Monroe v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al

Filing 84

ORDER GRANTING 74 Motion for Summary Judgment and 77 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Steven D. Monroe's claims against Defendants Anthony Wills, Rob Jeffreys, Holly Hawkins, Mohammed Siddiqui, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Stephen P. McGlynn on 9/2/2021. (anb2)

Case 3:18-cv-01052-SPM Document 84 Filed 09/02/21 Page 1 of 13 Page ID #768

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STEVEN D. MONROE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 18-CV-01052-SPM

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court for consideration of two Motions for
Summary Judgment. Defendants John Baldwin, Holly Hawkins, and Jacqueline
Lashbrook (IDOC Defendants) have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 74)
and memorandum in support (Doc. 75), which Plaintiff Steven D. Monroe responded
to (Doc. 80). Dr. Mohammed Siddiqui and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford
Defendants) also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 77) and memorandum
in support (Doc. 78), which Monroe responded to (Doc. 81). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the Motions.
RELEVANT FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS
In the Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monroe claims that
various Wexford and IDOC staff at Menard Correctional Center denied him adequate
medical treatment for a headache, hearing loss, ear swelling, and ear pain (Doc. 11).
Following threshold review of this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court
allowed Monroe to proceed with Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims
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against Mohammed Siddiqui and Holly Hawkins (Count 1) along with Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. (Count 2) because they denied Monroe medical treatment for
serious and sudden hearing loss, accompanied by severe pain and a persistent
headache (Doc. 7). The Court noted that Monroe did not allege that Hawkins
examined him or had any direct contact with him at any point (Id.). The Complaint
also does not indicate whether Monroe’s condition was ever resolved, nor does it
specify some degree of harm suffered (Doc. 1).
Monroe also sought injunctive relief. Therefore, Jacqueline Lashbrook, the
Warden at Menard Correctional Center at the time, and John Baldwin, the former
Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, remained in the case as
Defendants in their official capacities in order to carry out any injunctive relief should
Monroe prevail. 1
Defendants moved for summary judgment (Docs. 74, 77). Defendants set forth
the following undisputed facts: Monroe alleges he first submitted a sick call request
on October 17, 2017 (Doc. 75-1, p. 19). He alleges he gave a female med tech a request
slip addressed to healthcare, explaining his symptoms, and requesting to
immediately be seen, although he does not know what happened to the request slip
(Id. at 20). Monroe alleges he spoke with various mental health professionals and
correctional officers regarding the symptoms he was having and his request to be seen
by the health care unit, but none of these individuals were Hawkins, the Director of

The Court has since substituted Anthony Wills, current Warden of Menard Correctional Center, and
Rob Jeffreys, current Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, as the proper parties pursuant
to Rule 25(d).

1

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Nursing at Menard Correctional Center at the time (Doc. 75, pp. 2-3). Monroe alleges
on October 22, 2017, he gave a female medtech a second request slip directed to health
care explaining his symptoms (Id. at 4).
Monroe claims that on October 23, 2017, he gave a third request slip to a
gallery correctional officer (Doc. 75, p. 4). Later that day, a nurse saw Monroe for his
complaint of pain in his right ear (Doc. 78-1, p. 2). During the visit, he reported that
he had a history of earache, ear infection, or ear surgery (Id.). The nurse prescribed
Levaquin and Floxin ear drops (Id.). The nurse also referred him to a doctor for followup in one week (Id.). Monroe did not start his medications until October 27, 2017,
when his provider confirmed for the second time that neither antibiotic was penicillin
related (Doc. 78, p. 2). That same day, Monroe alleges that he sent a request slip
addressed to “health care/ medical director,” explaining he continued to have
unresolved medical issues and asked to be seen immediately (Doc. 75, p. 4). At his
follow up appointment on November 1, 2017, the nurse practitioner wrote that since
he just started the antibiotics for his ear infection, his appointment was rescheduled
for the following week (Doc. 78-1, p. 3).
On November 7, 2017, Monroe claims he gave a request slip addressed to
health care to the female med-tech/nurse who was conducting medication line in his
cell house (Doc. 75, p. 4). On November 8, 2017, Monroe was seen by Dr. Shah (Doc.
78-1, p. 4). 2 Monroe claims that during the visit, Shah otoscoped his right ear,
causing severe pain and profuse bleeding (Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 81, p. 2). Monroe alleges

2

The progress notes from this visit are mostly illegible.

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he gave a request slip addressed to health care to a female med-tech/nurse during
medication line on November 10, 2017, complaining of a swollen ear, bleeding,
headaches, and trouble hearing (Doc. 75, p. 5). Monroe states he was seen the next
day in the cell house pursuant to a call pass (Id.). Medical records reflect differing
dates from Monroe’s claim, showing that on November 12, 2017, Monroe called for a
nurse for pain in his right ear and reported hearing loss (Doc. 78-1, p. 5). The visiting
nurse noted that there was blood in his ear canal (Id.). Monroe was provided Tylenol
for the pain and referred to a physician (Id.).
Monroe filled out a grievance on November 16, 2017 complaining about
inadequate medical care (Doc. 75-3, pp. 1-6). After the grievance was returned due to
a procedural defect, Monroe resubmitted the grievance on November 20, 2017, and it
was received by the counselor the next day (Id. at 2-6).
Monroe also saw Siddiqui on November 20th (Doc. 78-1, p. 5). 3 At that
appointment, Monroe reported to Siddiqui that at the previous visit with Shah, he
had an ear flush and believed the otoscope caused him to have bleeding (Id.). While
the progress notes inexplicably focused on Monroe’s left ear, Siddiqui did note that
Monroe’s right ear appeared normal (Id.). 4 He advised Monroe to take ibuprofen and
follow-up in four weeks (Id.).
On November 30, 2017, Hawkins responded to Monroe’s grievance, noting she
reviewed the grievance and his medical file and found that his medical issues were

Monroe alleges that the progress notes for this visit were fabricated, but offers no evidence for his
assertion (Doc. 81, p. 3).
4 Siddiqui also noted that Monroe’s complaint of old dried blood in his left ear canal was not
visualized.
3

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addressed by Siddiqui at his previous appointment (Doc. 75, p. 5).
On December 6, 2017, Monroe claims that he submitted a sick call request
addressed to “health care/ medical director” by handing it to the med-tech/nurse
conducting medication line (Doc. 75, p. 6).
In December 2017, Monroe appealed the grievance response to the grievance
officer at Menard Correctional Center, noting he continued to have the same
symptoms and requesting to be seen by a specialist (Doc. 75-3, p. 1). The appeal was
received by the Menard Grievance Officer on December 18, 2017, and reviewed on
December 21, 2017 (Id.). He then appealed to the Arbitration Review Board (Doc. 754, p. 3).
On December 18, 2017, Monroe states he gave the med tech/nurse conducting
the medication line a request slip addressed to health care, requesting to be seen and
explaining his symptoms (Doc. 75, p. 6). Monroe also separately conceded that
Grievance Officer Lorie Oakley requested additional information from health care
upon receiving his appealed November 2017 grievance and was told the health care
unit had not received any additional requests during the grievance time frame (Id.).
On December 21, 2017, Monroe had his follow-up appointment with Siddiqui
(Doc. 78-1, p. 10). Monroe complained about decreased hearing in his right ear and
headaches (Id.). Siddiqui observed no drainage, but slight bruising in Monroe’s right
ear canal without bleeding (Id.). He referred Monroe for an audioscope appointment
that occurred on January 12, 2018 (Id. at pp. 10-11).
On January 18, 2018, Siddiqui submitted a referral for Monroe for an audiology
evaluation for hearing aids (Doc. 78-1, p. 33). On March 29, 2018, an outside provider
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at Southern Illinois Healthcare saw Monroe for his reported ear pain, headaches,
hearing loss, and for failing the prison hearing screening (Id. at p. 36). At that time,
Monroe reported that he could not “hear out of his right ear and the left is good” (Id.).
During the outside appointment, the provider reported “poor reliability and
asymmetry; left ear mild unspecified [hearing loss] with normal, Type A,
tympanometry. Right ear revealed a profound mixed hearing loss with normal, Type
A, tympanogram. Behavioral test est [sic] results were of poor reliability. OAE
diagnostic revealed strong responses bilaterally, consistent with normal cochlear
function” (Id.). The provider recommended to recheck Monroe’s audio at a later date
(Id.). On April 4, 2018, Monroe had a post-medical furlough follow-up with a nurse
practitioner, who reported that Monroe passed the provider’s hearing test (Id. at p.
16). Monroe was provided with a refill of Naproxen for pain (Id.).
Monroe did not return to medical staff regarding his earache until September
1, 2018 (Doc. 78-1, p. 18). On that date, Monroe attended sick call where he
complained of an ongoing earache (Id.). On September 19, 2018, Monroe saw Siddiqui
regarding his earache (Id. at p. 19). Siddiqui reviewed Monroe’s March 29 audiogram
report that stated testing for the right ear was inconclusive and recommended
retesting (Id.). Siddiqiui submitted a follow-up referral to audiology (Id.).
On October 23, 2018, Monroe was seen by the outside provider for another
hearing test (Doc. 78-1, p. 54). 5 During that visit, Monroe’s results revealed a
“bilateral border line mild/slight SNHL [sensorineural hearing loss] bilaterally with

Monroe states that this visit with an outside provider for testing never occurred, but he confused
the date of the of the exam (Doc. 81, p. 3).

5

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improved word recognition scores in the right ear, symmetrical to the left ear word
reorganization score from 3/29. Tympanometry is normal, Type A.” (Id.). The provider
recommended that Monroe return to audio as needed (Id.). Monroe did not submit
any further healthcare requests related to his earaches or headaches after the exam.
At his deposition in March 2020, when asked if he was continuing to experience
headaches, Monroe stated he did not know and that he recently had two surgeries he
was focused on recovering from (Doc. 75-1, pp. 28-9).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is “the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit” where a
party lays its proverbial cards on the table, showing what evidence it possesses to
convince a trier of fact to agree with its version of events. Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d
1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d
852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)). Summary judgment is only
appropriate if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M
Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)).
That “burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing
out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the
moving party has set forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then shifts
to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere conclusory allegations and offer
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e); see Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Celotex, 477
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U.S. at 232-24.
In determining the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court
construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Intern.-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396
(7th Cir. 2000). While the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the opposing party, “[i]nferences and opinions must be grounded
on more than flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions, or rumors[.]”
Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); Rand v. CF
Industries, Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, when opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007);
Henning v. O'Leary, 477 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
I.

Deliberate Indifference Claims
Claims for deliberate indifference have an objective and a subjective

component. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Monroe must establish that he
suffered from an objectively, sufficiently serious medical condition. Cesal v. Moats,
851 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2017). He must also show that Defendants actually knew
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of, but disregarded, a substantial risk to his health. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 721. It is wellsettled that mere negligence is not enough to establish a Defendant’s deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986). In fact, even
gross negligence is insufficient. King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012).
Instead, deliberate indifference is comparable to criminal recklessness. Thomas v.
Blackard, 2 F.4th 716 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing King, 680 F.3d at 1018).
A. Holly Hawkins
Monroe claims that in her administrative role, Hawkins was responsible for
ensuring that sick call procedures would provide him with access to care for the
serious medical needs he described in his numerous sick call requests, but she failed
to do so which resulted in delays he experienced in obtaining medical care (Doc. 1, pp.
30-2). Hawkins argues that she is entitled to summary judgment as the record belies
any claim that she was objectively unreasonable or deliberately indifferent to
Monroe’s serious medical needs. Hawkins argues that she was not personally
involved in Monroe’s medical care and although she ultimately denied Monroe’s
grievance, it was not ignored (Doc. 75, pp. 11-3).
The Court finds that Monroe failed to present sufficient evidence to support a
reasonable jury finding that Hawkins acted with deliberate indifference under the
Eighth Amendment. A court will not find a jail official to have acted with deliberate
indifference to an inmate’s medically related requests if he reasonably relied on the
judgment of medical personnel. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 343. Hawkins was entitled
to defer to the judgment of jail health professionals, so long as she did not ignore
Monroe. See Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2017); Hayes, 546 F.3d at
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527–528; Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010–11 (7th Cir. 2006); Greeno, 414
F.3d at 655–656; Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
Monroe did not allege that Hawkins had any direct contact with him (Doc. 7).
On November 30, 2017, Hawkins received and responded to Monroe’s November 20,
2017 grievance complaining about inadequate medical care. From the record, it
appears this was the first time that Hawkins learned of Monroe’s issues. Hawkins
responded to the grievance, noting that she reviewed the grievance and Monroe’s
medical file and stated that Monroe’s medical issues were addressed by Siddiqui on
November 20, 2017. While the grievance process progressed, Monroe’s medical
records reflect he was treated continuously by medical professionals.
Hawkins had no “reason to doubt” that the health care unit based their
recommendation on medical judgment and were adequately addressing Monroe’s
concerns. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017); Arnett, 658 F.3d at 756
(“A layperson’s failure to tell the medical staff how to do its job cannot be called
deliberate indifference; it is just a form of failing to supply a gratuitous rescue
service.”) (quoting Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009)). Hawkins
reviewed and responded to Monroe’s grievance, made sure that the medical staff was
monitoring and addressing the problem, and reasonably deferred to the medical
professionals’ opinions. Accordingly, Hawkins is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Mohammed Siddiqui and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
Monroe claims that Wexford’s policies and procedures resulted in delays he
experienced in obtaining medical care (Doc. 1, pp. 19-20). Monroe further alleges that
Siddiqui failed to ensure that sick call procedures would provide him with access to
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care, failed to timely respond to his requests for care, and intentionally ignored his
requests to be referred to a specialist, which resulted in delays he experienced in
obtaining medical care (Id. at 27-9).
Siddiqui and Wexford contest that Monroe suffered from a serious medical
condition. “A medical condition is objectively serious if a physician has diagnosed it
as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.”
Hammond v. Rector, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2015)(citing Pyles v. Fahim,
771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)). The Seventh Circuit has recognized numerous
medical issues, including hernia, arthritis, minor burns, heartburn accompanied by
vomiting, and a broken wrist, as objectively serious. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d
827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007)(collecting cases). The Court, after drawing all inferences in
the light most favorable to Monroe, finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that
he had an objectively serious medical condition.
Siddiqui and Wexford further argue that Monroe has not demonstrated that
Siddiqui acted with deliberate indifference by failing to establish that he had the
requisite state of mind by intentionally or recklessly disregarding Monroe’s needs. A
disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment about the proper choice of
treatment—or even a disagreement between two medical professionals—is not
enough to establish deliberate indifference. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409. Instead,
Monroe must set forth evidence that Siddiqui’s “treatment strayed so far from
accepted professional standards that a jury could infer the doctor acted with
deliberate indifference.” Petties, 795 F.3d at 692. In other words, a “medical
professional is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally
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competent

professional

would

have

so

responded

under

those

circumstances.’” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Monroe’s favor, after
examining the totality of his medical treatment, the record shows that Menard
healthcare staff, including Siddiqui, actively provided Monroe meaningful and
ongoing treatment for his right ear condition from 2017 to 2018, especially
considering that the undisputed facts show that Siddiqui provided Monroe with three
referrals, the last of which only found mild/slight hearing loss in his right ear, and he
no longer complained of pain or headaches after two of those referrals.
Wexford additionally argues that Monroe’s claim that its policies and
procedures resulted in delays that he experienced in obtaining medical care lacks any
evidence to support it. Because Monroe has provided no evidence of policies and
procedures that would result in his alleged delay in medical care, the Court agrees.
Last, as an alternative if the Court did find deliberate indifference, Siddiqui
and Wexford argue that Monroe has not presented any medical evidence that he
suffered harm as a result of the alleged delay. In cases “where the plaintiff alleges
the defendant delayed, rather than denied, medical treatment, [the Seventh Circuit
has] required that the plaintiff present verifying medical evidence that the delay, and
not the underlying condition, caused some harm.” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). Again, Monroe has
provided no evidence that the alleged delay caused some degree of harm.
For all of these reasons, Siddiqui and Wexford are entitled to summary
judgment.
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II.

Injunctive Relief
Wills and Jeffreys claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on

Monroe’s request for injunctive relief because he failed to demonstrate that he is
entitled to an injunction. Monroe failed to challenge Wills and Jeffreys’s argument.
“A party seeking to defeat a motion for summary judgment is required to ‘wheel out
all its artillery to defeat it’” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc.,
90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “Failure to respond to an
argument results in waiver” Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir.
2010). As a result, Wills and Jeffreys are entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 74)
and Plaintiff Steven D. Monroe’s claim and request for injunctive relief against
Defendants Holly Hawkins, Anthony Wills, and Rob Jeffreys is DISMISSED with
prejudice. The Court also GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 77)
and Monroe’s claims against Defendants Dr. Mohammed Siddiqui and Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

September 2, 2021
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge

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