Boclair v. Lashbrook et al

Filing 11

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 9/14/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STANLEY BOCLAIR,
#A-60451,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,
JOHN R. BALDWIN, and
JOHN DOES,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18-CV-1188-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Stanley Boclair, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
currently housed at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this pro se action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Boclair claims he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when
unidentified members of the Orange Crush tactical unit handcuffed him in a stress position,
causing severe pain and injuring his left shoulder. He also alleges that Jacqueline Lashbrook
(Warden of Menard) and John R. Baldwin (Director of IDOC) failed to intervene on his behalf
during the handcuffing incident. In connection with these claims, Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint (Doc. 1)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court must dismiss any claims that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from suit.

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The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint: in March 2015, Plaintiff fell
and injured his left shoulder. (Doc. 1, p. 5). After the injury, Plaintiff completed a course of
treatment that included physical therapy and cortisone injections.

Id.

The treatment was

successful, meaning that it alleviated Plaintiff’s pain and no additional medical treatment was
needed. Id.
On August 4, 2017, Warden Lashbrook and Director Baldwin directed members of the
Orange Crush tactical unit to conduct a shake down at Menard. Id. During the shake down, the
John Doe Defendants handcuffed Plaintiff in a stress position for more than 1 ½ hours. (Doc. 1,
p. 6). Plaintiff told the John Doe Defendants about his preexisting shoulder injury; he “cried out
in piercing pain and tears to three different Orange Crush voices that an old shoulder injury was
being ripped apart.” Id. Plaintiff continued “crying in excruciating pain,” but his complaints
were ignored by the John Doe Defendants. Id. Lashbrook and Baldwin were present during this
incident, but failed to intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf.
As a result of being handcuffed in this manner, Plaintiff’s shoulder is partially paralyzed.
Id. Plaintiff experiences daily “piercing pain” and surgery will be required to repair his shoulder.
(Doc. 1, pp. 6-7).
Merits Review Under § 1915(A)
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following Counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these Counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit. Any other
claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is dismissed without

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prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard. 1

Count 1 –

Eighth Amendment Claim against John Doe Defendants (unidentified
members of the Orange Crush tactical unit) for leaving Plaintiff
handcuffed in a stress position, on or about August 4, 2017, despite
Plaintiff’s complaints about excruciating pain and/or a prior shoulder
injury.

Count 2 –

Eighth Amendment claim against Lashbrook and Baldwin for failing to
intervene to protect Plaintiff on or about August 4, 2017.
Count 1

Plaintiff specifically alleges that the John Doe Defendants ignored his complaints of
severe pain. This is sufficient to allow the Eighth Amendment claim in Count 1 to proceed. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). See also Stewart v. Special Adm’r of Estate of
Mesrobian, 559 F. App’x 543, 548 (7th Cir. 2014) (“even security measures as ordinary as
handcuffs can be used in ways that violate the constitution”); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738
(2002) (prisoner's allegations, including that he suffered unnecessary pain while handcuffed for
seven hours, were sufficient to state Eighth Amendment violation). Accordingly, Count 1 will
receive further review.
Count 2
Count 2 may proceed against Director Baldwin and Warden Lashbrook to the extent that
Plaintiff alleges they witnessed the conduct at issue in Count 1 and failed to intervene on his
behalf. See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 2009) (official can be held liable under
§ 1983 if he “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or
committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent
the act from occurring”).
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See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).

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Identification of Unknown Defendants
The current Warden of Menard, Jacqueline Lashbrook, will be responsible for responding
to discovery (informal or formal) aimed at identifying the unknown defendants. See Rodriguez
v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). Guidelines for discovery will
be set by the United States Magistrate Judge. Once the names of the unknown defendants are
discovered, Plaintiff must file a motion to substitute the newly identified defendants in place of
the generic designations in the case caption and throughout the Complaint.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed two Motions for Recruitment of Counsel (Docs. 2 and 7), which shall
be DENIED. The district court has discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to recruit counsel
for an indigent litigant. Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d 864, 866–67 (7th Cir.
2013). When a pro se litigant submits a request for assistance of counsel, the Court must first
consider whether the indigent plaintiff has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his
own. Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
654 (7th Cir.2007). If so, the Court must examine “whether the difficulty of the case—factually
and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to coherently present it.”
Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696 (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).

The Court also considers such

factors as the plaintiff's “literacy, communication skills, education level, and litigation
experience.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655.
As to the first question, Plaintiff did not provide sufficient information for the Court to
determine if he has made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own (he merely indicates
that he wrote to one attorney). As to the second question, Plaintiff indicates that, although he has
some college education, the case involves complex issues. Nonetheless, the Court finds that

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Plaintiff is capable of proceeding pro se, at least for now. Plaintiff has some college education,
and his pleadings indicate that he can read and write in English effectively. Plaintiff appears
competent to try this matter without representation at this time. Once discovery has commenced,
if Plaintiff has significant difficulty, he may refile his motion.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 will proceed as to JOHN DOES
(unidentified members of the Orange Crush tactical unit).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 will proceed as to BALDWIN and
LASHBROOK.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for BALDWIN and
LASHBROOK: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms,
a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendants’ place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If one of the defendants fails to sign and return the
Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and
the Court will require the defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file

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or disclosed by the Clerk.
Service shall not be made on the unknown defendants until such time as Plaintiff has
identified them by name in a properly filed Motion for Substitution of Parties. Plaintiff is
ADVISED that it is his responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service addresses
for these individuals.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter shall be

REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Daly for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 14, 2018
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
District Judge

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