Jefferson v. Williams

Filing 15

ORDER. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, Petitioner Robert G. Jefferson's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 11/2/2022. (arm)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROBERT JEFFERSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
E. WILLIAMS,
Respondent.

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Case No. 20-cv-595-DWD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Now before the Court is Petitioner Robert G. Jefferson’s pro se Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1).
Background 1
On August 5, 1998, a jury found Petitioner guilty on 25 counts of a Third
Superseding Indictment, including for the murders of Londwea Brown and five young
children, running a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”), drug conspiracy, various
drug charges, and as a felon in possession of a firearm. See Jefferson v. United States, Nos.

1The

documents from Petitioner’s criminal case records are largely unavailable electronically. However,
the Court has reviewed the portions of the record submitted by the parties, in addition to the available
records in United States v. Jefferson, Case No. 97-276-2-MJD (D. Minn). The Court has further reviewed the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentence, see United States
v. Jefferson, 215 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2000), and the District Court’s orders denying Petitioner’s motions
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See Jefferson v. United States, Nos. CR 97-276(2), Civ.
01-1821, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25370, *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2002) (order denying Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion); United States v. Jefferson, No. CR 97-276 (2) (MJD), 2021 WL 2143478, at *1 (D. Minn. May 26, 2021),
(order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Sentence Reduction), reconsideration denied, No. CR 97-276 (2)
(MJD), United States v. Jefferson, No. CR 97-276 (2) (MJD), 2021 WL 3472650 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2021). The
Court is entitled to take judicial notice of these court documents. See Keller v. Walton, No. 14-CV-594-DRH,
2014 WL 2861547, at *1 (S.D. Ill. June 24, 2014), aff'd (July 30, 2015) (district courts may judicially notice
public records available on Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) and other court
documents to determine petitioner’s criminal and litigation history) (citing Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F.
Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.2 (S.D. Ill. 2006) and Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994)).

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CR 97-276(2), Civ. 01-1821, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25370, *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2002) (order
denying Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion).

Petitioner was sentenced to life

imprisonment on the CCE and murder counts. Jefferson, 2021 WL 2143478, at *1 (order
denying Petitioner’s Motion for Sentence Reduction). Petitioner was also convicted of
one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
for which he was sentenced to 10-years. Jefferson, 2021 WL 2143478, at *3. His convictions
and sentence were affirmed. Jefferson, 215 F.3d at 823.
Here, Petitioner only challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Doc.
1). Petitioner does not challenge the remaining counts of his conviction. Petitioner
invokes Rehaif v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), as the basis for his
collateral attack, and argues that the Government failed to prove that he knew he
belonged to the category of persons (those with a prior felony conviction) who were
prohibited from possessing a firearm, at the time he possessed a firearm (Doc. 1).
Petitioner argues generally that he is entitled to relief because his charging indictment
and corresponding jury instructions did not specify a “status” element (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Respondent answered the Petition (Doc. 10), to which Petitioner replied (Doc. 12).
Respondent also filed supplemental authority (Doc. 13), to which Petitioner responded
(Doc. 14).
Discussion
Typically, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be
used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing; they may only challenge
the execution of a sentence. Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus,
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aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court
is usually limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d
214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). A prisoner may only challenge his federal conviction or sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in very limited circumstances, such as the “saving clause” of 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e), which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition
where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798–99 (7th Cir.
2002).
Section 2255 relief is inadequate “when it is so configured as to deny a convicted
defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his
conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” In re Davenport, 147
F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Therefore, before relief under § 2241
becomes available, Petitioner must demonstrate the inability of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
to cure the alleged defect in their conviction because of a structural problem inherent in
§ 2255. See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (Petitioner must show
“something more than a lack of success with a section 2255 motion” before the saving
clause is satisfied).

Following Davenport and its progeny, the Seventh Circuit has

developed a three-part test for determining whether § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective
so to trigger the saving clause:
1.
The federal prisoner must seek relief based on a decision of
statutory interpretation (as opposed to a decision of constitutional
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interpretation, which the inmate could raise in a second or successive § 2255
motion);
2.
The statutory rule of law in question must apply retroactively
to cases on collateral review and could not have been invoked in a first §
2255 motion; and
3.
A failure to afford the prisoner collateral relief would amount
to an error “grave enough” to constitute “a miscarriage of justice.”
Worman v. Entzel, 953 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Montana
v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016) and Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir.
2019)); see also Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019).
Petitioner asserts a claim based on the 2019 Rehaif opinion, in which the Supreme
Court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove both that the defendant knew he
possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons
barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 204 L. Ed. 2d 594; United States v. Williams, 946
F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2020) (defendant’s conviction for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition was based on his status of being illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
reversing/remanding because the Government had not been required to prove at trial
that defendant knew he was unlawfully in the country).

The opinion abrogated

nationwide precedent in all eleven circuit courts of appeal which had held that
knowledge was not an element that the prosecution must prove to obtain a conviction,
including in the Eighth Circuit where Petitioner was convicted. See, e.g., United States v.
Thomas, 615 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that in a § 922(g) prosecution the
Government was not required to prove that the defendant knew of his disabling status).
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Petitioner claims that the Government failed to prove that he knew he belonged to
the category of persons (those with a prior felony conviction) who were prohibited from
possessing a firearm, at the time he possessed a firearm (Doc. 1). Respondent concedes
that Petitioner’s Rehaif claim satisfies the first and second prongs of the Seventh Circuit’s
“saving clause” test – Rehaif is a statutory interpretation case, and it sets forth a new
substantive rule narrowing the scope of Section 922(g), which applies retroactively (Doc.
10, pp. 19-20). Further, this new substantive rule was previously unavailable to Petitioner
because it would have been futile to raise his claim in his first Section 2255 motion2 under
binding pre-Rehaif precedent (Id.). However, Respondent asserts that Petitioner cannot
meet the third Davenport factor – a showing that an error in his conviction amounts to a
miscarriage of justice – because he was not convicted of a crime for which he was actually
innocent (Doc. 10, p. 21). 3 On this issue, the Court agrees.
Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner’s indictment did not allege that he knew
he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm (Doc. 10, p. 5). This was
consistent with pre-Rehaif controlling precedent. However, the Government avers that it
would have been implausible for Petitioner to not know he was a prohibited person
because of his prior state court felony conviction, and the term of imprisonment he served

2 Prior to the instant §

2241 Petition, Petitioner challenged his sentence on a direct appeal (Doc. 1). Petitioner
also filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which was denied on December 3, 2002 (Doc. 1, p. 14).
Petitioner has sought to file four successive § 2255 petitions, but these applications have all been denied
(Doc. 1, p. 14).
3Respondent also raises the argument, in order to preserve it, that an inmate who previously challenged
his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is barred from using the “saving clause” to raise a later challenge
under Section 2241. (Doc. 10). The Court finds it unnecessary to address the merits of this argument
because, as Respondent acknowledges, it is contrary to controlling Seventh Circuit precedent (Doc. 10, p.
17).

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for that felony conviction. See, e.g., Williams, 946 F.3d 968 (Finding that defendant “cannot
plausibly argue that he did not know his conviction had a maximum punishment
exceeding a year” where he spent twelve years of his life in prison).
Following the Rehaif decision, the Seventh Circuit has clarified that district courts
can, and should, consider other evidence in the criminal record to determine whether the
evidence establishes the knowledge element set forth in Rehaif. See, e.g., United States v.
Maez, 960 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2020); Williams, 946 F.3d at 973–74; United States v. Dowthard,
948 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2020). PostRehaif, the Government does not have “to prove that the defendant knew he was
prohibited from possessing a firearm. Knowledge of the relevant status is enough.”
Santiago v. Streeval, 36 F.4th 700, 707 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Maez, 960 F.3d 949); United
States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 880 (7th Cir. 2020). Further, to establish “actual innocence”
here, Petitioner “must show that no reasonable juror would find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he knew that . . . his prior conviction[] was for a crime that carried a potential
sentence of more than one year in prison.” Santiago, 36 F.4th at 707.
State Felony Conviction
On May 31, 1994, Petitioner pled guilty to a Minnesota felony charge for witness
tampering (Doc. 10-1, pp. 4-6, 41) (citing State of Minnesota v. Robert G. Jefferson, 62-K2-94670). In this case, Petitioner was originally charged with witness tampering and assault,
and the charging complaint provided that the maximum punishments for these charges
were five years, and seven years, respectively (Doc. 10-1, pp. 4-6). Petitioner pleaded

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guilty to the witness tampering charge on May 31, 1994 (Doc. 10-1, p. 41). The assault
charge was ultimately dismissed.
In a signed statement made before his change of plea hearing, Petitioner confirmed
that he understood that pleading to the charge of witness tampering was a felony and
carried a maximum sentence of 5 years (Doc. 10-1, p. 23 at ¶ 19.b) (“I have been told by
my attorney and I understand: b. That the maximum penalty that the court could impose
for this crime (taking into consideration any prior conviction or convictions) is
imprisonment for 5 years and/or a fine of $10,000”). At his change of plea hearing,
Petitioner also acknowledged that he had read and received a copy of the charging
complaint (Doc. 10-1, at pp. 12-13), which had stated the maximum punishment for that
charge was in excess of one-year. These statements alone support an inference that
Petitioner was aware that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than oneyear imprisonment. See, e.g., Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775, at *3-4; Maez, 960 F.3d at 967–68
(considering PSR record of prior incarceration, stipulation of felony conviction, and
evidence supporting inference of defendant’s knowledge of felon status to conclude plain
error of omitted Rehaif instruction did not warrant reversal of conviction).
Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that he was unaware that he had been convicted
of a felony in this case because his sentence was initially suspended. Indeed, on July 8,
1994, Petitioner’s sentence was suspended pending a five-year term of probation (Doc.
10-1, p. 48). However, this suspension was eventually revoked following two revocation
hearings (Doc. 10-1, p. 44). At his first revocation hearing, held on May 3, 1996, the state
court instructed Petitioner that his probation would continue with certain drug treatment
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conditions, but warned Petitioner that if he were to return, he would be given an 18month prison term (Doc. 10-1, p. 37). When asked directly by the court if he understood
that he would serve an 18-month prison term if he did not remain “[c]hemically free” on
probation, Petitioner responded “Yes, sir.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 38).
On October 4, 1996, another felony revocation hearing was held (Doc. 10-1, p. 40).
At this hearing, the Court found that Petitioner’s sentence should be executed (Doc. 101, p. 42). The Court sentenced Petitioner to 18-months incarceration (Doc. 10-1, p. 44).
The Court also calculated that Petitioner would receive custody credit for 88 days (Id.).
In explaining the sentence, the Court reasoned that Petitioner would serve 12 months in
custody, less 88 days, followed by a period of six months supervised release. (Doc. 10-1,
p. 44). The Court also warned that the period of supervised release “can be taken away
from you depending upon your conduct in the institution and your conduct while on
supervised release.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 44). Petitioner asked for clarification about only
serving twelve months, and the Court answered “You’re going to do twelve months less
88 days. So by my calculation you take 88 off 365 you’ll be down around 276 or so that
your attorney has stated. Good luck.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 45).
Merits of the Petition
Petitioner does not dispute that he was sentenced to 18-months of incarceration in
his state court case (Doc. 12), however, he argues that he was not on notice of his felony
status at the time he possessed the firearm in his federal case because of the suspended
sentence (Doc. 12). The Court is not persuaded that Petitioner was unaware of his state
felony conviction because of his suspended sentence. Instead, Petitioner’s statements
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made prior and during his state plea hearing, in addition to the statements he made
during his revocation hearings, indicate that Petitioner understood he was convicted of a
crime punishable by more than one-year imprisonment. Moreover, the Government
avers, and Petitioner does not contest, that he served more than 12-months incarceration
for this conviction (Doc. 13; Doc. 14).

Thus, Petitioner’s argument that he lacked

knowledge of his status is implausible considering these statements and because he
served more than one year in prison for his state court conviction. See e.g., Santiago, 36
F.4th at 708-09, and cases cited therein.
However, Petitioner also briefly argues that he could not have known about his
felony status when he allegedly possessed the firearm in his federal case because he
committed the acts leading to this felony charges while his state court case sentence was
suspended. This argument mirrors the rare exception exemplified in Moore v. United
States, No. 07-CR-137-BBC, 2020 WL 4785432, at *4–5 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2020) (granting
relief under § 2255 by showing that, at the time petitioner possessed the firearm, he had
not yet actually been convicted of a felony). Here, the record before the Court is largely
devoid of the necessary details for the Court to determine when the acts underlying
Petitioner’s federal crimes occurred. Instead, the Government’s briefing largely focuses
on the heinous nature of Petitioner’s federal convictions without detailing when those
crimes occurred. Further, in reviewing the available criminal court records, some of
Petitioner’s federal crimes indeed overlap in in time with the state felony proceedings.
See, e.g., Jefferson, 215 F.3d at 824 (explaining that Petitioner concocted one of his
attempted murder schemes after he committed the beating underlying his state witness
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tampering conviction because the beating was not sufficient punishment for the victim);
Jefferson, 2021 WL 2143478, at *1 (the six murders Petitioner was convicted for occurred
on February 12, 1994 and February 28, 1994). Petitioner did not plead guilty to the witness
tampering charge until May 31, 1994 (Doc. 10-1, p. 41). Thus, while Petitioner’s federal
murder convictions were egregious, the current record does not support a finding that
Petitioner could have been aware of his felony status at the time of all of his federal
crimes, and particularly the murder convictions, because those acts occurred prior to his
state court conviction.
Nevertheless, the evidence does support a finding that some of the other federal
crimes Petitioner was convicted for occurred after his state felony conviction. The
following excerpt from the District Court’s order denying Petitioner’s Motion to Reduce
Sentence provides a helpful timeline of Petitioner’s numerous crimes as described in the
Third Superseding Indictment:
As set forth in the Third Superseding Indictment, Count 1 charged “From
on or about January 1, 1992, the exact date being unknown, to the present
[the Third Superseding Indictment was filed on May 12, 1998], in the State
and District of Minnesota and elsewhere, the defendants Robert George
Jefferson and Yolanda Dean each aiding and abetting the other, knowingly
and intentionally engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise ...” (Doc. No.
676.) The conspiracy count covered the same time period. (Id.)
Defendant's date of birth is April 28, 1975. Thus, at the beginning of the
charged conspiracy Defendant was 16 years old. However, the Third
Superseding Indictment alleges that Defendant engaged in overt acts and
committed individual counts of drug trafficking dated August 6, 1996 and
later1. In August 1996, Defendant was 21 years old. . . .
As to the murder counts, Defendant was not a juvenile when the murders
were committed. Londwea Brown was killed on February 12, 1994. The
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Coppage children were killed on February 28, 1994. On those dates,
Defendant was almost 19 years old.
Jefferson, 2021 WL 2143478, at *1.
Therefore, the federal indictment charged Petitioner with committing overt acts in
furtherance of his conspiracy and other federal crimes from January 1, 1992, until May
12, 1998. Id. Petitioner pled guilty to the witness tampering charge on May 31, 1994 (Doc.
10-1, p. 41). His suspended sentence was revoked on October 4, 1996 (Doc. 10-1, p. 40),
and Petitioner was released from service of his state sentence on July 7, 1997 (Doc. 10, p.
7). 4 Thus, the evidence supports a finding that Petitioner was aware of his felony status
when he committed the crimes dated after May 31, 1994, and certainly when he
committed those crimes dated after October 4, 1996.
According to the limited record before the Court, one crime involving a firearm
occurred after Petitioner was convicted of his state felony offense. Specifically, Petitioner
was convicted of directing a drive-by shooting which occurred on February 22, 1995 See
Jefferson v. United States, Nos. CR 97-276(2), Civ. 01-1821, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25370, *2
(D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2002) (order denying Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion; describing
that the evidence at trial demonstrated that Petitioner instructed two gang members to
shoot a victim of a drive-by shooting, which made Petitioner liable for the shooting as
well; the drive-by shooting occurred in 1995); see also Jefferson v. United States, No.
97-276(4), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25382, at *13 (D. Minn. Dec. 2, 2002) (denying co-

The Government supplied this date based on statements made in Petitioner’s federal presentence
investigation report (“PSR”). A copy of Petitioner’s PSR was not provided to the Court for review.
However, Petitioner does not contest this date.

4

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defendant Robert James Jefferson a/k/a Duddy’s § 2255 petition, and referencing the
date for the drive-by shooting, which occurred on February 22, 1995). In sum, the
evidence shows that Petitioner was aware of his felony status at the time he committed
some of his federal crimes, including instructing his co-conspirators to commit the
February 1995 drive-by shooting for which he was also convicted.

Accordingly,

Petitioner cannot show a miscarriage of justice here.
Petitioner also briefly argues that he never possessed any firearm (Doc. 14). This
argument is underdeveloped. Nevertheless, this argument is unsupported by the record
which shows that Petitioner was the leader of the gang directing his co-conspirators
actions and making Petitioner liable for their actions as well. See Jefferson v. United States,
Nos. CR 97-276(2), Civ. 01-1821, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25370, *12 (“[T]he evidence at trial
overwhelmingly established that Petitioner was the leader of the gang”). Petitioner
raised a similar challenge in his first motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in
which he argued that the element of possession was never established. See Jefferson v.
United States, Nos. CR 97-276(2), Civ. 01-1821, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25370, *25-26. The
District Court, however, found that the claim was without merit because the
Government’s theory at trial was of constructive possession of a firearm. Id.
Petitioner does not otherwise contest the substantive facts of his convictions, and
he has not presented any evidence to show that he is actually innocent. He therefore
cannot demonstrate that the omission of the Rehaif knowledge element from
his indictment or proceedings resulted in his being convicted of a nonexistence offense,
or of a crime of which he was innocent. Accordingly, there was no miscarriage of justice
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in this case, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief under Section 2241 based on the
Rehaif decision.
Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine
Moreover, even if Petitioner could show a miscarriage of justice here, any error
related to Petitioner’s felon in possession charge had no real effect on his sentence such
that a court in this Circuit could remedy it. See Vanover v. Werlich, No. 19-1121, 2021 WL
2792955, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2021) (citing Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 845, 859 (7th
Cir. 2012) (applying concurrent-sentence doctrine where conviction has no cumulative
effect)). Specifically, reducing Petitioner’s 10-year sentence on the felon in possession
charge would not change the overall length of his incarceration where he is serving a life
sentence on multiple convictions and sentences which were found to be valid, and which
remain unchallenged by Petitioner. As the Seventh Circuit recently reasoned, “[a] habeas
court entertaining a saving-clause petition can order a prisoner's release when that
outcome is appropriate, but it cannot directly amend a sentencing judgment from outside
the circuit.” Vanover, 2021 WL 2792955, at *1. Thus, alternative grounds exist to deny the
Petition here based on the concurrent-sentence doctrine.
The concurrent-sentence doctrine is a discretionary doctrine that allows courts to
“pretermit decision about convictions producing concurrent sentences, when the extra
convictions do not have cumulative effects.” Ruiz v. United States, 990 F.3d 1025, 1033 (7th
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 212 L. Ed. 2d 406 (Mar. 28, 2022) (citing Ryan, 688 F.3d 845). “The
idea behind the doctrine is that review is unnecessary when the challenged sentence does
not affect the total aggregate punishment.” United States v. Harris, No. 21-1405, 2022 WL
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7880843, at *11 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022). This discretionary doctrine applies primarily in
habeas cases, although, the Seventh Circuit has also applied it in some limited
circumstances on direct appeal. Harris, 2022 WL 7880843, at *11; Ryan, 688 F.3d at 849
(“As a practical matter, the concurrent-sentence doctrine was abrogated for direct appeal
when Congress imposed a special assessment . . . for each separate felony conviction. A
collateral attack under § 2241, § 2254, or § 2255 contests only custody, however, and not
fines or special assessments.”) (internal citations omitted).
The concurrent-sentence doctrine applies where there is (1) an equal of longer
sentence on an unchallenged or affirmed conviction and (2) no adverse collateral
consequences would come to the prisoner by declining to review the challenged
conviction. Ruiz, 990 F.3d at 1033 (citing Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 649 n.1 (7th Cir.
2012)). Applying the concurrent sentencing doctrine here is warranted, for the same
reasons articulated by the District Court in its Order denying Petitioner’s § 2255 challenge
to his CCE conviction. See Jefferson, 2021 WL 2143478, at *3. There, the Minnesota District
Court found that “[e]ven if the Court were to sentence Defendant to a lesser sentence on
the CCE count under the First Step Act, it would not reduce his life sentence on the
murder counts –which involved the deaths of five, innocent young children, the youngest
of which was 2 years of age and the oldest 11 years of age.” Id. That reasoning also applies
here. The record clearly shows that Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on his murder
counts remain valid and unchallenged by this Petition, and there is no indication in the
record that the sentencing court would have imposed a different sentence on Petitioner’s
murder courts. Thus, even if Petitioner could show an error related to his felon in
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possession charge, he would be entitled to no tangible relief from this Court. See Vanover,
2021 WL 2792955, at *1 (“[a] habeas court entertaining a saving-clause petition can order
a prisoner's release when that outcome is appropriate, but it cannot directly amend a
sentencing judgment from outside the circuit.”).
Disposition
For these reasons, Petitioner Robert G. Jefferson’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED
with prejudice. It is not necessary for Petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability
from this disposition of his § 2241 Petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir.
2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 2, 2022

______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

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