Henn v. Madison County Jail et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly, denying 5 MOTION to Compel filed by Steven Henn, Jr., 6 MOTION for Writ filed by Steven Henn, Jr. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/2/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STEVEN HENN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MADISON COUNTY JAIL,
MIKE HARE,
JOHN D. LAKIN, and
CHRISTOPHER EALES

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Case No. 18−cv–0588−JPG

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Steven Henn, Jr., an inmate Madison County Jail, brings this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks damages
for pain and suffering and for Defendant Mike Hare to lose his job. This case is now before the
Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers

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to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this action are subject to
summary dismissal.
The Complaint
Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at the Madison County Jail. (Doc. 1, p. 8). On March 9,
2018, Mike Hare hit Plaintiff multiple times on the side of his face and then stomped and stood
on Plaintiff’s face while Plaintiff was in handcuffs. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff received medical
attention and x-rays. Id. Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch in a small cell with 7 other
individuals. Id. The cell lacked hot water and Plaintiff was forced to sleep on the floor. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Lakin and Eales “let[] it be that way.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Eales
and Lakin have failed to train the deputies at the Madison County Jail. Id.
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into 3 counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The following
claim survives threshold review:

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Count 1 – Hare used excessive force on Plaintiff on March 9, 2018 in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment;
Plaintiff has also attempted to bring other Counts, but for the reasons listed below, these
claims do not survive threshold review:
Count 2 – Eales and Lakin had an unconstitutional policy of failing to adequately
train staff in the use of force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
allowed staff to violate the Fourteenth Amendment;
Count 3 – Plaintiff was placed in a cell without hot water and forced to sleep on
the floor for 5 nights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has included Madison County Jail as a defendant in his case
caption, suggesting that Plaintiff intended to sue Madison County Jail as a defendant in this
action, although he makes no allegation against the Madison County Jail in his statement of
claim. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), a defendant named in a lawsuit must have
the legal capacity to be sued. Federal courts look to state law to determine if the entity has the
legal capacity to be sued under Rule 17(b). In Illinois, the defendant must have a legal existence.
Jackson v. Village of Rosemont, 536 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1988).
Illinois Courts have not recognized a sheriff's office or a police department as a legal
entity. Magnuson v. Cassarella, 812 F.Supp. 824, 827 (N.D. Ill. 1992); see West v. Waymire,
114 F.3d 646, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1997). The Illinois Constitution provides that each county shall
elect a sheriff who is responsible for law enforcement. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 4(c). The
sheriff is responsible for jail operations, medical treatment of inmates, and actions of his officers.
730 ILCS § 125/2; ILCS 125/17. As an elected officer, a sheriff is not an employee. County
police and county jails are merely a branch of the sheriff as a county officer, and are not legal
entities capable of being sued. Magnuson, 812 F.Supp. at 827. Article VII of the Illinois
Constitution does not establish any county police or county jail as a separate and individual legal

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entity. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Therefore the Madison County Jail will be dismissed with
prejudice as a defendant.
Plaintiff has alleged that he is a pre-trial detainee at Madison County Jail. “[D]ifferent
constitutional provisions, and thus different standards, govern depending on the relationship
between the state and the person in the state's custody.” Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 630
(7th Cir. 2013) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95, 395 n.10 (1989); Belbachir v.
Cty. of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2013)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment governs after the probable-cause determination has been made, see Lopez v. City of
Chi., 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); and the Eighth Amendment applies
after a conviction.

Id.

Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force in this case arise under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (U.S. 2015); Williams v.
Stauche, 709 F. App’x 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2017).
To prevail on a claim of excessive force, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the
force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 135
S.Ct. at 2472–73; Williams, 709 F. App’x at 834-35. “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the
facts and circumstances of each particular case,” including “the relationship between the need for
the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made
by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at
issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively
resisting.” Id. at 2473 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The absence of significant injury
will not defeat a claim of excessive force. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992); Guitron
v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 2012).

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Here Plaintiff has adequately stated an excessive force claim. Plaintiff has alleged that he
was hit and kicked about the face and head after he was handcuffed. At the pleading stages, this
is a plausible allegation that the use of force was objectively unreasonable. Therefore Count 1
shall be permitted to proceed.
As to Count 2, Plaintiff mentions both that Lakin and Eales “allowed” things to be “that
way” and that they failed to adequately train Hare. Neither of these theories establishes liability
as to Lakin and Eales. If Plaintiff is trying to sue Lakin and Eales because they had a position of
authority over Hare (presumably, that’s what Plaintiff means when he alleges that they allowed
certain things to happen), that position is squarely foreclosed by the relevant case law. The
theory that an individual will be responsible for the conduct of another because they are in
charge of that person is called respondeat superior. But no one can bring a respondeat superior
claim in a § 1983 action. Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2002). To the extent
that Plaintiff’s claim against Lakin and Eales is premised on their supervisory authority, it fails.
Plaintiff’s second theory, that Lakin and Eales did not adequately train Hare, fails to state
a claim. Failure to train may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of a detainee. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In Board of the County Commissioner of Bryan County, Okl. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Canton as
holding that an inadequate training claim required that the deficient training program apply over
time to multiple employees. Id. (Citing Canton, supra, at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197). That is,
deliberate indifference requires a plaintiff to show that the defendants knew of a risk to inmate
health or safety and disregarded that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 827 (1994). If a
plaintiff can only point to 1 instance of the problematic conduct, there is no evidence that the

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policy-makers knew or had reason to know that their training created a risk to inmates. In the
instant case, plaintiff has alleged a lack of training, but he has not alleged multiple incidents of
excessive force. Without an allegation of multiple incidents, there is not a plausible allegation
that Lakin and Eales had reason to know of the deficient training, and thus they could not be
deliberately indifferent to the risk that their training was inadequate to protect detainee health
and safety. For these reasons, Count 2 will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim.
Count 3 must also be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff appears to be alleging a
conditions of confinement claim, but it is not clear who the defendant is supposed to be here.
Plaintiff refers to “the other two Plaintiffs,” but the term “plaintiff” refers to the person making
the claim. The Plaintiff in this action is Steven Henn; there are no other plaintiffs. Even
presuming that Plaintiff is referring to Lakin and Eales (who are defendants), he does not allege
that either one of them actually placed him in the problematic cell or knew of the conditions of
that cell. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim in this count is premised on respondeat superior
liability, it must be dismissed without prejudice as discussed above. Should Plaintiff wish to
proceed with this claim, he should file an amended complaint identifying a proper defendant,
ideally by name, as to these allegations. For now, Count 3 is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed 2 motions in this action: a motion seeking to compel, (Doc. 5), which
appears to be a discovery request, and a motion for writ, (Doc. 6), asking to appear before the
Court for discovery. Both motions are premature at this time. This case is not in the discovery
phase. Prior to seeking discovery, Plaintiff should wait for the Court to serve the defendant with

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notice of this lawsuit and for the defendant to answer the Complaint. Once that happens, the
Court will enter a scheduling order, listing the discovery deadlines. Plaintiff may then send his
discovery requests directly to the defendant. Plaintiff’s motions are therefore DENIED without
prejudice; should Plaintiff have trouble after discovery has officially begun, he may move the
Court for relief. (Doc. 5) (Doc. 6).
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Count 1 against Hare survives threshold review.
Counts 2 and 3 shall be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

Defendants Lakin and Eales are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Defendant Madison County Jail is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel
and for a Court Writ are DENIED without prejudice. (Doc. 5) (Doc. 6).
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant Hare: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit
and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum
and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to
sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the
date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on
Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the
extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the

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Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge
for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court
and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently
investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay
in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 2, 2018
s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

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