Saterfield v. Baldwin et al

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 3/29/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LLOYD SATERFIELD,
#K53497,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN R. BALDWIN,
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
DR. RITZ, and
DR. SMITH,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18 cv–560 NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Lloyd Saterfield, an inmate in Menard Correctional Center, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. In his
Complaint, Plaintiff claims the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical issues in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1).
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
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from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
After a careful review of the Complaint and supporting exhibits, this case survives the
Court’s threshold screening.
The Complaint
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff makes the following allegations: near the end of
2013, Plaintiff began to have chronic lower back pain that made it hard for him to work, sit up to
write or read, and, at times, leave his cell for meals and activities. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff
submitted a nurse sick call about this issue. Id. After he spoke with the nurse, he was given
600mg of Ibuprofen and was put on the list to see the doctor. Id. At the doctor’s visit, Plaintiff
was told that he was getting old and had “a little arthritis in his lower back.” Id. The doctor told
him that he could only give him some Ibuprofen to ease the pain. Id.
This pattern continued until Plaintiff spoke with Dr. John Trost, who ordered that
Plaintiff be given an x-ray for chronic lower back pain and right foot drop. Id. The x-ray was
performed March 24, 2014. Id. Dr. Trost found that Plaintiff had minimal degenerative changes.

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Id. On May 16, 2014, he submitted Plaintiff’s name for a consult with neurology for right foot
drop and chronic lower back pain. Id. On May 30, 2014, Plaintiff received a Medical Special
Service

Referral

Denial

form,

stating

that

“Dr.

Garcia

UM

Wexford

denied

neurology/neurosurgery consult. Dr. Garcia UM Wexford recommended Dr. Trost reassess
inmate and perform a good neuro exam and represent. Dr. Garcia also recommended onsite x-ray
of C-Spine and Thoracic Spine and represent with results.” (Doc. 1, p. 4); (Doc. 1-1, p. 2). Dr.
Trost ordered the recommended x-rays on June 5, 2014, and the results came back as
“unremarkable cervical and thoracic spine radiographs.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). Dr. Trost then put
Plaintiff in for an MRI because he was still having lower back pain and right foot drop, and he
could not work, sit up, read or write, or leave his cell for meals and activities at certain times. Id.
On August 4, 2014, Plaintiff got an MRI of his lumbar spine. Id. It revealed a “bilateral
lateral recess narrowing related to a disc bulge with moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis at L-4,
L-5, bilateral ligamentous thickening, facet arthropathy, and facet effusions.” Id. Also shown
was a “bilateral recess narrowing with facet disease at L-5, S-1, but no canal or foraminal
stenosis.” Id. After receiving these results, Dr. Trost submitted Plaintiff to see a spine surgeon on
September 11, 2014. Id. On September 15, 2014, Wexford recommended that Dr. Trost “gather
more information and represent if necessary.” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Dr. Trost told Plaintiff that he was
not sure what else Wexford wanted, and he thought it was just trying to save money. Id. He told
Plaintiff he could give him more Ibuprofen, and he recommended Plaintiff file suit against
Wexford. Id.
Thanks to the pain medication, Plaintiff’s pain became tolerable, so “he put up with it
until June 6, 2017, when he had to be taken to SIH Herrin Hospital for increased colon content
and kidney failure.” Id. At the hospital, his labs showed that Plaintiff was “at the verge of death.”

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Id. The kidney specialist at the hospital advised Plaintiff not to take any more Ibuprofen-like
medication, as such drugs were the reason his kidney had failed. Id.
Plaintiff’s back pain increased when he ceased taking Ibuprofen-related medication, so he
put in for the doctor call line and was given Trumadol 100mg three times per day. Id. Because of
Plaintiff’s continuing lower back pain and its effect on his daily activities, Dr. Siddiqui submitted
Plaintiff for an MRI. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Dr. Ritz did not approve the MRI, stating that he “would like
to obtain more information.” Id. In response, Dr. Siddiqui ordered an x-ray, which was taken on
October 27, 2017. Id. The x-ray found a “moderate to large amount . . . of retained gas and stool
throughout the colon.” Id. It also showed Plaintiff’s lumbar spine was in good alignment, that
there was no loss of vertebral body height, and that there was “mild interspace narrowing at L4-5
and L5-S1.” Id. Dr. Siddiqui presented these findings for collegial review in response to the
request for more information. Id. Dr. Smith did not approve the request; instead, he noted that
“he would like to obtain update x-rays and MRI reports and represent.” Id.
Plaintiff filed an institutional grievance about this issue on November 27, 2017. (Doc. 1,
p. 7). On December 8, 2017, Dr. Siddiqui and RN Holly Hawkins responded to Plaintiff’s
grievance with a joint statement, noting that they “reviewed [Plaintiff’s] grievance and medical
record” and stating that Plaintiff “saw Dr. Siddiqui today and he has referred [Plaintiff] to
collegial and also for physical therapy to evaluate and treat.” Id. Plaintiff then filed a grievance
on December 19, 2017. Id. The grievance officer, Lori Oakley, sent a review and
recommendation of the grievance to Defendant Lashbrook, recommending Plaintiff’s grievance
be deemed moot because he was seen on November 27, 2017, and was referred to collegial and
physical therapy. Id. Lashbrook concurred with Oakley’s recommendation and advised Plaintiff
in writing of the decision on January 3, 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 8).

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Plaintiff appealed this decision on January 9, 2018. Id. On January 26, 2018, Debbie
Knauer of the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) reported the ARB’s findings to be that
“the issue was appropriately addressed by the facility administration” and that the “actual
treatment ordered is not within the jurisdiction of this office and must be ordered by the
attending physician.” Id. John Baldwin concurred with the ARB’s recommendation to deny the
grievance on January 26, 2018. Id.
Plaintiff requests declaratory and monetary relief. (Doc. 1, p. 12). Plaintiff also seeks an
injunction directing Defendants to arrange for Plaintiff to receive an MRI, see a neuro-surgeon,
and have surgery if it is needed. Id.
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate a
single count in this pro se action. The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of this count does not constitute an opinion regarding its merit.
Count 1 –

Defendants showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
medical need involving his chronic lower back pain and issues
associated that condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

As discussed in more detail below, Count 1 will be allowed to proceed. Any other
intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Count 1
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel
and unusual punishment. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme
Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may

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constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a
claim, a prisoner must show that: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical need; and
(2) state officials acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical need, which is a
subjective standard. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he suffers from an objectively
serious medical need in the form of his chronic lower back pain. The Complaint also must satisfy
the subjective component of these claims, however. To do so, the Complaint must suggest that
the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. Deliberate
indifference is established when prison officials “know of and disregard an excessive risk to
inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists’” and “‘draw[ing] the inference.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
This standard is satisfied with respect to Ritz and Smith. According to the Complaint,
these individuals were responsible for denying the requests submitted by Plaintiff’s treating
physicians for further testing and treatment of his chronic lower back pain. In essence, Plaintiff
claims that these individuals were responsible for giving him “the run around” instead of
approving needed treatment. (Doc. 1, p. 7). These allegations support a claim of deliberate
indifference under Count 1 against Ritz and Smith.
With respect to Lashbrook and Baldwin, “[a]s non-medical defendants, they were entitled
to reasonably rely on the expertise of the medical professionals.” Thornton v. Godinez, No. 171473, 2017 WL 6492651, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec.19, 2017) (citing Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d
1001, 1010–11 (7th Cir. 2006)). See also Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“Prison officials who simply processed or reviewed inmate grievances lack personal

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involvement in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.”) (citing Sanville v. McCaughtry,
266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001)).
From the grievance response attached to the Complaint, it appears that the Grievance
Officer investigated Plaintiff’s allegations regarding improper medical care. She was informed
by his medical providers that they recently met with him and were providing him with care
pursuant to their medical judgment, including submitting him to collegial review and ordering
physical therapy. After the investigation, Lashbrook concurred with the assessment that the
grievance was moot. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the ARB, and Baldwin similarly
concurred with the assessment that the administration at Menard handled the situation
appropriately and that they would defer to Plaintiff’s physicians on the matter of what medical
care is appropriate. Plaintiff has failed to implicate Lashbrook and Baldwin for deliberate
indifference to his medical needs based on these allegations, and because the doctrine of
respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 actions, they will be dismissed without prejudice
from this action. Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740.
With respect to Wexford, a corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only
if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. Woodward
v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Jackson v. Ill. MediCar, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though it were
a municipal entity in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants either acted or
failed to act as a result of an official policy espoused by Wexford. Therefore, Count 1 shall be
dismissed without prejudice as against Wexford.

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Injunctive Relief
The Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief. Notably, Plaintiff did not file a
separate motion seeking a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, nor does he specifically mention a desire for a preliminary, rather than
permanent, injunction. Should an urgent need arise, Plaintiff may request a preliminary
injunction by filing a separate motion pursuant to Rule 65. Until he does so, his request will be
construed as a request for permanent, not preliminary, injunctive relief.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for a decision.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 will PROCEED against RITZ and
SMITH and is DISMISSED without prejudice as against WEXFORD, LASHBROOK, and
BALDWIN.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that WEXFORD, LASHBROOK, and BALDWIN are
DISMISSED without prejudice from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for
RITZ and SMITH: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail
these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver
of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent,

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the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court
will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of whether
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action

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for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 29, 2018
__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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