Davis v. Chester Mental Health Center et al

Filing 17

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly, denying 3 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by Christopher Davis. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 9/14/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHRISTOPHER DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH HARPER, and
CHESTER DIETARY STAFF,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18−cv–1119−SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Christopher Davis, an inmate at Vienna Correctional Center, brings this action
for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for events that allegedly
occurred at Chester Mental Health Center (“Chester”). Plaintiff asserts that he was incarcerated
at Chester after being found unfit to stand trial in his criminal proceedings. This suggests that he
met the statutory definition in § 1915A for a “prisoner” at the time of the relevant events. (Doc.
1, p. 17). Plaintiff requests equitable relief and damages.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
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(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint: Plaintiff is a practicing
Muslim. (Doc. 1, p. 17). He has an allergy to carrots, bananas, and milk, which he reported to
the staff at Chester. Id. In 2016, Plaintiff told the staff he wished to participate in Ramadan, a
month-long Islamic fast.

(Doc. 1, pp. 17-18).

Staff permitted Plaintiff to participate, but

Plaintiff was not provided with adequate calories and nutritious meals or permitted to perform
the salats (prayer). (Doc. 1, p. 19).
Plaintiff was initially served breakfast trays with milk, one of his allergies. Id. When
Plaintiff complained, his breakfast meal was changed to oatmeal and/or grits, but the oatmeal and
grits were served cold because the breakfast tray was being prepared the night before. Id.
Plaintiff was denied adequate food at breakfast because he refused to eat hot food cold, and staff,

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including Harper, refused to accommodate him by microwaving the food or substituting cold
food that didn’t trigger Plaintiff’s allergies. (Doc. 1, pp. 20-21).
Plaintiff’s dinner trays were also frequently served cold and often contained carrots.
(Doc. 1, p. 21). When Plaintiff reported the carrots, he would not get a replacement because the
dietary staff had left for the day. (Doc. 1, p. 22). Plaintiff refused to eat any food served cold
except chicken salad and tuna salad. Id. When he complained, he was advised that it was his
option to participate in Ramadan. Id.
The end of Ramadan is marked by a feast called the Eid Celebration. (Doc. 1, p. 23).
Plaintiff wanted to participate in the feast, but the feast tray contained carrots, despite Plaintiff’s
well-documented allergy. Id. Plaintiff was told he could go to lunch later, but he was not
allowed to attend lunch or given a replacement tray. Id. Plaintiff was also prohibited from
celebrating the end of Ramadan together with other Islamic inmates. (Doc. 1, p. 24). Staff
retaliated against Plaintiff when he complained about his treatment to Islamic activist groups by
calling him an ISIS member, interrupting his prayers, and threatening to write him up for being
disruptive while he was praying. (Doc. 1, pp. 24-25).
Harper refused to take steps to make sure that Plaintiff received adequate care and
treatment while at Chester. (Doc. 1, p. 25). Harper also refused to intervene when the dietary
staff refused to provide Plaintiff with adequate nutrition during Ramadan. Id.
Discussion
Previously, the Court reviewed the Complaint and determined that Plaintiff had attempted
to bring improperly joined claims. (Doc. 16). That Order designated a single claim for this
action:

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Count 1 – Harper and Chester Dietary Staff violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights when they substantially burdened his practice of religion when they ignored
his documented allergies in preparing food for Ramadan and associated feasts.
An inmate’s religious free exercise rights are violated if the prison places a “substantial
burden” on his practice of his religion. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2009). A
religious diet is substantially burdened when officials force an inmate to choose between his
religious practice and adequate nutrition. Id. at 879; Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir.
1990) (failure to ensure staff kept pork products separate from pork substitute substantially
burdened Muslim inmate’s practice of religion).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants effectively burdened his practice of religion because they
accommodated his religious diet by serving food to which Plaintiff had a documented food
allergy. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants specifically told him his option was to cancel his
Ramadan accommodation if he wanted to avoid his food allergies.

According to these

allegations, Plaintiff was presented with a choice between following his religious practice or
adequate nutrition. The Seventh Circuit has found that this violates the First Amendment.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim will proceed as to all Defendants.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has moved the Court to appoint him counsel. (Doc. 3). A district court “may
request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1).
There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel for a civil litigant, however. Stroe v.
Immigration and Naturalization Services, 256 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2001); Zarnes v. Rhodes,
64 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995). Recruitment of counsel lies within the sound discretion of the
court. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson v. Doughty, 433
F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006)).

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In determining whether to recruit counsel, the Court is directed to make a two-fold
inquiry: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been
effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the
plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654 (citing Farmer v. Haas,
990 F.2d 319, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1993)). The first prong of the analysis is a threshold question – if
a plaintiff has made no attempt to obtain counsel on his own, the court should deny the request.
See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655.
Here, Plaintiff has met his threshold burden of making a “reasonable attempt” to secure
counsel. See Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760 (7th Cir. 2010); Brock v. Beelman Co., 2010
WL 1692769, at * 2 (S.D.Ill. April 27, 2010).

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff is

competent to litigate this matter at this time. Plaintiff’s pleadings have been clear and easy to
understand. Plaintiff alleges that he may need assistance in the discovery phase, but the case has
not reached that stage, and most of the information relevant to Plaintiff’s claim (his religious
beliefs, practices, and food allergies) is within Plaintiff’s own personal knowledge. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. Plaintiff may renew his motion if the case becomes more
difficult in the future. (Doc. 3).
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Count 1 survives threshold review against Harper and
the unknown Chester Dietary Staff.
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant Harper: (1) Form
5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint,
and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

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If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal
service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on the Unknown (John Doe) Defendants until such time as
Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint.

Plaintiff is

ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service
addresses for these individuals.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Defendant can no longer be found at the work
address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current
work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be
used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any
documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J.
Daly for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should
all the parties consent to such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the
judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the

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full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has
been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 14, 2018

s/ STACI M. YANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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