Teen v. Germaine et al

Filing 62

ORDER granting 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum & Order, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant Charles Germaine and Defendant Christopher Lanzante and against Plaintiff Antrell Teen and shall close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison on 5/11/2020. (kll)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTRELL A. TEEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHARLES GERMAINE, and
CHRISTOPHER LANZANTE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:18-cv-996-GCS

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
On April 19, 2018, a single claim was severed into this action from the claims in
Case No. 3:18-cv-568-JPG. Plaintiff Antrell Teen alleges that he was exposed to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement when he was exposed to harmful exhaust
fumes while incarcerated at the St. Clair County Jail. According to Teen, Defendants
Charles Germaine and Christopher Lanzante were deliberately indifferent to his health
and safety when they failed to act appropriately to prevent or limit his exposure to the
dangerous fumes. By motion dated February 28, 2020, Defendants moved for summary
judgment on the merits of Teen’s claims. For the reasons delineated below, Defendants’
motion is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to his complaint, Teen was an inmate in the custody of the St.
Clair County Jail. Teen was arrested and incarcerated beginning in 2015 as a pretrial
detainee, but on January 23, 2016, Teen was convicted of aggravated battery and first-

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degree murder. By 2018, he was still in the custody of the St. Clair County Jail, but he was
a convicted, post-trial prisoner. Defendants Charles Germaine and Christopher Lanzante
both worked as correctional officers at the jail.
This case arises out of a short period of time when Teen was housed on L-Block at
the jail. Teen was transferred to L-Block on January 29, 2018, and he remained housed
there until March 16, 2018. (Doc. 56-2). At around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. each Thursday
morning while he was housed in L-Block, Teen claims that he was exposed to exhaust
fumes and that the smell lasted for roughly 30 to 45 minutes. (Doc. 56-1, p. 3-4). He
described the smell as similar to a box truck exhaust or mechanical objects rubbing
together. Id. Teen further testified that he felt the smell was harsher than car exhaust
fumes and that it made him feel lightheaded and woozy. (Doc. 56-1, p. 4). His eyes would
burn, and he would have headaches and a scratchy throat. (Doc. 56-1, p. 12). Teen also
said he heard a machine running during the periods when he smelled the fumes. (Doc.
56-1, p. 4). When the odor dissipated, so did Teen’s headaches and other symptoms. (Doc.
56-1, p. 5, 20).
Teen first smelled the fumes on February 1, 2018. He asked a correctional officer,
Officer Taylor, for assistance, and Taylor set up an industrial-sized fan and opened the
door to the cell block to improve ventilation. (Doc. 56-1, p. 5). Defendants were not aware
of or involved in the response to the fumes on February 1, 2018. On February 8, 2018,
however, Teen testified that Germaine was making rounds when the odor was present
for a second time. Germaine “just plainly refused to open the door” to L-Block even
though Germaine allegedly smelled the fumes. (Doc. 56-1, p. 7). Teen and Germaine got

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into a “disagreement” because Teen was screaming for Captain Collins, the sergeant, to
come force Germaine to get the fan and improve air circulation. (Doc. 56-1, p. 7-8). Collins
and three officers, including Lanzante, came in response to the disturbance. (Doc. 56-1, p.
8). One officer, Miller, opened the door and got the fan about an hour after Teen first
asked Germaine for the fan. (Doc. 56-1, p. 8).
The next fume exposure was on February 15, 2018, but neither Lanzante nor
Germaine were involved in the response to the fumes that day. (Doc. 56-1, p. 10). Teen
testified that he could not remember his first issue with Lanzante, but he recalled a second
issue on February 22, 2018, when Lanzante allegedly refused to accept and turn in Teen’s
captain’s complaints and failed to get a supervisor. (Doc. 56-1, p. 11, 18). Teen did not
smell the fumes again until March 8, 2018. (Doc. 56-1, p. 18). He testified that Germaine
again disregarded his plea for help and refused to get the fan. (Doc. 56-1, p. 18). Teen
explained that he named Germaine and Lanzante in this action because they did not take
actions to ameliorate the fumes like setting up a fan or notifying a supervisor even though
they knew about the smell. (Doc. 56-1, p. 12).
Teen submitted a series of captain’s complaints about the fumes. On February 9,
2018, he complained about the fumes he smelled on February 1st and 8th, which
apparently came from a truck that had pulled into or near the jail. A supervisor
responded and advised Teen to report the issue more promptly so that officers could talk
with the driver of the truck. (Doc. 56-6, p. 1). On February 15, 2018, Teen filed a complaint
because he had submitted earlier complaints about the fumes and officers refusing to get
supervisors for issues they could not handle. Teen wrote that he had not received any

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responses. Officer Harris responded to the complaint stating that he did not notice any
odor, but he notified maintenance and opened the door to allow air circulation. A
supervisor agreed with Officer Harris’s approach and signed off on the complaint on
February 15, 2018. (Doc. 56-6, p. 3). There is a complaint from Teen written on February
22, 2018, but it is unrelated to his allegations in this case. (Doc. 56-6, p. 6).
Teen testified that his symptoms typically ended when the fumes subsided each
week. (Doc. 56-1, p. 5, 20).1 He testified that he submitted a sick call on February 15, 2018,
because he wanted a checkup to see if he had health issues from the fumes. (Doc. 56-1, p.
15). This is the only sick call request he claims to have made related to medical issues
caused by the fumes. Teen did not see anyone in the healthcare unit right away, and by
his next healthcare appointment in May 2018, he did not mention any issues related to
the fumes because he “[h]ad other pressing issues.” (Doc. 56-1, p. 16). No records confirm
whether Teen submitted the sick call as he testified.
The evidence suggests that the exhaust fume odor came from a back-up generator
system at the jail as opposed to a truck. Defendants provide an affidavit from Lee
Branstetter, a maintenance foreman for the St. Clair County Public Buildings
Commission, who works full-time in the St. Clair County Jail. (Doc. 56-4). He avers that,
at all times relevant to Teen’s allegation the ventilation system at the jail was in
compliance with the regulations set in the Illinois County Jail Standards, and he explains

1
In an affidavit attached to his responsive brief, Teen claims for the first time that his symptoms
were longer-lasting and more severe. A party, however, “cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment
by ‘contradict[ing] deposition testimony with later-filed contradictory affidavits.’” LaFary v. Rogers Group,
Inc., 591 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 2010)(quoting Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir.
2005))(alteration in original).

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that the jail maintains a back-up power generation system that has two diesel powered
generators. The generators must be given weekly test runs as part of their maintenance
process. The tests are routinely performed on Thursday mornings. During the tests, the
generators are started and system measurements, including amps, volts, oil psi and
coolant temperatures, are taken. The tests are regulated by a timer that automatically
starts and ends each test run after exactly one hour.
Branstetter maintains that he is unaware of any defects in the system during
February 2018 and March 2018, and the generator log sheets reveal no defects during any
of the relevant weekly tests. (Docs. 56-4, 56-5). The weekly tests require a minimal amount
of diesel fuel and do generate exhaust. The exhaust is released outside the jail through
exhaust pipes, and Branstetter is unaware of any leaks in the pipes. The jail also has a
smoke and fire detection system that sets off an alarm in any block if there’s a hazard like
smoke or a rise in temperature. The system passed its annual inspection on May 30, 2018.
It did not go off during any of the relevant generator tests. (Doc. 56-4).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014)(citing FED. R. CIV. PROC.
56(a)). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of
material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord

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Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011).
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by
examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party,
giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the
evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir.
2014).
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.2 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981)(citation omitted). To succeed on a claim related to conditions of confinement, a
plaintiff must establish both an objective and subjective element. See Grieveson v.
Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). As to the objective element, a prisoner must
establish that the conditions deny him “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To do so, he must show that the conditions resulted in an
unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs such as food, medical care,

2
The threshold order identifies Teen as a pretrial detainee. Although Teen was a pretrial detainee at
the St. Clair County Jail for a period of time, his claims in this case arise after he was convicted in 2016. As
such, his claims are derived from the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, as stated in
earlier orders. See, e.g., Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2019)(applying an objective
reasonableness standard under the Fourteenth Amendment to pretrial detainee’s conditions of
confinement claim but explaining that the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard applies to
claims by “convicted prisoners.”

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sanitation, or physical safety. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The Eighth Amendment “does
not require prisons to provide prisoners with more salubrious air, healthier food, or
cleaner water than are enjoyed by substantial numbers of free Americans.” Carroll v.
DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, “extreme deprivations are required to
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.
2002)(citations and quotations omitted).
The subjective component of a claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement requires demonstrating that a defendant had a culpable state of mind, that
is that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm
to the prisoner. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. While mere negligence does not amount
to a constitutional violation, a plaintiff satisfies the deliberate indifference standard by
showing that a prison official acted, or failed to act, despite the official’s knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm from the alleged unconstitutional conditions. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 842; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-348 (1986). That is, prison officials
must act to prevent “unreasonable peril” or to address “preventable, observed hazards
that pose a significant risk of severe harm to inmates.” Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681,
683 (7th Cir. 2016).
ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Teen was
exposed to an excessive risk to his health and safety. Unsafe air conditions can give rise
to claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. While prisoners may not be
guaranteed “more salubrious air,” they are protected from noxious air. See, e.g., Helling v.

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McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)(noting that intense exposure to tobacco smoke could
constitute a significant risk of harm to inmate health). Additionally, allegations of
extremely poor ventilation systems have been held to satisfy the objective prong of an
unconstitutional conditions claim where there is evidence of a “direct physical
manifestation of the harm caused by the poor ventilation, as well as the quite likely
possibility for future health problems.” See Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 486 (7th Cir.
2005). That said, there must be evidence that the air quality poses a danger to inmate
health.
Considering environmental tobacco smoke in Helling, the Supreme Court
determined that with respect to the objective component, the prisoner “must show that
he himself is being exposed to unreasonably high levels” of the smoke. 509 U.S. at 35. The
Supreme Court also reasoned that the prisoner’s claim required “more than a scientific
and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that
such an injury to health will actually be caused by exposure,” including assessing
“whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”
Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). Likewise, courts evaluating claims of exhaust fume
exposure consider the length of time of an inmate’s exposure to allegedly noxious air and
also the consequences of the exposure. See, e.g., Sibley v. Dart, No. 17-cv-6298, --F.Supp.3d ---, 2019 WL 8544391, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2019)(noting that the inmate,
who had asthma, was only exposed to smoke-filled air for under an hour but the air
caused the inmate to lose consciousness)(citing Morissette v. DeTella, No. 96-C-6798, 1997

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WL 619851, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1997)(noting that 45 minutes of exposure to engine
fumes, which caused long-term headaches and dizzy spells, was not actionable because
“brief and isolated exposure to engine exhaust does not violate the Constitution”)).
When all the facts and circumstances are considered, there is insufficient evidence
that Teen was exposed to noxious air at a level that rises to a constitutional violation. He
was exposed to fumes for short periods of time once per week for six weeks. There is no
evidence that the odor he smelled actually was harmful, but he does report mild
symptoms. His symptoms, however, were headaches, dizziness, stomach pain, watering
eyes, and a scratchy throat that dissipated along with the fumes, either because a fan was
brought in or because the odor ended. Crediting his testimony, Teen submitted a single
sick call, but he only did so to check and make sure that he was okay, as opposed to
seeking treatment for a serious or lingering health problem. He did not visit the
healthcare unit until May 2018. By that appointment, he had “more pressing” medical
issues and did not report any lingering medical issues tied to the exhaust odor.
All members of society are exposed to incidental, fleeting exposure to exhaust
fumes, and here, there is no evidence that Teen’s exposure was severe or was at a level
beyond what anyone would willingly accept as a part of life. Correctional officers
continued their rounds and duties without any changes as a result of the alleged odor.
Based on the record before the Court, it is likely that the smell described by Teen came
from the test of the back-up generator system, but there is no evidence of a malfunction
in the system or in the piping that led to exhaust pouring into L-Block. Teen testified that
no smoke or particles related to the odor were visible in the air, and he required no

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medical care in the wake of his exposure.
Teen’s captain’s complaints similarly do not evidence any sort of long term or
lingering medical problems from the fumes, and one officer’s response indicates the
officer did not smell any fumes in the jail. The record is devoid of support for Teen’s
contention that he was exposed to unreasonable amounts of exhaust fumes or that the
fumes were harmful. If the air was harmful during the generator tests, any exposure was
brief and isolated, and, as such, no reasonable juror could conclude that Teen was
exposed to an excessive risk to his health or physical safety. But see Farnham, 394 F.3d at
486 (finding triable issue of fact where prisoners claimed numerous nosebleeds and
prolonged respiratory issues, which led to one prisoner’s hospitalization, and where a
heating contractor examined the jail ventilation system and reported that the ducts were
contaminated with black mold and fiberglass in a manner that posed a health hazard).
Even if Teen could establish that he was exposed to a substantial risk of harm, he
cannot establish that Lanzante was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Lanzante was
involved in Teen’s claims only on February 8, 2018, when he responded to a disturbance
between Teen and Germaine, and on February 22, 2018, when he allegedly refused to give
Teen a captain’s complaint form. On February 8, 2018, another officer opened the door
and got a fan shortly after Lanzante’s arrival to the scene. Thus, there is no evidence that
Lanzante’s behavior rose to the level of deliberate indifference, or was even objectively
unreasonable, on that date.
As to the claim that Lanzante refused to give Teen a captain’s complaint form to
report the exhaust smell on February 22, 2018, that claim is questionable since Teen

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submitted an unrelated captain’s complaint on that date. Nonetheless, refusing to turn
over a captain’s complaint form does not rise to the level of personal conduct that could
be deemed to be reckless behavior towards Teen’s health or safety with respect to an odor
in the cell block. Teen does not allege that he was bothered by the fumes on that date, so
it is unclear how that behavior displayed reckless disregard to Teen’s health or safety.
Even under an objective reasonableness standard, no reasonable juror could find that
Lanzante’s alleged behavior towards Teen during this period was constitutionally
suspect.
As to Germaine, Teen’s testimony suggests that he was involved in Teen’s odor
complaints on two dates: February 8, 2018, and March 8, 2018. On February 8, 2018, Teen
testified that Germaine smelled the fumes but refused to open the door to the cell block
to improve air circulation, leading to a disagreement approximately 30 minutes later after
which another officer got a fan. (Doc. 56-1, p. 7-8). On March 8, 2018, Germaine again
allegedly refused to get a fan.
Two discrete incidents one month apart during which Germaine continued his
assigned duties and conducted rounds as usual do not rise to the level of reckless
disregard for, nor did it constitute objectively unreasonable behavior with respect to,
Teen’s health or safety, particularly where security reasons explain a refusal to open the
cell block door. The Court need not resolve this question, however, because Teen was not
exposed to a substantial risk of harm as required to establish a constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc.

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56) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Charles Germaine
and Christopher Lanzante and shall close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed
by Judge Sison
Date:
2020.05.11
15:54:00 -05'00'
______________________________

Dated: May 11, 2020.

GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

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