Smith v. Engelage et al

Filing 42

ORDER: 20 Motion to Reinstate is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Count 4 is reinstated to assert a substantive due process claim as set forth in the attached Order. 23 Third Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint is DENIED. 30 Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits as a Supplement to Complaint is DENIED. 21 Motion for Recruitment of Counsel is DENIED. 32 Motion for Preliminary Injunction is MOOT. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 9/8/20. (klh2)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL SMITH #K57543,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUSTIN ENGELAGE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:19-CV-713-MAB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Michael Smith is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections and
currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center. On July 1, 2019, he filed this
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding deprivations of his constitutional rights
while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 1; Doc. 14). Specifically,
Plaintiff alleged that on March 14, 2019, while on his way to the dining hall, he was asked
by “staff” about the location of his line movement partner. Plaintiff responded that some
correctional officers inside of the cell house had “turned [his partner] around.” The
“staff” then “asked why the guy was turned around,” and Plaintiff replied, “I don’t know,
I have no control over that.” Plaintiff’s reply prompted Defendants Padraig HaithcockDukes and Nicolas Sanders to say he was “mouthy” and “like[d] to sue.” Defendant
Justin Engelage ordered him to cuff up, “since [he] like[d] to talk.” Plaintiff’s active
double cuff permit was ignored and he was taken to a segregation cell. He alleged that
he never received dinner, and the segregation cell did not have a blanket, mattress,
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pillow, hygiene bag, or running water. He claimed all of these actions were taken in
retaliation “for First Amendment activity, Plaintiff’s freedom of expression (‘c/o’s in N2
turned a guy around’ . . . ‘I don’t know, I have no control over that’) and request to be
properly handcuffed (‘I have a active approved double cuff permit’ . . . ‘can ya’ll cuff me
properly’)” (Doc. 1 at p. 14; see also id. at p. 22). Plaintiff wrote numerous grievances. Some
were deemed non-emergencies by the warden. Others were purportedly mishandled.
The next day, on March 15th, Plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket written by
Defendant Engelage, which Plaintiff claims was “fraudulent.” The ticket listed
Defendants Haithcock-Dukes and Sanders as witnesses. Plaintiff claimed that he was not
allowed to appear at the March 19th hearing on his disciplinary ticket, he was not given
staff assistance, he was not allowed to call witnesses, and he was denied an extension of
time to prepare for the hearing. The camera footage of the incident that prompted the
ticket was not reviewed and was instead destroyed. Grievances he wrote about the
disciplinary process were denied. He spent a total of six days in segregation awaiting the
outcome of the disciplinary ticket. He was ultimately found guilty and placed on C Grade
and lost two months commissary privileges.
Following a threshold review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on the following claims:
Count 1: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders retaliated against
Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment by writing Plaintiff a false
disciplinary ticket, denying him his evening meal, and refusing to double
cuff Plaintiff.
Count 2: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, Sanders, Cynthia Meyer, and Frank
Lawrence were deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment to
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Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement while in segregation.
Count 3: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders were deliberately
indifferent under the Eighth Amendment to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs by refusing to comply with Plaintiff’s medical cuff permit.
Count 7: Joshua Schoenbeck and Jason Hart retaliated against Plaintiff in
violation of the First Amendment by refusing to call Plaintiff’s witnesses at
the disciplinary hearing.
Count 8: Meyer and Lawrence retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the
First Amendment when they failed to properly respond to Plaintiff’s
grievances.
(Doc. 14).
1. Motion to Reinstate Counts 4 and 5 (Doc. 20)
The threshold order delineated the following claims as Counts 4 and 5:
Count 4: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders violated Plaintiff’s due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing Plaintiff a false
disciplinary ticket.
Count 5: John Doe Reviewing Officer, Schoenbeck, Hart, and Lawrence
violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by denying him access to video
evidence and denying his request to call witnesses at his disciplinary
hearing.
(Doc. 14). Count 4 was dismissed because “[s]tanding alone, the receipt of a false
disciplinary ticket does not give rise to a due process violation.” (Doc. 14, p. 6) (citing
Hadley v. Peters, 841 F. Supp. 850, 856 (C.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 117 (7th Cir. 1995).
Count 5 was dismissed because even assuming that his procedural safeguards were not
followed during Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, he failed to allege that he suffered the
loss of a liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protections (Doc. 14, pp. 6–7).
More specifically, the Court noted that “Plaintiff did not lose any good conduct credit nor
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was he placed in segregation as a result of the disciplinary ticket. Although he was
demoted to C Grade and lost commissary privileges, those restrictions do not give rise to
a liberty interest.” (Doc 14, p. 7) (citing Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n. 8 (7th Cir.
1997) (collecting cases). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s placement in segregation for six days
pending his disciplinary hearing did not give rise to a liberty interest because segregation
“imposed for administrative, protective, or investigative purposes,” does not implicate
the Fourteenth Amendment (Doc. 14, p. 7) (quoting Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771–
72 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff filed a motion asking the Court to reinstate Counts 4 and 5. He reiterated
that the ticket was “fraudulently prepared” and “in retaliation for the exercise of a
constitutionally protected right” (Doc. 20, p. 2, 3). He also asserted that he “was placed in
segregation as a result of the disciplinary ticket”—in other words, for retaliatory and
punitive purposes—not for “administrative, protective, or investigative purposes,” and
therefore he did suffer a loss of a liberty interest that triggered due process protections
(Doc. 20, pp. 2, 3). He claimed that the conditions of the segregation cell were “inhumane”
and “extremely harsh” (Doc. 20, p. 3).
To the extent that Counts 4 and 5 alleged procedural due process claims, Plaintiff’s
arguments are unpersuasive, and the Court remains convinced that its analysis outlined
in the threshold Order (Doc. 14) is correct. However, the Court believes that Count 4
should be reinstated to set forth a substantive due process claim. Ordinarily, an allegation
that a prison guard falsified a disciplinary ticket fails to state a claim for which relief can
be granted because “the protection from such arbitrary action is found in the procedures
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mandated by due process.” Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2006)
(quoting McPherson, 188 F.3d at 787); see also Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th
Cir.1984) (“We find that an allegation that a prison guard planted false evidence which
implicates an inmate in a disciplinary infraction fails to state a claim for which relief can
be granted where the procedural due process protections as required in Wolff v.
McDonnell are provided.”). However, an exception exists—and a substantive due process
claim can lie—where the falsified disciplinary ticket is issued in retaliation for the exercise
of a constitutional right. Lagerstrom, 463 F.3d at 625 (citing Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402
(7th Cir. 1994)). See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (substantive due
process “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests,” including “the specific freedoms protected by
the Bill of Rights”).
The exception in Black appears to be applicable here. Plaintiff has alleged that
Defendants issued him a fraudulent disciplinary report in retaliation for exercising his
First Amendment rights. At this stage, that is sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration will, therefore, be granted in part, and Count 4 is reinstated to assert
a claim that Defendants Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders violated Plaintiff’s
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing him a false
disciplinary ticket in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.
The Court notes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of
exhaustion has been filed and fully briefed (Docs. 38, 39, 41). The reinstatement of Count
4 does not require any supplemental briefing on the motion for summary judgment
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because the substantive due process claim is based on the same allegations as the other
claims in this case, and therefore the briefing as to those claims will also cover the
substantive due process claim.
2. Third Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 23)
Eugene Simpson, Travis Bayler, and Rob Jeffreys were mentioned in the body of
Plaintiff’s original complaint but they were not identified as Defendants in the caption
(Doc. 14, p. 5). Consequently, they were not treated as Defendants and any claims against
them were considered dismissed without prejudice (Id.). On November 25, 2019, Plaintiff
filed a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint with Simpson, Bayler, and
Jeffreys identified in the caption as Defendants (Doc. 23). He also identified and added
“Sgt. Royster” as a Defendant (Doc. 23). The proposed amended complaint is 111 pages
long. It contains a 29-page handwritten complaint followed by 82 pages of “exhibits.”
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that courts should “freely give leave when justice so
requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). The Court can deny a plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint, however, if there is undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, if the plaintiff
repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in the complaint, if the opposing party would suffer
undue prejudice, or when the amendment would be futile. Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock
Island Cty., 850 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796
(7th Cir. 2008)). “The decision to grant or deny a motion to file an amended pleading is a
matter purely within the sound discretion of the district court.” Aldridge v. Forest River,
Inc., 635 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brunt v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 284 F.3d
715, 720 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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A. Royster
According to the proposed amended complaint, Royster was a correctional officer
in north II cell house (p. 3). Plaintiff alleges that on November 7, 2019, Royster removed
Plaintiff from the yard line and sent him back to his cell because Plaintiff was “walking
alongside three offenders” (as opposed to following the facility rule and walking in pairs)
(p. 4; see also pp. 37, 38, 51). Consequently, Plaintiff missed yard that day (p. 4). Plaintiff
alleges he was removed from the yard line “as retaliation by Sgt. Royster . . . following a
request from Plaintiff for his name and badge number” (p. 4). Plaintiff alleges Royster
responded to the request by saying “this is a ongoing problem with you . . . I aint Engelage
(who is a Defendant in this case), go ahead and try to sue me, good luck proving
anything” (p. 4)
The allegations fail to state a claim for retaliation. Even if the Court assumes that
asking for Royster’s name and badge number was activity protected by the First
Amendment, the allegations do not suggest that this activity was “at least a motivating
factor in the Defendant[‘s] decision to take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680
F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Rather, the allegations suggest that Royster
pulled Plaintiff out of the line and told him to go back to his cell, at which point Plaintiff
then asked for Royster’s name and badge number, presumably because he wanted to file
a grievance. There is no indication that the events occurred in reverse or that Plaintiff had
any occasion to ask for Royster’s name and badge number before Rosyter pulled Plaintiff
out of the line. In other words, the alleged First Amendment activity did not occur prior
to the purported retaliatory act, and therefore cannot be said to have motivated the
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retaliatory act. Furthermore, it does not seem plausible that losing one hour in the yard
is the type of “deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the
future.” Gomez, 680 F.3d at 866.
The allegations also fail to state a claim for a due process violation. The right to
due process in prison hinges upon the existence of a protected liberty interest, which
requires Plaintiff to show that the punishment he received imposed “an atypical and
significant hardship.” Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Losing one hour on the yard is not an
atypical and significant hardship. See, e.g., Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir.
2005) (ninety days in disciplinary segregation without any yard access did not violate
due process).
In sum, the allegations against Royster fail to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. Consequently, Plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint to add Royster as a
Defendant is denied.
B. Eugene Simpson
According to the proposed amended complaint, Eugene Simpson was “assigned
to the grievance office” (p. 8). Plaintiff alleges that he submitted grievance #316-4-19
regarding “personal property/staff conduct” with an attached letter dated April 22, 2019
(p. 19). On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff received a copy of Grievance Officer Simpson’s
recommendation that the grievance be denied (p. 19). Plaintiff alleges that Simpson was
“deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s right to due process” and failed to review all
information submitted to the grievance office because Simpson did not attach to his
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response a copy of the letter Plaintiff submitted with the grievance, which Plaintiff claims
is “required under Due process” (p. 19). Plaintiff claims Simpson is “liable, also, under
supervisor liability, [because he] failed to remedy a wrong” (p. 19).
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that Simpson mishandled his grievance, he fails
to state a claim. “[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th
Cir. 1996); see also Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); Grieveson v. Anderson,
538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, the denial or mishandling of a grievance—
standing alone—is not enough to establish deliberate indifference in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. See Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425, 428-29 (7th
Cir. 2017); Owens, 635 F.3d at 953; George v. Abdullah, 507 F.3d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir.
2007). See also Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 2017 WL 2784561, *4 (7th Cir. 2017) (“reject[ing]
the notion that ‘everyone who knows about a prisoner’s problems will incur § 1983
liability.” (quoting Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiff asserts that Simpson is liable because he knew of a violation of Smith’s
rights and failed to remedy the wrong” (Doc. 23, p. 2). A prisoner’s communication can,
under some circumstances, provide sufficient notice to a prison official about an ongoing
constitutional violation that requires the official to exercise their authority and to take the
needed action to investigate and, if necessary, to rectify the offending condition. See, e.g.,
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir.
1996). However, a high-level official typically cannot be roped into a constitutional claim
merely by denying a grievance concerning a “completed act of misconduct.” George v.
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Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[R]eject[ing] an administrative
complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not [violate the Constitution].”).
Here, Plaintiff mentions various grievances throughout the proposed amended
complaint, but he never provided a comprehensive description about what the
grievances were about. And the grievance that appears to be at issue here—#316-4-19—
is not attached to the proposed amended complaint. So the Court has no way of knowing
whether any of the purported misconduct was still ongoing at the time Simpson reviewed
the grievance. Therefore, the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are
insufficient to state a claim that Simpson acted with deliberate indifference in denying
Plaintiff’s grievance.
C. Travis Bayler & Rob Jeffreys
According to the proposed amended complaint Travis Bayler and Rob Jeffreys
“were assigned to the ARB in IDOC at Springfield, Illinois” (p. 8). The only allegations
that the Court was able to locate regarding Bayler and Jeffreys was that “[i]nstitutional
restrictions and loss of privileges, associated with B-grade status, is directly attributed to
the action(s) or lack thereof by Defendants . . . Travis Bayler and Rob Jeffreys” (p. 19) and
that Bayler and Jeffreys “believed [Plaintiff] received radio back two days after seg
release” (p. 22). It is not clear from these allegations what Plaintiff is alleging Bayler and
Jeffreys did wrong. See Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a
complaint must “provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim,’ which is sufficient to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests,’ including “some indication . . . of time and place.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S.
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544, 555 (2007) and Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970–71 (7th Cir. 2004)).To the
extent that their purported misconduct was related to the denial of a grievance, as the
Court has already stated, simply ruling against a prisoner on a grievance does not
constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore,
it cannot be inferred from the paltry allegations that Bayler or Jeffreys knew about and
ignored an ongoing constitutional violation.
Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Royster, Simpson, Bayler, and
Jeffries, his motion for leave to amend is denied.
3. Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits as Supplement to Complaint
(Doc. 30)
Plaintiff asks the Court to allow him to file additional exhibits as a supplement to
his complaint. Specifically, he wants to file a letter from the ACLU declining his request
for representation (Doc. 30, pp. 1–2, 5). Plaintiff also wants to file an internal memo from
Menard reflecting that the grievance office received a grievance dated November 7, 2019
regarding recreational opportunities. This motion is denied.
To begin with, the Court does not accept piecemeal amendments or supplements
to a complaint. See SDIL-LR 15.1. Additionally, the declination letter from the ACLU has
no bearing on the allegations in the complaint or the claims Plaintiff is pursuing. In other
words, it’s simply not relevant to the complaint; it is only relevant to his request for
counsel. As for the memo, it simply reflects that one of Plaintiff’s grievances was received
by the grievance officer for the second level of review. This memo does not provide any
additional facts or allegations relevant to the claims in this case. Given that neither of the
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proposed exhibits have any bearing on Plaintiff’s claims, the motion to supplement the
complaint is denied.
4. Second Motion for Counsel (Doc. 21)
“There is no right to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.” Giles v.
Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1052 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711
(7th Cir. 2014)). But the district court has discretion to recruit an attorney for any litigant
who cannot otherwise afford one. Giles, 914 F.3d at 1052; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Evaluating
whether to recruit counsel is a two-step process. Giles, 914 F.3d at 1052. The court must
determine whether “(1) the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel
or been effectively precluded from doing so and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,
does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?" Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654
(7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s first motion for counsel (Doc. 4), which he filed at the same time he filed
his complaint, was denied because the case was still in its infancy (Doc. 14). After the
threshold review of the complaint was completed and Defendants were served, Plaintiff
renewed his motion for counsel (Doc. 21).
Plaintiff indicates that he contacted two attorneys, the Uptown People’s Law
Center, and the American Civil Liberties Union (Doc. 4; Doc. 21). Accordingly, it appears
that Plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own. That leaves the
Court to determine whether Plaintiff appears competent to litigate the case himself. This
inquiry requires the Court to look at the factual and legal complexity of the plaintiff’s
claims. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655, 656. It also requires the Court to consider “the tasks that
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normally attend litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and
other court filings, and trial,” as well as the litigant’s literacy, communication skills,
educational level, and litigation experience. Id. at 655. In other words, this inquiry is an
individualized one based upon the record as a whole, the nature of the claims, and the
plaintiff’s ability to pursue his claims through all phases of the case, including discovery
and trial. Navejar v. Iyioloa, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff’s main contention is that he needs counsel to help him obtain evidence
necessary to succeed on his claims (Doc. 21). However, discovery on the merits of
Plaintiff’s claims has not yet commenced—it has been stayed until the issue of exhaustion
is resolved (Doc. 31). Given the quality of Plaintiff’s filings thus far and his litigation
experience, the Court is convinced that Plaintiff is capable of explaining his efforts to
exhaust his administrative remedies and representing himself at this stage of the
proceedings. Accordingly, the motion for counsel is denied. If and when the case
proceeds to discovery on the merits, Plaintiff may file a new motion for recruitment of
counsel if he is having significant difficulty in conducting discovery.
5. Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 32)
In this motion, which was filed on January 27, 2020, Plaintiff alleges that six days
prior, he sent a copy of the scheduling order in this case to the law librarian at Menard
and asked for weekly access to the law library. Plaintiff seems to think that the law library
supervisor notified other prison officials about the scheduling order, which prompted
them to give Plaintiff a cellmate on January 22nd “as a form of retaliation and in violation
of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to conditions of confinement” (Doc. 32, p. 2). At that
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point, Plaintiff claims he’d had a cell to himself for approximately six months. Plaintiff
claims the cell he was in—cell 343 in the North 2 segregation unit—was not fit for two
people. He asked the Court to order Defendant Frank Lawrence, the warden at Menard
at that time, to stop any and all forms of harassment and retaliation directed toward
Plaintiff, to not put another inmate in cell 343 with Plaintiff, and to require Plaintiff to
remain the sole occupant of cell 343 in the North 2 cell house until the pending litigation
is concluded or he was granted a requested job assignment.
Defendants filed their response to Plaintiff’s motion on February 19, 2020 (Doc.
35). Plaintiff filed his reply brief on February 27, 2020 (Doc. 36). Approximately one week
later, Plaintiff notified the Court that he had been transferred from Menard to Lawrence
Correctional Center (Doc. 37).
Plaintiff’s transfer out of Menard renders his motion for preliminary injunction
moot. Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a prisoner who seeks
injunctive relief for a condition specific to a particular prison is transferred out of that
prison, the need for relief, and hence the prisoner's claim, become moot.” (citing Higgason
v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1995)).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Counts 4 and 5 (Doc. 20) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED IN PART. Count 4 is reinstated to assert a claim that Defendants Engelage,
Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders violated Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing him a false disciplinary ticket in retaliation for
exercising his First Amendment rights.
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Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is
DENIED.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits as Supplement to
Complaint (Doc. 30) is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Counsel (Doc. 21) is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 32) is MOOT.
This matter will proceed on the following claims:
Count 1: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders retaliated against
Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment by writing Plaintiff a false
disciplinary ticket, denying him his evening meal, and refusing to double
cuff Plaintiff.
Count 2: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, Sanders, Meyer, and Lawrence were
deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment to Plaintiff’s
conditions of confinement while in segregation.
Count 3: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders were deliberately
indifferent under the Eighth Amendment to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs by refusing to comply with Plaintiff’s medical cuff permit.
Count 4: Engelage, Haithcock-Dukes, and Sanders violated Plaintiff’s substantive
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing him a false
disciplinary ticket in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.
Count 7: Schoenbeck and Hart retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the
First Amendment by refusing to call Plaintiff’s witnesses at the disciplinary
hearing.
Count 8: Meyer and Lawrence retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the
First Amendment when they failed to properly respond to Plaintiff’s
grievances.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 8, 2020
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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