Jenkins v. USA

Filing 94

ORDER: For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum & Order, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 (Doc. 1 ). Because Jenkins has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. Petitioner's pro se motion to supplement (Doc. 51 ) and his pro se motion for transcript (Doc. 55 ) are DENIED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the United States and against Petitioner Antwon Deshane Jenkins and to close this case. Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 11/25/2020. (kll)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTWON DESHANE JENKINS,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Case No. 18-cv-610-DWD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ON PETITION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255
DUGAN, District Judge:
On March 18, 2015, a jury found Petitioner Antwon Deshane Jenkins guilty for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 in Case No. 13-cr-30125 (13-cr-30125, Doc. 1). On September 18, 2015, the Court
sentenced Jenkins to 27 months in prison to run consecutively to his sentence in Case No.
12-cr-30239, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release to run concurrent to the
supervised release in Case No. 12-cr-30239 1 (13-cr-30125, Doc. 542, Doc. 567). The
Seventh Circuit affirmed Jenkins’ sentence on March 13, 2017 in United States v. Jenkins,
850 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 2017).
On March 26, 2018, Jenkins timely 2 filed a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct
his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1). He filed supplements to his Motion

1In

Case No. 12-cr-30239, an amended judgment was entered on January 28, 2020 sentencing
Jenkins to 293 months in prison to run consecutively to his sentence in this case. (12-cr-30239,
Doc. 406).
2See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).

1

on April 5, 2018 (Doc. 5) and May 22, 2018 (Doc. 19). Jenkins’ petition advances four
grounds for relief, more succinctly described as:
Ground 1: The District Court erred in denying Jenkins’ motion to
substitute counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment (Doc. 1); and
Grounds 2 & 3: Jenkins’ trial attorney provided ineffective assistance
which negatively impacted Jenkins’ trial and subsequent appeal. More
specifically, Jenkins argues that his trial attorney mishandled evidence
related to the traffic stop leading to Jenkins’ arrest and wrongly conceded
that the traffic stop was lawful. (Doc. 1, Doc. 19).
Jenkins also requests that a different judge review his petition (Doc. 1).

As the

undersigned did not preside over Jenkins’ criminal proceedings, this requested relief is
moot and the Court will not substantively address this argument. In sum, Jenkins claims
that had his attorney acted differently and/or had different counsel been appointed, the
outcome of his trial and appeal would have been different (Doc. 1, Doc. 19).
Upon review of Jenkins’ Petition (Doc. 1), Respondent’s Response (Doc. 30) and
Affidavit (Doc. 34), and Jenkins’ Reply (Doc. 50), the Court concluded that an evidentiary
hearing was necessary. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“An evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion is
required unless the record ‘conclusively show[s] that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief.’”). The Court appointed counsel for Jenkins and offered an opportunity for
additional briefing (Doc. 53). On November 17, 2020, the Court held an evidentiary
hearing via secured Zoom teleconferencing. Jenkins was present with attorney Joslyn
Anthony Sandifer. Assistant United States Attorney Laura Reppert appeared on behalf
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of the United States. The Court heard testimony from Agent Matthew W. McKnight of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, Detective Shane M. Drazic of the Kirkwood,
Missouri Police Department, and Sergeant Jared A. Leckrone of the Illinois State Police.
The Court also heard arguments from counsel regarding the entire petition. With briefing
and the evidentiary hearing complete, Petitioner Jenkins’ motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct sentence is ripe for ruling. For the reasons articulated below, Jenkins’ motion is
DENIED.
Background
The Court takes the following facts from testimony heard on November 17, 2020,
the pleadings in this matter, the record in Jenkins’ Case No. 13-cr-30125 and the appellate
court decision in United States v. Jenkins, 850 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 2017). 3 In January 2012,
the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) was investigating an ongoing drug
trafficking conspiracy in this district. Agent McKnight and Detective Drazic were leading
the investigation. During the investigation, McKnight and Drazic obtained authorization
to monitor phone calls of suspected drug distributors Cortez Jarbarro and Tyrone
Carroway, ultimately to intercept details of future drug transactions and identify their
associates. Using the information received from these intercepted phone calls, McKnight
and Drazic identified the voice of an associate whom they referred to as “unknown male.”

3The

Court “has the power, in fact the obligation, to take judicial notice of the relevant decisions
of courts and administrative agencies, whether made before or after the decision under review.
Determinations to be judicially noticed include ‘proceedings in other courts, both within and
outside of the federal judicial system if the proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”
Opoka v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 1996).

3

On January 14, 2012, DEA agents intercepted a highly coded call between
Carroway and the “unknown male” leading McKnight and Drazic to suspect a
forthcoming narcotics transaction. McKnight, Drazic, and other DEA agents established
surveillance at a purported drug distribution site and Drazic observed a black SUV arrive
and leave the site. After reviewing the vehicle’s registration information and comparing
the information to Carroway’s phone records, McKnight and Drazic suspected the
“unknown male” was likely Petitioner Jenkins, although both McKnight and Drazic
testified that there would have been no way for them to actually identify who was driving
the vehicle on January 14th without stopping the vehicle.

On January 28, 2012, DEA

agents again intercepted a coded phone call with the same phone number and voices as
they heard on January 14th, leading them to suspect another forthcoming narcotics
transaction.

DEA agents again established surveillance at the purported drug

distribution site and Drazic observed the same black SUV from January 14th arrive at and
leave the site.
Drazic and McKnight coordinated with Illinois State Police’s Sergeant Leckrone to
discuss stopping the vehicle on January 28th. McKnight, Drazic, and Leckrone all
testified consistently that they spoke multiple times.

During these conversations,

McKnight and Drazic shared the vehicle details with Leckrone and further instructed
Leckrone to develop his own probable cause to stop the vehicle. McKnight specifically
testified that he believed there was sufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle because
of the DEA investigation, but that he did not want to compromise the ongoing
investigation so he asked Leckrone to first determine if there were violations of Illinois
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law which would permit Leckrone to stop the vehicle. Drazic testified similarly, stating
that he told Leckrone to “do what he needed to do” but to “let him go” if Leckrone
thought there was no reason to stop the vehicle. McKnight and Drazic stated that they
did not tell Leckrone to fabricate probable cause, but only wanted Leckrone to stop the
vehicle if there was a reason unrelated to the ongoing investigation to do so. Leckrone
confirmed that he understood McKnight and Drazic’s instructions to mean that he should
pull over the identified vehicle if he had a basis under Illinois to do so.
Leckrone also testified that after speaking to McKnight and Drazic he did not
know the specifics of the DEA investigation, but did know the investigation was drug
related in nature. He also testified that the DEA did not know what was or was not in
the vehicle. Leckrone located the vehicle fitting the description provided by McKnight
and Drazic and observed that it had illegally tinted windows. Leckrone then pulled
behind the vehicle and observed though the rear windshield that the driver was not
wearing a seat belt. Leckrone also saw that the vehicle’s registration was not secured
properly. Leckrone therefore turned his lights on and conducted the traffic stop. After
stopping the vehicle, Leckrone approached the driver side door of the vehicle and
observed the driver – now identified as Jenkins – attempting to secure his seat belt.
Jenkins admitted that he had not been wearing a seat belt at the time Leckrone stopped
him. Jenkins, 850 F.3d at 915. At that time Leckrone testified to smelling a cannabis odor,
and so asked Jenkins to exit the vehicle. Leckrone then conducted a vehicle search, which
he stated was identical to every other “general search” that he conducted regularly in his

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employment. During the search, Leckrone located cocaine under the dash, above the
floor of the vehicle, and Jenkins was arrested.
Following Jenkins’ arrest, Leckrone delivered the video tape of the traffic stop to
the Illinois State Police Headquarters in Collinsville, Illinois, and secured “it into
evidence.” He testified that after securing the video into evidence, he had nothing more
to do with the video and was not sure why the video was not requested during Jenkins’
criminal proceedings. Leckrone also confirmed that he did not find evidence of cannabis
in the vehicle, although he testified that the vehicle was in a state of disarray with dirt
and trash throughout. Finally, Leckrone testified that after stopping the vehicle he
learned that Jenkins’ driver’s license was suspended. Leckrone explained that even if
Jenkins had not been arrested, Jenkins would not have been permitted to drive away in
the vehicle because of his suspended driver’s license. Instead, Leckrone would have
contacted a tow company to tow the vehicle, but before releasing the vehicle to the tow
company, Leckrone would have been required to conduct a record or “inventory check”
of the vehicle. Leckrone explained that a record/inventory check is conducted just like
the general search he conducted on Jenkins’ vehicle. Therefore, Leckrone concluded that
had he not located the cocaine when conducting his general search based on his
suspicions of cannabis in the vehicle, Leckrone believed he would have located the
cocaine during the records/inventory check.
Following his arrest, Attorney Turner Rouse was appointed to represent Jenkins
(13-cr-30125, Doc. 125). On April 2, 2014, Jenkins filed his motion to substitute counsel,
alleging that he and Rouse were not on the “same page” (13-cr-30125, Doc. 196; Doc. 655
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at 3:8). Jenkins was concerned Attorney Jenkins was not filing certain pretrial motions
Jenkins had requested; however, at the hearing, Jenkins admitted that he and Rouse had
not yet discussed the possible motion (13-cr-30125, Doc. 655 at 10:10-10:24, 15:20-15:22).
Attorney Rouse stated that he did not believe there was an irretrievable conflict between
him and Jenkins, and instead asked for additional time to file pre-trial motions (13-cr30125, Doc. 655 at 17:7-17:21). The court denied Jenkins’ request, but did grant him
additional time to file pre-trial motions (13-cr-30125, Doc. 209). Rouse then filed a motion
to suppress challenging the search of Jenkins’ vehicle and cell phone (13-cr-30125, Doc.
222). However, Rouse did not challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop, nor did he
question whether there was sufficient probable cause to conduct the traffic stop based on
the “collective knowledge doctrine.”
Legal Standard
Section 2255 permits prisoners to petition their sentencing court for relief from
their sentence if the sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

Relief under section 2255 is “reserved for

extraordinary situations” and cannot substitute for direct appeals. Kafo v. United States,
467 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2006); Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996).
Therefore, issues not raised on direct appeal are barred from collateral review absent
either a showing of good cause for the failure resulting in actual prejudice, or that a
refusal to consider the issue would lead to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id.
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Jenkins ultimately bears the burden to prove the allegations in his Petition warrant relief
under Section 2255. Stetson v. United States, 417 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1969).
Jenkins’ primary argument relates to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be brought in a collateral proceeding under
section 2255 regardless of whether the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct
appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). To succeed on his ineffective
assistance claim, Jenkins must ultimately show that “his counsel was deficient, and that
this deficiency prejudiced him.” Gant v. United States, 627 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2010).
For the first prong, Jenkins must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below
the objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
Here, Jenkins must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance the Court.” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984); Cooper v. United States, 378 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Defense
counsel is ‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made
significant decisions in the exercise of his or her reasonable professional judgment.”). For
the second prong, Jenkins must demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient
performance, or in other words, that without counsel’s defective assistance, the outcome
of Jenkins’ case would have been different. Prewitt, 83 F.3d at 819 (“A mere possibility of
prejudice does not qualify as actual prejudice.”) (emphasis in original).
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is premised on an attorney’s
alleged failure to file a motion to suppress – which is Jenkins’ primary argument here –
the defendant must prove that the motion would have been meritorious. United States v.
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Cieslowski, 410 F. 3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2005). Failure to file a motion to suppress is
objectively reasonable and does not constitute ineffective assistance where the motion
would have little or no chance of success. Koons v. United States, 639 F. 3d 348, 354 (7th
Cir. 2011); U.S. v. Bustamante, 367 Fed.Appx. 708, 710 (“An attorney is not required to
pursue an argument that can lead only to a dead end for his client.”). Finally, at the
evidentiary hearing, the district court possesses broad discretion to evaluate the
credibility of contradictory testimony. Gant, 627 F.3d 677, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2010).
Analysis
Ground 1: Denial of Motion to Substitute Counsel
Jenkins argues that the district court wrongly denied his motion to substitute
counsel in violation of “his Sixth Amendment Right to choose his attorney.” (Doc. 1-1, at
p. 2; Doc. 19). In support, Jenkins claims that Attorney Rouse refused to file pre-trial
motions to suppress that he requested. However, at the hearing on Jenkins’ motion,
Jenkins specifically admitted that he had not yet spoken with Attorney Rouse about the
motions. Attorney Rouse also sought additional time from the Court to file additional
pre-trial motions should they be meritorious, which the Court granted. Finding that no
irretrievable conflict existed, the Court denied Jenkins motion to substitute counsel.
Jenkins claims this was an error in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to choose his
own counsel.
The Sixth Amendment “guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to
adequate representation, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers
have no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys
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appointed by the courts.” Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624
(1989). The Sixth Amendment, however, does not give defendants the right to choose
who will represent them when the defendant requires counsel to be appointed for them.
United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151-52 (2006); United States v. Turner, 594 F.
3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2010). Consequently, Jenkins had no right to choose his own
appointed counsel.
Preliminarily, the Court questions whether Jenkins’ claims of error against the
Court are ripe for review considering he did not raise them on direct appeal. Prewitt, 83
F.3d at 812 (Claims not raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred unless the
petitioner can show good cause for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal, actual
prejudice from that failure, or that refusing to hear the claim would lead to a fundamental
miscarriage of justice). Regardless, and as more fully detailed below, the Court finds that
Attorney Rouse’s decision to not pursue a motion to suppress challenging the lawfulness
of the traffic stop or the applicability of the “collective knowledge doctrine” was
reasonable because the motion would not have been successful and would not have
changed the outcome of Jenkins’ trial and appeal. Consequently, Jenkins cannot establish
that Rouse’s assistance was ineffective. Koons, 639 F. 3d at 354 (Failure to file a motion to
suppress is objectively reasonable and does not constitute ineffective assistance where
the motion would have little or no chance of success). Because Jenkins cannot establish
that his counsel’s assistance was ineffective, the Court’s decision to deny Jenkins’ motion
to substitute counsel did not violate Jenkins’ Sixth Amendment Right or otherwise
prejudice Jenkins so to warrant extraordinary relief under Section 2255. Caplin, 491 U.S.
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617 at 624 (Defendants do not have a cognizable complaint under the Sixth Amendment
so long as they were “adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts.”).
Grounds 2 and 3: ineffective assistance of counsel
Jenkins claims his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of how Attorney
Rouse handled the evidence of the traffic stop leading to Jenkins’ arrest, and by ultimately
conceding that the traffic stop was lawful. In his briefing, Jenkins specifically complains
that (a) Rouse did not obtain his drug test results following his arrest (Doc. 1-1, pg. 3; Doc.
5; Doc. 19), (b) Rouse did not challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop (Doc. 1-1, pp. 3,
4-7; Doc. 19), and (c) Rouse did not move to dismiss Jenkins’ indictment after learning
that the video of the traffic stop had been destroyed (Doc. 19, pg. 1). At his hearing,
Jenkins narrowed his argument to specifically focus on Rouse’s alleged failure to
challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop leading to Jenkins arrest, and the application
of the “collective knowledge doctrine.” Jenkins argues that the traffic stop was unlawful
because Leckrone did not have independent probable cause to conduct the traffic stop,
and that the DEA did not share enough details of its investigation so to impute their
probable cause to Leckrone under the collective knowledge doctrine. Jenkins maintains
that Rouse’s failure to file a motion to suppress amounts to inadequate assistance which
prejudiced Jenkins’ trial and appeal.
The Government contends that Leckrone had probable cause to stop Jenkins based
on both his independent observations of multiple Illinois motor vehicle violations, and
the collective knowledge doctrine. As such, the Government argues that Attorney Rouse
rendered adequate assistance because any motion to suppress the traffic stop would have
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been unsuccessful. The Government relies heavily on Attorney Rouse’s Affidavit to
demonstrate he provided reasonable assistance and that the deficiencies, if any, would
not have prejudiced Jenkins’ case. (Doc. 34). Specifically, Rouse stated that he did not
believe a motion would be successful based on his professional judgment (Doc. 34).
Upon review of the evidence presented by Jenkins and the testimony of McKnight,
Drazic, and Leckrone, the Court finds that Leckrone had sufficient probable cause to
conduct the traffic stop. Leckrone testified credibly that he had a reasonable basis to
believe Jenkins had committed at least three traffic offenses based on his observation of
the vehicle’s window tint, the license registration, and watching the driver attempt to
secure his seat belt while driving. Leckrone therefore had his own independent basis of
probable cause for the traffic stop. United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 513 F.3d 753, 758-59
(7th Cir. 2008) (Probable cause for a traffic stop exists when an officer “has an objectively
reasonable basis to believe a traffic law has been violated . . . even a minor traffic
offense.”); United States. v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 596 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[S]o long as the
circumstances confronting a police officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has
committed even a minor traffic offense, the officer has probable cause to stop the
driver.”); United States v. $304,980 in U.S. Currency, 2013 WL 54055, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 3,
2013), aff’d sub nom, United States v. $304,980.00 in U.S. Currency, 735 F.3d 812 (7th Cir.
2013) (collecting cases).
The Court notes that Leckrone testified credibly that while driving behind Jenkins’
vehicle he personally observed the drive attempting to put on his seat belt, and that even
after stopping the vehicle, the driver continued to try and secure his seat belt as Leckrone
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arrived at the driver’s side door. Importantly, the Court finds it significant that Jenkins
does not dispute Leckrone’s account of the traffic stop, and specifically admitted that he
was not wearing a seat belt when Leckrone stopped his vehicle. Jenkins, 850 F.3d at 915.
Leckrone’s personal observations and Jenkins’ admission that he violated Illinois traffic
law for failing to wear a seat belt 4, necessarily concludes, that Leckrone had independent
probable cause to conduct the traffic stop, irrespective of the collective knowledge
doctrine. United States v. Downthard, 500 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 2007) (Holding that
probable cause existed for a traffic stop based on the officer’s reasonable observation that
defendant was not wearing a seat belt because driving without wearing a seat belt
necessarily violates Illinois law); Hernandez-Rivas, 513 F.3d at 758-59; Cashman, 216 F.3d
at 596.
Regardless, the Court also finds that the collective knowledge doctrine applies
here, and the DEA had probable cause to stop Jenkins’ vehicle, which can be imputed to
Leckrone. “The collective knowledge doctrine permits an officer to stop, search, or arrest
a suspect at the direction of another officer or police agency, even if the officer himself
does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level of
suspicion to permit the given action.” United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir.
2010). McKnight and Drazic testified credibly about the specifics of the DEA
investigation. Accordingly, based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the phone
calls and surveillance of Jenkins’ vehicle on January 14th and January 28th, in addition to

4625

ILCS 5/12-603.1 requires all drivers of motor vehicles operated on a street or highway in the
State of Illinois to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt.

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their experience in policing narcotics transactions, it was reasonable for McKnight and
Drazic to believe that a drug transaction had occurred on January 28th, so to establish
sufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle. See Williams, 627 F.3d at 251-52. The DEA
task force’s probable cause could then be imputed to Leckrone because McKnight and
Drazic made Leckrone aware of the specific vehicle involved in an ongoing DEA
investigation, and asked Leckrone to stop the vehicle.
The Seventh Circuit routinely applies the collective knowledge doctrine to
situations, where, as here, “DEA agents ask local law enforcement officers to stop a
specifically identified vehicle, and the local officers had no knowledge of the facts
underlying the DEA’s probable cause.” Williams, 627 F.3d at 251-53 (collecting cases).
Although Leckrone testified that he suspected the driver of the vehicle was connected to
a drug transaction because the DEA was the agency requesting him to make the traffic
stop, Leckrone was not required to have independent knowledge of the facts underlying
the DEA’s probable cause in order for the probable cause to be imputed to him. Id. As
McKnight, Drazic, and the DEA had sufficient probable cause to stop Jenkins’ vehicle, by
involving Leckrone in their investigation efforts, their probable cause could be imputed
to Leckrone, even if Leckrone had not had independent probable cause for the traffic
stop 5.

5This

finding is also consistent with the court’s prior findings that Leckrone’s search of Jenkins’
vehicle was permissible under the collective knowledge doctrine. United States v. Jenkins, 850 F.3d
912, 921 (7th Cir. 2017) (The court found that the vehicle search was invalid under the search
incident to arrest exception, but permissible under the collective knowledge doctrine).

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Accordingly, because there was sufficient probable cause to support the traffic
stop, any motion Attorney Rouse could have filed challenging the lawfulness would have
been unsuccessful.

Jenkins has therefore failed to establish that Attorney Rouse’s

assistance was ineffective so to warrant extraordinary relief under Section 2255. Koons,
639 F. 3d at 354 (Failure to file a motion to suppress is objectively reasonable and does
not constitute ineffective assistance where the motion would have little or no chance of
success); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984); Cooper v. United States, 378 F.3d
638, 641 (7th Cir. 2004).
As for Jenkins remaining claims, the Court also finds that Attorney Rouse’s
decision to not obtain Jenkins’ drug test results or moving to dismiss the indictment
based on the missing tape of the traffic stop were reasonable and do not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel. Regarding the drug test results, Leckrone specifically
admitted that he did not recover evidence of cannabis in Jenkins’ vehicles.

The

Government relied on this testimony to support its position that Leckrone had
independent probable cause to search Jenkins’ vehicle – an argument that this Court
rejected, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Jenkins, 850 F.3d 912 at 921. Therefore, any
additional supporting evidence as to the non-presence of cannabis in the vehicle would
not have changed the conclusion that the vehicle search was lawful under the collective
knowledge doctrine, and further has little, if any, relevance to Jenkins’ arguments in this
petition related to the traffic stop.
Similarly, the Court finds that the fact that no video tape of the traffic stop was
reviewed by Jenkins or available at trial would not change the Court’s findings that the
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traffic stop was lawful. Leckrone testified credibly about his recollection of the traffic
stop, and Jenkins admitted to not wearing a seat belt, so to justify the traffic stop. Jenkins
has not offered any contrary version of the facts and has not otherwise suggested that
Leckrone’s recollection of the traffic stop was inaccurate. Therefore, Jenkins does not
provide any argument as to why the video tape would be necessary, and the Court cannot
find any basis in the record to conclude that a video tape of the traffic stop would have
had any impact on Jenkins’ trial or appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds that Jenkins has
not met his burden to show that Rouse rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, or that
he is otherwise entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Disposition
For the reasons articulated above, the Court DENIES Jenkins’ petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter
judgment in favor of the United States and against Petitioner Antwon Deshane Jenkins.
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings requires a district
court entering a final order adverse to a petitioner to issue or deny a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2) states that a certificate of appealability may issue “only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
This standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); see also United States v.
Fleming, 676 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2012). The undersigned concludes that Jenkins has not
16

satisfied his burden of showing that was entitled to relief on the merits of his petition.
Reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion debatable. Accordingly, the Court
DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.
Finally, the Court notes that Jenkins filed two pro se motions prior to the
evidentiary hearing: his Motion to Supplement (Doc. 51) and Motion for Transcript (Doc.
55). Because Jenkins was represented by counsel, he was to only file motions through
counsel. Regardless, Jenkins was permitted to offer evidence at the November 22, 2020
hearing testimony in lieu of the briefing he sought to provide in his Motion to
Supplement. As for his Motion for Transcript, Jenkins can request such copies through
his Counsel. Accordingly, both the Motion to Supplement (Doc. 51) and Motion for
Transcript (Doc. 55) are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 25, 2020
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

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