Crawford et al v. Godinez et al
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendants' 73 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The motion is GRANTED as to all of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Bates and Godinez. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Barnard, Suits, and Davis relative to the conditions of the showers at Dixon Springs. The motion is GRANTED as to all other of Plaintiffs' claims against Barnard, Suits, and Davis. At the close of the case, the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants Bates and Godinez. Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 7/15/2021. (sth)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTHONY CRAWFORD, and
TY J. BATES,
NORMAN SUITS, and
Case No. 3:18-cv-1067-DWD
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiffs Anthony Crawford and Howard Tessman bring Eighth Amendment
conditions-of-confinement claims against Defendants, alleging that the conditions they
suffered at the Dixon Springs Impact Incarceration Program violated their constitutional
motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Docs. 74 & 80) For the following reasons,
the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In September 2010, Crawford was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment
All record citations refer to the document and page nu
release with the option of participating in
Program to receive a sentence reduction. (Doc. 74-11) Crawford chose to participate in
the Dixon Springs program and was placed there from December 7, 2010, to April 6, 2011.
(Docs. 74-1 & 74-14) In April 2012, Tessman was sentenced to a five-year term of
imprisonment in IDOC. (Doc. 74-13) He also chose to participate in the Dixon Springs
program and was placed there on September 2, 2012 but left four days later. (Docs. 74-2
& 74-15) Plaintiffs had the option to leave Dixon Springs at any time, but if they did so
before they completed 120 days there, they would have to serve the remainder of their
original sentence. (Docs. 74-10 at 27; 74-15)
Dixon Springs is a satellite facility of the Vienna Correctional Center and houses
302 inmates. (Doc. 74-9 at 4) According to the Inmate Orientation Manual, the primary
goal of Dixon Springs
is to promote lawful behavior in youthful offenders who are incarcerated
for the first time, by providing a structured, specialized, program that
develops responsibility, self-esteem, and positive self-concept while also
addressing the underlying issues that often lead to criminal behavior. To
accomplish this goal, the Impact Incarceration Program has designed a
strict system of discipline.
(Doc. 74-9 at 8) The manual describes possible punishments for rules infractions, which
include verbal counseling, various types of additional exercise, and a demerit system.
entry to the program, inmates must sign a consent form
training and labor, military formation and drills, regimented activities, uniformity of
dress and appearance, [and] that privileges including visitation, commissary, receipt and
retention of property and publications and access to television, radio, and a library will
bsite describes Dixon
Springs as a boot camp that prov
Dixon Springs Impact
https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/dixonsprings.aspx (last accessed on
the inmates an experience similar to that
of old-fashioned military basic training, in which harsh regimentation, including drillsergeant abuse by correctional officers, is used to break down and remold the character
Wittmer v. Peters
units must continue to develop self-discipline in their [participants]. Self-discipline
begins early in boot camp by ensuring that the training center cadre maintains total
An Overview of Boot Camp
Goals, Components, and Results, in Correctional Boot Camps: A Tough Intermediate
Sanction 17, 19 (Doris L. MacKenzie & Eugene E. Hebert eds., 1996). Many of the aspects
of military basic training were described in
Crawford recalls starting his day at Dixon Springs by being awakened and
standing in front of his bunk dressed only in his boxers. (Doc. 74-10 at 32) Then the
inmates would exercise and eat breakfast.
every day outside regardless of weather. (Doc. 74-10 at 152) The officers made the inmates
perform an exercise that required them to stand in front of a wall with their hands raised
in the air for an indeterminate amount of time, sometimes more than 30 minutes and
sometimes outside wearing only their underwear. (Doc. 74-10 at 154) Crawford testified
that they would be required to exercise outside in the cold and snow and that his fingers
would become numb. (Doc. 74-10 at 58) None of the sessions lasted more than an hour.
(Doc. 74-10 at 59)
After morning exercises, the inmates would be released by groups to use the
bathroom. (Doc. 74-10 at 32) According to Crawford, if a tough officer was monitoring
bathroom use, he might get only two or three minutes to shave, brush his teeth, and use
the toilet. (Docs. 74-10 at 33; 74-18 at 44) Crawford testified that Defendant Barnard, a
corrections officer at Dixon Springs, would give the inmates from two and a half to four
minutes to defecate in the bathroom. 2
of the inmates in a group
did not finish in time, then the guards would punish that inmate and his group with extra
exercise. 3 (Doc. 74-10 at 34) Officers sometimes withheld mail as a form of punishment.
(Doc. 74-10 at 166)
Typically, inmates would be permitted to use the bathroom four times a day, once
after each exercise session and once after showering at night. (Doc
inmate asked to use the bathroom outside of those times, the officers would give the
inmate permission but would also punish the inmate with additional exercise. (Doc. 74-
deciding summary judgment, the Court infers that al
Barnard testified that generally more time would be given to an inmate who needed more time to finish
using the bathroom. (Doc. 74-8 at 29)
defecated on themselves because they
were denied permission to use the bathroom. (Doc. 74-10 at 108). If that happened, they
would not be given permission to change clothes. (Doc. 74urinated on himself once for that reason. (Doc. 74-10 at
came when he was working in the kitchen, where he was able to use the bathroom
e Dixon Springs manual requires that the
inmates brush their teeth after every meal (Doc. 74-9 at 12), but the officers often did not
let them do so. (Doc. 74-10 at
minutes to shower at night. (Doc. 74-10 at 95)
Often, some of the showerheads did not work, so there would be nine or ten
inmates crowded together to use the functioning showerheads. 4
The drains did not work well, so the showers had five to six inches of standing water and
urine. (Docs. 74-10 at 100; 74-18 at 42) The drains were never fixed while Crawford was
at Dixon Springs. (Doc. 74-10 at 127) Crawford believes that the fungal infections on his
feet are due to the dirty shower water. (Doc. 74-10 at 102) The toilets had fecal stains on
the seats and there were urine and toilet paper on the floor of the bathrooms. (Doc. 74-10
at 105) At one point during Cr
ngs, three urinals were not
working but took over a month to be repaired. 5 (Doc. 80-2 at 62) Crawford estimates that
they were allotted about one roll of toilet paper a week. (Doc. 74-10 at 106) Sometimes
Barnard testified that showerheads and toilets were repaired within a reasonable amount of time. (Doc.
74-8 at 18)
5 Plaintiffs cite several other work orders that show toilets, urinals, and showerheads were often broken
but took an excessively long time to repair. (Doc. 80 at 20) However, most of these work orders were filed
and completed when neither Crawford nor Tessman were present at Dixon Springs.
Crawford and other inmates would tell some of the officers about the broken toilets or
showerheads but avoided telling certain officers for fear of punishment. (Doc. 74-17 at
The inmates were provided with three meals a day. (Doc. 74-10 at 44) Crawford
testified that some of the meals were heavily seasoned to cover the taste of the spoiled
food. (Doc. 74-10 at 140) Crawford reports that other inmates sometimes vomited onto
their food trays. (Doc. 74-10 at 141) He had diarrhea once or twice after eating the food
(Doc. 74-17 at 123) The officers had different, better food. 6 (Doc. 74-10 at 147) Tessman
testified that he had spoiled milk on one occasion and noticed that other inmates had
something wrong with their
ssman experienced diarrhea
during and immediately after leaving Dixon Springs. (Doc. 74-18 at 54) Crawford testified
that Barnard and other officers would make them eat quickly in about six or seven
minutes, sometimes while standing up with one hand behind their back. (Doc. 74-17 at
Upon arriving at Dixon Springs, Crawford received two pairs of pants, two blue
shirts, a pair of boots, a winter hat, a baseball hat, three pairs of socks, three pairs of
underwear, three undershirts, a jacket, and a sweatshirt and sweatpants. (Doc. 74-10 at
oots had holes in them and were too small. (Docs. 74-10
also had holes in them. (Doc. 74-10 at 144) Often,
Barnard testified that officers ate the same food as inmates most of the time. (Doc. 74-8 at 24)
three pairs of socks total and only one pair of boots.
underwear had stains. (Docs. 74-10 at 114; 74-18 at 55)
The inmates were not permitted to wear their sweatpants to bed. (Doc. 74-10 at 50)
At night, it was sometimes extremely cold because Barnard or another officer would leave
a window open or leave fans on, even in
Crawford and others could see their breath at night in the dormitory. (Doc. 74-10 at 120)
However, the inmates were not permitted to adjust the thermostats. (Doc. 74-9 at 13) But
the officers had personal space heaters and fans and wore large coats and boots with
heavy clothing. 7 (Doc. 74-10 at 94)
ttress, a fitted sheet, a second sheet, and
a blanket. (Doc. 74-10 at 45) The inmates were permitted to wash their sheets once a
month. (Doc. 74-10 at 111) The sheets had stains and holes in them. (Docs. 74-10 at 126;
74-18 at 33) There was mold in the dormitories, and water leaked onto beds in the
The mold was never cleaned while
Crawford was at Dixon Springs. (Doc. 74-10 at 127)
Dixon Springs has a procedure for inmates to file grie
However, Crawford never filed a grievance. (Doc. 74-10 at 45) He claims that he did not
file a grievance because the officers would punish inmates who did so. (Doc. 74-10 at 116)
Tessman never filed a grievance for
Barnard testified that he does not recall wearing a coat inside. (Doc. 74-8 at 31)
Defendant Norman Suits, Superintendent of Dixons Springs, testified that there was a leak in the roof of
a common area of the administrative building but could not recall any leaks in the dormitories. (Doc. 74-5
Neither Crawford nor Tessman know any of the defendants except Barnard (Docs.
Barnard made him do excessive physical
exercise. (Doc. 74-18 at 58) He also described an incident that occurred during an exercise
session. While Tessman was running, Barnard punched or elbowed him in the side which
caused him to trip, fall, and hit his head on the side of the track.
suffered dizziness, blurred vision, a mild concussion, and was urinating blood for two
days. (Doc. 74-18 at 69) Barnard punished Crawford and other inmates by making them
stand or lie down outside in the cold, rain, and snow. (Doc. 74-17
withheld candy bars that Crawford and the other inmates had purchased from the
commissary until the inmates did additional exercise. (Doc. 74-17 at 101)
Defendant Norman Suits was the Superintendent of Dixon Springs from August
2011 to October 2012. (Doc. 74-5 at 1) Suits main
to speak with staff and inmates and oversee the operation of the fac
recall any complaints about the food being spoiled or expired. (Doc. 80-4 at 14)
Defendant Randy Davis was the Warden of Vienna Correctional Center from
December 2011 to June 2014 and had oversight of Dixon Springs. (Doc. 74-3 at 1) He
sanitation, speak with staff and inmates, address any raised concerns or make note of any
visible issues that required follow up, meet with the Superintendent of the facility, and
serts that Dixon Springs was clean and wellances of excessive exercise or abuse by
(Doc. 74-3 at 1)
Defendant Ty Bates was Deputy Director of the Southern Region of IDOC from
December 2011 to June 2013 and was responsible for several facilities including Dixon
Springs. (Doc. 74-7) He would typically visit Dixon Springs about once a month. (Doc.
74-7) On his visits, Bates would walk through the facility and speak with the staff casually
but not about any institutional concerns. (Doc. 80-4 at 14) He also spoke with inmates
about their concerns. (Doc. 80-4 at 15) He observed prob
ally a leak in the roof, and he
Bates recalls inmates complaining to him about the food, specifically that they
were being served expired food and rotten
passed these concerns on to the warden or superintendent. (Doc. 80-4 at 21) He also
reported the food complaints to the state dietary manager. (Doc. 80-4 at 35) He also recalls
inmates complaining that there were too few bathrooms, that there was not enough time
to use them, and that they n
He also recalls complaints
about the building being drafty. (Doc. 80-4 at 27) He says that the warden and
superintendent would frequently tell him about needed repairs in the bathrooms and he
would try to get approval for those projects. (Doc. 80-4 at 25) Suits was the superintendent
who would be touring with him and Davis would be with them most of the time. (Doc.
mplaints from the inmates about the clothing being old,
worn, and inadequate, but he does not reca
Defendant Salvador Godinez was the director of IDOC from 2011 to 2015. (Doc.
74-6 at 17) During that time, he visited Dixo
not remember any details of the conditions at Dixon Springs. (Doc. 74-6 at 24) Plaintiffs
concede that Suits, Davis, Bates, and Godinez were not employed by IDOC while
Crawford was at Dixon Springs and that
ainst them should
therefore be dismissed. (Doc. 80 at 5)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
56(a)). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord
Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011).
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, and as required by Rule 56(
facts by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving
party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts
Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)
(citation omitted). To succeed on a claim related to conditions of confinement, a plaintiff
must establish both an objective and subjective element. See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538
F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). As to the objective element, a prisoner must establish that
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
To do so, he must show that the conditions resulted in an unquestioned and serious
deprivation of basic human needs such as food, medical care, sanitation, or physical
safety. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The Eighth Amendm
provide prisoners with more salubrious air, healthier food, or cleaner water than are
Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472
are required to make out a conditions-ofTurner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations and
Johnson v. Pelker,
891 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1989).
The subjective component of a claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement requires demonstrating that a defendant had a culpable state of mind, that
is that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm
to the prisoner. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. While mere negligence does not amount
to a constitutional violation, a plaintiff satisfies the deliberate indifference standard by
substantial risk of serious harm from the alleged unconstitutional conditions. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 842; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-348 (1986). That is, prison officials
Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681,
683 (7th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiffs have produced evidence sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the conditions at Dixon Springs violated the objective component
of an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim. Plaintiffs have also produced
evidence sufficient to generate genuine issues of material fact regarding the deliberate
indifference of Barnard, Suits, and Davis. Plaintiffs have not evidence that Bates or
Godinez was deliberately indifferent, however, so summary judgment is due to be
granted in favor of those two defendants.
xon Springs, only one presents a plainly
inadequate condition: the lack of hygiene in the dormitory showers. See Gillis v. Litscher,
468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a lack of sanitation can violate the Eighth
Amendment); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prison
must provide adequate utilities, including plumbing). The shower drains are alleged to
have been consistently clogged for days at a time, resulting in several inches of standing
water. Because the inmates had little time and few opportunities to use the bathroom,
they would sometimes urinate in the showers. As a result, Crawford, Tessman, and the
other inmates were forced to use showers filled with standing water and urine. Crawford
testified that these unhygienic conditions caused the fungal infections on his feet.
Whether this correlation is true is one for a trier of fact. The Court finds that Crawford
and Tessman have raised a triable Eighth Amendment claim concerning the conditions
in the showers.
Crawford and Tessman have also described many other uncomfortable aspects of
life at Dixon Springs. However, none of these conditions can be said to violate the Eighth
Amendment. For example, courts have found that single incidents of exposing inmates
to cold weather for hours at a time does not constitute an Eighth Amendment claim. See,
e.g., Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1997); Dunn v. FNU Mitchell, No. 3:14-cv719, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8549 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2015); Ray v. Schoo, No. CV 10-942, 2014
Crawford testified that he was forced to exercise in the cold sometimes, but he also
testified that workouts never lasted longer than an hour. And while he may have been
cold at night, he was always sleeping indoors in his dormitory bed. The conditions he
describes do not constitute the kind of prolonged, repeated exposure to extreme weather
that would violate the Eighth Amendment.
ood, even accepted as true, do not make
adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an
Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th
Cir. 1985)). Crawford testified that, although he was required to eat quickly, he received
three meals each day while at Dixon Springs. While Crawford undoubtedly experienced
evidence that the quantity of food he received was inadequate. Crawford also testified
but did not eat any. (Doc. 74-17 at 75) He also testified that he ate a danish after the food
that occurred on only one occasion. Id.
he reported his complaints about the either the food quantity or condition, nor did he
seek medical treatment for his single bout with diarrhea.
49) He was given a carton of expired or
spoiled milk but did not drink it. (Doc. 74-18 at 50) He did not vomit from the food
provided at Dixon Springs but did have diarrhea for four to five days after leaving the
program. (Doc. 74-18 at 54) While he did not testify specifically that the food there caused
his diarrhea, he stated that he
74-12 at 32) The quality of the food may not have met their culinary standards, but
Crawford and Tessman fail to point to evidence that it was nutritionally inadequate or
that it presented an immediate danger to their health and well-being.
fitting clothes, intense exercise, and limited access to bathrooms certainly constitute
uncomfortable conditions but they are incidental to and a component of the boot camp
environment accepted by the Plaintiffs. As the manual and consent form make clear,
Dixon Springs is a military-style program designed to teach inmates discipline and
responsibility through an intense, demanding lifestyle. Inmates always have the option
of leaving Dixon Springs and returning to a traditional detention center. These conditions
also do not rise to the level of the extreme deprivations necessary to state an Eighth
Amendment claim. Under these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised a triable
Eighth Amendment claim only as to the unhygienic conditions of the showers at Dixon
Plaintiffs have put forward no evidence showing that Godinez was aware of the
conditions of the showers at Dixon Springs. Godinez said that he visited Dixon Springs
while he was director of IDOC, but he could not recall any details of the conditions there.
Neither Crawford nor Tessman know Godinez or could testify that he observed the
conditions at Dixon Springs. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the subjective
to be granted on the claims against him.
Bates has admitted that he received complaints from inmates at Dixon Springs
about the conditions there. He also testified that the warden and superintendent
frequently informed him that the bathrooms needed repairs, and he tried to get approval
taken to avert known risks will insulate a
prison official from Eighth Amendment liability, even if those measures proved
Brown v. Ryker, No. 10-cv-397-MJR-SCW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80861, at
*10 (S.D. Ill. June 12, 2012) (citing Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 646 (7th Cir. 1997)). Here,
the evidence shows that Bates took reasonable measures to report the issues brought to
his attention. And as he makes clear, it was difficult to obtain funding for capital
improvement projects, despite his best efforts. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy the subjective component vis-à-vis Bates,
and the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted on the claims against him.
refuge in Farmer
may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very facts that the
Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 646 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). Although both Suits and Davis assert that Dixon
insist that they walked the grounds every
day (Suits) or at least every month (Davis). Given the conditions of the showers at Dixon
Springs as sworn to by Crawford and Tessman, the unhygienic conditions described by
the plaintiffs would have been obvious to anyone who regularly toured the campus.
Further, Bates testified that Davis and Suits told him that the bathrooms needed repairs.
Taking these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmovants, there is a
triable question of fact conc
dge of the shower conditions.
Per their own testimony, they did nothing about the complaints, because (they assert)
they never received or were aware of the complaints. As an officer, Barnard would have
had even more opportunities to observe any inadequate conditions in the bathrooms.
Although Davis, Suits, and Barnard deny
Jackson v. Duckworth, 955
F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). Without more, the court cannot grant summary judgment for
Davis, Suits, or Barnard. 9
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
hen she makes a decision that, even if
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
The qualified immunity test has two prongs: (1) whether the facts shown, taken in
Defendants concede that there is a triable issue of
conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. See also
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 197; Wilson v. Layne
y that every reasonable official would have
Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808
(7th Cir. 2015) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). There need not be a case
have placed the statutory or constitutional
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The right must be
Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. Instead, it must
of it are clear to a reasonable official. Id. That
ve placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
Carroll v. Carmen, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014).
For the reasons discussed above, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
However, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Barnard, Suits, and Davis
to the condition of the showers at Dixon Springs. Further, as
established in this context. Therefore, qualified immunity is not available to Barnard,
Suits, and Davis at this stage.
for summary judgment (Doc. 73) is
claims against Defendants Bates and Godinez.
Barnard, Suits, and Davis relative to the condition of the showers at Dixon Springs, the
directed to Barnard, Suits, and Davis, the motion for summary judgment is hereby
GRANTED. By separate order, the Court will set a status conference to discuss scheduling
matters. The parties shall be prepared to discuss trial dates and whether a settlement
conference would be fruitful. At the close of the case, the Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment in favor of Defendants Bates and Godinez.
The Court wishes to remind Plaintiffs that litigation is often viewed as a series of
hurdles that Plaintiffs must clear to get to another hurdle. Summary Judgment is such a
hurdle, but it is a very low one for Plaintiffs to clear. Clearing the Summary Judgment
hurdle does not mean that Plaintiffs have won their case nor does it mean that they are
entitled to damages or other relief. As noted above, clearing the summary judgment
hurdle only requires the existence of a disputed fact material
trial, they will need to prove that the disputed fact did, in fact, occur as the Plaintiffs say
it occurred. Trial is the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.
Dated: July 15, 2021
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
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