Buckley v. Unknown Party

Filing 7

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is assessed a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 6). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to change "Unknown Party" to "Capt. Crammer." Plaintiff's request for joinder is DENIED (Doc. 6). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 7/3/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SHAWN BUCKLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNKNOWN PARTY
Defendant.

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Case No. 18−cv–0883−JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Shawn Buckley, an inmate in USP Leavenworth, brings this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for events that happened at
the Alton Law Enforcement Center. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review
of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-

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27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; this action is subject to summary dismissal.
The Complaint
This case has a long procedural history. Plaintiff originally filed suit with 6 other named
plaintiffs on October 10, 2017 in case No. 17-cv-1085-JPG (“17-1085”). That complaint was
dismissed without prejudice on January 10, 2018 for failure to state a claim. (17-1085, Doc. 29).
In lieu of submitting an amended complaint together, the remaining plaintiffs submitted
individually-signed amended complaints alleging facts unique to them. (See, e.g., 17-1085, Doc.
36). On February 28, 2018, the Court severed the action as improperly joined. (17-1085, Doc.
43). Plaintiff Buckley’s complaint was severed into Case No. 18-cv-518-JPG-SCW (“18-518”).
After that action underwent threshold review, it was determined that Plaintiff’s individual claims
were not properly joined, and the Court opened the present action on April 11, 2018. (Doc. 1).
Specifically, the Court designated Count 6 for this action. As relevant to that claim,
Plaintiff alleges that he was under video surveillance when he used the bathroom and while
changing. (Doc. 2, p. 5). All cells at the Alton Law Enforcement Center were equipped with
cameras. Id. While the severance order designated this claim against an unknown party,

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Plaintiff has since clarified that the unknown party is Captain Crammer, and that he was in
charge of the cameras at the jail. (Doc. 6).
Discussion
The severance Order designated 1 claim for this action:
Count 6 – Fourteenth Amendment claim against Unknown Party (Crammer)
for using surveillance cameras to monitor Plaintiff in his cell and in the
bathroom.
It is not clear exactly what Plaintiff’s status was at the time of the alleged incident;
records from this Court suggest that he was in the Alton Law Enforcement Center after the
revocation of his supervised release. See United States v. Shawn Buckley, 13-cr-30201-DRH-6
(S.D. Ill). The Court’s prior order assumed that Plaintiff’s claims arose under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and not the Eighth Amendment.

The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment prohibits punishment of persons who have not yet been convicted of a crime. Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536, n. 16 (1979); Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 2015);
Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1455 (7th Cir. 1988). However, there is “little practical
difference” under the Fourteenth Amendment from claims brought pursuant to the Eighth
Amendment. Smith, 803 F.3d at 310. Claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
may be analyzed under Eighth Amendment standards. Id. (citing Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d
752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he protection afforded under [the Due Process Clause] is
functionally indistinguishable from the Eighth Amendment’s protection for convicted
prisoners.”); Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he standards applicable to

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complaints by convicts and by pretrial detainees about unsafe conditions of confinement
merge.”)) (other citations omitted). 1
Prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 525-30 (1984); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995). The Hudson
Court found that, “[a] right of privacy . . . is fundamentally incompatible with the close and
continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and
internal order.” 468 U.S. at 527-28. These security concerns apply equally to detainees, who do
not have the right to be free from reasonable surveillance. Courtney v. Marion County Jail, No.
13-cv-302-JPG, 2013 WL 1663877 at *1 (S.D. Ill. April 17, 2013) reversed on other grounds
595 F. App’x 618 (7th Cir. 2014). However, conduct may rise to the level of a constitutional
claim if the conduct was intended to harass instead of as a means of meeting legitimate
penological interests. Courtney v. Devore, 595 F. App’x 618, 619 (7th Cir. 2014); Peckham v.
Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998).

The Seventh Circuit has

specifically found that the monitoring of naked prisoners, while showering, using the toilet, or
undressing is constitutional due to the constant vigilance required by the corrective environment.
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995).
All Plaintiff has alleged here is that guards were able to observe him while he used the
toilet, and while he was dressing and undressing. There is no allegation that the guards put him
in that position in order to harass him; in fact, Plaintiff has alleged that all inmates of the Alton
Law Enforcement Center were subjected to the same conditions. As Plaintiff has not made any
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In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard on an excessive force
claim brought by a pre-trial detainee was the less-stringent “objectively unreasonable” standard of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015). This has created some ambiguity in more recent Seventh Circuit case law
about the propriety of applying the Eighth Amendment standard to claims raised by pre-trial detainees, although at
this stage, the Seventh Circuit has not definitively addressed the issue or overruled its prior precedent. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 n. 31 (7th Cir. 2016); Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty.,
850 F.3d 849, 856-58 (7th Cir. 2017); Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2017).

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allegations that he was being harassed for an improper purpose, he has not stated a constitutional
claim. Moreover, as the present Compliant was submitted in compliance with the Court’s order
directing Plaintiff to submit an amended complaint to correct a prior failure to state a claim in
17-1085, Plaintiff no longer has a right to amend once as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15. Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a
claim.
Pending Motions
On May 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion “to Amend Doc. #5.” (Doc. 6). The Motion
requests that Crammer be substituted for the unknown party listed on the docket. Id. The
Motion further requests that the Court join the claims in this suit back to 18-518, and un-do the
prior order severing this action. Id. Plaintiff filed an identical motion in 18-518, which was
denied by the undersigned on June 26, 2018. (18-518, Doc. 20).
Plaintiff’s request that Crammer be substituted for “Unknown Party” is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to change “Unknown Party” to “Capt. Crammer.” The remainder
of Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED for the reasons stated in the undersigned’s order in Case No.
18-518 at Doc. 20, which is hereby incorporated by reference. The Court continues to find the
cases properly severed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 and 20.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is assessed a strike pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1915(g). Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
(Doc. 6). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to change “Unknown Party” to “Capt. Crammer.”
Plaintiff’s request for joinder is DENIED. (Doc. 6).

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If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his notice of appeal must be filed with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal.
See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v.
Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir.
1998). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another
“strike.” A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed
no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline
cannot be extended.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 3, 2018
s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

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