Cruz v. State of Illinois et al

Filing 171

ORDER GRANTING 158 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Mark McFarland; GRANTING in part 160 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant James Hanson; DENYING in part 160 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants Lorie Cunningham, Trevor Goodrum, Leif McCarthy, John McGrath, and Nolan Thompson; and GRANTING 162 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Faiyaz Ahmed. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket sheet to reflect that the true and correct name of Defendant "Laura Cunningham" is "Lorie Cunningham." Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 5/17/2022. (jmp2)

Case 3:18-cv-01321-MAB Document 171 Filed 05/17/22 Page 1 of 38 Page ID #2892

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RICKY EDWARD CRUZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LORIE CUNNINGHAM,1 MARK
MCFARLAND, TREVOR GOODRUM,
JAMES HANSON, FAIYAZ AHMED,
JOHN MCGRATH, LEIF MCCARTHY,
AND NOLAN THOMPSON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:18-CV-1321-MAB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Mark McFarland (Doc. 158), Defendants Lorie Cunningham, Trevor
Goodrum, James Hanson, John McGrath, Leif McCarthy, and Nolan Thompson (Doc.
160), and Defendant Dr. Faiyaz Ahmed (Doc. 162). For the reasons explained below,
summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants McFarland, Hanson, and Ahmed.
Summary judgment is denied as to Defendants Cunningham, Goodrum, McGrath,
McCarthy, and Thompson.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ricky Cruz is a prisoner under the care of the Illinois Department of

The docket sheet refers to Defendant Cunningham as “Laura Cunningham.” However, filings indicate
the correct spelling of Defendant Cunningham’s name is “Lorie.” The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
update the docket sheet to reflect that the true and correct name of Defendant “Laura Cunningham” is
“Lorie Cunningham.”
1

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Corrections who brings this civil rights actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his
Second Amended Complaint on November 16, 2018 (Doc. 27). Plaintiff alleges he
received unconstitutionally inadequate medical care after he sustained an injury to his
leg (Id.).
The Court performed a merits review of the Second Amended Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and permitted Plaintiff to proceed on the following count:
Count 1:

Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Nolan
Thompson, Faiyaz Ahmed, Mark McFarland, Laura Cuningham,
John McGrath, Trevor Goodrum, James Hanson, and Leif McCarthy
for delaying or denying Plaintiff medical care for the right shin
injury he sustained at Lawrence on or around June 16, 2017.

(Doc. 29).
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
The following materials facts are not genuinely disputed. Plaintiff was housed at
Lawrence Correctional Facility (“Lawrence”) from January 2017 through March 2019
(Doc. 167-1, p. 1). On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff sustained an injury to his right leg and
pressed the emergency call button in his cell (Doc. 167-2, p. 8) (Doc. 163-3) (Doc. 167-4, p.
96-98 & 169). Plaintiff testified a correctional officer responded and indicated he would
contact medical professionals (Doc. 167-4, p. 98 & 171-72).
Plaintiff attempted to notify other inmates to press their emergency call buttons
and was yelling (Id. at p. 175). He testified he was “in a lot of pain” and “losing a lot of
blood” (Id.). Another inmate, Gilbert Mojena, heard Plaintiff’s pleas (Doc. 167-5). Plaintiff
was not seen in the Health Care Unit (“HCU”) on June 16, 2017 (Id. at p. 98-99).
During the relevant times, protocol at Lawrence required correctional officers on

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the Housing Unit wings to perform “checks” every 30 minutes and record the checks in
a log (Doc. 167-6, p. 11). Defendant Thompson was the officer on duty on the A wing in
R8 on June 16, 2017, during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift (Doc. 167-3, p. 3). The wing
log for June 16, 2017 indicates the R8 A wing was checked and marked secure at 8:50 p.m.,
9:19 p.m., 9:48 p.m., 10:15 p.m., 10:30 p.m., and 10:34 p.m. (Doc. 167-7).
Plaintiff did not speak to any correctional officers or medical staff who were
working the third shift (the overnight shift) between 11:00 p.m. on June 16, 2017 and 7:00
a.m. on June 17, 2017 (Doc. 161-1, p. 45). Plaintiff wrapped his leg to keep it from bleeding
and fell asleep (Id.).
A. Plaintiff’s Medical Treatment
On June 17, 2017 at 9:40 p.m., approximately 24 hours after he sustained the cut to
his right leg, Plaintiff was seen in the HCU (Doc. 167-2, p. 8-9). Plaintiff’s cut was
approximately one to one-and-a-half inches long and one-half inch wide (Id. at p. 9). The
nurse noted no bleeding or drainage but noted swelling (Doc. 163-6, p. 2-3). The nurse
cleaned the wound, applied triple antibiotic ointment, and applied a bandage (Id.). While
Plaintiff was in the HCU, Dr. Vipin Shah was notified by telephone of Plaintiff’s injuries
and directed Plaintiff to see a physician on June 19, 2017 (Id. at p. 3 & 34). Dr. Shah
instructed that the wound not be sutured or stitched because of the time frame of the
injury (Id.). Defendant Ahmed testified that if more than six hours passes between a
wound occurring and receiving medical treatment, it is generally too late to stitch or
suture a wound (Doc. 163-2, p. 23-24, 39-40, & 41).
Plaintiff alleges he saw Defendant Cunningham on June 17, 2017, but did not see
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her in person any time after this date (Doc. 161-1, p. 17). However, Plaintiff’s medical
records do not show Plaintiff saw Defendant Cunningham for any medical treatment
related to his leg wound (Doc. 161-2, p. 6-28).
On June 18, 2017, a licensed practical nurse (“LPN”) cleaned Plaintiff’s wound,
changed his dressings, and noted the laceration was red with moderate pus (Doc. 167-2,
p. 7). The LPN recorded that Plaintiff was provided bandages and triple antibiotic
ointment (Id.).
On June 19, 2018, Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff and prescribed him a course
of treatment to be administered by Lawrence’s nursing staff, which included antibiotics
and daily dressing changes (Id. at p. 10). Defendant Ahmed observed serosanguinous
discharge from the wound and ordered a culture (Id. at p. 10 & 114).
For the following seven weeks, from June 19 to August 2, 2017, Plaintiff saw
nursing staff at Lawrence (Id. at p. 10-28). On June 21, 2017, an LPN changed Plaintiff’s
dressings, cleaned the wound, and noted a small amount of drainage (Id. at p. 10). On
June 23, 2017, an RN performed a dressing change and charted there was drainage on the
old dressings but the margins were clean (Id. at p. 11). Also on June 23, 2017, Defendant
Ahmed reviewed the lab results of Plaintiff’s wound culture from June 19 and the culture
was negative for infection (Id. at p. 119). On June 24, 2017, an LPN performed a dressing
change and noted there was a small amount of dark red drainage on the old dressing and
that the wound’s margins were clean and pink (Id. at p. 11). On June 25 and June 28, an
LPN performed dressing changes on Plaintiff’s leg wound (Id. at p. 12).
Plaintiff recalls his wound was getting better around June 23, 2017 (Doc. 161-1, p.
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21). On July 2, 2017, an LPN performed a dressing change and noted the wound was
tender, open, and there was a small amount of drainage (Doc. 167-2, p. 12). When the
LPN performed the dressing change on July 2, the LPN noted the Plaintiff was to be put
on the M.D. line for the next available date for reevaluation with a doctor (Id.). On July 6,
2017, an LPN performed a dressing change on Plaintiff’s right leg and noted the area was
healing (Id. at p. 13). On July 7, 2017, an LPN performed a dressing change and observed
the wound had clean pink skin and good borders (Id. at p. 14). On July 12, 2017, an LPN
performed a dressing change on Plaintiff’s right leg wound and noted the area was
healing and there were no signs or symptoms of infection (Id. at p. 15) (Doc. 163-1, p. 12021). Plaintiff recalled his wound was getting better around June 30, 2017 to July 12, 2017
(Doc. 161-1, p. 21 & 31-32).
On July 14, 2017, Plaintiff saw Defendant Ahmed, who noted the area was tender
but healing (Doc. 163-2, p. 71-73) (Doc. 167-2, p. 18). Dr. Ahmed ordered triple antibiotic
ointment and Band-Aids be applied to the wound daily for two weeks and Plaintiff was
issued triple antibiotic ointment and Band-Aids (Doc. 163-2, p. 44-45) (Doc. 167-2, p. 114).
On July 18, 2017, an LPN examined Plaintiff’s leg and observed that one inch of the area
was open and there were no signs or symptoms of infection (Doc. 167-2, p. 19). The LPN
educated Plaintiff to continue with the treatment and issued him supplies; the LPN noted
that Plaintiff understood (Doc. 163-5, p. 39-40) (Doc. 167-2, p. 19).
Plaintiff testified he was instructed to rinse the wound with water, apply ointment,
and apply a bandage (Doc. 161-1, p. 18). However, Plaintiff testified he tried to keep water
from getting into the wound while in the shower and would leave a bandage on during
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showers (Id. at p. 19).
On July 24, 2017, Plaintiff presented to nurse sick call and reported his right leg
wound was severely hurting and he had chills (Doc. 167-2, p. 21-22). The medical record
indicates that Plaintiff reported he was keeping the wound clean and applying antibiotic
ointment, as ordered (Id. at p. 22). The nurse recorded that Plaintiff’s wound was swollen
with slightly dark edges and redness surrounding the tissue (Id.). Plaintiff reported that
he had been keeping his wound clean and applying the ointment as ordered (Id.). A
physician on site prescribed the antibiotic Augmentin and prescribed ibuprofen for his
leg and another medical issue (Doc. 163-2, p. 73-76) (Doc. 167-2, p. 22).
On July 26, 2017, a nurse entered a medical note in Plaintiff’s medical records,
which indicated Defendant Hanson stopped the nurse while she was conducting a
medical line and asked her to see Plaintiff about his leg wound (Doc. 167-2, p. 23). The
note stated Plaintiff was already scheduled to see a medical provider the next day, July
27, 2017 (Id.).
On July 27, 2017, Plaintiff saw Defendant Ahmed, who noted Plaintiff’s wound
was tender with redness and no discharge (Doc. 167-2, p. 24). Defendant Ahmed assessed
Plaintiff with a right leg laceration with cellulitis (Id.). Defendant Ahmed discontinued
the Augment, prescribed Plaintiff Clindamycin, which is used to treat MethicillinResistant Staphylococcus Aureus (“MRSA”), ordered a culture and blood laboratory
tests, and ordered a dressing change every day by a nurse (Doc. 167-2, p. 24-25, 115, &
120-22). On July 28, 2017, Plaintiff’s blood was drawn for the labs ordered by Defendant
Ahmed and an RN performed a dressing change (Doc. 167-3, p. 120-22).
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On July 30, 2017, the HCU received the results of Plaintiff’s culture, which
indicated Plaintiff had MRSA, but the MRSA was susceptible to the antibiotic
Clindamycin (Doc. 167-2, p. 26-27 & 120-21). An RN advised Dr. Shah of the culture
results and medication susceptibility received that day and Plaintiff’s current
prescriptions; Dr. Shah gave no new orders (Doc. 167-2, p. 27). Also on July 30, 2021, an
RN performed a dressing change (Id. at p. 26-27).
Nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records show he was infected with MRSA due to the
medical treatment he received for his leg wound (Doc. 161-1, p. 54). On August 2, 2017,
Plaintiff saw Defendant Ahmed, who examined Plaintiff’s wound and reviewed the
culture and lab results (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-59) (Doc. 167-2, p. 28). Defendant Ahmed
observed Plaintiff’s wound was healing, there was granulation, and there was no redness
or discharge (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-59) (Doc. 167-2, p. 28). Defendant Ahmed discontinued
the Clindamycin because the leg was healing, there were no signs of infection, and he
wanted Plaintiff to avoid side effects from the antibiotic (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-60) (Doc. 1672, p. 28).
The dressings on Plaintiff’s right leg were changed on August 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,
13, & 14 (Doc. 167-2, p. 91). The laceration and infection healed after the treatments in
August 2017 (Doc. 163-1, p. 138-39) (Doc. 167-2, p. 91).
To Defendant Ahmed’s knowledge, nurses were following his orders through the
treatment of Plaintiff’s leg wound (Doc. 163-2, p. 82-83).
When an inmate is placed on the med line, a nurse schedules the appointment with
the physician and the physicians do not schedule when a patient is seen by a nurse or
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physician (Doc. 163-2, p. 78) (Doc. 163-5, p. 36). When a physician sets up a treatment
plan, the nurses are required to follow that treatment plan when it is in the scope of their
practice (Doc. 163-5, p. 31). The nurse who is assigned to the housing unit has the
responsibility to make sure the nurses are following the doctor’s treatment plans for the
inmates in that unit, such as changing the dressings of an inmate in that housing unit
(Doc. 163-5, p. 31-32).
B. Plaintiff’s Grievances
On July 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states:
Due to my personal injury to my right leg that took place from a slip and
fall from top bunk sli[p]ping off of in location R8 AL15 now this taking
place I have a deep cut. Deep enough to see the muscle in my leg this slip
was from the sink and I was seen from the Doctor Ahmed. And told me
M30089 that I could not receive [stitches] to close the wound on 6.17.17
because of it being to[o] late. And this was an order from Laura
[Cunningham] that this wound could not be stitched. Now this being said
directions an[d] orders from the Doctor after being seen on 6.17.17 was that
I be seen every day to monitor the wound. To be cleaned an[d] bandage
[until the] wound started to get better on 6.30.17 Ms. Gates that passed out
medication on 2nd shift was the only one to help me with at that time with
adhesive bandages to keep this cut from getting infected[.] [N]ow this being
said on 7.1.17 not one of the nurses on 1st shift came to tend to this wound.
This wound is not healing in a healthy way[.] [It’s] getting infected and
when they do see me they try to steril[ize] the wound with just water. I keep
putting in for medical for treatment on other treatment that I want to have
taken care of while I put in request after request and still I wait patient and
do not get called to see the doctor. Now this being said on 1st shift from
6.18.17 I was seen from nurses to tend the wound 6 25 17 6 26 17 6 28 17 6
29 17 6 30 17 Ms. Gates and officer Simpson was the ones I had to call on to
help me with this wound I spoke to officer Pieper today on 7.1.17 and he
called over there to medical to find out what has [taken] place and see if
they [could] send someone over to see me about this cut[.] I even told Mr.
McCaslin and he told me on 1st shift to talk to 1st shift officer on 7.1.17
Kurkwood and he even called over to medical to find out what was taking
place and still nothing took place. Now when R/O Piper came with nurse
on medication line on 2d shift on 7.1.17 the nurse [once] again made [sure]
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I had a bandage to keep wound closed if it was not for me reaching out to
officer Piper and officer Piper making [sure] I had something to keep this
wound closed off so it [would] not get infected even more [than] it is. I don’t
know what I would do[.] This large cut is still open and is not healing at all
or get[t]ing any better from [inadequate medical attention[.] this was an
emergency at [the] time because my leg was very badly infected and staff
here at Lawrence was doing nothing about it.
(Doc. 167-9, p. 4-5).
The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id. at
p. 4). A grievance counselor responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 710-17 grievance” (Id. at p. 5)
On July 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed another grievance that states, in part:
On date 7 2 17 I was seen by Nurse Shriver and another that told me she’s
not taking care of that to officer. Nurse Shriver came looked at the wound
gave me a bandage. Looked at the wound did not clean it put some
antib[i]otic ointment on a bandage and then placed it on the wound[.] It
seems to me that since [I] put in request for my other situation th[ese] nurses
are not trying to help me with [either] or because the request.
(Id. at p. 6).
The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id.).
A grievance counselor responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 7-10-17
grievance” (Id.).
On July 3, 2017, Plaintiff failed a grievance that states, in part:
On 7 3 17 Again I was not seen for a nurse check up on the wound on my
leg – right leg to keep clean. I have been asking doctors through request to
be seen let[t]ing officers I need to be t[ak]en care of all I needed was it to be
cleaned and bandaged and today they did not do anything. This was the
doctor’s orders and every other day I have to let officer simpson know that
I need a bandage to at least keep it from get[t]ing infected. I’m also let[t]ing
officer Simpson know today on 7 4 17 that the nurse has not seen me again
for this treatment. And I asked officer Simpson on[ce] again that I needed
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for this deep cut to be cleaned. I [illegible] bandages to cover the wound.. .
(Doc. 161-3, p. 85).
The grievance indicates it was received by the Administrative Review Board
(“ARB”), which responded that the grievance was misdirected because medical issues
must be reviewed at the facility prior to review by the ARB (Id. at p. 84).
On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff file a grievance that states:
On July 8th as I was coming back from the yard Lt McCarthy was told from
I/M M30089 that I M30089 had on my right leg that was open and not
bandaged because I had nothing to bandage this wound with. Because of
nurses not seeing if it was bandage[d]. Now this being said this wound has
been open since the 17th of June really the 16th so this being said I asked Lt
McCarthy if he could phone H.C.U. for this purpose of my wound[.] [H]e
told me as I was showing him my wound that he would call over there now
as I’m showing him my wound. I sa[id] to Lt McCarthy why is this wound
turning green[.] [H]e told me its because its getting better and that means
that its healing for some reason. I did not believe so and I don’t understand
why it was such a big problem for nurse with a order form the doctor to
treat this wound and monitor it [u]ntil it has gotten better[.] Ever since this
slip and fall from top bunk off the sink that split my right leg open has let
me a nasty scar[] and will be like that now for the rest of my life[.] Now I’m
having problems walking on my right leg[.] Ive be[e]n scheduled to see the
doctor and still nothing. I even been putting in request slips about this to
see the doctor.
(Doc. 167-9, p. 2-3). The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at
Lawrence (Id. at p. 2). On July 17, a grievance counselor responded, “Per HCU as
documented in medical chart Offender Cruz is being seen and treated by a licensed
Illinois physician within community standards of care” (Id.).
Plaintiff filed another grievance on August 15, 2017, which states:
On 6.16.17 I/M M30089 has slip[p]ed off of top bunk off the sink split[t]ing
right leg open on shin opening my leg about 4 inch in size on win A,8,L15.
Now this being said, on 6 17 17 – 6, 19, 17, 6, 21, 17 – 6, 23, 17 – 6, 24, 17 6,
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25, 17 – 6, 28, 17 I had a[n] infection starting in right leg because of
inadequate medical attention from doctor ahmed’s orders to clean wound
properly and bandage wound properly but nurs[e]s failed to do so on these
dates giving me one bandage at on dates telling me to wash with water and
my soap[.] [T]hey told me the same thing on dates 7, 2, 17 7, 16, 17 7, 7, 17
was the last they seen me kept telling me it was get[t]ing better and not
paying attention to doctor[s] orders, as I kept on R/O [illegible] seeing that
nurs[e]s paid attention to this wound it took all the way to the date 7, 23, 17
that my right leg had got real bad with a[] staff infection from staff in
Lawrence not car[]ing when I/M Ricky Cruz kept alerting officers nurs[es]
director of nurs[e]s Laura Cunni[n]gham Mark Mcfarland that run medical.
I even let the warden know about it warden Lamb. The staff here took so
much time to get on to what needed to be done that I had got very sick and
had a very bad infection in my leg that the doctor had to give me antibiotic
Clindamyein to try to take the swollen down and infection away first doctor
ahmed put me on [Amoxicillin]…and Ibuprofen…for pain [be]cause the
infection was causing me so much pain I could[n’t] walk caus[ing] me to
have a temperature of 97 on 7/23/17 because of inadequate medical
attention[.] [E]very time I told Officers Goodrum R/O McGrath R/O
Johnson R/O Imboeen and Lts that work 8-B they told me after seeing this
bad infection that they would phone[] medical and it took all the way for
medical doctor Ahmed to properly wrap an clean the infected wound on
7,28,17 after [already] being infected with [illegible] also I had to walk on
swollen painful right leg from dates to an[d] from chow and medical after
staff seeing what they seen my leg is still seriously infected because of
medical staff not doing the[i]r jobs. None of these officers or staff here at
Lawrence [were] concerned when this infection had started to take affect[.]
this infection has caused affliction to my person[.] I let staff here know so
many times [u]ntil it came to these proven facts of lack of medical nurses
not taking care of wound by doctor[‘]s orders. This is a proven fact
[be]cause if it was not I [would] have been fine with no infection.
(Doc. 161-3, p. 70-71).
The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id. at
p. 70). A grievance counselor responded to the grievance on August 18 and wrote, “Per
HCUA, Ms. Cunningham, ‘As documented in medical chart, Offender Cruz being seen
and treated by licensed Illinois physician within community standards of care.’” (Id. at p.
69). Plaintiff appealed the grievance to the ARB and the ARB emailed Defendant
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Cunningham about Plaintiff’s treatment on November 6, 2017 (Id. at p. 68). Defendant
Cunningham responded on November 7, 2017 with a summary of Plaintiff’s medical care
(Id. at p. 67-68). The summary states Plaintiff was treated by either a nurse or a physician
on June 17, June 18, June 19, June 21, June 22, June 24, June 25, June 28, July 2, July 6, July
7, July 12, July 13, July 14, July 18, July 24, July 26, July 27, July 28, July 29, July 30, July
31, August 2, August 5, August 6, August 7, August 8, August 10, August 11, August 12,
August 13, and August 14 (Id.). The summary also states that on August 15, the right leg
wound healed (Id. at p. 67).
C. Defendants’ Job Duties
Defendant McFarland was the Director of Nursing who was in charge of
Lawrence’s nursing staff during June, July, and August, 2017 (Doc. 167-10, p. 5).
Defendant McFarland did not provide any treatment to Plaintiff (Doc. 163-1, p. 65). The
Director of Nursing at a correctional center does not provide direct care to inmate patients
(Doc. 167-10, p. 5). Medical personnel that provide direct treatment of inmate patients are
part of a union, and it would be against union rules for a Director of Nursing to provide
any direct patient care (Id. at p. 17). Defendant McFarland’s position as Director of
Nursing is a non-union position (Id.). The role of the Director of Nursing is more of a site
manager and Defendant McFarland was in charge of coordinating staffing and
scheduling the medical unit (Id.). A physician prepares the treatment plans for
lacerations, not the Director of Nursing (Id. at p. 18). Defendant McFarland would not
have been involved in Plaintiff’s treatment unless a complaint was made about his
treatment after the doctor and nurses had provided treatment (Doc. 159-3, p. 17-18).
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Defendant Ahmed testified he did not speak with Defendant McFarland about Plaintiff’s
treatment because treatment was going well (Id.).
During the relevant timeframe, Defendant Cunningham was the HCU
Administrator who reviewed and responded to inmate grievances related to medical
needs (Doc. 167-11, p. 12-15). Plaintiff testified he sent letters to Defendant Cunningham
about “what was going on with Medical” (Doc. 163-1, p. 183). Plaintiff’s medical records
do not contain copies of any letters sent to Defendant Cunningham related to Plaintiff’s
medical treatment (Doc. 161-2). Plaintiff states Defendant Cunningham never provided
him direct medical treatment (Doc. 163-1 p. 185). Plaintiff stated he does not know if
Defendant Cunningham was consulted regarding his grievances or ever saw a copy of
those grievances (Doc. 161-1, p. 184-85). Plaintiff testified his claim against Defendant
Cunningham is based on the fact that she “runs medical” (Doc. 161-1, p. 182-83).
Defendant Cunningham is not licensed to provide a plan of care for an offender, because
she was a nurse serving in an administrative role in 2017 (Doc. 161-4, p. 8 & 15).
During the relevant times, Defendant Goodrum was a correctional officer at
Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 48) (Doc. 161-5, p. 3-4). Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant
Goodrum he was unsatisfied with his medical treatment and Defendant Goodrum did
not fix the issue (Doc. 161-1, p. 48). Plaintiff testified he spoke to Defendant Goodrum
about his medical issues “a few” times (Doc. 161-1, p. 48). Plaintiff stated he does not
know if Defendant Goodrum has any medical training (Id.). Defendant Goodrum testified
he relays medical complaints he receives from individuals in custody to the health care
unit and takes direction on how to act from the medical professionals (Doc. 161-5, p. 13Page 13 of 38

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14).
During the relevant times, Defendant Hanson was a correctional sergeant at
Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 48) (Doc. 161-6, p. 3). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hanson was
not respectful enough to Plaintiff when Plaintiff complained about his medical treatment
(Doc. 161-1, p. 49). Plaintiff did not make any complaints about his leg to Defendant
Hanson until he believed his leg was getting infected, around the end of July 2017 (Id. at
p. 49-49). Plaintiff received medical treatment approximately ten to fifteen minutes after
speaking to Defendant Hanson about his medical issues (Id.). Plaintiff spoke to Defendant
Hanson two times regarding his medical treatment (Id. at p. 49) Both conversations
occurred on the same day (Id.). Plaintiff received additional medical treatment the same
day he spoke to Defendant Hanson (Id.). Plaintiff does not know if Defendant Hanson
has any medical training (Id.). Defendant Hanson is not a medical provider and does not
provide ordinary medical treatment to offenders housed at Lawrence (Doc. 161-6, p. 12).
During the relevant times, Defendant McCarthy was a correctional lieutenant at
Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 51) (Doc. 161-7, p. 3). Plaintiff testified he told Defendant
McCarthy about his wound but Defendant McCarthy told Plaintiff it was getting better
and that he was not a medical doctor (Doc. 161-1, p. 51-52). Plaintiff testified he told
Defendant McCarthy he was unhappy with his medical treatment while he was in
segregation (Id.). Plaintiff asked Defendant McCarthy to call the HCU (Id. at p. 52).
Plaintiff cannot say how many times he spoke to Defendant McCarthy about his medical
care or what he expected Defendant McCarthy to do in response (Doc. 161-1, p. 51).
Plaintiff does not know if Defendant McCarthy has any medical training (Id. at p. 51).
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Defendant McCarthy is not a medical professional and has only basic first aid and CPR
training (Doc. 161-7, p. 14).
During the relevant times, Defendant McGrath was a correctional officer at
Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 49) (Doc. 161-8, p. 8). Plaintiff talked to Defendant McGrath after
he thought his leg was infected, around the end of July 2017 (Doc. 161-1, p. 50). Plaintiff
spoke to Defendant McGrath approximately three or four times concerning his medical
treatment on one or two days (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he showed Defendant McGrath
his leg and told Defendant McGrath his leg was “bad,” he was in pain, and he had a fever
(Id.). At least one of those days was the same day Defendant Hanson took Plaintiff to the
HCU for additional treatment (Id.). Plaintiff does not know if Defendant McGrath has any
medical training (Id.). Defendant McGrath is trained in basic first aid every year at
Lawrence (Doc. 161-8, p. 14). Plaintiff testified nurses make rounds in segregation
housing and if an offender has an issue with his medical treatment, the officer gets a
nurse’s attention to tell them about said issue (Doc. 161-1, p. 51).
During the relevant times, Defendant Thompson was a correctional officer at
Lawrence (Doc. 161-1, p. 43) (Doc. 161-9, p. 4-5). Plaintiff alleges he spoke to Defendant
Thompson regarding his leg injury on June 16, 2017, during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
shift (Doc. 161-1, p. 44). Plaintiff does not know if Defendant Thompson called the HCU
regarding Plaintiff’s injury after Plaintiff talked to him (Id.). Plaintiff does not know if
Defendant Thompson has any medical training (Id.). Defendant Thompson testified that
if an offender would have complained about a medical issue, he would have verified that
he could see the injury and would have contacted a supervisor for direction (Doc. 161-9,
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p. 8). Plaintiff stated there are multiple other ways to obtain medical attention outside of
requesting attention from correctional staff (Doc. 161-1, p. 56).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party “shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the
evidence presented, and they are material only if their resolution might change the suit’s
outcome under the governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir.
2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the court’s role is not to determine the truth of the matter, and the court may
not “choose between competing inferences or balance the relative weight of conflicting
evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hansen v. Fincantieri
Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Instead, “it must view all the evidence in the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes
in favor of the non-moving party.” Hansen, 763 F.3d at 836.
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of prisoners may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order to prevail on a claim
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, there are “two high hurdles, which
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every inmate-plaintiff must clear.” Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago Cnty., 165 F.3d
587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate he suffered from an
objectively serious medical condition. Id. at 591-92. Second, the plaintiff must establish
the individual prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that condition. Id.
A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference when they know a serious risk to
the prisoner’s health exists but they consciously disregard that risk. Holloway, 700 F.3d at
1073 (citation omitted). “The standard is a subjective one: The defendant must know facts
from which he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must
actually draw the inference.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Zaya
v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016)).
Here, no one disputes that Plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical
condition. However, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because
there is no evidence they knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff or
consciously disregarded that risk.
I.

Defendant Ahmed

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ahmed was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs because Defendant Ahmed did not suture Plaintiff’s wound,
nurses did not follow Defendant Ahmed’s orders to change Plaintiff’s bandages daily,
and Defendant Ahmed did not order the nurses to change Plaintiff’s bandages.
The parties agree that Plaintiff sustained the wound to his right leg on June 16,
2017, around 9:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. (Doc. 167-2, p. 8) (Doc. 163-3) and that Plaintiff did
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not receive treatment from the Health Care Unit until approximately 24 hours later, on
June 17, 2017, at 9:40 p.m. (Doc. 167-4, p. 98-99). It is also undisputed that Defendant
Ahmed first treated Plaintiff’s wound on June 19, 2017, and again on July 14, July 27, and
August 2, 2017 (Doc. 167-2, p. 10, 18, 24, & 28)2
Defendant Ahmed testified that in his medical opinion, if more than six hours
passes between a wound occurring and receiving medical treatment, it is generally too
late to stitch or suture the wound (Doc. 163-2, p. 23-24, 39-40, & 41). For this reason,
Defendant Ahmed did not suture or stitch Plaintiff’s wound when he initially examined
Plaintiff on June 19, 2017 (Doc. 163-2, p. 23-24). Instead, Defendant Ahmed continued the
treatment plan to clean the wound (Id. at p. 23-24 & 29-33). Defendant Ahmed prescribed
Plaintiff the antibiotic Amoxicillin, ordered nurses to change Plaintiff’s wound and
dressing daily with triple antibiotic ointment, and ordered a wound culture (Id. at p. 2933) (Doc. 163-6, p. 4). On June 23, 2017, Defendant Ahmed reviewed the lab results of
Plaintiff’s wound culture from June 19 and the culture was negative for infection (Doc.
167-2, p. 119).
Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff an additional three times. On July 14, 2017,
Defendant Ahmed noted the area of Plaintiff’s wound was tender but healing (Doc. 1632, p. 71-73) (Doc. 167-2, p. 18). Defendant Ahmed ordered that Plaintiff be issued triple

2 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

suggests Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff on June 16, 2017 (Doc.
27, p. 11, ¶ 20). However, Plaintiff abandons this argument in his response to Defendant Ahmed’s summary
judgment motion and states Defendant Ahmed first treated Plaintiff for his leg wound on June 19, 2017
(Doc. 167, p. 12). However, whether Defendant Ahmed initially treated Plaintiff on June 16 or June 19, 2017
has no bearing on the deliberate indifference analysis. Either medical visit occurred after six hours from
when Plaintiff sustained the wound, which according to Defendant Ahmed’s professional judgment, was
too long to suture or stitch the wound.

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antibiotic ointment and Band-Aids and educated Plaintiff on wound care (Doc. 163-2, p.
44-45) (Doc. 167-2, p. 114).
Defendant Ahmed treated Plaintiff on July 27, 2017 and he assessed Plaintiff with
cellulitis (Doc. 167-2, p. 24). Defendant Ahmed prescribed Plaintiff Clindamycin, which
is used to treat MRSA, ordered a culture and blood laboratory tests, and again ordered
nurses to change Plaintiff’s dressing every day (Doc. 163-6, p. 18-19, 36, & 38-40).
The HCU determined Plaintiff’s culture was positive for MRSA on July 30, 2017
(Doc. 163-6, p. 20-21 & 38-39). Defendant Ahmed saw Plaintiff on August 2, 2017 and
observed Plaintiff’s wound was healing, there was granulation, and there was no redness
or discharge (Doc. 163-2, p. 57-59) (Doc. 163-6, p. 22). Defendant Ahmed discontinued the
Clindamycin because the leg was healing, there were no signs of infection, and he wanted
Plaintiff to avoid side effects from the antibiotic (Doc. 163-2, p. 58-59) (Doc. 167-2, p. 2425, 115, & 120-22). Plaintiff testified his wound healed around August 2, 2017 and did not
require any additional treatment (Doc. 163-1, p. 138-39).
To the extent Plaintiff disagrees with Defendant Ahmed’s decision not to suture
the wound or to pursue the course of treatment that he did, the constitution does not
entitle a prisoner to “demand specific care” or to receive the “best care possible.” Arnett
v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011). “Neither medical malpractice nor a mere
disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment amounts to deliberate indifference.”
Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations,
alterations, and quotations omitted). A prisoner’s dissatisfaction with a medical
professional’s prescribed course of treatment cannot support a deliberate indifference
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claim unless there is evidence the defendant “knew better than to make the medical
decision” he made. Id. at 662-63. Sufficient evidence to support this inference may include
“the obviousness of the risk from a particular course of treatment, the defendant’s
persistence in a course of treatment known to be ineffective, or proof that the defendant’s
treatment decision departed so radically from accepted professional judgment, practice,
or standards that a jury may reasonably infer that the decision was not based on
professional judgment.” Id. at 663 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, there is no inference that Defendant Ahmed “knew better” than to pursue
the course of treatment that Plaintiff contends was unconstitutional. Defendant Ahmed
explained at his deposition that he does not stitch a laceration if more than six hours has
passed and instead treats the wound with saline and a dressing with an antibiotic (Doc.
163-2, p. 24). He also takes a culture to determine if there is an infection to assess if oral
antibiotics are appropriate, which is how he treated Plaintiff here (Id.). Plaintiff has not
pointed out any medical standard that Defendant Ahmed violated by not suturing the
wound or by pursuing the course of treatment that he did. Further, no expert testified
that Defendant Ahmed’s chosen course of treatment was a substantial departure from
accepted medical judgment, and the decision was not so obviously wrong that a
layperson could draw the inference without an expert. See Owens v. Duncan, 788 F. App’x
371, 375 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of a deliberate indifference claim because the
defendant’s decision to let the plaintiff’s incision heal naturally instead of stitching it was
insufficient to support any inference of an improper motive); Reaves v. Riggs, 2020 WL
6689109, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2020) (granting summary judgment on a plaintiff’s
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deliberate indifference claim based on a nurse’s decision to provide the plaintiff with
supplies to change his wound dressing rather than order medical staff to change the
dressing daily).
Also, there is no evidence that Defendant Ahmed persisted in a course of treatment
he knew was ineffective. According to the undisputed evidence, Defendant Ahmed first
noted an infection on July 27, 2017 and he immediately modified Plaintiff’s treatment
plan and ordered laboratory tests. When Defendant Ahmed saw Plaintiff around a week
later, on August 2, 2017, Plaintiff’s wound was healing. The wound did not require any
further treatment.
No reasonable jury could determine Defendant Ahmed was deliberately
indifferent in his treatment of Plaintiff’s laceration. Plaintiff merely disagrees with
Defendant Ahmed’s medical judgment and is dissatisfied he did not receive specific care
or the best care possible. But none of these complaints are sufficient to sustain a claim for
deliberate indifference.
Further, Plaintiff contends Defendant Ahmed was deliberately indifferent because
he ignored Plaintiff’s complaints that nurses at Lawrence were not cleaning his wounds
and dressings every day. Individual liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement
in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th
Cir. 2017). However, “a defendant’s direct participation in the deprivation is not
required.” Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2000). “An official satisfies the
personal responsibility requirement of § 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or
reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. (emphasis in original)
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(internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, a defendant may be held liable under §
1983 if he knows about a plaintiff’s medical condition and does not intervene to remedy
the condition. See Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2017); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792
F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2015).
Here, there is no evidence Defendant Ahmed received, reviewed, or was aware of
any of Plaintiff’s grievances or complaints concerning his wound treatment or otherwise
knew that nurses were not following instructions. Defendant Ahmed testified that, to his
knowledge, the nurses were following his orders throughout Plaintiff’s treatment (Doc.
163-2, p. 82-83). Because there is no evidence Defendant Ahmed knew of Plaintiff’s
complaints concerning his medical care, Defendant Ahmed could not have recklessly
disregarded those complaints. Defendant Ahmed is entitled to summary judgment. See
Bans v. Patton, 2019 WL 189243, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 14, 2019) (nurse practitioner entitled
to summary judgment on deliberate indifference claim where she had no knowledge the
jail staff failed to follow her orders to change the plaintiff’s bandage daily).
II.

Defendants Cunningham, Goodrum, Hanson, McCarthy, McGrath, and
Thompson
Defendants Cunningham, Goodrum, Hanson, McCarthy, McGrath, and

Thompson argue they are entitled to summary judgment because they were not
personally involved in providing Plaintiff medical treatment. During the relevant times,
Defendants Goodrum, McCarthy, Hanson, and McGrath were correctional officers,
sergeants, or lieutenants at Lawrence. Defendant Cunningham was the Health Care Unit
Administrator and Defendant McFarland was the Director of Nursing. None of these

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defendants provided direct medical care to Plaintiff.3
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts, a non-medical prison official will
generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. Arnett, 658 F.3d
at 755. However, non-medical officials can be held liable for deliberate indifference where
they have a reason to believe or actual knowledge that prison doctors or their assistants
are mistreating or not treating a prisoner. Id. “Non-medical defendants cannot simply
ignore an inmate’s plight.” Id. However, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he gave the
non-medical defendant “sufficient notice to alert him or her to an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
A. Defendant McFarland
Defendant McFarland was the Director of Nursing who was in charge of
Lawrence’s nursing staff during June, July, and August, 2017 (Doc. 167-10, p. 5). As the
Director of Nursing, Defendant McFarland would not have been involved in Plaintiff’s
treatment unless a complaint was made about his medical care (Doc. 159-3, p. 17-18).
Defendant Ahmed testified he did not speak with Defendant McFarland about Plaintiff’s
treatment because treatment was going well (Id.).

Plaintiff’s testimony suggests that Defendants Cunningham and McFarland were involved in the decision
not to suture his wound on June 17, 2017 (Doc. 163-1, p. 109, 182, & 219). Defendants dispute this. Although
the Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment, Plaintiff
does not reference Defendant Cunningham or Defendant McFarland’s alleged treatment, argue that their
treatment was deliberately indifferent, or otherwise pursue this theory in his opposition to the summary
judgment motions. Arguments not properly developed in a response to a summary judgment motion are
waived. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Eastern
Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2001) (“acquiescence” in response to an argument “operates as a
waiver”). Further, even if Defendant Cunningham and Defendant McFarland provided input on the
decision not to stitch or suture Plaintiff’s wound on June 17, 2017, there is no evidence that the treatment
was deliberately indifferent.
3

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On August 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states, in relevant part:
it took all the way to the date 7, 23, 17 that my right leg had got real bad
with a[] staff infection from staff in Lawrence not car[]ing when I/M Ricky
Cruz kept alerting officers nurs[es] director of nurs[e]s Laura
Cunni[n]gham Mark Mcfarland that run medical. I even let the warden
know about it warden Lamb. The staff here took so much time to get on to
what needed to be done that I had got very sick and had a very bad infection
in my leg. . .
(Doc. 161-3, p. 70-71) (errors in original).
Although Plaintiff states he “kept alerting” Defendant McFarland, there is no
evidence of what he alerted McFarland about or of the timing or substance of his
complaints. Neither the grievance, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, nor any other
evidence identifies the details of Plaintiff’s complaints to Defendant McFarland. Thus, no
reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s communications put Defendant
McFarland on notice of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d
987, 994 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment for prison warden where the
inmate argued she sent letters describing inadequate medical care but did “not supply,
in her description of the purported letters, any detail to permit the conclusion that the
letters sufficiently advised the warden of the situation to require her intervention”).
Plaintiff relies on deposition testimony that he complained to nurses that his leg
was not healing (Doc. 167, p. 12) (citing Doc. 167-4, p. 199), and points out that Defendant
McFarland supervised those nurses (Doc. 167, p. 13). However, there is no evidence
Defendant McFarland knew the nurses were not following orders. Defendant McFarland
cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of nurses under his supervision. Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Even if Defendant McFarland was negligent in
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supervising the nurses, “[s]upervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and
prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not liable. The supervisors must know about the
conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they
might see.” Chavez v. Illinois States Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal
citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). Because Plaintiff has no evidence of
Defendant McFarland’s involvement in the alleged constitutional violation, his claim
against Defendant McFarland fails as a matter of law.
B. Defendant Cunningham
Defendant Cunningham reviewed and responded to inmate grievances related to
medical needs during the relevant times (Doc. 167-11, p. 12-15). She provided input on
grievance responses and spoke to medical professionals whose conduct was at issue in
grievances (Id.).
On July 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states a physician ordered that he
receive bandage changes and wound cleaning every day, beginning on June 17, 2017
(Doc. 167-9, p. 4-5). Plaintiff complained that nurses were not treating him at all or were
only cleaning the wound with water (Id. at p. 5). The grievance states that on July 1, 2017,
a nurse eventually tended to Plaintiff’s wound (Id.). The grievance is stamped
“RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id. at p. 4). A grievance counselor
responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 7-10-17 grievance” (Id. at p. 5)
On July 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed another grievance that states a nurse looked at his
wound and gave him a bandage but did not clean it or apply antibiotic ointment (Id. at p.
6). The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id.). A
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grievance counselor responded on August 8, 2017 and stated, “addressed by 7-10-17
grievance” (Id.).
On July 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states he had not been seen by a
nurse for his leg wound on that date and needed the wound cleaned and bandaged (Doc.
161-3, p. 85). The grievance indicates it was received by the Administrative Review Board
(“ARB”), which responded that the grievance was misdirected because medical issues
must be reviewed at the facility prior to review by the ARB (Id. at p. 84).
On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff file a grievance about his medical treatment (Doc. 167-9,
p. 2-3). The grievance states Plaintiff’s wound was open and he did not have bandages to
dress the wound (Id.). Further, the wound was turning green and Plaintiff believed it was
infected (Id.). The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence
(Id. at p. 2). On July 17, a grievance counselor responded, “Per HCU as documented in
medical chart Offender Cruz is being seen and treated by a licensed Illinois physician
within community standards of care” (Id.). Defendant Cunningham indicated she was
the individual from the HCU who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical chart and responded to
the grievance counselor (Doc. 161-4, p. 15-16).
Plaintiff filed another grievance on August 15, 2017, which states, in part:
it took all the way to the date 7, 23, 17 that my right leg had got real bad
with a[] staff infection from staff in Lawrence not car[]ing when I/M Ricky
Cruz kept alerting officers nurs[es] director of nurs[e]s Laura
Cunni[n]gham Mark Mcfarland that run medical. I even let the warden
know about it warden Lamb. The staff here took so much time to get on to
what needed to be done that I had got very sick and had a very bad infection
in my leg. . .
(Doc. 161-3, p. 70-71).
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The grievance is stamped “RECEIVED” by the grievance office at Lawrence (Id. at
p. 70). A grievance counselor responded to the grievance on August 18 and wrote, “Per
HCUA, Ms. Cunningham, ‘As documented in medical chart, Offender Cruz being seen
and treated by licensed Illinois physician within community standards of care.’” (Id. at p.
69). Plaintiff appealed the grievance to the ARB and the ARB emailed Defendant
Cunningham about Plaintiff’s treatment on November 6, 2017 (Id. at p. 68). Defendant
Cunningham responded on November 7, 2017 with a summary of Plaintiff’s medical care
(Id. at p. 67-68). The summary states Plaintiff was treated by either a nurse or a physician
on June 17, June 18, June 19, June 21, June 22, June 24, June 25, June 28, July 2, July 6, July
7, July 12, July 13, July 14, July 18, July 24, July 26, July 27, July 28, July 29, July 30, July
31, August 2, August 5, August 6, August 7, August 8, August 10, August 11, August 12,
August 13, and August 14 (Id.). The summary also states that on August 15, the right leg
wound healed (Id. at p. 67).
In addition to these grievances, Plaintiff testified he sent one or two letters directly
to Defendant Cunningham in which he was “letting her know about certain
things…going on with Medical” (Doc. 163-1, p. 183-85). The letters are not in the record
and Plaintiff did not testify as to any more details about the letters (See Id.).
Although Defendant Cunningham was the Health Care Unit Administrator
during the relevant times, she was not involved in Plaintiff’s medical treatment and was
therefore entitled to rely on the judgment of medical professionals. Arnett, 658 F.3d at
755. However, Defendant Cunningham can still “be chargeable with deliberate
indifference” if she had a reason to believe or actual knowledge that the medical
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professionals were mistreating Plaintiff. Id. (internal citations, quotations, and alterations
omitted).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff testified he sent letters to Defendant Cunningham
and in his August 15, 2017 grievance, Plaintiff states he “kept alerting” Defendant
Cunningham. However, Plaintiff makes no argument that Defendant Cunningham was
deliberately indifferent to his complaints outside of her responses to the grievances she
reviewed. Aside from these grievances, Plaintiff does not set out any evidence of how or
when he otherwise alerted Defendant Cunningham about his medical care, or what the
substance of his complaints were. “The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
communication, in its content and manner of transmission, gave the prison official
sufficient notice to alert him or her to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Arnett,
658 F.3d at 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
However, Plaintiff’s grievances specifically state he was prescribed daily wound
care but that nurses were not following physician orders, which led to an infection. The
grievances also state Plaintiff did not have bandages to dress his own wound. Defendant
Cunningham testified she reviewed inmate grievances during the relevant time and
provided input into grievance responses. Further, when a medical professional’s conduct
was placed at issue in a grievance, she could speak to the nurse or physician about the
complaint. Defendant Cunningham does not dispute that she received Plaintiff’s
grievances. These grievances support an inference that Defendant Cunningham knew
Plaintiff was not receiving adequate care. While Defendant Cunningham may have been
able to rely on the judgment of medical professionals, that relevant judgment had already
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been made. Plaintiff’s physicians prescribed daily wound care from nurses from June 17,
2017 to July 14, 2017. Plaintiff was prescribed bandages and ointments between July 14,
2017 and July 27, 2017. Again, on July 27, 2017, Plaintiff was prescribed daily wound care
from nurses. According to Plaintiff’s grievances, which Defendant Cunningham
reviewed, Plaintiff was not receiving the prescribed care. At some point during July,
while Plaintiff complained about his medical treatment, the wound became infected.
Accordingly, the record contains issues of disputed material facts that a jury must decide
as to whether Defendant Cunningham was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical
needs.
C. Defendant Hanson
Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Hanson two times regarding his medical treatment
(Doc. 163-1, p. 192). Both conversations occurred on the same day (Id.). Plaintiff received
medical treatment approximately ten to fifteen minutes after Plaintiff’s second
conversation with Defendant Hanson (Id. at p. 190-91). Also, medical records state that
on July 26, 2017, Defendant Hanson stopped a nurse while she was conducting a medical
line and asked her to see Plaintiff about his leg wound (Doc. 167-2, p. 23). The note states
Plaintiff was already scheduled to see a medical provider the next day, July 27, 2017 (Id.).
Plaintiff testified his complaints against Defendant Hanson are based on his belief that
Defendant Hanson was disrespectful to Plaintiff when Plaintiff complained about his
medical treatment (Doc. 161-1, p. 192-93).
The evidence related to Defendant Hanson does not raise any inference that he
was deliberately indifferent. When Plaintiff lodged complaints about his treatment with
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Defendant Hanson, Plaintiff received medical attention shortly after or Defendant
Hanson verified with a nurse that Plaintiff was under the care of a medical provider.
Nothing suggests Defendant Hanson approved of or turned a blind eye to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs. Defendants Hanson is entitled to summary judgment. See Greeno
v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e can see no deliberate indifference
given that [the non-medical defendant] investigated the complaints and referred them to
the medical providers who could be expected to address [the plaintiff’s] concerns”).
D. Defendants McGrath, McCarthy, Goodrum, & Thompson
Defendant Thompson was the correctional officer on duty in the wing where
Plaintiff’s cell was located on June 16, 2017, the date Plaintiff suffered the laceration to his
leg (Doc. 167-3, p. 3). Plaintiff testified he showed Defendant Thompson his injury and
told him he needed medical attention (Doc. 161-1, p. 44). According to Plaintiff,
Defendant Thompson said he would call the HCU, but never returned to help Plaintiff
(Id.). Plaintiff does not know whether Defendant Thompson called the HCU (Id.). Another
inmate, Gilberto Mojena, submitted an affidavit that states on June 16, 2017, he heard
Plaintiff yelling to an officer that he needed medical treatment (Doc. 167-5). Mr. Mojena
stated the officer told Plaintiff he would contact the HCU (Id.). Plaintiff did not receive
medical attention until the following day (Doc. 167-2, p. 8-9). Defendant Thompson
testified he would never ignore an inmate’s complaint of suffering (Doc. 161-9, p. 8).
Plaintiff spoke to Defendant McGrath approximately three or four times about his
medical treatment over the course of one or two days (Doc. 161-1, p. 50). The
conversations occurred around the end of July, when Plaintiff’s leg started getting
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infected (Id.). Plaintiff showed Defendant McGrath his leg and told Defendant McGrath
his leg was “bad,” he was in pain, and he had a fever (Id.). On one of the days Plaintiff
spoke to Defendant McGrath, Plaintiff was escorted to the HCU by another officer for
treatment (Doc. 161-1, p. 194-95).
On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance that states on July 8, he showed
Defendant McCarthy his leg wound and asked why it was turning green ((Doc. 167-9, p.
2-3). The grievance states Plaintiff told Defendant McCarthy he did not have any
bandages and nurses were not treating him, which was contrary to his doctor’s orders
(Id.). According to the grievance, Plaintiff asked Defendant McCarthy if he would call
HCU for treatment (Id.). Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that the next time Plaintiff
received a dressing change was on July 12, 2017.
Plaintiff stopped Defendant Goodrum during rounds on “a few” occasions and
explained he was not receiving proper medical treatment for his wound (Doc. 161-1, p.
48). Plaintiff asked Defendant Goodrum to call someone to arrange treatment (Id).
Defendant Goodrum told Plaintiff he would call the HCU (Id.).
On August 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance, which states:
the infection was causing me so much pain I could[n’t] walk caus[ing] me
to have a temperature of 97 on 7/23/17 because of inadequate medical
attention[.] [E]very time I told Officers Goodrum R/O McGrath R/O
Johnson R/O Imboeen and Lts that work 8-B they told me after seeing this
bad infection that they would phone[] medical and it took all the way for
medical doctor Ahmed to properly wrap an clean the infected wound on
7,28,17 after [already] being infected with [illegible] also I had to walk on
swollen painful right leg from dates to an[d] from chow and medical after
staff seeing what they seen my leg is still seriously infected because of
medical staff not doing the[i]r jobs. None of these officers or staff here at
Lawrence [were] concerned when this infection had started to take affect[.]
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(Doc. 161-3, p. 70-71).
The Court begins this analysis by noting that many of the arguments set out by
Defendants Thompson, McGrath, Goodrum, and McCarthy are undeveloped and lack
citations to any authority. For instance, Defendants state “there are multiple other ways
to obtain medical attention, outside of requesting attention from correctional staff” (Doc.
161, p. 17). Also, Defendants point out that Plaintiff wrapped his leg and fell asleep on
the night he sustained his injury, which shows the injury “was not so severe that he
needed immediate medical attention” (Id. at p. 18). Defendants’ skeletal assertions are
insufficient and the Court has “no duty to research and construct legal arguments
available to a party.” Kossman v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 211 F.3d
1031, 1038 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Raghunathan
v. Holder, 604 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[S]tating blankly what one’s argument is and
actually arguing a position are different things.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly,
Defendants’ undeveloped arguments are waived and will not be addressed. United States
v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir.2000) (“We repeatedly have made clear that
perfunctory and underdeveloped arguments and arguments that are unsupported by
pertinent authority, are waived.”).
When viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants
Thompson, McGrath, Goodrum, and McCarthy saw Plaintiff’s wound and were notified
Plaintiff was in pain and not receiving proper medical attention. “If a prisoner is writhing
in agony, the guard cannot ignore him on the ground of not being a doctor; he has to
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make an effort to find a doctor[.]” Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir.
2015). Nothing in the record suggests these defendants did anything to confirm that
Plaintiff was actually receiving medical treatment, deferred to the judgment of a medical
official, or acted on Plaintiff’s complaints in any way. Cf. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 655-56
(finding a non-medical official was not deliberately indifferent where he reviewed the
plaintiff’s complaints and verified with medical officials that the plaintiff was receiving
treatment but noting, “perhaps it would be a different matter if [the defendant] had
ignored [the plaintiff’s] complaints entirely”). Defendants argue that “defendants who
worked in [Plaintiff’s] housing unit would have been aware that he was consistently
being treated by health care unit staff” (Doc. 161, p. 17). However, again here, Defendants
do not cite to any evidence to show the Court that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s
medical care and the Court is not obligated to scour the record for such evidence, if it
exists. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating the court “will
not scour a record to locate evidence supporting a party’s legal argument.”).
Defendants Thompson, McGrath, Goodrum, and McCarthy argue Plaintiff’s claim
still fails because there is no evidence their inaction caused his infection. Common sense
dictates that wounds must be kept clean to prevent or treat infections, and that regular
bandage changes and care would help keep a wound clean, especially in a prison
environment. See Banks v. Patton, 2019 WL 189243, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 14, 2019). It is
uncontested that Plaintiff’s doctor prescribed him daily wound care from June 17, 2017
until July 14, 2017 and again, beginning on July 27, 2017. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff
developed a MRSA infection at some point in July 2017, which is around the time Plaintiff
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complained about his medical treatment to Defendants McGrath, Goodrum, and
McCarthy. Plaintiff is not required to definitively prove his case at the summary
judgment stage. It is enough that he raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether
Defendants’ inaction caused him an injury.
Further, Plaintiff testified he experienced pain and suffering as a result of the delay
in medical attention when he incurred the laceration and when the wound became
infected. A delay in treating painful conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if
the delay unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 753. Even short
delays caused by the inaction of Defendants Thompson, McGrath, Goodrum, and
McCarthy can support a deliberate indifference claim. See Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556
(7th Cir. 2017) (one-and-a-half hours delay in assisting an inmate with severe and
immobilizing back pain sufficient to overcome summary judgment); Grieveson v.
Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008) (failure to treat a broken nose for a day and a
half sufficient to withstand summary judgment); Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding that the question of whether the plaintiffs were in sufficient pain to entitle
them to pain medication within the first 48 hours after a “beating” was “an issue for the
jury”); Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Even a few days’
delay in addressing a severely painful but readily treasonable condition suffices to state
a claim of deliberate indifference”). With respect to Defendant Thompson, specifically, a
reasonable jury could find his delay in assisting Plaintiff on June 16, 2017, prevented
Plaintiff’s physicians from suturing his wound, which led to the MRSA infection. See
Perez, 792 F.3d at 781 (finding the plaintiff stated a deliberate indifference claim against a
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prison administer who’s delay in approving medical treatment allegedly resulted in a
physician not being able to suture the plaintiff’s wound). Defendants do not point the
Court to any authority that the delay in Plaintiff’s medical treatment attributable to
Defendants Thompson, Goodrum, McGrath, and McCarthy is insufficient to support a
deliberate indifference claim as a matter of law.
Also, Defendant Thompson argues the wing check logbook for the evening shift
on June 16, 2017 does not indicate there were any issues. He also points out that Mr.
Mojena’s affidavit references the receiving officer (not the wing officer) as the individual
from whom Plaintiff requested medical attention. Thus, according to Defendant
Thompson, a reasonable jury could find Plaintiff was not requesting medical attention
from him on June 16, 2017. “On summary judgment a court may not make credibility
determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts;
these are jobs for the factfinder.” Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation, 892
F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018). Defendant Thompson’s assertion that a reasonable jury could
find in his favor is insufficient to establish that he is entitled to judgment at this stage.
The question is whether no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff. See Id. Here, Plaintiff
testified he spoke to Defendant Thompson and there is evidence Defendant Thompson
was on duty and assigned to Plaintiff’s wing on the night in question. Thus, there is a
genuine dispute of fact that precludes summary judgment on this basis.
In sum, the record contains evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that
Defendants Thompson, McGrath, Goodrum, and McCarthy were sufficiently aware of
Plaintiff’s complaints about inadequate medical treatment and that they ignored
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Plaintiff’s complaints entirely.
III.

Qualified Immunity
Defendants Cunningham, Goodrum, Hanson, McCarthy, and McGrath argue they

are entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statuary or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529,
536 (7th Cir. 20140 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The qualified immunity
analysis involves two inquiries: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 537. “If either inquiry is
answered in the negative, the defendant official is entitled to summary judgment.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
Here, aside from citing the qualified immunity standard, Defendants’ argument
consists of the following:
Under the first prong of the analysis, the facts alleged here do not give rise
to a Constitutional violation. As analyzed in the preceding sections,
Plaintiff cannot establish Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. Under the second prong of the analysis, the Defendants are also
entitled to qualified immunity because if they were to be held liable on the
facts alleged, it would constitute a heightened standard for what constitutes
an Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.
(Doc. 161, p. 19).
Defendants do not provide any legal analysis on the qualified immunity issue or
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cite any authority to support the defense. Again, it is not the Court’s role to research and
raise legal arguments for a party. “It has long been clear that deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.” Lewis, 864 F.3d at 566.
In Lewis, the Seventh Circuit rejected a qualified immunity defense on summary
judgment where a prisoner plaintiff complained of severe back pain to the correctional
personnel defendants, but they refused to escort him to the infirmary unless he would
stand to be cuffed. Id. The inmate told them he was unable to move because of the pain
and the defendants refused to take him to the infirmary. Id. An hour-and-a-half after the
inmate initially requested help, one of the defendants contacted the on-call physician,
who directed the inmate be taken to the hospital. Id. at 560. The Seventh Circuit found
the deliberate indifference claim against the defendants survived summary judgment
because a reasonable jury could find the delay in treatment for one-and-a-half hours
caused the inmate unnecessary suffering. Id. at 563-64.

The Court also found the

defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the delay in assisting the
inmate “ran afoul” of the inmate’s clearly established rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 566. Here, as noted in Lewis, it has long been clearly established that
correctional personnel could not ignore an inmate’s serious medical needs. Accordingly,
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Mark McFarland (Doc. 158) is GRANTED. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Lorie Cunningham, Trevor Goodrum, James Hanson, Leif McCarthy, John McGrath, and
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Nolan Thompson (Doc. 160) is GRANTED, in part, as to Defendant James Hanson, and
DENIED, in part, as to Defendants Lorie Cunningham, Trevor Goodrum, Leif McCarthy,
John McGrath, and Nolan Thompson. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Faiyaz Ahmed (Doc. 162) is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered in favor of
Defendants McFarland, Hanson, and Ahmed at the conclusion of this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 17, 2022
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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