Watford v. Harner et al

Filing 177

ORDER granting 147 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jim Winters, Scott Opolka, Jacqueline Lashbrook, Howard Harner, Theodore Meininger, Gustave Vanderhove, Roger Kern, Lloyd Hanna, David Seals, Billy Rose, Robert Delre, Roge r Holt, Richard Harrington, Kimberly Butler. All pending motions are terminated as moot. Final pretrial conference and video writ are cancelled. Trial setting is vacated. Clerk to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Stephen P. McGlynn on 2/25/2022. (jce)

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 1 of 21 Page ID #2404

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARLON L. WATFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 18-cv-1313-SPM

HOWARD HARNER, et al.
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
Memorandum of Law filed by Defendants, Kimberly Butler, Lloyd Hanna, Richard
Harrington, Roger Holt, Roger Kern, Jacqueline Lashbrook, Theodore Meininger, Scott
Opolka, Billy Rose, David Seals, Gustave Vandekerhove, Robert Delre, Howard Harner
and Jim Winters (Docs. 147, 148). For the reason’s set forth below, the Court GRANTS
the Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of a complaint filed on June 22, 2018 by Marlon L. Watford,
(“Watford”) an inmate at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) (Doc. 1). Within the
complaint, Watford sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive
relief (Id).
On July 16, 2018, following the preliminary review conducted of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court determined that Watford could proceed on the
following three counts against the named defendants:
Page 1 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 2 of 21 Page ID #2405

Count 1 – Harner, Winters, Kerns, Opoka, Theo, Van Deckerhoff,
Harrington, Butler, and Lashbrook have deprived Plaintiff of the Id-ul-Fitr
feast, while providing meals to celebrate Christian feasts, burdening his
sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment, and/or RLUIPA;
Count 2 – Harner, Theo, Winters, Van Deckerhoff, Lashbrook, Rose, Seals,
and John Doe deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to participate in the
Ramadhan fast between June 1, 2017 through June 24, 2017, while not
treating other similarly situated inmates in the same manner, in violation
of the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and /or RLUIPA;
Count 3 – Hanna, Winters, Kerns, Opoka, Holt, Van Deckerhoff, Theo,
Jan Doe, and Lashbrook have substantially burdened Plaintiff’s practice of
his religion by making substitutions to his food tray in violation of the First
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and/or RLUIPA.
(Doc. 5, p. 4).
On July 16, 2018, Watford filed his motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 6). On
February 12, 2019 a Report and Recommendation was filed (Doc. 42), and on February
25, 2019, Watford filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 43). On
March 19, 2019, the Court adopted in part and denied in part the proposed disposition
to deny injunctive relief as set forth in the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 44).
Specifically, the Court denied the request for additional peanut butter and jelly packets,
but directed Menard to provide Watford with the standard Lacto-Ovo_veg tray for the
duration of the litigation (Id.).
On October 16, 2018, a Trial Practice Schedule was entered with discovery due
by 3/2/2020, dispositive motions due by 4/1/2020 (Doc. 22). At that time, the parties were
also advised that dispositive motions re exhaustion of administrative remedies were due
by 12/17/18 (Id.). Because of ongoing discovery issues, the deadline for filing of
dispositive motions was extended to 9/10/2020 (Doc. 85).

Page 2 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 3 of 21 Page ID #2406

On September 10, 2020, defendants requested an extension of time to file
dispositive motions, and said motion was granted on 9/14/2020 extending the time for
filing to 9/24/2020 (Doc. 90). On September 24, 2020, defendants filed their initial
motion for summary judgment, along with supporting memorandum of law and notice
of Rule 56 (Docs. 94-96). The initial response date was 10/29/2020 (Doc. 94); however,
the response date was extended to 1/12/2021 (Doc. 106). Watford did not file a response
to said motion; instead he continued to file discovery motions and sought to file an
amended complaint.
On July 16, 2021, a hearing was held before the Court on Watford’s motion to
compel (Doc. 114), amended motion to compel (Doc. 115), and motion to amend (Doc.
117). At that time, the Court withdrew the outstanding motion for summary judgment
as it had been on file for almost ten (10) months with no response due to Watford’s
contention of ongoing discovery issues (Doc. 136). Following the hearing, defendants
were ordered to produce all food logs and nutritional values of the items that constituted
the salad trays, along with a Bates Log of all items produced in discovery, and Watford
was to advise of any deficiencies (Doc. 137). On August 31, 2021, defendants filed their
notice regarding discovery (Doc. 142).
On October 4, 2021, an amended scheduling order was entered with discovery due
by 11/1/2021, dispositive motions due by 11/15/2021, final pretrial conference on
2/24/2022 and jury trial scheduled to commence on 3/15/2022 (Doc. 143). On October 15,
2021, approximately forty-five (45) days after defendants filed their notice regarding

Page 3 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 4 of 21 Page ID #2407

discovery on 8/31/21 and more than ten (10) days after the entry of the amended
scheduling order, plaintiff filed a motion to lodge objection (Doc. 144)1.
On November 15, 2021, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment,
along with supporting memorandum of law and notice of filing pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Docs. 147 – 149). On November 24, 2021, the Court
noted that any responses were due on or before December 27, 2022 (Doc. 152). On
December 17, 2021, Watford filed a motion for extension of time, seeking 60 days to file
his response as he was still gathering discovery and working on his own motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 151). On December 20, 2021, the motion was granted in part
and Watford was advised that any responses were due on or before January 31, 2022
(Doc. 157). However, the Court also noted that the “discovery and dispositive motions
deadline have passed” and that no further extensions would be granted “absent
extraordinary circumstances” because this matter was set for final pre-trial conference
in February 2022 as well as jury trial on March 15 2022 (Id.).
On February 7, 2022, Watford’s Motion in Opposition of Summary Judgment was
received; however, it was “filed” as of January 31, 2022 because the E-file scanning
machine was malfunctioning at Menard (Doc. 158). The document consisted of a 10-page
motion as well as a section wherein Watford answered the “Undisputed Material Facts”
asserted by defendants and his supporting memorandum that numbered 94
handwritten pages (Id.). Although Watford’s document was clearly in excess of the local

The Court is constrained to note that Watford is incarcerated at Menard, which is a scan facility, and
page 1 of his Motion indicates that it was scanned at Menard on 10-15-21, which is the same date it was
filed with the Court.
1

Page 4 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 5 of 21 Page ID #2408

rules 2, this Court did not strike the opposition (Doc. 166). The Court was mindful of the
upcoming settings and did not want to delay resolution of this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
This Court has prepared its own Statement of Facts based upon the briefs
provided by the parties herein, and which were supported by particular portions of the
record, including exhibits, to support that it is material and undisputed in accordance
with Rule 56(c)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This section is limited to
those facts which would be admissible at trial and which are adequately supported and
material to the issues in this case.
Watford has been incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections since
2002, and he received a rule book, the orientation manual. Watford is currently
incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) in Chester, IL.
Watford began participating in Ramadan at Menard in 2003. Ramadan is an
obligatory practice of fasting from sun up to sun down for 30 days that normally ends in
a 3-day feast. At Menard, inmates are given one feast meal for special religious days,
such as Ramadan. Due to security reasons and lockdown, dietary can not always make
a special meal 4. Watford testified that he did not get a feast meal, but he did get his
regular Lacto-Ovo-Veg tray at the end of Ramadan.
Watford knows that he has to be approved to participate in Ramadan at Menard.
Watford was initially approved to participate in Ramadan in April 2017 and the fast
Local Rule 7.1(d) provides that, “No brief shall be submitted which is longer than 20 double-spaced
typewritten pages in 12 point font.” SDIL – LR 7.1.
3
In an effort to exclude immaterial, irrelevant and redundant facts, this Court has prepared its own Statement of Facts
based upon the briefs provided by the parties herein.
4
In 2014, Menard was on lockdown at the end of Ramadan, so the inmates were served baked chicken instead of fried
chicken.
2

Page 5 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 6 of 21 Page ID #2409

started on or about May 27, 2017. Plaintiff was away from Menard on a writ from April
19, 2017 until May 31, 2017. Upon his return to Menard, Watford did not get a Ramadan
tray, even though he had previously been approved. The next day, Watford still did not
get a Ramadan tray. Watford reached out to the dietary department but did not speak
with Vandekerkove or Meininger. Correctional staff advised Watford that he was not on
the list to participate in Ramadan.
Howard Harner was a chaplain at Menard from 2014 to October 12, 2018 and he
approved inmates to be placed on Ramadan and to receive special trays. Harner
approved Watford, but Watford was removed from the list when he was on writ and it
was his responsibility to notify the chaplain that he was back so he could go back on the
list. Watford contacted the chaplaincy department and was re-approved again on June
2, 2017 to receive the tray.
Watford wanted a diet that did not include Islamic unlawful meat. He was placed
on a Lacto-Ovo vegetarian diet in 2007. Lacto-ovo is a form of a vegetarian diet that did
not include meat, poultry, or fish, but did include fruits, grains, seeds, nuts, legumes,
dairy and eggs. Lacto-ovo vegetarians can get quality protein from milk and eggs.
Between 2014 and 2018, Watford claims he was not receiving everything the
Lacto-Ovo diet offers. He claims he was supposed to get peanut butter and dry cereal
and claims he was given breakfast sausage on occasion with two slices of bread, butter
and some gravy.
The menus for the lacto-ovo diet were prepared several years ago by Suzann
Bailey, food nutritionist. The same menus are currently used, but the dietary
department sometimes makes available substitutions depending on what it is able to
Page 6 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 7 of 21 Page ID #2410

purchase, including eggs, cheese, milk and soy gravy, so long as nutritional
requirements are met. Sometimes apples are substituted for bananas and sometimes
salad is not served if it is not available.
Lloyd Hanna is the current Food Services Program Manager at Menard and has
been with IDOC since March 1, 2007. Hanna is responsible for ordering all of the dietary
food items and ensuring that all meals are served in a sanitary manner with proper
nutrition. Hanna also oversees daily operations of food.
Jim Winters is a retired Food Service Supervisor III who was at Menard until his
retirement in 2015. He was familiar with the trays but did not prepare the menus. The
dietary manager at each facility is required to follow the menu as close as possible, but
makes substitutions when necessary and tries to substitute with a similar product, like
a fruit for a fruit or a vegetable for a vegetable.
Scott Opalka was a Food Services Supervisor II at Menard for a portion of time
until his retirement in 2019. Gustave Vanderkerhove is the current Food Service
Supervisor at Menard. Roger Holt is the Food Services Supervisor II at Pinckneyville
and was at Menard from 2001 until December of 2017. Holt helped assemble the diet
trays according to the menus, with available substitutions, but it was the dietary
manager who was required to follow the master menu as closely as possible.
Jacqueline Lashbrook was the warden at Menard from January 2017 to February
1, 2019. She toured the galleries and occasionally spoke with inmates. She did not
participate in religious observation approvals and was never directly involved in
Watford’s dietary tray preparation. She received one kite from him in 2017, but it

Page 7 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 8 of 21 Page ID #2411

concerned a request to take various items on a writ and had nothing to do with dietary
issues or his food tray.
Kimberly Butler was the warden at Menard before Lashbrook and was there from
April 16, 2014 to September 30, 2016. As warden, she did not have direct involvement
in special diet tray approval or religious observance approval. She has no recollection of
any kites from Watford relating to Ramadan or dietary issues, but a log was kept of all
kites to the warden. Richard Harrington was the warden at Menard before Butler from
February 2013 to April 2014. Harrington has no recollection of any involvement with
Watford.
David Seals was a correctional officer in 2016 and 2017. During meal
distribution, dietary provided the trays and his job was to deliver the trays with another
officer – one opened the chuck hole and the other handed the tray to the inmate. If an
inmate complained, Seals directed them to dietary. Billy Rose has been employed by
IDOC for 24 years and was a correctional sergeant from December 2016 to August 2018.
He has been a supply supervisor II since September 2019. He does not recall Watford.
As a sergeant, he was primarily in the North Uppers. He rarely interacted with the
inmates and said his only involvement with dietary trays was in supervising the
delivery to the inmates. If an inmate complained he did not receive the proper tray, he
would check the system to see what the inmate was supposed to receive. If the inmate
was not listed to receive a religious diet, he would tell the inmate to write to the
chaplain. Rose could not order a religious tray or special diet.

Page 8 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 9 of 21 Page ID #2412

LEGAL STANDARD
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Once the moving party has set forth the basis for summary
judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere
allegations and offer specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Stated another
way, the nonmoving party must offer more than “[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported
by specific facts,” to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d
767 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
Summary judgment is proper against “a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. The non-moving party
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's]
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
find for the [non-movant].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
While it is true that pro se pleadings are liberally construed; leniency toward
a pro se litigant is circumscribed. See Greer v. Bd. Of Educ., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.
2001) (courts are not “obliged ... to scour the record looking for factual disputes” to rescue
a pro se litigant from losing summary judgment). Pro se status does not serve as a
Page 9 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 10 of 21 Page ID #2413

license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules. See Members
v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[procedural] rules apply to uncounseled
litigants”); Downs v. Westphal, 78 F.3d 1252, 1257 (7th Cir. 1996) (“pro se litigants are
not entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of procedure”). Furthermore,
although severe, the Seventh Circuit has consistently upheld district judges’ discretion
to require strict compliance with local rules. Coleman v. Goodwill Indus. of Se. Wis.,
Inc., 423 Fed.Appx. 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Though courts are solicitous of pro se
litigants, they may nonetheless require strict compliance with local rules); Cady v.
Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven pro se litigants must follow rules
of civil procedure.”).
APPLICABLE LAW
Following merit review, Watford was allowed to proceed on three separate counts,
all of which alleged violations of the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and/or
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) (Doc. 5. P. 4).
Defendants contend that they did not violate any of Watford’s rights (Doc. 148).
Defendants further assert that they cannot be liable under § 1983 without direct, alleged
constitutional violations and that they are entitled to qualified immunity (Id.).
Additionally, defendants contend that any claims prior to June 22, 2016 are barred by
the applicable statute of limitations (Id.).
I.

RLUIPA

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) prohibits
prison officials from imposing a substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person is the
Page 10 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 11 of 21 Page ID #2414

least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-1(a). See also Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012). The relevant
portion of RLUIPA provides in pertinent part:
“No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person residing in or confined to an institution, ... even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
In recent cases the United States Supreme Court has defined “substantial
burden” as something that “seriously violates [one's] religious beliefs,” regardless of
whether alternative means of religious exercise are available. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct.
853, 862 (2015) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775
(2014)). The use of the term “seriously” provides little more guidance than “substantial
burden,” but the Seventh Circuit advises it means more than just a “modest”
violation. Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court has
further clarified that the religious exercise includes “any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at
860 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A)). Still, plaintiff must show at least (1) a loss of
benefits or (2) that the prison applied pressure to modify behavior. Koger v. Bryan, 523
F.3d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that government conduct is substantially
burdensome when it “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and violate his beliefs”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If a prisoner
satisfies the initial burden of demonstrating something more than “a modest violation,”
Page 11 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 12 of 21 Page ID #2415

then the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the policy is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. Koger, 523 F.3d at
796.
In the application of the “compelling government interest” standard, courts must
afford “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators
in establishing necessary regulations and procedures ... consistent with consideration of
costs and limited resources.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005). Hence, as is
often true with claims of impingement on constitutional rights, district courts are left to
apply a balancing test under RLUIPA.
II.

First Amendment

Under the First Amendment, prisoners enjoy a right to the free exercise of their
religion. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011). However, a prison
may impose restrictions on the exercise of religion that are reasonably related to the
legitimate penological objectives of the state. Tarpley v. Allen County, Ind., 312 F.3d
895, 898 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
To establish a First Amendment violation, Watford must demonstrate that
defendants “personally and unjustifiably placed a substantial burden on his religious
practices.” Neely-Bey

Tarik-El

v.

Conley,

912

F.3d

989,

1003

(7th

Cir.

2019) (quoting Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2016)). A substantial
burden is one that puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs.” Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). In the prison
context, such a burden is justified if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest. Thompson, 809 F.3d at 380 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987)).
Page 12 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 13 of 21 Page ID #2416

In determining whether an asserted justification is rationally related to a
legitimate penological objective, courts consider: (1) whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to the inmate; (2) the impact an
accommodation of the asserted right would have on guards and other inmates; and
whether there are “obvious alternatives” to the restriction. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d
664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Prisons also have a
legitimate penological interest in maintaining security. Tarpley, 312 F.3d at 898; AlAlamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1991). The inmate has the burden of
disproving the validity of a challenged prison regulation. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.
126, 132 (2003). As a general principle, federal courts afford deference to the decisions
of prison administrators. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. Indeed, to survive summary judgment,
the opposing party has to submit evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that
the defendants personally and unjustifiably placed a substantial burden on religious
practices. Thompson, 809 F.3d at 379.
III.

Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “provides heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests”, such as religious freedom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
(1997). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also offers a basis
for a distinct claim, which requires the State to treat all similarly situated people
equally. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
It is important to note that that all prisoners do not have to receive identical
treatment and resources. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). As a general matter,
Page 13 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 14 of 21 Page ID #2417

a “prison administrative decision may give rise to an equal protection claim only if the
plaintiff can establish that “state officials had purposefully and intentionally
discriminated against him”. Meriweather v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 n.7 (7th Cir.
1987). In other words, a particular group has to be singled out for disparate treatment.
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1996).
ANALYSIS
Following merit review, Watford was allowed to proceed on the following three
claims:
Count 1 – Harner, Winters, Kerns, Opoka, Theo [Meininger], Van
Deckerhoff, Harrington, Butler, and Lashbrook have deprived Plaintiff of
the Id-ul-Fitr feast, while providing meals to celebrate Christian feasts,
burdening his sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of the First
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and/or RLUIPA;
Count 2 – Harner, Theo [Meininger], Winters, Van Deckerhoff,
Lashbrook, Rose, Seals, and John Doe deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity
to participate in the Ramadhan fast between June 1, 2017 through June
24, 2017, while not treating other similarly situated inmates in the same
manner, in violation of the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment,
and /or RLUIPA;
Count 3 – Hanna, Winters, Kerns, Opoka, Holt, Van Deckerhoff, Theo,
Jan Doe, and Lashbrook have substantially burdened Plaintiff’s practice of
his religion by making substitutions to his food tray in violation of the First
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and/or RLUIPA. (Doc. 5, p. 5).
I.

CLAIMS
Count 1:

Eid-Al-Fitr Feast

Count 1 of plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was deprived of his right to the
Eid-Al-Fitr-Feast and that said deprivation burdened his religious beliefs (Doc. 5).
Watford further claimed that meals were provided for Christian feasts, He claims he did
not receive the feast meal in 2014, 2015, 2016 or 2017.
Page 14 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 15 of 21 Page ID #2418

At Menard on Christmas, all inmates receive the “feast” meal of turkey and gravy.
At the end of Ramadan, all inmates also receive a special meal, which usually includes
fried chicken or another form of chicken and vegetables. However, inmates on special
diets do not receive “feast meals”.
Watford is a vegetarian and has been on the lacto-ovo-veg diet since 2007. While
he contends that he did not receive a special feast meal, he concedes that he did receive
his standard meal tray at the end of Ramadan. Because of his special dietary needs and
restrictions, a feast meal containing chicken is in direct contravention to his lacto-ovoveg diet. Watford has placed the personnel at Menard in a Catch-22 position. They are
responsible for ensuring that his nutritional needs are met.
Menard is a maximum-security prison and the facility has articulated rational
reasons for providing the same feast meal to all inmates. To provide individual meals
would be an extreme burden on the staff and would hinder security concerns.
There is no question of fact that Watford was provided his meal pursuant to his
dietary plan, and that absent his restrictions, he would have received the “feast” meal
like all of the other inmates. As such, summary judgment is appropriate as to Count 1
of Watford’s claims.
Count 2: Ramadan
Watford next contends that he was deprived of the opportunity to participate in
the Ramadan fast from June 1, 2017 through June 24, 2017. It is uncontroverted that
Watford was initially approved to participate in Ramadam in April 2017; however, he
was then on writ from Menard until May 31, 2017, which was approximately 4 days
after the beginning of Ramadan.
Page 15 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 16 of 21 Page ID #2419

Upon his return to Menard, Watford did not automatically return to the Ramadan
list. According to the Affidavit of Chaplain Howard Harner, if an inmate leaves the
facility, he must request to be returned to the religious dietary list upon his returns
(Doc. 148-2, p. 2). This information is provided to the inmates when they are first
approved to participate in the Ramadan fast (Id.). When the Chaplaincy Department
was finally alerted by Watford that he had returned to Menard, he was placed back on
the Ramadan fast list on June 2, 2017 5 (Id.).
Federal courts have routinely held that “where a delay in providing an inmate
with a religious diet is brief and caused by ordinary administrative delay, the inmate’s
religious rights are not violated.” Tapp v. Stanley, 2008 WL 4934592, at 7 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 2008) (finding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim even when the plaintiff was denied kosher meals from April 4,
2004 to July 23, 2004); see, e.g., Lambright v. Indiana, 2020 WL 4451075, at 3 (N.D.
Ind. Aug. 3, 2020) (holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiff’s First Amendment claim even when the plaintiff experienced a sixty-two day
delay in receiving a kosher diet); Green v. Paramo, 2018 WL 6062359, at 4 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 20, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s First Amendment claim although the plaintiff
experienced a five month delay in receiving approval for a kosher diet); McCormack v.
Myers, 2007 WL 1704905, at 4-5 (D.S.C. June 12, 2007) (acknowledging that plaintiff
was not given kosher meals for two and a half months, but plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that the actions of the defendants violated any of his constitutional rights).
There are many cogs in the prison wheel. Even if the alleged non-receipt of fasting
5

This Court notes that the original fast list was compiled more than one month before the start of Ramadan.
Page 16 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 17 of 21 Page ID #2420

trays was sufficient to burden Watford’s religious practices, nothing indicates that the
non-conforming trays or the delay in accommodating Watford was caused by defendants
and was due to anything other than an ordinary administrative delay. Watford makes
numerous unsubstantiated and unsupported allegations, but there is no evidence that
any alleged harm was substantial (22 days without fast meals), and that it was caused
by anything other than ordinary administrative delay. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment with respect to Count 2 is granted.
Count 3: Substitutions to Food Trays
Finally, Watford alleges that defendants burdened his practice of religion by
making substitutions to his food tray. Watford has been on the Lacto-ovo-veg diet since
2007. His chosen diet was prepared by a dietician to provide inmates with nutritionally
sound meals based upon the Lacto-ovo-veg diet plan. Watford was never provided
anything that is in violation of his religious practices on the meal plan. Any
substitutions are made based upon what is available at the prison in accordance with
the Lacto-ovo-veg meal plan that include non-meat protein alternatives, which can
include peanut butter, but which can also include egg, milk, cheese, and soy gravy.
Prisons have a duty to ensure that inmates receive adequate food. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S., 825, 828 (1994). There is no evidence that Watford was not provided
nutritionally sound meals or that any substitutions burdened his religious practices.
Indeed, prison officials are limited in what they can obtain and from whom, and
wherever possible substituted a fruit for a fruit and a vegetable for a vegetable. This
Court is confused how an apple in place of a banana can be construed as a substantial
burden. Furthermore, Watford received a lacto-ovo-veg tray, not a specific religious tray,
Page 17 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 18 of 21 Page ID #2421

so how can an alleged peanut butter discrepancy impact one’s religious practice. Finally,
the Court previously directed Menard to provide Watford with the standard Lacto-OvoVeg tray every Wednesday morning for the duration of this litigation (Doc. 44). As such,
summary judgment is granted as to Count 3 as Watford has not shown a question of fact
that any substitutions made to his food trays have substantially burdened his religion.
II.

Defenses
Although this Court has already determined that summary judgment is

appropriate as to all three of Watford’s claims, defendants have also raised three
defenses in support of their arguments.
1. § 1983 Liability
For

a

defendant

to

be

held liable under section 1983,

he

must

have

been personally involved in the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Mitchell
v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018). A high-ranking prison official cannot be
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because he oversees operations within
the prison or supervises other correctional staff. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596
(7th Cir. 2009). A defendant will be deemed to have sufficient personal responsibility for
a constitutional violation if the violation occurred “at a defendant's direction” or with
his “knowledge or consent.” Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d at 498.
As the undisputed material facts show, none of the wardens, Harrington, Butler,
and Lashbrook, were directly involved with Watford and any of his alleged claims.
Sergeant Rose and Officers Delre and Seals were also not directly involved in dietary
matters, they merely delivered what they were given based upon who was on the list.
Food supervisors Winters, Holt, Opalka, Meininger, and Vanderkerkhove, also lack
Page 18 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 19 of 21 Page ID #2422

personal involvement. They were bound by the menus and used what was available to
make appropriate substitutions. They prepared the food trays based upon the names
upon their list. Furthermore, Winters retired in 2014, so cannot be liable for any alleged
deprivations in 2015, 2016 and 2017. As for Chaplain Harner, he did his job and placed
Watford on the Ramadan fast list and then got him back on the list on June 2, 2017.
Harner has no responsibilities in the kitchen with respect to food preparation or dietary
issues.
2. Statute of Limitations
To determine the proper statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, the
federal court adopts the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury
claims. See Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.1998) (Pursuant to 735
ILCS 5/13-202, the state of limitations for Section 1983 cases filed in federal court is two
years.).
Watford filed his claim on June 22, 2018 (Doc. 1). Within his complaint, he claims
he was deprived of the feast at the conclusion of Ramadan in 2014, 2015 and 2016.
Although is appears as if the claims relating to the alleged feast deprivation in 2014 and
2015 are beyond the applicable statute of limitations, it is irrelevant because Watford
received his meal according to his Lacto-Ovo-Veg diet, and any alleged deprivation of
the “feast” meal was due to his dietary restrictions and not due to any religious beliefs.
3. Qualified Immunity
“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are liable for
civil damages ... only when their conduct violated clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Balsewicz v.
Page 19 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 20 of 21 Page ID #2423

Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The doctrine “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
In evaluating a qualified immunity defense at summary judgment, the court
considers (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show
that the official violated a clearly established right; and (2) whether the plaintiff has
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether
the official in fact committed those acts. Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at 656. “To be clearly
established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
741 (2011); see also Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013) (cautioning
that rights should not be defined in a highly general fashion).
While there are constitutional rights and freedoms, none are established in this
case. Watford was not deprived of the feast meal, he was provided with his special
dietary meal pursuant to his Lacto-Ovo diet. He was also initially placed on the
Ramadan fast list in April 2017 and then was re-approved to return to the list on June
2, 2017. Finally, the substitutions to the Lacto-Ovo tray did not substantially burden
his religious practice. The substitutions were based upon availability and were to
comply with nutritious requirements.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendants, Kimberly Butler, Lloyd Hanna, Richard Harrington,
Roger Holt, Roger Kern, Jacqueline Lashbrook, Theodore Meininger, Scott Opolka, Billy
Page 20 of 21

Case 3:18-cv-01313-SPM Document 177 Filed 02/25/22 Page 21 of 21 Page ID #2424

Rose, David Seals, Gustave Vandekerhove, Robert Delre, Howard Harner and Jim
Winters. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly. As such, all pending
court dates are cancelled and terminated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 25, 2022

/s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge

Page 21 of 21