Teen v. Massey

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly, ( Amended Pleadings due by 6/27/2018.). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/23/2018. (tkm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTRELL TEEN, #461504,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SGT. MASSE,
Defendant.

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Case No. 18-cv-00994-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Antrell Teen, who is currently detained at St. Clair County Jail (“Jail”), filed a
civil rights action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights
at the Jail. Teen v. John Doe #1, No. 18-cv-568-JPG-RJD (S.D. Ill.) (“original action”). The
Court severed the claims in the original action into seven additional cases pursuant to George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007). (Doc. 2). The instant case addresses two retaliation claims
(“Counts 6 and 7”) against Sergeant Masse. (Doc. 2, pp. 7, 10; Doc. 2-1, p. 8). In connection
with these claims, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the defendant. (Doc. 2, p. 11).
This severed case is now subject to preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as
soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th
Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). Counts 6 and 7 do not survive screening under this standard and
shall be dismissed.
The Complaint
On October 4, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly gave legal mail to C/O Jerry1 for delivery to the
district court. (Doc. 2, p. 7). The mail did not actually reach the court until October 25, 2017.
Id. The “normal uninterrupted time” for mail to reach the court is two days. Id. In November
2017, C/O Carter2 also delayed the delivery of Plaintiff’s legal mail for more than two weeks.
Id.
During this general time period, Plaintiff was subject to a deadline for filing an amended
complaint in Teen v. Peebles, Case No. 17-cv-593-JPG-SCW (S.D. Ill.). (Doc. 2, p. 7). He had
to prepare and file the amended complaint in only three days, in order to meet the court-imposed
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C/O Jerry is not named as a defendant in the Complaint. When parties are not listed in the caption, this
Court will not treat them as defendants, and any claims against them should be considered dismissed
without prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that the title of the complaint “must name all the
parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be properly
considered a party, a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). Any claims against C/O Jerry
should be considered dismissed without prejudice from this action.
2
C/O Carter is also not named as a defendant in the Complaint, and any claims against this individual
should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See id.

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deadline. Id. The delays caused his amended complaint to reach the court too late, and his case
was dismissed.

Id.

Plaintiff’s appeal was adversely impacted by these delays and also

dismissed. Id. Sergeant Masse and C/O Walt3 were supervisors in charge of mail during both
incidents and were allegedly responsible for the constitutional deprivations. Id. Plaintiff alleges
that the delays were retaliatory in nature and aimed at preventing him from succeeding with his
civil complaints. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that on November 7, 2017, Sergeant Masse slammed a window shut
in Plaintiff’s face while he was speaking with a nurse on AB-Block about a medical concern.
(Doc. 2, p. 10; Doc. 2-1, p. 8). As a result, Plaintiff was unable to obtain information or medical
care from the nurse. Id. Plaintiff maintains that Sergeant Masse’s conduct was discriminatory
and retaliatory. Id.
Discussion
This severed case focuses on the following claims against Sergeant Masse, which were
designated as “Counts 6 and 7” in the original action:
Count 6:

First Amendment retaliation claim against Masse for delaying Plaintiff’s
outgoing and incoming legal mail in November 2017, in an attempt to
interfere with Plaintiff’s pending lawsuit.

Count 7:

First Amendment retaliation claim and deliberate indifference to medical
needs claim against Masse for preventing Plaintiff from speaking to a
nurse about his medical issues on November 7, 2017.

(See Doc. 2, pp. 7, 10; Doc. 2-1, p. 8). The parties and the Court will continue to use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of
this Court.

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C/O Walt is not named as a defendant, and all claims against this individual are considered dismissed
without prejudice. Id.

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Count 1
In order to state a claim under the First Amendment for retaliation, a plaintiff “must show
that he engaged in a protected activity, he suffered a deprivation likely to prevent future
protected activities, and there was a causal connection between the two.” Felton v. Huibregtse,
525 F. App’x 484, 486 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir.
2010); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)). In connection with Count 1,
Plaintiff claims that he engaged in protected activity because he was attempting to send legal
mail to the district court, and Sergeant Masse supervised those individual officers who prevented
him from sending the mail. (Doc. 2, p. 7). It is true that inmates have a First Amendment right
to send and receive mail. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)). This First Amendment right extends to both
non-legal and legal mail. Id. When analyzed under the First Amendment, the question is
whether the conduct “chills the individual’s ability to engage in protected speech.” GuajardoPalma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 802 (7th Cir. 2010); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 954
(7th Cir. 2000). An inmate’s legal mail receives greater protection than his non-legal mail
because of the potential for interference with his right of access to the courts. Rowe, 196 F.3d at
782.

Prisoners often bring civil suits against prison officials at prisons where they are

incarcerated, so the Court is concerned about situations in which prison officials open and read
legal mail offering insight into the prisoner’s case. Guajardo-Palma, 622 F.3d at 802 (citations
omitted). Against the legal backdrop, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity
when he attempted to send mail to the court.
Even so, Count 1 does not survive preliminary review because the claim against Sergeant
Masse is based entirely on his supervisory role in the mailroom. Plaintiff does not allege that

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this defendant prevented him from sending or receiving court mail. He alleges that Sergeant
Masse supervised the individuals who interfered with his mail. (Doc. 2, p. 7). Sergeant Masse’s
supervisory role, standing alone, does not give rise to a constitutional claim. “The doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions; thus to be held individually liable, a
defendant must be ‘personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.’” Sanville
v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d
612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). See also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Eades v.
Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir. 1987); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th
Cir. 1983); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655-56 (7th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff must explain,
in basic terms, how Sergeant Masse’s action or inaction amounted to retaliation or resulted in
some other deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Because he did not do so, this claim
cannot proceed against the defendant.
Although Plaintiff identified other individuals who were more directly involved in the
interference with Plaintiff’s mail (e.g., C/O Jerry, C/O Carter, and C/O Walt), Plaintiff did not
name these individuals as defendants in the Complaint. The claims against them are considered
dismissed without prejudice from this action.
Count 2
Count 2 shall also be dismissed against Sergeant Masse. Plaintiff offers insufficient
allegations to support a claim of retaliation against the defendant. He simply states that Sergeant
Masse slammed a window that Plaintiff was using to communicate with a nurse about a medical
concern.

In conclusory fashion, Plaintiff characterizes this conduct as retaliatory and

discriminatory in nature. However, Plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations or legal
statements when bringing a claim under § 1983. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.

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2009). In the prison context, where an inmate is alleging retaliation, it is not enough to simply
state the cause of action. The inmate must identify the reasons that retaliation has been taken, as
well as “the act or acts claimed to have constituted retaliation,” so as to put those charged with
the retaliation on notice of the claim(s). Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002).
The inmate need not plead facts to establish the claim beyond doubt, but need only provide the
bare essentials of the claim, and in a claim for retaliation the reason for the retaliation and the
acts taken in an effort to retaliate suffice. Id. Because the allegations fall short of this standard,
Count 2 shall be dismissed without prejudice against Sergeant Masse for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 6 and 7, the only claims at issue in this
severed case, are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff
shall file his First Amended Complaint, stating any facts which may exist to support his claims in
Counts 6 or 7, within 35 days of the entry of this order (on or before June 27, 2018). Plaintiff is
cautioned that in order to state a viable claim, he must identify the individual defendant(s) who
were directly responsible for any alleged constitutional deprivations at the Jail. An amended
complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the original complaint void.
See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The
Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint. Thus, the First Amended
Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any other pleading. Should the First
Amended Complaint not conform to these requirements, it shall be stricken. Failure to file an

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amended complaint shall result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. Such dismissal
shall count as one of Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
No service shall be ordered on any Defendant until after the Court completes its § 1915A
review of the First Amended Complaint.
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is DIRECTED
to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 23, 2018
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

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