Spoden v. Phelps et al

Filing 8

IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 5-19, which are unrelated to COUNTS 2 and 3, are SEVERED into 4 new cases, as follows: SEVERED CASE 1 involving COUNTS 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 against Defendants Phelps, Brisbee, Prescott, and/or Janet shall be cap tioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. NIGEL PHELPS, KASEY PRESCOTT, C/O BRISBEE, and NURSE JANET, Defendants. SEVERED CASE 2 involving COUNTS 8, 9, 10, and 11 against Defendants Lynn, Vaughn, Laster, and/or Wright shall be captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. DAN LYNN, AUSTIN LASTER, GIA D. WRIGHT, and B. VAUGHN, Defendants. SEVERED CASE 3 involving COUNTS 12 and 13 against Defendants Smith, Doe 1, Doe 2, and/or Doe 3 shall be captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. AMANDA SMITH, JOHN DOE 1 , JOHN DOE 2, and JOHN DOE 3, Defendants. SEVERED CASE 4 involving COUNT 14 against Defendants Kasey and David shall be captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. NURSE KASEY and ALFONSO DAVID, Defendants. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 7/16/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTHONY SPODEN, #Y15676,
also known as NINA SPODEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NIGEL PHELPS,
AMANDA SMITH,
ALFONSO DAVID,
DAN LYNN,
JEFFERY M. DENNISON,
KASEY PRESCOTT,
AUSTIN LASTER,
C/O BRISBEE,
GIA D. WRIGHT,
NURSE KASEY,
NURSE JANET,
B. VAUGHN,
JOHN DOE 1,
JOHN DOE 2,
JOHN DOE 3, and
UNKNOWN PARTIES,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18-cv-0949-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Anthony Spoden, 1 an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Shawnee
Correctional Center (“Shawnee”), brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
order to address violations of her constitutional rights at Shawnee. (Doc. 1). In the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that prison officials conspired to retaliate against her for filing grievances.
(Doc. 1, pp. 6-39). She seeks monetary damages against the defendants. (Doc. 1, p. 40).
1

Plaintiff’s legal name is Anthony Spoden. However, Plaintiff is a transgender inmate who prefers to be
called Nina Cole. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 13). Although the Court must use Plaintiff’s legal name, feminine
pronouns will be used in reference to Plaintiff.

1

This matter is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th
Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). As part of the screening order, the Court also will consider
whether any claims in the Complaint are improperly joined in this action and are subject to
severance. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
Complaint
Plaintiff is a transgender inmate, who is anatomically male but identifies as female.
(Doc. 1, p. 35). She is diagnosed with gender dysphoria, generalized anxiety disorder, and
borderline personality disorder. (Doc. 1, pp. 35-36). These conditions cause her to suffer from

2

severe anxiety, crying spells, and depression. (Doc. 1, p. 36). Treatment for gender dysphoria
includes hormone therapy, sex reassignment surgery, and experience living as a member of the
opposite sex. (Doc. 1, p. 37).
Plaintiff claims that Shawnee has failed to institute policies or practices aimed at ensuring
the safety and care of transgender inmates. 2 (Doc. 1). She has allegedly been denied adequate
treatment for her gender dysphoria. 3 (Doc. 1, p. 36). She has also been physically assaulted twice
and complains of regular sexual harassment. (Doc. 1, p. 37). In addition, transgender inmates are
housed in isolation from the general inmate population and one another. 4 (Doc. 1, pp. 35-37).
Plaintiff has used the prison’s grievance process to complain about her conditions of
confinement and harassment by various prison officials, but Shawnee officials have allegedly
conspired to retaliate against her for doing so. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-39). This campaign of retaliation
stems from a single incident involving Lieutenant Nigel Phelps. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). On September
17, 2017, Phelps noticed that Plaintiff was wearing makeup at lunch. 5 (Doc. 1, p. 6). As Plaintiff
stood up from the table, Phelps ordered her to sit back down and “wipe that shit off your face,
too.” Id. Plaintiff explained that she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a medical condition
that compels her to strive for a more feminine appearance. (Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff informed
Phelps that she had a right to do so “within reason.” Id. When Phelps called her a “liar,” Plaintiff
asked the officer for his name so that she could file a grievance against him. Id.

2

She does not request a prison transfer or a change in prison policies in the Complaint.
Although she does not explain what she means by this assertion, Plaintiff alleges that she began
hormone therapy on April 3, 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 37).
4
Plaintiff cites a single exception in her Complaint. (Doc. 1, pp. 35-37). A transgender inmate who
suffers from severe depression and regular suicidal ideations has been allowed to live in the same cell
with another transgender inmate. Id. The two inmates have a sexual relationship. Id. Plaintiff has also
requested a cellmate who can offer her moral support, but her requests have been denied. Id.
5
Plaintiff allegedly applied instant coffee to her eyebrows to make them appear full. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7).
3

3

Phelps ordered Plaintiff to cuff up because he was taking her to segregation. (Doc. 1,
p. 7). While escorting her there, Phelps told Plaintiff that Shawnee is a “male prison,” and he
would treat her as a male “as long as [Plaintiff has] a dick between [her] legs.” Id. Phelps then
issued Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket for an undisclosed rule violation, and Plaintiff admitted at
the disciplinary hearing that she responded to Phelps in a “smart assed” manner. Id. She was
punished with 7 days of segregation and 30 days of B-grade status and a commissary restriction.
(Doc. 1, pp. 7-8).
On September 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Phelps pursuant to the Prison
Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”). (Doc. 1, p. 7). Following a 2-day investigation into the matter,
her complaint was deemed unsubstantiated. Id. Plaintiff maintains that the investigation was
“filled with bias.” Id.
Plaintiff then filed a grievance against Phelps on October 4, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 8). She met
with Katherine Hammersly6 (mental health supervisor) and Jeffery Dennison (warden) to discuss
her concerns on October 6, 2017. Id. At the meeting, Plaintiff complained about the prison’s lack
of standards for ensuring the safety and care of transgender inmates. Id. She pointed out that a
disciplinary ticket for wearing makeup was “extreme,” given that the inmate manual did not
forbid the practice. Id. She asked Hammersly and Dennison to restore her A-grade status and
commissary privileges. Id. They agreed to do so. Id.
These events allegedly triggered “a relentless conspiracy [and] campaign to retaliate
against [P]laintiff for exercising her First Amendment right to redress [her] grievances.” (Doc. 1,
pp. 8-9). The Complaint offers numerous examples in support of this claim, but the examples are

6

This individual is not named as a defendant in the case caption, and Plaintiff brings no claim against her.
(Doc. 1, pp. 1-5).

4

poorly organized, largely undeveloped, and seemingly unrelated to the incident involving Phelps.
The Court will nevertheless attempt to summarize each example below.
1.

Disciplinary Tickets
A.

Ticket Issued by Defendant Lynn

On October 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Daniel Lynn, a correctional
counselor who Plaintiff believed was condoning the misconduct of the inmate peer educators.
(Doc. 1, p. 18). Plaintiff complained that these educators dispensed false information about
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) inmates. Id. At orientation, the educators
suggested that all LGBT inmates at Shawnee have HIV, and they disclosed the names of past
inmates who tested positive. Id. Plaintiff threatened to contact Internal Affairs and the
Springfield Foundation for LGBT Equality for disclosing this information to new inmates as a
“scare tactic.” (Doc. 1, pp. 18-19).
On November 7, 2017, Lynn issued Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket for “intimidation or
threats . . . [e]xpressing words,” simply because she filed the grievance against the counselor.
(Doc. 1, pp. 9, 19-20). The adjustment committee, which was comprised of Austin Laster and
Gia Wright, found Plaintiff guilty of the rule violation. Id. She was punished with 15 days of Bgrade status, a commissary restriction, and a phone restriction. 7 (Doc. 1, p. 20).
B.

Ticket Issued by Defendant Vaughn

On or around November 25, 2017, Correctional Officer (“C/O”) B. Vaughn issued
Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket. (Doc. 1, p. 31). On that date, Plaintiff was released from her cell
and permitted to take a shower. Id. As she waited outside the shower while the water warmed up,
Vaughn ordered Plaintiff to “get in or lock up.” Id. Plaintiff explained that she was waiting for
the shower water to warm up, but Officer Vaughn simply repeated the same order. Id.
7

She was only allowed two phone calls per month.

5

As Plaintiff began setting her items in the shower, the officer again used the intercom
system to state, “[T]hat’s it. Lock up or get a ticket.” (Doc. 1, p. 31). Plaintiff locked up in her
cell and then asked to speak with a lieutenant. Id. In response, Vaughn issued her a ticket for
“socializing with [I]nmate Marcus Sanders” and giving the officer “the middle finger.” (Doc. 1,
p. 32). Plaintiff denies both. Id. When Plaintiff explained this to the adjustment committee,
which included Laster, the lieutenant “agreed plaintiff was being harassed by staff” and issued
her a verbal reprimand. Id.
2.

Inmate Assault
On December 12, 2017, Plaintiff was brutally assaulted by a known sexual predator,

named Inmate Burton. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff claims that the entire incident could have been
avoided, if prison officials took steps to separate her from Inmate Burton in the days leading up
to the attack. Id. Plaintiff informed her caseworker, Amanda Smith, that she was being harassed
by Inmate Burton at a group therapy session on November 28, 2017. Id. Smith was in charge of
Plaintiff’s “Coping Skills” group, and she is also a mandatory reporter. (Doc. 1, p. 11). On
November 28, 2017, Plaintiff informed Smith that Inmate Burton reached into the shower and
attempted to grab her. Id. Smith did not report the incident. Id. On December 12, 2017, Plaintiff
told Smith that there was “ongoing hostility” between the two inmates, and Plaintiff was
concerned that the situation would escalate. Id. Smith again took no action. Id.
That evening, Plaintiff confronted Inmate Burton about his “sexual misconduct.” (Doc. 1,
p. 12). In response, Inmate Burton brutally attacked Plaintiff, breaking her jaw and ocular bone.
Id. Plaintiff asserts that the incident could have been avoided, if Smith had taken steps to
separate the two inmates. Id.

6

Plaintiff also blames three other unknown defendants (John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John
Doe 3) for failing to intervene and protect her from the assault. (Doc. 1, p. 13). All of the officers
were working in Plaintiff’s cell house when the assault occurred. Id. Plaintiff was attacked “in
plain sight” of the officers, and the attack lasted for several minutes. Id. None of the officers
intervened to stop the attack. (Doc. 1, p. 14).
3.

Denial of Medical Care
Following the assault, Plaintiff was allegedly denied medical treatment for her injuries.

(Doc. 1, p. 21). She was taken to the prison’s health care unit (“HCU”), where Nurse Kasey
examined her bruised, swollen, and cut eye. Id. The nurse taped the wound. Id. She also
examined Plaintiff’s mouth and observed what she believed was a missing tooth. Id. Plaintiff told
Nurse Kasey that she “felt like her jaw was in pieces.” Id. The nurse explained that it would take
time to “adjust back to normal.” Id. She gave Plaintiff a blister pack of ibuprofen (18) and sent
her to segregation on investigative status. (Doc. 1, p. 22).
The following day, Plaintiff developed a fever. (Doc. 1, p. 22). She also noticed that her
jaw “split[ ] in two different directions” when she attempted to speak. Id. A segregation officer 8
ignored her requests for medical care. Id.
On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff ran out of ibuprofen. (Doc. 1, p. 22). The pain and
swelling in her jaw increased dramatically. Id. Plaintiff was unable to eat. Id. She began to feel
weak and dizzy. Id. The cut under her eye began to bleed. Id. Plaintiff repeatedly asked
segregation officers for a nurse, but the officers ignored her. (Doc. 1, p. 23). Plaintiff also
requested hygiene supplies to clean her wounds, but her request was denied. Id.

8

Plaintiff does not name the segregation officer as a defendant in this action or assert claims against this
individual.

7

While making rounds that day, Nurse Kasey examined Plaintiff’s jaw. (Doc. 1, p. 23).
She asked another nurse for a second opinion, and the nurse suspected a jaw fracture. Id. Plaintiff
was transferred to the HCU, where Doctor David examined her and prescribed Motrin (three
times daily) for pain. Id.
On December 15, 2017, a dentist 9 examined Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p. 23). The dentist
concluded that Plaintiff was missing no teeth; the gap that appeared between her teeth was due to
a fractured jaw. Id. The dentist prescribed Plaintiff Tylenol-3 every six hours. Id. X-rays were
also ordered of Plaintiff’s jaw. (Doc. 1, pp. 23-24).
Doctor David would not review the x-rays, and the doctor’s delay unnecessarily
prolonged Plaintiff’s pain. (Doc. 1, p. 24). She asked the doctor for more Motrin, but Doctor
David denied her request. Id. Plaintiff also requested permission to contact a close family
member by phone or mail, but these requests were also denied. Id.
On December 16, 2017, Plaintiff was taken to an offsite hospital for treatment when her
fever spiked. (Doc. 1, p. 24). A CT scan confirmed that her jaw was fractured in multiple places,
and surgery was required. Id. The treating physician told Plaintiff to return to the prison and
prepare for surgery by showering and shaving to prevent infection. (Doc. 1, p. 25). Plaintiff was
discharged with a prescription for pain medication and antibiotics. Id.
Despite these explicit orders from the doctor, Plaintiff was denied access to a shower and
hygiene supplies at the prison. (Doc. 1, p. 26). Eventually, she broke down crying and asked to
see a member of the crisis team. (Doc. 1, p. 27). A lieutenant 10 assured Plaintiff that she would
receive hygiene supplies and a shower, but she was denied both until December 18, 2017. Id.

9

The dentist is not named as a defendant, and Plaintiff brings no claims against her.
The lieutenant is not named as a defendant, and Plaintiff brings no claim against this individual.

10

8

At an appointment with a specialist that day, Plaintiff learned that a hematoma had
formed under her jaw and become infected. (Doc. 1, p. 28). She also learned that her ocular bone
was fractured but would heal on its own, but she would likely suffer from permanent vision
impairment (i.e., black spots). Id.
Plaintiff underwent jaw surgery on December 20, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 28). Pins and plates
were installed in her jaw. Id. She returned to the prison the following day, where she was taken
off of investigative status while still in the HCU. Id. Plaintiff’s stitches tore in the back of her
mouth while she was eating two days later. Id. A nurse told her that “it will heal on its own.” Id.
Plaintiff reported continued pain and difficulty eating when Doctor David met with her on
December 27, 2017. Id. Despite these statements, Doctor David issued orders discontinuing
Plaintiff’s soft diet, terminating her pain medication, and discharging her to the general prison
population. (Doc. 1, pp. 28-29).
Plaintiff’s fever returned the following day, and a nurse told Plaintiff that Doctor David
would meet with her. (Doc. 1, p. 29). This never happened. Id. Plaintiff continued to struggle
with fever, difficulty eating, bleeding, and pain for several days. (Doc. 1, pp. 29-30). When she
met with a surgeon for a follow-up appointment sometime around January 1, 2018, the surgeon
recommended a course of antibiotics and pain medication. Id. However, the surgeon assured her
that everything was healing properly. Id.
4.

Staff Assault
On January 13, 2018, Lieutenant Phelps allegedly used excessive force against Plaintiff.

(Doc. 1, p. 14). On that date, Plaintiff remained in her cell during lunch because she had no clean
laundry. (Doc. 1, p. 15). At the time, she was wearing a robe that she received in the HCU. Id.
Her cell was cold, and she began to ask Officer Prescott for permission to open her cell door to

9

allow warm air to flow into her cell. Id. Before she could do so, Phelps entered the cell house and
demanded Plaintiff’s robe back. Id. To avoid a confrontation, Plaintiff relinquished the robe and
wrapped herself in a blanket. Id.
When the other inmates returned from lunch, Plaintiff attempted to engage Phelps in
conversation. (Doc. 1, p. 15). As Plaintiff spoke, Phelps slammed the cell door “with force” in
her face. Id. The door hit Plaintiff’s jaw and tore the stitches in her mouth. Id. Out of frustration,
Plaintiff told Phelps that she intended to sue him. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16). Officers Prescott and
Brisbee stood watching but took no action to intervene and protect Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p. 16).
They also failed to file an incident report. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Instead, they signed as witnesses to a
second disciplinary report issued by Phelps against Plaintiff. Id. When Plaintiff met with Nurse
Janet in the HCU “later,” she “attempted to cover up the excessive force” by failing to document
the new injuries. (Doc. 1, p. 16).
On January 14, 2018, Plaintiff complained about the incident. (Doc. 1, p. 16). Internal
affairs conducted an investigation. (Doc. 1, pp. 16-17). A medical report issued during the
investigation revealed new injuries to Plaintiff’s jaw. (Doc. 1, p. 17). A piece of Plaintiff’ s jaw
bone had broken loose. Id. It became so painful that Plaintiff extracted the loose bone “from a
hole under [her] chin” a month later. Id. Despite the information in this medical report, the
investigation resulted in a recommendation to return Plaintiff to the general prison population on
or around February 14, 2018. (Doc. 1, pp. 16-18).
Claims
The Court deems it appropriate to divide the pro se action into the following enumerated
counts to facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case and in accordance
with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b):

10

Count 1 -

Claims against Defendants for conspiring to retaliate against
Plaintiff because she filed grievances to complain about Officer
Phelps and the conditions of her confinement at Shawnee.

Count 2 -

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant
Dennison for mishandling Plaintiff’s grievances regarding the
conditions of her confinement or various prison officials, by
ignoring, denying, delaying, or disposing of the grievances.

Count 3 –

Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant
Dennison for failing to establish policies and procedures necessary
to ensure the safety and care of transgender inmates at Shawnee.

Count 4 -

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for failing to
provide Plaintiff with adequate medical and mental health care for
her gender dysphoria, including counseling and hormone therapy.

Count 5 -

First Amendment claim against Defendant Phelps for denying
Plaintiff the right to express her gender by wearing makeup on or
around September 17, 2017.

Count 6 -

First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Phelps for
issuing Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket on or around September 17,
2017, for an undisclosed reason or rule violation.

Count 7 -

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Phelps 11 for
depriving Plaintiff of a protected liberty interest without due
process of law by punishing her with a week of segregation and a
month of B-grade status and a commissary restriction in
connection with the disciplinary ticket issued on or around
September 17, 2017.

Count 8 -

First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Lynn for
issuing Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket for “intimidation or threats . . .
[e]xpressing words” on or around November 7, 2017, after
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Lynn for condoning
the alleged misconduct of inmate peer educators on or around
October 31, 2017.

Count 9 -

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Lynn, Laster,
and Wright for depriving Plaintiff of a protected liberty interest
without due process of law by punishing her with segregation,
demotion to B-grade status, and a commissary restriction in

11

Plaintiff failed to identify the adjustment committee members who considered the ticket issued by
Defendant Phelps on or around September 17, 2017. Therefore, the Court has only listed Defendant
Phelps in connection with this due process claim.

11

connection with the disciplinary ticket issued on November 7,
2017.
Count 10 -

First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Vaughn for
issuing Plaintiff a false disciplinary ticket for socializing with an
inmate and giving an officer the middle finger on or around
November 25, 2017, because Plaintiff filed grievances.

Count 11 -

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Vaughn and
Laster for depriving Plaintiff of a protected liberty interest without
due process of law by punishing her with a verbal reprimand for
the false disciplinary ticket issued by Defendant Vaughn on
November 25, 2017.

Count 12 -

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Smith for failing to
take steps to protect Plaintiff from a known risk of harm posed by
Inmate Burton, who assaulted Plaintiff on December 12, 2017.

Count 13 -

Eighth Amendment claim against John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and
John Doe 3 for failing to intervene and protect Plaintiff from the
attack by Inmate Burton on December 12, 2017.

Count 14 -

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
against Defendants Kasey and David for failing to provide timely
and adequate medical care for Plaintiff’s fractured jaw, fractured
ocular bone, pain, and infection following the inmate assault that
occurred on December 12, 2017.

Count 15 -

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Phelps for using
excessive force against Plaintiff on or around January 13, 2018.

Count 16 -

Illinois state law claims for assault and battery against Defendant
Phelps for using excessive force against Plaintiff on or around
January 13, 2018.

Count 17 -

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Prescott and Brisbee
for failing to intervene and protect Plaintiff from Phelps on or
around January 13, 2018.

Count 18 -

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Janet for failing to
document or treat the injuries Plaintiff sustained on or around
January 13, 2018, in a conspiracy to cover up Phelps’ misconduct.

Count 19 –

First and/or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants
Phelps, Prescott, and Brisbee for issuing Plaintiff a false
disciplinary ticket on January 13, 2018.
12

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. These designations do not constitute an
opinion regarding the merits of the claims. Any claims that are encompassed by the
allegations in the Complaint but not identified above are considered dismissed without
prejudice for failure to meet the Twombly pleading standards.
Discussion
Plaintiff attempts to bring 19 claims against 15 known and numerous unknown
defendants in a single action. The only common thread between them is Count 1, i.e., Plaintiff’s
claim that the defendants all conspired to retaliate against her for filing grievances against
Defendant Phelps. In support of her conspiracy claim, Plaintiff recites the elements of that cause
of action in conclusory fashion. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-9). Even at this early stage, conclusory allegations
are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not satisfy the Rule 8 standard. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff must instead set forth sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In her Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to nudge her
claim from the realm of “possible” to “plausible” because she offers no plausible link between
Count 1 and the other claims. Id. Count 1 falls short of stating a claim and shall therefore be
dismissed without prejudice.
What remains are 18 claims against different defendants, and these claims cannot proceed
together in a single action. Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow joinder

13

of multiple claims against multiple defendants. See UWM Student Ass’n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854
(7th Cir. 2018) (providing overview of joinder rules). According to Rule 20, multiple defendants
may be joined in a single action if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 18 authorizes a properly
joined party to bring “as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” See FED. R. CIV. P.
18(a). These rules are “broad” and thus give district courts “considerable flexibility in managing
and structuring civil litigation for fair and efficient resolution of complex disputes.” Lovell, 888
F.3d at 863. However, the rules are not without limits. Id.
In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits. George, 507 F.3d at
607 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)). This is “not only to prevent the sort of morass” produced by
multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees”
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id. A prisoner who files a “buckshot complaint” cannot
avoid “risking multiple strikes for what should have been several different lawsuits.” Turley v.
Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1011 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing George). The Seventh Circuit has warned
district courts not to allow inmates “to flout the rules for joining claims and defendants, see FED.
R. CIV. P. 18, 20, or to circumvent the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s fee requirements by
combining multiple lawsuits into a single complaint.” Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th
Cir. 2017). See also Wheeler v. Talbot, 695 F. App’x 151 (7th Cir. 2017) (district court should
have severed unrelated and improperly joined claims or dismissed one of them). When deciding
whether to sever claims or to dismiss improperly joined defendants, the Seventh Circuit has

14

repeatedly reminded district courts that they have broad discretion to do both. See Owens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016
(7th Cir. 2000). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time,
on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”). The
remedy for misjoinder of otherwise proper claims is severance or dismissal without prejudice.
Lovell, 888 F.3d at 862-63.
Against this backdrop, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s claims against the defendants
and determined that they arise from separate transactions, occurrences, and/or series of
transactions or occurrence within the meaning of Rule 20, as follows:
Counts 2 and 3 against Defendant Dennison for failing to address Plaintiff’s
grievances and complaints regarding the treatment of transgender inmates at
Shawnee by developing policies or practices aimed at the care and safety of these
inmates.
Count 4 against no identified defendant for providing inadequate medical care
and mental health treatment for Plaintiff’s gender dysphoria.
Counts 5, 6, and 7 against Defendant Phelps for issuing Plaintiff a disciplinary
ticket and punishing her for undisclosed rule violations on or around September
17, 2017.
Count 8, 9, 10, and 11 against Defendants Lynn, Vaughn, Wright and/or Laster
for taking unwarranted disciplinary action against Plaintiff on or around
November 7 and 25, 2017.
Counts 12 and 13 against Defendant Smith, Doe 1, Doe 2, and/or Doe 3 for
failing to protect Plaintiff from the inmate attack that occurred on December 12,
2017.
Count 14 against Defendants Kasey and David for failing to provide timely and
adequate medical treatment for the injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result of the
inmate assault on December 12, 2017.
Counts 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 against Defendants Phelps, Prescott, Brisbee,
and/or Janet for mistreating Plaintiff on or around January 13, 2018.

15

Consistent with George and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the Court will exercise its
discretion to sever or dismiss the misjoined claims, as follows: COUNT 1 shall be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim; COUNTS 2 and 3 shall proceed in this action;
COUNT 4 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to name a defendant in connection
with the claim (and because the Court is unable to ascertain who the claim is against); COUNTS
5, 6, 7 and 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 shall proceed as SEVERED CASE #1; COUNTS 8, 9, 10, and
11 shall proceed as SEVERED CASE #2; COUNTS 12 and 13 shall proceed as SEVERED
CASE #3; COUNT 14 shall proceed as SEVERED CASE #4.
Each newly-severed case shall receive a new case number, and Plaintiff shall be assessed
another filing fee for the case. Because Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) was already granted in this case, Plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed IFP
in each newly-severed case. Finally, the claims in each case will be separately screened under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 1 and 4 are DISMISSED without prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNTS 2 and 3 will remain in this action and be
screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A in a separate order.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that COUNTS 5-19, which are unrelated to COUNTS 2 and 3,
are SEVERED into 4 new cases, as follows:
SEVERED CASE 1 involving COUNTS 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 against
Defendants Phelps, Brisbee, Prescott, and/or Janet shall be captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN,

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Plaintiff v. NIGEL PHELPS, KASEY PRESCOTT, C/O BRISBEE, and NURSE JANET,
Defendants.
SEVERED CASE 2 involving COUNTS 8, 9, 10, and 11 against Defendants Lynn,
Vaughn, Laster, and/or Wright shall be captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. DAN
LYNN, AUSTIN LASTER, GIA D. WRIGHT, and B. VAUGHN, Defendants.
SEVERED CASE 3 involving COUNTS 12 and 13 against Defendants Smith, Doe 1,
Doe 2, and/or Doe 3 shall be captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. AMANDA
SMITH, JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, and JOHN DOE 3, Defendants.
SEVERED CASE 4 involving COUNT 14 against Defendants Kasey and David shall be
captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. NURSE KASEY and ALFONSO DAVID,
Defendants.
In each new case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:
(1)

This Memorandum and Order;

(2)

The Complaint (Doc. 1);

(3)

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2);

(4)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3).

Plaintiff will be assessed an additional filing fee for each newly-severed case. Because Plaintiff
was granted leave to proceed IFP in this case, however, she shall be granted leave to proceed as a
poor person in each newly-severed case as well. The claims in the newly-severed cases will be
screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A after the new case numbers and judge assignments are
made. No service shall be ordered on the defendant(s) in the newly-severed cases until the
Section 1915A review is complete.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claims remaining in this action are
COUNTS 2 and 3 against Defendant JEFFERY M. DENNISON. This case shall now be
captioned: ANTHONY SPODEN, Plaintiff v. JEFFERY M. DENNISON, Defendant.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants NIGEL PHELPS, AMANDA SMITH, ALFONSO
DAVID, DAN LYNN, KASEY PRESCOTT, AUSTIN LASTER, C/O BRISBEE, GIA D.
WRIGHT, NURSE KASEY, NURSE JANET, B. VAUGHN, JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2,
JOHN DOE 3, and UNKNOWN PARTIES are DISMISSED with prejudice from this action
because they are not named in connection with Counts 2 and 3.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that she is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court
and each opposing party informed of any change in her address; the Court will not independently
investigate her whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in
the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 16, 2018

__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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