Parker v. Baldwin et al
Filing
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ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 6/15/2018. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KYLE A. PARKER, # R-42752,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN BALDWIN,
ANITA BAZILE-SAWYER,
and JULIE THOMPSON,
Defendants.
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Case No. 18-cv-1122-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) currently
incarcerated at Graham Correctional Center (“Graham”), has brought this pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arose while he was confined at Southwestern
Illinois Correctional Center (“Southwestern”). Plaintiff claims that Defendants infringed on his
right to practice his religion and punished him for engaging in the practice of his faith. The
Complaint is now before the Court for a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
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to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the
line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith
v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same
time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff’s claims survive
threshold review under § 1915A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff sues Baldwin, who is Acting Director of the IDOC; Bazile-Sawyer, the
Southwestern Warden; and Thompson, an Internal Affairs officer at Southwestern.
On October 16, 2017, Thompson called Plaintiff in to interview him about his religious
practices. Plaintiff is an adherent of the Asatru faith. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Thompson implied that
Plaintiff was a member of a white supremacist organization because he practiced Asatru.
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Plaintiff vehemently disputed this suggestion, offering to show Thompson documentation that an
Asatru practitioner could not hold racist views. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Thompson declined to review
Plaintiff’s information. Plaintiff acknowledged that he was a “spiritual leader” with other Asatru
practitioners, but did not hold any authority over them. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff also discussed his
history of teaching an Asatru service while in the Indiana Department of Corrections, as well as
his work with Southwestern chaplains in an attempt to get Asatru services started there with an
outside volunteer to teach services. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). Plaintiff told Thompson that he was not
holding religious services for “all of the Asatru” in the prison dayroom, because some members
lived in different housing units and could not join him in his unit’s dayroom.
Thompson asked Plaintiff to step out of her office while she consulted with BazileSawyer “to determine if [Plaintiff] would be put into segregation for practicing and holding
religious services on [his] unit.” (Doc. 1, p. 7). About 20 minutes later, Plaintiff was placed in
segregation with no explanation. Id. The documents he provides show that he was placed there
under investigative status. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 1-2).
Nine days later, Thompson filed charges against Plaintiff for dangerous disturbance,
security threat group or unauthorized organization activity, and dangerous communications,
because Plaintiff had provided instruction in the Asatru faith, held services, and taught the runes.
(Doc. 1, pp. 7-8; Doc. 1-1, pp. 4-6; 8-11). According to Plaintiff’s attached grievances and the
responses, he was found guilty of these offenses and punished with 30 days in segregation,
60 days in “C” grade status, six months of contact visit restrictions, and a disciplinary transfer.
(Doc. 1-1, p. 11). Plaintiff contested this action in his grievance, noting that the Asatru and
Wicca faiths are approved religious groups in the IDOC. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 10-11). He acknowledges
that he held an Asatru study group in his dayroom, but states that the information on the number
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of inmates attending and the identities of those inmates was incorrect. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 10-11).
Plaintiff asserts that Thompson’s disciplinary charges and his punishment violated his
First and Eighth Amendment rights, as well as his rights under the Religious Land Use and
Incarcerated Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), because he was disciplined for practicing his religion.
(Doc. 1, p. 8). In addition to the segregation time and other punishment he received, Plaintiff
asserts that the “dangerous disturbance” conviction will make him ineligible to receive a six
month sentence credit that he would otherwise be eligible for. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-10). 1
During Plaintiff’s time in segregation at Southwestern, he spoke directly to BazileSawyer on more than one occasion while she made rounds. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff told BazileSawyer about the violations of his rights as a result of Thompson’s actions, but Bazile-Sawyer
refused to investigate the matter, stating she supported Thompson’s actions. Bazile-Sawyer
upheld the disciplinary action after Plaintiff appealed it.
Baldwin, as the “direct supervisor” of Bazile-Sawyer and Thompson, also approved the
disciplinary action when Plaintiff’s appeal reached him. (Doc. 1, pp 9-10).
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the violations of his rights and
seeks to have his disciplinary convictions reversed and expunged from his record. (Doc. 1,
p. 11).
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Plaintiff’s pleading and attachments do not indicate that any of the good-conduct credits he may have
already earned were revoked as part of his punishment for the offenses in question. Instead, he speculates
that he would have been given the six month credit in the future if he had not incurred the disciplinary
violation. Under these circumstances, it does not appear that Plaintiff’s claim runs afoul of the doctrine of
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)
(a prisoner cannot maintain an action for damages based on a disciplinary action where good conduct
credits were revoked, unless the prison disciplinary decision has first been invalidated); DeWalt v. Carter,
224 F.3d 607, 616-617 (7th Cir. 2000) (Section 1983 claim could proceed where disciplinary sanction did
not involve loss of good time).
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Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1:
First Amendment claim against all Defendants, for punishing
Plaintiff for practicing his Asatru religious faith;
Count 2:
Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants, for punishing
Plaintiff for practicing his Asatru religious faith;
Count 3:
RLUIPA claim against all Defendants, for punishing Plaintiff for
practicing his Asatru religious faith.
As explained below, Counts 1 and 3 shall proceed against some of the Defendants. Count
2 shall be dismissed as duplicative of Count 1 and for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
Count 1 – First Amendment
It is well-established that “a prisoner is entitled to practice his religion insofar as doing so
does not unduly burden the administration of the prison.” Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47
(7th Cir. 1990); see Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 and nn. 3-5 (7th Cir. 1991)
(collecting cases). On the other hand, a prison regulation that impinges on an inmate’s First
Amendment rights is nevertheless valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Such interests include inmate security and the proper allocation of limited
prison resources. See id. at 348, 352-53; Turner, 482 U.S. at 90; Al-Alamin, 926 F.2d at 686.
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Restrictions on access to religious services and other opportunities or practices are
reviewed in light of four factors outlined in Turner: (1) whether there is a valid and rational
connection between the regulation prohibiting access and a legitimate governmental interest to
justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right to practice religion that
remain open to inmates; (3) whether accommodation of the right to practice would have a
significant impact on prison staff or other inmates; and (4) whether the regulation is reasonable
in terms of allowing prisoners use of available alternatives. Turner, 482 U.S. 78; see also Beard
v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
Here, Thompson brought disciplinary charges against Plaintiff for conducting or
facilitating group Asatru worship services, because she viewed this activity as a threat to the
safety and security of the institution. Bazile-Sawyer endorsed the disciplinary action and refused
to reconsider it after Plaintiff asked her to reverse his punishment. Plaintiff maintains that his
religious activity was not a threat and states that IDOC in fact recognizes Asatru as a permitted
religion in the prison system. He states that he was open about his beliefs and approached the
prison chaplain about holding worship services at Southwestern and bringing in a volunteer to
teach adherents, before Thompson initiated her investigation.
Further factual development will be necessary in order to determine whether Thompson
and Bazile-Sawyer were justified under the Turner factors listed above in curtailing Plaintiff’s
practice of Asatru and punishing him for his conduct, or whether their actions amounted to a
violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Count 1 shall proceed against
Thompson and Bazile-Sawyer.
The claim against IDOC Director Baldwin in his personal capacity shall be dismissed
without prejudice, however. According to Plaintiff’s narrative, Baldwin was not personally
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involved in bringing the disciplinary charges against Plaintiff, imposing punishment, or in
hindering his practice of Asatru. Baldwin merely concurred with the disciplinary action and/or
the denial of Plaintiff’s grievances filed over the matter, in his supervisory capacity. An
administrator cannot be held liable in a civil rights action for the unconstitutional acts of his or
her subordinate employees, simply because the administrator held supervisory authority. The
doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) is not applicable to Section 1983 actions.
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For the same
reason, an official who reviews a grievance that was filed to complain about the conduct of
another prison officer does not thereby incur liability. The Seventh Circuit instructs that the
alleged mishandling or denial of grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or
participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953
(7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George
v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.
1996). Baldwin shall therefore be dismissed from Count 1.
Dismissal of Count 2 – Eighth Amendment – Cruel & Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and punishment grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Two elements are required to establish a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause with regard to any conditions of
confinement in prison. First, an objective element requires a showing that the conditions deny the
inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the
inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective
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conditions must have resulted in an unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs
such as food, medical care, sanitation, or physical safety. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981). The second requirement is a subjective element—establishing a defendant’s culpable
state of mind, which is deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate
from those conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. The deliberate indifference standard is
satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm from the conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
In this case, Plaintiff claims that his punishment with segregation and other sanctions for
practicing his religion amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation. But however unjust he
believes that punishment may have been, nothing in the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff’s
health or safety was put at risk or that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities” in the way his punishment was imposed. Accordingly, he does not state a claim upon
which relief may be granted for cruel or unusual punishment.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s purported Eighth Amendment claim is redundant, because it is
based on the same set of facts underlying the First Amendment claim in Count 1. See Conyers v.
Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing equal protection and Eighth Amendment
claims based on same circumstances as free exercise claim because free exercise claim “gains
nothing by attracting additional constitutional labels”); Williams v. Snyder, 150 F. App’x 549,
552-53 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing equal protection, access to courts, due process, and Eighth
Amendment claims as duplicative of retaliation and freedom of religion claims).
For these reasons, Count 2 shall be dismissed from the action without prejudice.
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Count 3 – RLUIPA
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim overlaps with his First Amendment claim, but it is not subject
to dismissal. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012) (advising courts to
interpret First Amendment free exercise claims filed by pro se plaintiffs as including a RLUIPA
claim). Notably, the RLUIPA, which is directed at institutions receiving federal financial
assistance, provides greater protections than the First Amendment. See Schlemm v. Wall, 784
F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2015); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1. “Under the Act, if an inmate shows that
an institutional policy substantially burdens his religious exercise, then that policy may not be
applied unless the institution shows that the policy is the least restrictive means for advancing a
compelling state interest.” Tanksley v. Litscher, No. 17-2867, 2018 WL 2316923 at *1 (7th Cir.
May 22, 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1; Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015)).
Money damages are not available in a RLUIPA suit against state employees in their
official capacity, nor does RLUIPA authorize any kind of relief against public employees.
Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
1651 (2011); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Nelson v. Miller, 570
F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009)). For this reason, Plaintiff may not pursue his RLUIPA claim against
any of the Defendants in their personal capacities. However, a court may order injunctive relief
to correct a violation of the RLUIPA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-2.
In this action, Plaintiff has requested injunctive relief to expunge the disciplinary action
from his record. Setting aside at this stage the question of whether or not this relief would be
available in this civil rights action, the Complaint suggests that other forms of injunctive relief
could be appropriate in the event that Plaintiff prevails on his claim. For example, he mentions
that certain religious items were confiscated from him, and most basically, he wants to be able to
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practice his faith without interference. For this reason, Count 3 survives review under
Section 1915A and shall proceed for further consideration against Baldwin only, in his official
capacity.
IDOC Director Baldwin shall therefore remain in the action, in order to carry out any
injunctive relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled in connection with Count 3 or his First
Amendment claim. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (proper
defendant in a claim for injunctive relief is the government official responsible for ensuring any
injunctive relief is carried out).
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) is referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson for further consideration.
Disposition
COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
All claims against BALDWIN in his individual capacity are DISMISSED from this
action without prejudice. BALDWIN shall remain in the action in his official capacity only, as
IDOC Director.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for BALDWIN (Official Capacity Only), BAZILESAWYER, and THOMPSON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service
of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to
mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver
of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent,
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the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court
will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a
determination on the pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
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days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 15, 2018
__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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