Jones v. Wills et al
ORDER denying 329 Motion for TRO. Signed by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 11/21/2022. (anp)
Case 3:20-cv-01128-NJR Document 364 Filed 11/21/22 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #1914
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Case No. 20-cv-1128-NJR
ANTHONY WILLS, et al.,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Reginald Jones, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”)
brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
His Complaint (Doc. 1) alleges that Defendants denied him protective custody and tried
to place him in an area of the prison which would cause harm to him.
This matter is before the Court on Jones’s motion for temporary restraining order
(Doc. 329). Jones also filed two supplements to his motion (Docs. 340 and 343).
Defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion (Doc. 346).
On October 26, 2020, Jones filed his Complaint alleging that Defendants denied his
request for protective custody and then improperly tried to place him in protective
custody at Menard, in an attempt to cause him harm (Doc. 1). Jones alleged that
Defendants tried to harm him in retaliation for filing grievances and lawsuits. The events
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which make up the claims in his Complaint took place in 2020 (Doc. 15, p. 2)
Jones was allowed to proceed on the following counts:
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Anthony
Wills, Krista Allsup, Frank Lawrence, and Joseph Childers for
denying Jones’s request for protective custody placement
outside of Menard.
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Anthony
Wills, Krista Allsup, Montgomery Waterman, Kyle Hess,
Kelly Maue, Frank Lawrence, Joseph Childers, Terri
Wingerter, and Christopher Bradley for trying to place Jones
in protective custody, after being denied placement, in an
effort to place Jones in danger of attack from other inmates
First Amendment retaliation claim against Krista Allsup,
Montgomery Waterman, Frank Lawrence, Joseph Childers,
and Kelly Maue for denying his request for protective custody
placement and then trying to place him in protective custody
because Jones filed previous lawsuits against Menard staff.
(Doc. 15, p. 4-5).
On October 31, 2022, Jones filed the pending motion for temporary restraining
order (Doc. 329). Jones alleged that he needed medical care and an order to prevent him
from suffering injuries at the hands of staff. Specifically, ever since the alleged incident
on May 20, 2020, where Jones alleged staff tried to move him to protective custody despite
being denied protective custody, Jones has refused housing and remained in segregation
(Id. at p. 3). He believes remaining in segregation is the only way to ensure his safety prior
to his release on parole (Id.).
According to the allegations set forth in his motion, on November 15, 2022, a nonparty staff member (later identified as Officer Kempfer), informed Jones that paying for
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his appeal in Case No. 19-cv-1281-NJR was “not going to save [him]” (Id. at p. 4; Doc. 340,
p. 3). He has also endured other “threats” from staff who are not a party to this case (Id.
at p. 5). In a supplement (Doc. 340), Jones alleges that an Officer Fenton told Jones that he
would not be paroled. Jones believes he is in compliance with all of IDOC’s requirements
for parole. He indicates that both Officer Kempfer and an Officer Edwards appear to have
knowledge of Jones’s cases, including pending motions (Id. at pp. 2-3). He believes the
information that other officers are reporting to him comes from Sandra Quick, a
defendant in one of his other cases (Id. at p. 3). He believes officers are trying to thwart
his ability to be paroled (Id. at p. 4). In his second supplement, he alleges that Officer
Edwards indicated that a written statement in Case No. 19-cv-1386-SPM would lead to
Jones suffering a broken neck prior to his parole (Doc. 343, p. 2). 1
In addition to the threats to his safety, Jones alleges that he is currently suffering
from pain throughout his body. His condition includes a lump on his body, numbness in
his left arm and hand, temporary blindness, spots, and pain in his eyes (Doc. 328, p. 5).
He suffers from spasms and loss of use in his arms, hands, and fingers (Doc. 340, p. 3).
Although he has concerns for his medical conditions, Jones indicates he is reluctant to
place a sick call slip and leave his cell due to threats from staff. Jones believes if he goes
to the infirmary, he will face threats from Sergeant Anthony Jones, who is a defendant in
another case (Id. at p. 4). Due to Anthony Jones’s mere presence in the infirmary, Jones
Although Jones refers to the motion to compel at Doc. 204 in Case No. 19-cv-1386-SPM as the
source of the offending statement that would lead to his injury, he does not point to the specific
quote or reference in the motion. He merely alleges that his motion implied that related video
footage does not match what occurred.
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has refused to return to the infirmary for any care since August 29, 2019. He believes all
of these individuals are connected both to each other and to defendants in this case and
defendants in other cases before this Court (Id. at p. 5).
A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) may issue without notice only if “specific
facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate or irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in
opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Such injunctive relief is also warranted “to
prevent a substantial risk of serious injury from ripening into actual harm.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994). The same legal analysis is used to determine whether a
TRO or a preliminary injunction is warranted.
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” for which there
must be a “clear showing” that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R Miller, & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948 (5th ed. 1995)). The purpose of such an
injunction is “to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of
the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating:
1. a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;
2. no adequate remedy at law; and
3. irreparable harm absent the injunction.
Planned Parenthood v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir.
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As to the first hurdle, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any
likelihood of success—in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.”
AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). Once a
plaintiff has met his burden, the Court must weigh “the balance of harm to the parties if
the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction on the
public interest.” Id.; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). “This equitable
balancing proceeds on a sliding-scale analysis; the greater the likelihood of success of the
merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s favor.” Korte,
735 F.3d at 665. In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a preliminary
injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the
harm . . . ,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(2). Finally, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), a preliminary
injunction would bind only the parties, their officers or agents, or persons in active
concert with the parties or their agents.
Simply put, Jones fails to meet the standard for injunctive relief. Specifically, he
has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. In fact, the claims raised in his motion
for injunctive relief are not at all related to the claims in this case. The allegations involve
threats from individuals who are not parties to this lawsuit and include health conditions
which are not at issue in this case. Although Jones tries to connect these new allegations
to his current claims in this case, he fails to make the connection. He alleges, without any
support, that the non-parties threatening him are supportive of Sandra Quick, but Quick
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is not a party in this case. He believes that Kelly Maue and Monte Waterman, who are
defendants in this case, have a connection to Quick through grievance No. 162-8-19,
which Jones alleges Quick made inexhaustible. Jones brings up this grievance in a
number of his motions before this Court, but the Court does not find that this grievance
creates a connection between Quick and the defendants in this case. Nor does it create a
connection with the non-parties Jones cites to in his motion for injunctive relief. There is
simply no connection between these new allegations regarding threats to his safety and
the claims in this case.
Further, his claims regarding his need for medical care are even less related to the
claims in this case. He argues that he cannot go to the infirmary because Sergeant Jones,
a defendant in another case, works there and he fears for his safety. Jones fails to allege
that any of the defendants in this case work in the infirmary, nor do they have any
identifiable connection to Sergeant Jones. The only evidence Jones offers is his wildly
speculative theory that the individuals are all connected in some vast conspiracy against
him. He fails to offer any evidence that such a conspiracy exists.
Jones also fails to demonstrate that he will suffer harm if he is not awarded
injunctive relief. The Court notes that Jones has not clearly set forth what relief he seeks
from the Court. He vaguely states that he seeks the Court’s help in ensuring necessary
medical care and to avoid injury until his parole date. But it appears that the only thing
preventing Jones from receiving medical care is Jones himself. He could request medical
care at any time; he simply refuses to leave his cell. He could also file an emergency
grievance about his need for care and about the threats against him. It does not appear
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from his filings that he has made any attempt on his own to receive care or report his
concerns to the administration. Nor is there any evidence that any defendant or non-party
is actively preventing him from receiving care. Jones could take steps on his own to obtain
medical care and report his concerns with staff without the issuing of an injunction. The
fact that he has not done so also shows that he still has legal remedies which he can
pursue. Thus, Jones has not met the standard for obtaining injunctive relief in this case.
For the reasons stated above, Jones’s motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 332) is
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 21, 2022
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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