Dent v. Dennison et al

Filing 42

ORDER DENYING 3 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Charles Dent. See Order for details. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 9/10/2018. (ceh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHARLES DENT,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 18-cv-1156-DRH-DGW

JEFFERY M. DENNISON, L. WALKER, LT.
PICKFORD, SAMUEL STERRETT, and
LANCE MAHAN
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(“the Report”) issued by Magistrate Donald G. Wilkerson on July 13, 2018 (doc.
32) regarding plaintiff Dent’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction (doc. 3) 1.

Concisely, plaintiff seeks that defendants be

enjoined and ordered to permit plaintiff to attend weekly religious services for
both Catholics and Protestants on the days and times set out by the Chaplain.
The Report recommends that the Court grant plaintiff’s request.

While the

undersigned holds in high regard the opinion of the magistrate judge, he
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Because defendants have had notice of the pending motion, the Court construes the motion as
seeking a preliminary injunction and the request for a temporary restraining order is moot.

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respectfully declines to adopt the Report’s conclusions of law.

Based on the

record, applicable law, and the following, the Court REJECTS the Report’s
finding that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction be granted.
In the motion addressed by the Report, plaintiff complains that he has been
prohibited from attending multiple religious services a week at Shawnee
Correctional Center after filing a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint
against volunteer pastor Mahan. Prior to the filing of this complaint, plaintiff had
been attending both Protestant and Catholic services, despite his primary
religious affiliation selected as Catholic. After filing the PREA complaint, plaintiff
was informed by Chaplain Sterrett that he would only be permitted to attend
Catholic mass due to the Illinois Administrative Code provision stating that an
inmate may only attend the religious services of their designated religion (or nondenominational religious services). 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.30(f). Chaplain
Sterrett also began review of all chapel lines to ensure that all Shawnee inmates
were attending services that comport with the Illinois Administrative Code
provisions.

Plaintiff argues his removal from the Protestant religious services

constitutes “harm” and wants it to stop.

As the magistrate judge points out,

plaintiff did not specify the type of harm he was suffering or would likely suffer in
the future.
A hearing was held on plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction on June
23, 2018. Both plaintiff and Chaplain Sterrett testified. After the hearing, Judge
Wilkerson issued his Report pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), recommending

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the Court grant plaintiff’s motion due to plaintiff demonstrating a likelihood of
success on the merits.

The Report also found that no burden was placed on

defendants by allowing plaintiff to attend services outside his designated religion.
Doc. 32 at 6. The magistrate judge reasoned that plaintiff was only prevented
from attending Protestant services due to a “desire to conform to administrative
directives” and that “there has been no security or economic concern” presented
by defendants to necessitate the attendance policy change. Id. The Report was
sent to the parties with a notice informing them of their right to appeal by way of
filing “objections” within 14 days of service the Report. Defendants filed their
objections on August 9, 2018 (doc. 38).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court's review of the Report is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C),
which provides in part:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions
of
the report or
specified
proposed
findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may
also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.

Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) also directs that the Court must only make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which
specific written objection has been made. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d
734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). If no objection or only a partial objection is made, the

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Court reviews those unobjected portions for clear error. Id. In addition, failure
to file objections with the district court “waives appellate review of both factual
and legal questions.” Id. Under the clear error standard, the Court can only
overturn a Magistrate Judge's ruling if the Court is left with “the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co.,

Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, defendants object to the Report generally in its entirety, with specific
focuses on the way the Report described and applied the Illinois Administrative
Code (see doc. 38 at 5-7); the analysis of plaintiff showing a likelihood of success
on the merits (id. at 7-9); and the finding that the balance of harm weighs in
plaintiff’s favor (id. at 9-11).
III.

ANALYSIS

A preliminary injunction is a drastic remedy and should not be granted
“unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). A
party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate four factors, of which
the first two are a threshold inquiry that if not met, the court’s inquiry is over. 2

See Abbot Lab. V. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F. 2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). The four
factors are: (1) the party is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits; (2) no
adequate remedy at law exists and the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the

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As the Report notes, in the context of a First Amendment case the reasonable likelihood of
success factor is “usually the decisive factor,” Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d
804, 830 (7th Cir. 2014), and this proposition extends to a RLUIPA claim protecting religious
rights. See Korte v Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2013).

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preliminary relief is denied; (3) this irreparable harm, absent injunctive relief,
outweighs the irreparable harm the respondent will suffer if the injunction is
granted; and (4) the injunction will not harm the public interest. Id. at 11-12.
The Court is not convinced that plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits or that he will suffer from irreparable harm if a preliminary
injunction is not granted.
In his motion, plaintiff has not demonstrated or alleged any irreparable
harm – just that he is unhappy with changing operations at Shawnee regarding
how many religious services inmates may attend 3. The Court, sua sponte, also
does not find a showing of harm within the record. Despite plaintiff’s claims that
his personal removal from services not designated for Catholics is a result of his
filing a PREA complaint, the Illinois Administrate Code is clear that an inmate is
only entitled to attend the religious services/activities of their designated religion
or non-denominational services.

20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.30(f); see also

Testimony of Chaplain Sterrett, doc 33, 17:12-21 (“Q. Chaplain, are inmates that
are not - - that are designated a certain religion, are they allowed to attend
religious services that are not that designation? A. As a general rule, no. It is - they are allowed to declare their religion. They may attend a chap line or activity
that

matches

that

religion.

They

may

attend

a

nondenomination

or

interdenominational activity. But if it is an activity for a religion that does not
match their denomination they generally may not attend.”).

The Report acknowledges that plaintiff did not specify the type of harm he is suffering. See doc.
32 at 6.
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Plaintiff is currently allowed to attend the services permissible under the
Illinois Administrative Code and simply wishing to attend others does not
properly show harm of the kind necessary to institute a preliminary injunction.

See Harlem Algonquin, LLC v. Canadian Funding Corp., 742 F. Supp. 2d 957,
960 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (preliminary injunctions are “cautiously viewed and sparingly
issued[.]”).

This Court is not prepared to find that the directives of the

Administrative Code are something to take lightly or are able to be ignored. The
Code is whole and apart from simple administrative directives, see Illinois
Administrative Procedure Act 5 ILCS 100/et seq, and carries the force and effect
of law. People v. Bonutti, 212 Ill. 2d 182, 188 (2004) (administrative regulations
have the force and effect of law and are construed according to the same
standards that govern the construction of statutes).
Further, the record shows that plaintiff does have an adequate remedy at
law for the outcome he desires. Under the Administrative Code, inmates are able
to request attendance at religious services outside their main designation by
submitting a written request to the facility chaplain.

The chaplain will then

determine if attendance is appropriate based on factors such as space, resources,
security, and safety. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.30(g). Plaintiff has not made such
request. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he had only filed a grievance and
has made no request to any chaplain to attend further religious services in
addition to Catholic mass. See doc. 33, 12:13-16 (“Q. Have you made a - - I’m

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just trying to find out if you made a request since then. But you filed a grievance.
Have you made any other requests besides the grievance? A. No.”).
If an inmate does make a written request to attend services outside their
main religious affiliation –not the case here- the chaplain must then determine,
among other criteria, if any safety or security concerns arise from allowing
attendance. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.30(g). At the hearing, Chaplain Sterrett
demonstrated that one way an inmate attending multiple services can present a
security concern is by disrupting the services via talking to other inmates or
otherwise not paying attention. Doc. 33 at 26:7-16 (“If [inmates] are [] disrupting
the service in some way or another - - that is, by not paying attention - - that can
be a grounds, and it would basically be classified as a safety or security issue,
instead of paying attention to the service and as if they are using it as an avenue
when they could possibly get together and socialize at the back of a chapel[.]”).
Chaplain Sterrett continued that in this regard, plaintiff had been known to be
disruptive during services. Id. 26:17-21. See also Compl., doc. 1 at ¶ 43 (plaintiff
acknowledges [though denies] he was removed from Protestant service on April 8,
2018 due to volunteer chaplain’s concern over plaintiff’s talking during the
service).

The Court believes that had plaintiff made the proper request to

continue attending Protestant services, defendants have established a reasonable
penal concern regarding plaintiff’s attendance of services outside his Catholic
designation.

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Based on the foregoing, plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits. Defendants have shown legitimate security
trepidations with allowing plaintiff to continue on with attending both Catholic
and Protestant services. Further, plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law he has
not yet pursued and he has not alleged any irreparable harm absent the granting
of a preliminary injunction. Because the Court finds that plaintiff has not met his
burden in demonstrating the first threshold inquiries in seeking a preliminary
injunction, it will not partake in a “balancing of harms” analysis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court REJECTS the conclusions of law contained within
the Report (doc. 32) and REVERSES and VACATES the Report.

For the

abovementioned reasons, plaintiff’s pending motion for temporary restraining
order or for preliminary injunction (doc. 3) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2018.09.10
12:08:56 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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