Hadley v. Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals PLC et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 9/18/2018. (jdh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LEONARD HADLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 18-cv-1068-JPG-DGW

ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC,
ASTRAZENECA PLC, and U.S. GOVERNMENT
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff Leonard Hadley, who appears pro se, filed this case in May 2018 asserting that

he was injured when he took Seroquel, a psychotropic drug he alleges was developed and
manufactured by defendants AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals PLC and AstraZenica PLC and was
approved by the defendant United States Government Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).
He believes his ingestion of Seroquel from 2002 to 2008 caused him to develop Phase 1 Brugada
syndrome, a heart condition that results in disruption of the heart’s normal rhythm. Nat’l
Institutes of Health, U.S. Nat’l Library of Medicine, Brugada syndrome (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/brugada-syndrome#definition. He was diagnosed with
Brugada syndrome in 2008. As a consequence of the disease, Hadley had to have a combination
defibrillator/pacemaker implanted in his chest, has suffered extreme pain, and is constantly at
risk of death. He believes Seroquel was defective because it did not come with an adequate
warning about the cardiac risks from taking the medication.
Shortly after filing this lawsuit, Hadley moved for summary judgment against all of the
defendants (Doc. 10). In his motion, Hadley points to lawsuits AstraZenica (he does not specify

which AstraZenica defendant) settled with the United States Department of Justice in 2010 and
with a number of states in 2011 for off-label marketing and inadequate labeling of Seroquel.
Hadley believes that his undisputed ingestion of Seroquel and his development of Brugada
syndrome, along with the FDA’s conclusion that the Seroquel labeling did not adequately warn
of the risk of Brugada syndrome and AstraZenica’s settlement of the aforementioned lawsuits,
entitled him to judgment as a matter of law in this case. He seeks money damages from the
AstraZenica defendants and an injunction for the FDA to require a warning about Brugada
syndrome on the Seroquel label.
Before responding to Hadley’s summary judgment motion, AstraZenica PLC filed a
motion to dismiss (Docs. 13 & 15), which the Court has construed as a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Hadley’s purported 2011 settlement, release and agreed judgment in a
different Seroquel products liability suit against it and other AstraZenica defendants is res
judicata for this lawsuit. See Confidential Settlement and Indemnification Agreement and
Release/Covenant Not to Sue (“Settlement/Release”) (Doc. 15-1); Scott v. AstraZenica
Pharmaceuticals, LP, No. 2010-77447 (189th Jud. Dist. Harris Cty., Tex., Oct. 20, 2011) (Doc.
18-2). Alternatively, it argues that Hadley’s current suit is barred by the Illinois two-year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions, 735 ILCS 5/13-202; that AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals
PLC should be dismissed because there is no such entity; that Hadley has failed to plead facts
plausibly suggesting a right to relief; and that AstraZenica PLC should be dismissed because it
does not design, manufacture, distribute or sell pharmaceutical products. It further asks the
Court to strike Hadley’s prayer for punitive damages as improper under Illinois law. In support
of its motion, AstraZenica PLC filed, with the Court’s permission, its memorandum (Doc. 15)
under seal because it discussed, quoted and attached the confidential settlement agreement

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purportedly reached with Hadley in the prior lawsuit.
In Hadley’s response to AstraZenica PLC’s motion (Docs. 19 & 20), he denies that he
ever executed any settlement agreement and release of the AstraZenica defendants and denies
that his legal name―Leonard Eugene Hadley―and/or signature appear on the documents
submitted in support of the defendants’ res judicata argument. In support of this position, he has
filed copies of numerous personal documents: his birth certificate, his driver’s license, a 2013
report to law enforcement of identity theft, correspondence with a creditor about identity theft,
and a certificate of marriage registration. He further claims the statute of limitations for this case
has not run because the limitations period has been tolled since 1976, when he became legally
disabled. Hadley maintains he has stated a claim and properly requested punitive damages.
Hadley filed part of his response (Doc. 20) under seal.
In its reply in support of its summary judgment motion (Doc. 22), AstraZenica PLC calls
into question Hadley’s unsupported claim that he is legally disabled in a way that would toll the
statute of limitations. It also points to documentary evidence supporting the inference that
Hadley is the same person who settled the prior Seroquel lawsuit. Again with the Court’s
permission, AstraZenica PLC filed its submission under seal.
At the same time AstraZeneca PLC filed its reply in support of its own summary
judgment motion, it responded to Hadley’s summary judgment motion (Doc. 23), also under seal
with the Court’s permission. AstraZenica PLC’s brief reiterates the arguments made in its
summary judgment motion.
After briefing on the summary judgment motions was complete, Hadley filed a motion to
strike in which he objects to AstraZenica PLC’s filings under seal (Doc. 27). He contends that
because he did not sign the Settlement/Release, no privacy or confidentiality interest exists and

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the public has a right to open records of the Court. He asks that all of AstraZenica PLC’s filings
suggesting he settled the previous lawsuit be stricken. AstraZenica PLC has responded to the
motion (Doc. 28).
II.

Motion to Strike (Doc. 27)
The Court first addresses Hadley’s motion to strike. The Court rejects his request to

strike AstraZenica PLC’s filings simply because he believes they do not put forth a meritorious
defense. Striking is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which has often been
applied beyond its strict terms to filings other than pleadings, where a pleading presents an
insufficient defense or if material is “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.” This
Court and others have held that a party must show prejudice to succeed on a motion to strike.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Board of Educ. of Chi., 169 F. Supp. 2d 864, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see also
Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992). The Court should not
strike matter pursuant to Rule 12(f) “unless the challenged allegations have no possible relation
or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause some form of
significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.” 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382 (3d ed.); accord Anderson, 169 F. Supp. 2d at
867-68. The burden on a motion to strike is upon the moving party. See Vakharia v. Little Co.
of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Hadley has not
pointed to any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous material in AstraZenica PLC’s
filings and has not shown that, if proven, its argument presents an insufficient defense. Nor has
he pointed to any prejudice he will suffer if AstraZenica PLC’s filings are not stricken. Instead,
he merely disagrees with the arguments AstraZenica PLC advances. This is not a sufficient
reason to strike its filings.

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Hadley’s objections with respect to sealing documents meet with more success. Judicial
proceedings leading to a final decision and materials on which a judicial decision rests are
presumptively in the public domain. Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir.
2006), overruled in part on other grounds by TRP LLC v. Orix Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827
F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2016); Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 1996);
cf. Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994). There is
a common law right of access to documents filed in litigation. Methodist Hosps., 91 F.3d at
1031; Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978). “Public scrutiny over the
court system serves to (1) promote community respect for the rule of law, (2) provide a check on
the activities of judges and litigants, and (3) foster more accurate fact finding.” Grove Fresh, 24
F.3d at 897; see generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
“Though its original inception was in the realm of criminal proceedings, the right of access has
since been extended to civil proceedings because the contribution of publicity is just as important
there.” Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897. The common law holds that “court files and documents
should be open to the public unless the court finds that its records are being used for improper
purposes.” Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897. There are exceptions, however, to the general rule of
access to court documents. For example, a court may seal records to protect trade secrets or
other kinds of information deserving of long-term confidentiality. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott
Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002); see Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (to protect business
information that could harm litigant’s competitive standing).
In addition to this common law right of access to court documents, there is a
constitutional right of access to court records. Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897; Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982). “The First Amendment presumes that there is

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a right of access to proceedings and documents which have historically been open to the public
and where the disclosure of which would serve a significant role in the functioning of the process
in question.” Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897 (internal quotations omitted). “This presumption is
rebuttable upon demonstration that suppression ‘is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897 (quoting Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). “[W]hen a court finds that the presumption of
access has been rebutted by some countervailing interest, that ‘interest is to be articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was
properly entered.’” Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 898 (quoting Press Enter., 464 U.S. at 510).
In its initial review of AstraZenica PLC’s filings, the Court noted the reference to and
attachment of the confidential Settlement/Release, and it allowed certain documents to be sealed
to preserve the confidentiality of the settlement that had been bargained for in that agreement.
However, upon further review, and in light of the presumption that Court records are in the
public domain, the Court revisits that decision.
The Court first addresses the Settlement/Release proffered by AstraZenica PLC (Ex. 2,
Doc. 15-1). As explained below, the Court’s decision in this case does not in any way rest on the
content of that document. Therefore, the public’s interest in access to that document is
negligible since it would add little or nothing to the public’s understanding of the Court’s
decision in this case. Therefore, the parties’ interest in confidentiality is greater than the public’s
interest in access to the document, and the document should remain under seal.
With respect to AstraZenica PLC’s briefs (Docs. 15, 22 & 23) that are sealed because
they refer to that Settlement/Release, wholesale sealing simply because one part refers to the
confidential Settlement/Release is not warranted. The Court notes that most parts of those briefs

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advance arguments unrelated to the Settlement/Release so cannot support the decision to seal.
As to the parts that reference the Settlement/Release, they reveal some details that are already
revealed in unsealed filings such as the mere existence of the Settlement/Release. However, they
also refer to and quote the Settlement/Release which, as the Court has noted in the previous
paragraph, reveals nothing about the Court’s decision-making process. The Court will therefore
order AstraZenica PLC to refile its sealed briefs (Docs. 15, 22 & 23) with redactions of the parts
that reveal specific terms of the Settlement/Release and any personal information about Hadley
(e.g., his social security number and date of birth) wherever it appears.
As for the sworn declaration attached to two of those briefs (Docs. 22-3 & 23-1), there is
no indication there was any expectation of confidentiality with respect to this document.
Therefore, even though there is likewise little or no public interest in access to the document,
sealing is not justified. Accordingly, the Court will order AstraZenica PLC to refile this
document (Docs. 22-3 & 23-1) not under seal.
Hadley himself has filed documents under seal without leave of the Court (Doc. 20). The
Court has reviewed Hadley’s brief in response to AstraZenica PLC’s summary judgment motion
(Doc. 20, pp. 1-6) and finds it contains no confidential information not already asserted by
Hadley in his other public filings. Therefore, the Court will order it unsealed. As a courtesy to
Hadley, who is proceeding pro se, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to refile his response
brief for him not under seal.
As for the exhibits Hadley has filed under seal, the Court finds that most of those
documents (Doc. 20, pp. 7-20) contain information that is properly sealed pursuant to Local Rule
5.1. Furthermore, the Court has not relied on any of Hadley’s exhibits in formulating its
decision, so the public has little or no interest in access to these documents. The Court will

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therefore allow them to remain under seal.1
The Court believes this decision regarding sealing of documents is necessary to preserve
the confidentiality AstraZenica PLC bargained for in obtaining the Settlement/Release and the
privacy of Hadley’s personal information. This order allowing sealing is narrowly tailored to
serve the parties’ interests in confidentiality without impairing the ability of the public to
understand and oversee the workings of the Court.
III.

Motions for Summary Judgment
The Court now turns to the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment. Summary

judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l-Ind., Inc.,
211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678,
685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396. The initial summary judgment burden of production
is on the moving party to show the Court that there is no reason to have a trial. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 323; Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013).
A.

Hadley’s Motion

As a plaintiff with the burden of persuasion on his claim at trial, Hadley must “lay out the
elements of the claim, cite the facts which [he] believes satisfies these elements, and demonstrate
why the record is so one-sided as to rule out the prospect of a finding in favor of the non-movant

The remaining two pages of exhibits contain a copy of 735 ILCS 5/13-211, which is publicly
available, and an unexplained page showing a Google search, which the Court has not considered
in its decision.
1

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on the claim.” Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. National Ret. Fund, 778 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir.
2015); accord Felix v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 828 F.3d 560, 570 (7th Cir. 2016).
To succeed on his products liability claim for failure to warn, Hadley must prove (1) that
the defendant did not disclose the product’s unreasonably dangerous condition which it knew or
should have known about and which the average consumer would not have known about and (2)
that the presence of an adequate warning would have prevented his injuries. Sollami v. Eaton,
772 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ill. 2002); Norabuena v. Medtronic, Inc., 86 N.E.3d 1198, 1207 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2017); Solis v. BASF Corp., 979 N.E.2d 419, 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). In this case, that
means Hadley must establish that the defendants knew of the dangerous propensities of Seroquel
to cause cardiac problems like Brugada syndrome, that they gave inadequate warnings, that the
lack of warning caused Hadley to ingest Seroquel when he otherwise would not have, and that he
suffered injury from taking Seroquel.
Causation of harm by the product, an essential element of Hadley’s claim, is generally a
complicated issue to prove, especially when, as here, the question includes whether use of the
product with the allegedly inadequate warnings actually caused the harm suffered by the
plaintiff. Rather than providing any scientific or other reliable evidence that Seroquel caused
him to develop Brugada syndrome, Hadley relies on the post hoc ergo proper hoc faulty theory
of causation―that is, because one event occurred after another event, the earlier even must have
caused the latter. Courts have long rejected such fallacious reasoning unless there is additional
evidence of causation. Rittler v. Industrial Comm’n, 184 N.E. 654, 660 (Ill. 1933) (“Post hoc
ergo propter hoc is a fallacious argument.”); Hussung v. Patel, 861 N.E.2d 678, 686 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007) (citing with approval other jurisdictions that have held a “temporal association alone
does not suffice to show a causal link because a mere temporal coincidence between two events

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does not necessarily entail a substantial causal relation between them”; internal citations and
quotations omitted).
For this reason, the Court finds Hadley has failed to carry his initial burden of production
on summary judgment to establish that the record is so one-sided that no reasonable jury could
find for the defendants on the issue of causation, an essential element of Hadley’s case.
B.

AstraZenica PLC’s Motion
1.

AstraZenica PLC

The Court turns first to AstraZenica PLC’s statute of limitations argument.2 Because the
Court finds this argument has merit, it need not address its other arguments in support of its
motion. AstraZenica PLC argues that Hadley’s claims are governed by the limitations law of
Illinois, and Hadley does not dispute this. Therefore, Court assumes for the purposes of this
motion that Illinois law applies.3
Under Illinois law, claims for personal injury are subject to the two-year statute of
limitations found in 735 ILCS 5/13-202. Golla v. General Motors Corp., 657 N.E.2d 894, 897
(Ill. 1995). Generally, a personal injury cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations
begins to run, when the plaintiff suffers the injury. Id. at 898. This moment is fairly easy to
identify when there is a sudden, traumatic injury, but less so when the injury is not immediately
apparent. To address latent injuries, the discovery rule “postpone[s] the commencement of the

While the Court must always address jurisdictional arguments before substantive arguments, it
need not consider AstraZenica PLC’s res judicata argument first because, despite AstraZenica
PLC’s assertions otherwise, it does not concern the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. See
Elder v. Illinois Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 99-3852, 215 F.3d 1329, 2000 WL 689179, at *2
(7th Cir. May 22, 2000) (noting res judicata is not jurisdictional). It simply presents an alternate
basis for a decision on the merits.
2

Hadley claims to have ingested Seroquel while in the West Valley Detention Center, which is
located in San Bernardino, California. He now lives in Illinois.
3

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relevant statute of limitations until the injured plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he
has been injured and that his injury was wrongfully caused.” Id. It does not, however, postpone
the running of the limitations period until the plaintiff knows the full extent of his injuries so long
as he knew earlier that he was injured in some way. Id. at 900.
Illinois law also provides a statute of repose for products liability actions:
12 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession by a seller or
10 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession to its initial
user, consumer, or other non-seller, whichever period expires earlier, of any
product unit that is claimed to have injured or damaged the plaintiff,
unless the defendant has agreed to a longer period. 735 ILCS 5/13-213(b). Illinois law also
provides an exception to the statute of repose. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 782 N.E.2d
258, 263 (Ill. 2002) (citing Davis v. Toshiba Mach. Co., Am., 710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ill. 1999)).
That exception, found in 735 ILCS 5/13-213(d), provides that, if a plaintiff suffers an injury
within the ten- or twelve-year repose period, he may sue within two years of when he knew or
should have known of his injury, so long as that date is not more than eight years from the date
the injury occurred. See Davis, 710 N.E.2d at 401.
The relevant dates in this case are: (1) 2002, when Hadley began taking Seroquel; (2)
2008, when he was diagnosed with Brugada syndrome; and (3) 2018, when he filed this lawsuit.4
Hadley did not file this lawsuit within the two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury set forth in 735 ILCS 5/13-202. Although the date of his alleged injury is unclear, the
most recent date he knew or should have known of that injury was 2008 when he was diagnosed
with Brugada syndrome. To be within the statute of limitations, he would have had to have filed

It is sufficient to discuss the relevant dates generally in terms of years rather than specific days.
Had this case turned on the specific date of an event, the Court would be more specific.
4

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his lawsuit within two years of his diagnosis, that is, in or before 2010. He filed this suit eight
years beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Even if the discovery rule had extended his limitations period, he failed to file this
lawsuit within the statute of repose set forth in 735 ILCS 5/13-213(b). The first delivery of
Seroquel to Hadley occurred in 2002, so to be within the statute of repose, Hadley would have
had to have filed his lawsuit within ten years of that delivery, that is, in or before 2012. He filed
this suit six years beyond the expiration of the statute of repose.
Finally, Hadley did not file this lawsuit within the exception to the statute of repose set
forth in 735 ILCS 5/13-213(d). While his diagnosis of Brugada syndrome occurred in 2008,
within the statute of repose, he knew that he was injured at that time because a doctor told him he
had Brugada syndrome. Consequently, he had two years from that time to file a lawsuit within
the exception to the statute of repose, that is, in or before 2010. However, again, he filed this
lawsuit eight years too late to meet that deadline.
Hadley does not dispute that his suit is untimely based on the events and limitations
periods set forth above. Instead, he seizes on 735 ILCS 5/13-211(a) and the final provision of
735 ILCS 5/13-213(d) to argue that his disability has prevented the aforementioned limitations
periods from running. 735 ILCS 5/13-211(a) states, “If the person entitled to bring an action,
specified in Sections 13-201 through 13-210 of this Code [e.g., a personal injury action], at the
time the cause of action accrued, is . . . under a legal disability, then he or she may bring the
action within 2 years after . . . the disability is removed.” Similarly, the final provision of 735
ILCS 5/13-213(d) states, “In any such case, if the person entitled to bring the action was, at the
time the personal injury, . . . under a legal disability, then the period of limitations does not begin
to run until . . . the disability is removed.” He believes, and states in his sworn statement, that he

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is legally disabled and has been since 1976 when he suffered a gunshot wound and became
partially paralyzed. Therefore, he believes his statute of limitations has not begun to run because
he remains physically disabled.
Various Illinois courts have opined on what “legal disability” means for limitations
purposes. One court has held, “A person suffers from a ‘legal disability’ where he or she is
entirely without understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions regarding his
person and totally unable to manage his [or her] estate or financial affairs.” Hochbaum v.
Casiano, 686 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (internal citation omitted). That court further
noted that a plaintiff is not legally disabled if he “can comprehend the nature of the injury and its
implications.” Id. One Illinois trial court instructed a jury that a “legally disabled” person “was
incapable of managing her person or property and could not comprehend her rights or the nature
of the act giving rise to her cause of action.” Tardi v. Henry, 571 N.E.2d 1020, 1028 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991). Whatever the precise definition of “legal disability” is, it is clear that, in the
limitations context, it concerns the plaintiff’s mental competence, comprehension and ability to
communicate and requires something other than a mere physical disability.
Whether someone is under a “legal disability” is a conclusion of law, not a statement of
fact, although on summary judgment, assertions of fact regarding a plaintiff’s abilities and
understanding can be sufficient to support a finding of legal disability. Here, however, Hadley
simply asserts the legal conclusion that he has been “legally disabled” since 1976 without any
assertions of fact that would support such a legal conclusion. The Court believes he may be
referring to his physical disability―partial paralysis from a gunshot wound. However, that kind
of physical disability is not sufficient to establish that he is “legally disabled” under 735 ILCS
5/13-211 or -213. Indeed, Hadley statement indicates that his “legal disability” continues today,

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yet the record reflect that he is sound in the areas of mental competence, comprehension and
communication. He clearly understands his injuries and the issues in this lawsuit and is able to
communicate his thoughts and arguments well. There is simply no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that Hadley is, or has ever been, under a “legal disability” for
limitations purposes.
For these reasons, the Court finds AstraZenica PLC is entitled to summary judgment on
statute of limitations grounds.
2.

AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals PLC

AstraZenica PLC also argues that the Court must grant summary judgment for
AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals PLC because there is no such entity. It has presented an affidavit
from its deputy general counsel in support of this position. Hadley disputes this fact but has
provided no evidence that AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals PLC exists. As there is evidence to
support only one side of this question, there is no need for a trial, and the Court will dismiss
AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals PLC without prejudice.5
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
•

DENIES Hadley’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 10);

•

GRANTS AstraZenica PLC’s motion for summary judgment, originally filed as a motion
to dismiss (Doc. 13);

•

DISMISSES AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals PLC without prejudice;

•

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Hadley’s motion to strike (Doc. 27);

•

ORDERS AstraZenica PLC to refile the following documents not under seal on or before
October 5, 2018:

Even if AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals PLC existed, the Court would dispose of the claims
against it for the same reason it grants summary judgment for AstraZeneca PLC.
5

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o its sealed briefs (Docs. 15, 22 & 23) with redactions of the parts that reveal
specific terms of the Settlement/Release and any personal information about
Hadley (e.g., his social security number and date of birth) wherever it appears;
and
o one copy of the sealed sworn declaration (Docs. 22-3 & 23-1);
These documents should be filed using the CM/ECF event “Exhibit” and should be
linked to the motion to which they pertain;
•

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to refile Hadley’s response brief (Doc. 20, pp. 1-6) not
under seal as an Exhibit linked to his Response (Doc. 19). The exhibits to Hadley’s
response will remain under seal; and

•

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case.

AstraZenica PLC and AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals PLC are terminated as parties to this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 19, 2018
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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