13 F.3d 1079 (denial of good time credits lengthened sentence
and brought claim within ambit of § 2241). His claim of specific due process
violations in connection with disciplinary charges and hearing are also properly
addressed in this habeas action.
Without commenting on the merits of Petitioner’s claims, the Court
concludes that the petition survives preliminary review under Rule 4 and Rule
1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent shall answer the § 2241
petition (Doc. 1) or otherwise plead within thirty days of the date this order is
entered. This preliminary order to respond does not, of course, preclude the
Government from raising any objection or defense it may wish to present.
Service upon the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois,
750 Missouri Avenue, East St. Louis, Illinois, shall constitute sufficient service.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this
cause is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud for further
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that this entire matter be REFERRED to United
States Magistrate Judge Proud for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a
Petitioner is ADVISED of his continuing obligation to keep the Clerk (and
each opposing party) informed of any change in his whereabouts during the
pendency of this action. This notification shall be done in writing and not later
than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to
provide such notice may result in dismissal of this action. See FED. R. CIV. P.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
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