Selders v. Santos et al

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 4/27/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOHNNY SELDERS,
#S02401,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. SANTOS,
DR. SHAH,
DR. GARCIA, and
DR. BUTALID,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 18−cv–829−JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Johnny Selders, an inmate in Lincoln Correctional Center, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights that allegedly occurred
at Centralia Correctional Center (“Centralia”). In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims the defendants
have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. (Doc. 1). This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
1

An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to allow this case to proceed past the threshold stage.
The Complaint
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff makes the following allegations: on May 4, 2016,
while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Centralia, he injured his left knee playing basketball. (Doc. 1,
p. 5). He was admitted to the health care unit (“HCU”) and remained there from May 4, 2016 to
May 18, 2016. Id. During this time, his left leg would not bend, he could not walk, his left knee
was swollen, and he was in excruciating pain. Id. He was seen by Defendants Santos, Shah,
Garcia, and Butalid. Id. On May 7, 2016, X-rays were taken of Plaintiff’s left knee. Id. Santos,
Shah, Garcia, and Butalid all told him on several occasions that the X-rays were normal and that
he had only suffered a sprain. Id.
Plaintiff was discharged from the HCU by Santos on May 18, 2016, despite his constant
complaints and concerns regarding the condition of his knee. Id. Plaintiff was transferred to
Lincoln Correctional Center on September 28, 2016, where he was told that he may have
2

suffered a meniscal injury to his left knee. Id. Plaintiff was taken to Abraham Lincoln Memorial
Hospital on December 21, 2016 for a physical therapy evaluation, where he was diagnosed with
chronic left knee pain and muscle atrophy with decreased range of motion. Id. Plaintiff also
received an MRI, which showed a longitudinal tear in Plaintiff’s lateral meniscus and a chronic
rupture of his anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”). Id.
Plaintiff’s quality of life had significantly changed since his injury, due in part, he
believes, to Santos, Shah, Garcia, and Butalid’s indifference to his serious medical needs. Id.
Plaintiff seeks to have his medical needs addressed and to be granted lifetime physical therapy
for his left leg. (Doc. 1, p. 6). He also seeks monetary damages from the defendants. Id.
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate a
single count in this pro se action. The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of this count does not constitute an opinion regarding its merit.
Count 1 –

Defendants showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs involving his knee injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

As discussed in more detail below, Count 1 will be allowed to proceed past threshold.
Any other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered dismissed
without prejudice as inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Count 1
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel
and unusual punishment. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme
Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
3

see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam). To state a claim, a prisoner must
show that: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical need; and (2) state officials acted
with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical need, which is a subjective standard.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the test. With respect to the
second prong, “a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” one that
amounts to “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d
1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Liability under the deliberate-indifference

standard requires more than negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness; rather, it is
satisfied only by conduct that approaches intentional wrongdoing, i.e., “something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.

The Eighth Amendment does not give prisoners entitlement to

“demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to
meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of sufficiently alleging deliberate indifference on the part
of Shah, Garcia, and Butalid. He claims that these doctors each saw him and that they told him
that he had a sprain and that his X-rays were normal. These allegations, without more, do not
indicate Shah, Garcia, or Butalid acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind in their
treatment of Plaintiff’s injuries. At most, the alleged facts suggest Shah, Garcia, and Butalid may
have instead been negligent.
In contrast, Plaintiff has stated a deliberate indifference claim against Santos. Plaintiff
claims that Santos discharged him from the HCU despite his complaints about his knee. A
grievance attached to the Complaint elaborates on the circumstances surrounding this discharge,

4

indicating that Santos was aware that Plaintiff was barely capable of walking without crutches
and that Santos informed him that he would not be able to use crutches once discharged. (Doc.
1-2, p. 74). The grievance also indicates that Plaintiff was given only three days of pain
medication and was not given a knee brace when he was discharged by Santos, despite the fact
that he would not be able to use crutches. Id. These allegations suggest deliberate indifference
on the part of Santos.
For the foregoing reasons, Count 1 shall receive further review against Santos and will be
dismissed without prejudice as against Shah, Garcia, and Butalid.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for a decision.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against SANTOS and is
DISMISSED without prejudice as against SHAH, GARCIA, and BUTALID.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that SHAH, GARCIA, and BUTALID are
DISMISSED without prejudice from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for
SANTOS: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and
(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendant’s place of employment
as identified by Plaintiff. If the defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of
Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall

5

take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that
defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Santos is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the Complaint
and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

6

cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 27, 2018
s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

7