Villagran v. Lawrence et al

Filing 13

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/19/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL ASAD VILLAGRAN,
#834583, and

)
)
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Plaintiff,
)
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vs.
)
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BRUCE WILLIAMS,
)
WILL MILLER, and
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CHESTER MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, )
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Defendants.
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Case No. 18-cv-915-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Michāel Villāgrān, a detainee at Chester Mental Health Center (“CHMC”),
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional
rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the defendants retaliated against him in violation of his
First Amendment rights for statements he made to another detainee. (Doc. 1). This case is now
before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to allow this case to proceed past the threshold stage.
The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff advised a
patient, Jesse Morrise, that “it is not wise to continue speaking to certain (STA’s) that work the
modules.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). He used Defendant Bruce Williams as an example, claiming that he
“becomes vindictive, belligerent, antagonizing, [and] harassing towards patients.” Id. Plaintiff
stated that he has witnessed Williams being argumentative, annoying, and cranky, with bouts of
aggression, child-like emotional behavior and manners, and weak intimidation tactics. Id. He
also stated that Williams’ supervisors and co-workers allow him to behave this way because he
has had his job for approximately 20 years. Id.
Williams was eavesdropping on this conversation during which Plaintiff told Morrise to
“deal with problematic staff” by filing a complaint, keeping cool, remaining unaggressive, not
being argumentative, and not letting them get to him. Id. Plaintiff told Morrise that the staff has
“patients in a 4-point restraint when patients are most vulnerable, defenseless, [and] unable to

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protect themselves from retaliation, violence, attack, aggression, [and] corporal punishment from
[staff] who become their tormenters.” (Doc. 1, p. 5). The rest of the staff turns a blind eye to
this behavior, or allows it and laughs or smirks “like nothing serious has happened.” Id. “It is
well known amongst them and patients alike that nothing will change.” Id. Plaintiff cited to
“cover ups, denials, retaliation, [and] retribution if you dare speak out for patients and staff
alike.” Id. He stated that the administration does not hold staff accountable for this behavior.
Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bruce Williams and Will Miller retaliated against
Plaintiff, D. Lawrence, and J. Morrise after Williams overheard Plaintiff’s conversation with
Morrise, in that “they only picked [their] 3 rooms to be shaken down and took items out of
[their] rooms.” Id. They then sent Ms. Jama Klausin to speak with Plaintiff, Lawrence, and
Morrise, and she tried to “mislead, undermine, intimidate, discourage, [and] discredit [them] on
the true nature of the rules and from voicing [their] concerns.” Id.
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate a
single count in this pro se action. The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of this count does not constitute an opinion regarding its merit.
Count 1 –

Defendants conducted a shakedown of Plaintiff’s cell in retaliation for
Plaintiff talking about CMHC staff with another patient, in violation of the
First Amendment.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against individuals not included in the case
caption, these individuals will not be treated as defendants in this case, and any claims against
them should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d

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551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendants must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). For example, Ms.
Jama Klausin is mentioned in the Complaint but is not included in the case caption or list of
defendants and will therefore not be considered a defendant in this case. Further, any claims not
addressed herein should be considered dismissed without prejudice from this action as
inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
As to Count 1, to establish a claim of retaliation, Plaintiff “must show that he engaged in
a protected activity, he suffered a deprivation likely to prevent future protected activities, and
there was a causal connection between the two.” Felton v. Huibregtse, 525 F. App'x 484, 486
(7th Cir. 2013) (citing Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2010); Bridges v. Gilbert,
557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)). The question of whether an inmate’s speech is protected by
the First Amendment is governed by the standard established in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987), under which a prison regulation that impinges on prisoners' constitutional rights is valid
if “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Watkins, 599 F.3d at 794-95 (citing
Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551). However, “a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that
are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of
the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). See also Brown v.
Williams, 2015 WL 7293508, No. 14 C 5347, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2015).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that Williams and Miller retaliated against him by shaking
down his cell and taking items based on comments Plaintiff made to another patient about abuses
at CMHC, including some abuses committed by Williams. These allegations are sufficient to
state a retaliation claim against Williams and Miller at this stage, so Count 1 will proceed against
them.
Insofar as CMHC is a named defendant, governmental entities cannot be held liable for

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the unconstitutional acts of their employees unless those acts were carried out pursuant to an
official custom or policy. Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 765 (7th Cir. 2006). See
also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “The ‘official policy’ requirement
for liability under § 1983 is to ‘distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the
municipality is actually responsible.’” Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. County of Bureau, 506 F.3d
509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). As
no policy or practice of CMHC has been sufficiently pled, CMHC will be dismissed without
prejudice.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Representation (Doc. 3) is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly for a decision.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against WILLIAMS and
MILLER, and it is DISMISSED without prejudice against CHESTER MENTAL HEALTH
CENTER for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CHESTER MENTAL HEALTH CENTER is
DISMISSED without prejudice from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for
WILLIAMS and MILLER: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail
these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendant’s

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place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If any defendant fails to sign and return the
Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and
the Court will require that defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter shall be

REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly for disposition, pursuant to
Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, whether or not
his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than

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7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 19, 2018
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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