Hardin v. IDOC et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 6/7/2018. (jaj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ALEX HARDIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 18 cv–0583 DRH

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL
CENTER,
THOMPSON,
UNKNOWN PARTY
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON , District Judge:
Plaintiff Alex Hardin, an inmate in Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings
this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

Plaintiff seeks damages.

This case is now before the Court for a

preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an

objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find
meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the
factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.

See

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket on September 29, 2017 and was
brought to segregation as a result. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2). Plaintiff was placed in a
shower unit and told to strip naked. Id. Plaintiff refused and asked to speak to
Warden Thompson instead. Id. Thompson came to the showers with members of
the Orange Crush Tactical Team.

(Doc. 1-1, p. 3).

Thompson promised to

discuss the situation with Plaintiff if he agreed to the strip search. Id. Plaintiff
was told to cuff up, and he turned around and cuffed up. Id. As soon as Plaintiff
cuffed up, an orange crush tactical team member began yanking on Plaintiff’s
arms and wrists. (Doc. 1, p. 5). They pulled Plaintiff’s arms up forcefully and
squeezed the handcuffs tighter, all while pushing Plaintiff’s head and neck

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downwards. Id. These actions were painful to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was then
marched to a different unit. Id.
When Plaintiff reached the 5-House A-unit segregation shower, he was
forced to strip naked. Id. When Plaintiff did not move fast enough for the Orange
Crush Tactical Team member, they began ripping his clothes off, causing further
bruises. Id. Plaintiff was stripped searched. Id. An Orange Crush member then
escorted Plaintiff down the gallery naked in front of the other inmates.

Id.

Thompson and Pearce were present. Id. When Plaintiff stopped walking out of
embarrassment, his arms were once again yanked above his head and his upper
body pushed down, causing pain. Id. Plaintiff was then dragged down the gallery.

Id.
Ultimately, Plaintiff was forced into a cell that had feces on the floor, wall,
and toilet, smelled of urine, and had ants, gnats, and spiders.

Id.

Plaintiff

showed Thompson the conditions of the cell, but he just replied, “What’s done is
done.” (Doc. 1-1, pp. 5-6). Pearce was also present. (Doc. 1-1, p. 6).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into 3 counts. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court. The following claims survive threshold review:
Count 1 – Thompson, Pearce, and the Orange Crush Tactical Team
members used excessive force on Plaintiff on September 29, 2017 in
violation of the Eighth Amendment;

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Count 2 – Thompson, Pearce, and the Orange Crush Tactical Team
members subjected Plaintiff to a humiliating strip search on
September 29, 2017 in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
Count 3 – Orange Crush Tactical Team members, Thompson, and
Pearce subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement when he was placed in a cell contaminated with feces,
urine, and insects on September 29, 2017 in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff submitted both a statement of claim and a
separate affidavit attached as an exhibit further explaining the events at issue.
The affidavit refers to individuals who were not listed in the case caption as
defendants, for example, a Lt. J. Smith.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10

requires a Plaintiff to list all Defendants in the case caption. See also Myles v.

United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (to be properly considered a
party a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”).

The Court will not

consider any claims against those individuals who are not listed in the case
caption nor included in the statement of claim.

To the extent that Plaintiff is

attempting to state any such claims, those claims are dismissed without prejudice
for failure to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint, properly raising such claims, if he so desires.
Plaintiff has also named 2 improper defendants: the IDOC itself and
Pinckneyville Correctional Center. Plaintiff cannot maintain his suit against the
Defendant Illinois Department of Corrections, because it is a state government
agency. The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting
in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592
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(7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for
money damages); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)
(state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh
Amendment); Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991)
(same); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 220 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).
Likewise, Pinckneyville Correctional Center, which is a division of the
Illinois Department of Corrections, is not a “person” within the meaning of the
Civil Rights Act, and is not subject to a § 1983 suit. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Even if Plaintiff has named a person, such as the prison warden, as a
defendant, he would have fared no better. There is no supervisory liability in a §
1983 action; thus to be held individually liable, a defendant must be “‘personally
responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.’” Sanville v. McCaughtry,
266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d
612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)).
For these reasons, Defendants Pinckneyville Correctional Center and
Illinois Department of Corrections are dismissed from this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s claims otherwise survive threshold review. As to Count 1¸ the
intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against an inmate without
penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under § 1983. See Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34 (2010); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). An
inmate must show that an assault occurred, and that “it was carried out

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‘maliciously and sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline.’” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). The factors relevant to this determination include: (1) the need
for the application of force; (2) the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of
injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known
to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.

Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d
833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
An inmate seeking damages for the use of excessive force need not establish
serious bodily injury to make a claim, but not “every malevolent touch by a prison
guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38 (the
question is whether force was de minimis, not whether the injury suffered was de
minimis); see also Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2001).
Excessively tight handcuffs can be an example of excessive force. Payne v.

Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 779 (7th Cir. 2003); Herzog v. Village of Winnetka, 309
F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2002).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he was not only

subjected to excessively tight handcuffs, but also that the guards repeatedly placed
him in stress positions with his chest on his thighs and his arms stretched over
his head. Plaintiff has further alleged that he suffered pain as a result of this
treatment. At the pleading stages, this is an adequate allegation of excessive force.
Moreover, although Plaintiff appears to be alleging that the Orange Crush

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members actually employed the excessive force, failure to intervene in an
excessive force incident can also be a ground for liability.

Under the Eighth

Amendment, a correctional officer may be held liable for failing to intervene if he
or she has a realistic opportunity to step forward and protect a plaintiff from
another officer's excessive force, but fails to do so. Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d
1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). As Plaintiff has alleged that Pearce and Thompson
observed the excessive force incident, Plaintiff’s claim shall also be allowed to
proceed as to them.
In Count 2, Plaintiff has alleged that he was subjected to a humiliating strip
search. Strip searches that are not related to legitimate security needs or are
conducted in a harassing manner in order to humiliate and inflict psychological
pain, may be found unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Further, even
if a valid penological reason existed for the search, “the manner in which the
searches were conducted must itself pass constitutional muster.”

Mays v.

Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 634, (7th Cir. 2013) (group of inmates were strip
searched together, gratuitously exposing prisoners’ nude bodies to each other,
while guards uttered demeaning comments); Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643,
649-50 (7th Cir. 2009); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (a
strip search conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict
psychological pain could violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Meriwether v.

Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (allegation of calculated harassment by

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strip searches stated Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935
(1987).
Plaintiff has alleged that he was not permitted to undress himself, but that
his clothes were torn off his body in a manner that left him bruised. He has
further alleged, that after being strip searched, he was dragged down the gallery
while other prisoners watched.

As a result of this incident, Plaintiff allegedly

experienced physical pain, humiliation, and embarrassment. It is a reasonable
inference from these allegations that the strip search was conducted in a
harassing matter in order to cause pain. This is a sufficient allegation to survive
threshold review against the Orange Crush Tactical Team members that
conducted the strip search. Furthermore, Plaintiff has alleged that Pearce and
Thompson were present during the allegedly unconstitutional strip search and
failed to intervene. Officials can be held liable for constitutional violations if they
approve, condone, or turn a blind eye to the behavior. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65
F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). Therefore Count 2 will also proceed against all
defendants.
Finally, Plaintiff has alleged in Count 3 that he was subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

The Eighth Amendment can be

violated by conditions of confinement in a jail or prison when (1) there is a
deprivation that is, from an objective standpoint, sufficiently serious that it results
“in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,’ ” and (2)
where prison officials are deliberately indifferent to this state of affairs. Farmer v.

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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th
Cir. 2016).

Prisons must have adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, and

hygiene products. Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1987).
Prison officials demonstrate deliberate indifference when they “know[] of
and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn . . . and he must also
draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff has alleged that he was placed in a cell contaminated with feces
and urine, and that it had insects in it. This is a sufficient allegation that the cell
failed to meet the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. He has further
alleged that he was placed in the cell by members of the Orange Crush Tactical
Team and that Pearce and Thompson observed the conditions of the cell. This is
a plausible allegation that all of the named Defendants were personally involved in
the conduct at issue. Count 3 will be allowed to proceed in this litigation.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel will be referred to a United
States Magistrate Judge for disposition. (Doc. 3).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense is denied
as moot. (Doc. 4). Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed IFP in this case.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 requires the Court to order service if a plaintiff is authorized to
proceed IFP. Plaintiff’s motion is unnecessary.
Disposition
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Counts 1-3 survive against Pearce,
Thompson, and Unknown Party (Officers involved in the Orange Crush Tactical
Team).

Defendants IDOC and Pinckneyville Correctional Center will be

DISMISSED with prejudice as not “persons” pursuant to § 1983.

Plaintiff’s

Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense is DENIED as MOOT.
(Doc. 4).
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
Pearce and Thompson:

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive

Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified
by Plaintiff.

If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of

Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that
Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of
formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on the Unknown (John Doe) Defendants until
such time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed amended
complaint. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the
Court with the names and service addresses for these individuals.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no
longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall

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furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading
to the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate
Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff,
and the judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will
be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his
application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay
fees and costs or give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney
were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured

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in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all
unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule
3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Judge Herndon
2018.06.07
10:13:34 -05'00'

IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge

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