Teen v. Robinson-Davis

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/10/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTRELL TEEN,
#461504
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARY ROBINSON-DAVIS,
Defendant.

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Case No. 18-cv-991-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
This case was severed on April 18, 2018 from Teen v. John Doe #1, Case No. 18-cv-568JPG-RJD (S.D. Ill.). (Doc. 1). It contains the claim designated as Count 2 in the original case,
described as follows:
Count 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Robinson-Davis, for
charging Plaintiff for food trays that were never delivered, after Plaintiff made
complaints about the food service and/or filed a lawsuit against Robinson-Davis.
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Plaintiff Antrell Teen, a pretrial detainee confined at the St. Clair County Jail (“the Jail”),
filed the original civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 13, 2018. In the
original action, among other things, Plaintiff alleged that various officials were retaliating against
him for having brought complaints and lawsuits against Jail staff. This severed action pertains to
alleged acts of retaliation by Mary Robinson-Davis, the Jail’s kitchen supervisor. Plaintiff’s
claims are now before the Court for a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
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granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is
plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters,
631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible
that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of
a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. However, the factual allegations of a pro
se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir.
2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint (Doc. 2)
Plaintiff’s factual allegations relating to Count 2 are as follows.
Beginning in January 2016, Plaintiff submitted a number of captain complaints, raising
concerns about several problems in the Jail. One of Plaintiff’s complaints pertained to maggots

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in the food at the Jail.

In addition, Plaintiff has sued various Jail officials during his

imprisonment, including Robinson-Davis. (Doc. 1, p. 4). As a result of these complaints and
lawsuits, Plaintiff asserts that Robinson-Davis has retaliated against him by repeatedly denying
Plaintiff access to hot food trays. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he would
place a hot tray order and his account would be charged, but no tray would be delivered to him,
while other inmates received their hot trays without a problem. Plaintiff had to file complaints
before his money was eventually refunded. Id.
Discussion
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, lawsuits, or
otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680
F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v.
Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). A “prisoner can state a claim for retaliatory treatment by
alleging a chronology of events from which retaliation can be inferred.” Jellis v. Hulick, 422 F.
App'x 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the notion that
prisoners are required to allege a chronology of events at the pleading stage. See McElroy v.
Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2005) (“we note that the district court required far too much
of [the prisoner] in the first place. Our recent cases have rejected any requirement that an inmate
allege a chronology of events in order to state a claim of retaliation because such a requirement
is contrary to the federal rule of notice pleading.”); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009
(7th Cir. 2002) (prisoner need not allege a chronology of events in order to state a claim for
retaliation). “Instead, a plaintiff must allege only enough to put the defendants on notice and
enable them to respond.” McElroy, at 858. In this regard, allegations describing the defendant’s

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retaliatory conduct and the constitutionally protected activity that motivated the retaliatory
conduct are sufficient. Id.
Plaintiff claims that, after filing complaints (including complaints about food at the Jail)
and after naming Robinson-Davis as a defendant in one or more civil rights lawsuits, he was
repeatedly denied access to hot food trays and charged for food he never received. Plaintiff also
asserts that Robinson-Davis was responsible for the alleged retaliatory actions. Even if these
allegations would not be actionable in and of themselves, if the acts were taken in retaliation for
the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, then they are actionable under § 1983. See
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d
639, 644 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would
have been proper.”).
At issue here is whether Plaintiff experienced an adverse action that would likely deter
First Amendment activity in the future, and if the First Amendment activity was “at least a
motivating factor” in Defendant’s decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557
F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir.2009). This is a question that cannot be resolved at the pleadings stage of
this case. Thus, Plaintiff may proceed on his retaliation claim against Robinson-Davis at this
time.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint, which includes COUNT 2, shall
proceed as to ROBINSON-DAVIS. The Clerk of Court shall prepare for ROBINSON-DAVIS:
(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the

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Complaint, a copy of the Memorandum and Order at Doc. 1, and this Memorandum and Order to
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return
the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the
Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to
a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is REMINDED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7

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days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 10, 2018

s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

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