Wise v. Lessie Bates Davis Neighborhood House

Filing 105

ORDER granting 90 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Clerk shall dismiss this case with prejudice. All pending court dates and cancelled and vacated and all pending motions are terminated as moot. Signed by Judge Stephen P. McGlynn on 5/19/2023. (jce)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REONA WISE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:21-cv-01265-SPM

LESSIE BATES DAVIS
NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSE, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90) filed by
Defendant, Lessie Bates Davis Neighborhood House, Inc. (“LBD”). For the reason’s
set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 15, 2021, Reona Wise (“Wise”) timely filed her initial complaint 1,
then amended said complaint on October 25, 2021 prior to the entry of LBD (Doc. 1,
14). On November 18, 2021, LBD filed a partial motion to dismiss and a partial
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docs. 25, 26). On April 4, 2022, this Court sua
sponte dismissed the amended complaint for procedural deficiencies and granted
Wise leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 41).
On June 4, 2022, Wise filed her second amended complaint (Doc. 44). In

According to the Notice of Suit Rights dated July 29, 2021, “Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN
90 days of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost”.
1

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response, on June 20, 2022, LBD filed its answer along with a partial motion to
dismiss and a partial motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docs. 50-52).
On September 19, 2022, following briefing by the parties, this Court granted
in part and denied in part both the partial motion to dismiss and partial motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 72). Specifically, this Court entered judgment as to
six of the alleged Counts and held that Wise could only proceed on two of her alleged
claims, to wit: (1) Count VI – Race Based Discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981;
and, (2) Count VIII – Unlawful Retaliation, also pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Id.).
Accordingly, the actions brought pursuant to Title VII – 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., the
Equal Pay Act – 29 U.S.C. §206, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act – 29
U.S.C. §§621 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §1983, were all dismissed.
On February 24, 2023, LBD filed the instant motion for summary judgment
along with a statement of facts and excerpts of deposition testimony (Doc. 90). On
that same date, LBD also filed a supplement that included twenty-eight exhibits in
support of motion for summary judgment (Doc. 91). Within the motion, LBD claims
that Wise is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to her claims of
discrimination (Doc. 90). LBD also argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Wise’s retaliation claim (Id.). Specifically, LBD asserts that Wise cannot
make a prima facie showing of either discrimination or retaliation (Id.).
On April 5, 2023, Wise filed her response to the motion for summary judgment
wherein she counters that she has made a prima facie case for both race and color
discrimination as well as for retaliation (Doc. 95). In support of her position, Wise

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also submitted several exhibits (Id.).
On April 19, 2023, LBD filed its reply and claimed that Wise did not contest
the facts asserted in the motion for summary judgment nor did she bolster her
assertions with evidentiary support (Doc. 96). LBD further points out that Coleman
was terminated eight months prior to Wise and that Wise has not shown that any
alleged discrimination that occurred during his tenure was imputed to LBD and
Interim CEO/President, the Reverend Gary Gaston (Id.).

STATEMENT OF FACTS2
LBD is a United Methodist Community Center whose mission is to improve
the quality of life for residents of all ages, races, and backgrounds in East St. Louis,
Illinois. LBD provides quality early childhood development services, comprehensive
youth services, individual and family support services, services to older adults, and
housing economic services. The majority of individuals served by LBD are African
American. Many of the services provided by LBD are funded through federal and
state grants, which also provide funding for the salaries of the employees working
under the grants.
Wise was hired by the President and CEO of LBD, Christopher Coleman
(“Coleman”), as a Program Coordinator on May 24, 2016. Wise is an African American
female with a medium to dark complexion (Doc. 44, ¶ 5). Coleman is also African
American.
In an effort to mete out immaterial and irrelevant facts, this Court has prepared its own statement
of facts based upon the parties’ submissions herein, as well as the exhibits attached thereto. This
statement only includes facts which would be admissible at trial and which are adequately supported
and material to the issues in this case.

2

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In August of 2016, Wise was promoted by Coleman to Vice President of
Prevention Initiatives and reported directly to him. Her duties were expanded in the
new position and required overseeing various grants. She also received a salary
increase in November of 2016. Wise’s title later changed to Vice President of
Prevention Initiatives and Youth Programs and she began to oversee additional
programs. In April 2017, Wise received another salary increase. In July 2017, Wise
began to oversee even more programs.
Wise received her first performance evaluation in June 2017, at which time
her failure to timely report to her own meetings and her difficulty working with
subordinates were noted as marginal (Doc. 95-6). In the summer of 2017, LBD also
received numerous reports of dissatisfaction from the employees in Wise’s programs
who complained she was a bully to staff, played favorites, and threatened staff not to
complain about her because it would get back to her. Staff also complained that Wise
directed them to perform personal tasks, such as picking up and transporting her
children, that Wise mismanaged certain programs, such as TeenREACH, and that
Wise denied requisition requests without explanation, which forced them to spend
their own money. Staff indicated these issues were unprecedented prior to Wise.
In the fall of 2017, Wise entered into a contract with Creative Consultants to
work on a project. Wise planned to use funds from an agreement with ESL School
District that had not yet been approved. Wise authorized Creative Consultants to
begin the work without having received an approved purchase requisition to ensure
LBD would be reimbursed by District 189 for the funds. Coleman was not aware of

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this contract until after its execution by Wise and after work had already been
performed for the month of September 2017.
In October 2017, Wise was admonished by Coleman and the CFO that they
were the only individuals authorized to sign and execute contracts with vendors and
lending institutions. Wise was then placed on 45 days paid administrative leave.
During Wise’s administrative leave, LBD’s HR official, Mishayla Clemmons
(“Clemmons”), also an African American female, completed an investigation into the
complaints made by Wise’s subordinates. Clemmons conducted interviews with
twelve (12) different staff members and learned that employees felt Wise exhibited
unprofessional conduct and created a hostile work environment.
As a result of these findings, Wise was placed on a Performance Improvement
Plan (PIP) upon her return from administrative leave on December 18, 2017. The PIP
outlined “Areas of Concern” and “Improvement Goals” and noted that “improvement
must occur immediately and must be maintained.” (Doc. 91-3).
Although Wise’s pay was not reduced, several programs were removed from
her supervision. On December 21, 2017, which was three days after the PIP was
issued, Wise received her only written warning for tardiness, but it did not result in
loss of pay or benefits.
On December 22, 2017, the day after receiving the written warning, Wise filed
a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and indicated the complaint was for
discrimination based on “sex” and “retaliation”. The 2017 charge did not reference
either “race” or “color”. On December 28, 2017, less than a week after the EEOC

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claim, Wise filed an internal grievance with Clemmons at LBD. This grievance did
not mention race or color.
In late December 2017, Coleman3 was dismissed by the Board at LBD over
suspicion of embezzlement and misappropriation of agency funds, and in January
2018, the Reverend Gary Gaston (“Gaston”) became interim President and CEO of
LBD. Gaston is African American and is the pastor at St. Paul Baptist Church, which
is a predominantly African American congregation.
On January 11, 2018 4, Gaston vacated Wise’s PIP and reinstated her to all the
programs she previously oversaw. Wise’s statement of facts does not go beyond this
date, other than to state she was terminated in August of 2018 (Doc. 95, pp. 2-6).
In the first half of 2018, LBD faced a significant budget crisis and faced threats
of discontinuation of several grants and grant monies. Coleman’s issues also caused
increased scrutiny on LBD’s use of grant monies and raised questions about the
future of LBD. Due to these issues, Gaston required all programs operate in strict
compliance with LBD’s policies and program requirements, including that VPs still
needed the approval of the President/CEO to enter into contracts on behalf of LBD.
On May 17, 2018, Wise, without any consultation with Gaston or his preapproval,

signed

a

“Pre-Award

Checklist”

with

the

St.

Clair

County

Intergovernmental Grants Department for On-the Job (“OJT”) Training that

On June 4, 2019, Christopher Coleman was indicted by the grand jury with one count of
Embezzlement from the Lessie Bates Neighborhood House, an Organization that Received Federal
Funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(A). See USA v. Coleman, 3:19-cr-30080-SMY (S.D. IL). On
August 15, 2019, Coleman entered a guilty plea and was ultimately sentenced to 18 months
incarceration to be followed by two (2) years of supervised release.
3

4

The PIP was in effect from December 18, 2017 – January 11, 2018 (24 days).
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committed LBD to long-term employment and benefits (Doc. 91-20). On June 18,
2018, Wise, again without any consultation with Gaston or his pre-approval, executed
a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with the LUME institute that obligated
LBD to employ apprentices and pay them (Doc. 91-21).
LBD became aware of the OJT and MOU in July 2018, and Gaston sent Wise
a letter on July 19, 2018 requesting an explanation for her execution without prior
approval and seeking answers to four specific questions. Wise did not address the
questions and claimed that LBD had discussed the OJT and MOU in 2017, and that
the contracts had both forwarded to HR for approval. Wise also advised that the
Lume/MOU could be canceled with a 30-day notice and that Intergovernmental
Grants reissued the OJT for the appropriate signatures.
Wise was VP over the Early Childhood Programs at LBD’s Family
Development Center. In June of 2018, LBD became aware that Wise’s son was
working at the Family Development Center. On June 19, 2018, Clemmons wrote Wise
a letter to “gain[ing] knowledge and clarification of why your son is working at the
Family Development Center.” (Doc. 91-7). In response, Wise filed a formal grievance
with LBD claiming that the inquiry was a “direct attack” by Gaston, who acted with
“malicious intent” and created a “hostile work environment” (Doc. 95-5). The
grievance advised that her son was working at the Family Development Center
through District 189’s AmeriCorp program as a volunteer placed at the Early
Childhood Center and that he was “used throughout the programs and center in
various roles as needed” (Id.). The grievance did not mention race or color in any

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manner.
Following an investigation, the Personnel Committee of the Board at LBD
concluded that Gaston’s inquiry was appropriate and agreed that Wise’s son should
not volunteer in a program she supervised. Wise was not disciplined or suspended
following the investigation, nor were her pay or benefits reduced. The Chair of the
Personnel Committee was Robbie Edmond, an African American.
On July 26, 2018, the Director of Strategic Partnerships of 189 terminated its
long-running Host Site Partnership Agreement with LBD (Doc. 91-10). The letter
specifically referred to the Mary Brown Center and/or Family Development Center
and claims members may have been used for non-allowable program activities
including caring for children 0-3 years of age and filling in for the receptionist 5.
The Board of Directors at LBD is responsible for approving the fiscal budget.
The Board determined that no staff raises would be given in 2018 beyond what was
mandated by the grants themselves. Wise’s raise was $405.89. In late June and early
July 2018, Wise proposed a budget for her programs that would have increased her
salary by $30,000 - $40,000 per year. Wise also proposed raises for her staff and told
them they would be getting a raise. Wise submitted Payroll Change Notices directly
to the LBD Payroll Department before approval.
The president of the Board, Earl McDowell, notified staff that the raises

During her deposition of 11/22/2022, Wise indicated her son was an AmeriCorp volunteer through
ESL 189 and was assigned to the Migrant Head Start where he worked with toddlers (aged 2-3) to
third grade (Doc. 90-2, pp. 180- 181). She also testified that her son also completed assignments
throughout the center, such as supporting on the phone and helping with preparing on of the
classrooms (Id., pp. 186-187).
5

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promised by Wise had not been approved. Wise had been advised by Gaston that she
was not authorized to submit the Notices and that the Board had not yet finalized
the 2019 Fiscal Year Budget.
On August 17, 2018, LBD terminated Wise’s employment (Doc. 91-15).
LEGAL STANDARD
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Once the moving party has set forth the basis for
summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go
beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
of fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Stated another way, the nonmoving party must offer more than “[c]onclusory
allegations, unsupported by specific facts,” to establish a genuine issue of material
fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.
Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). However, no issue remains for trial “unless
there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party. See Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2008).

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The nonmovant cannot simply rely on its pleadings; the nonmovant must present
admissible evidence that sufficiently shows the existence of each element of its case
on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71
F.3d 1311 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th Cir.
1995); Greater Rockford Energy and Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391
(7th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, the mere existence of an alleged factual dispute will
not defeat a summary judgment motion; instead the nonmovant must present
definite, competent evidence in rebuttal. Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d
921, 924 (7th Cir. 2004).
The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor
of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to
the motion for summary judgment. White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th
Cir. 2016). In the employment discrimination context, summary judgment is
warranted where “the evidence, interpreted favorably to the plaintiff, could not
persuade a reasonable jury that the employer had discriminated against the plaintiff.
Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1570 (7th Cir. 1989).
ANALYSIS
In the Motion for Summary Judgment, LBD asserts that Wise’s termination is
the only actionable employment decision in this case (Doc. 90). However, LBD further
asserts that Wise has not made a prima facie of race discrimination or retaliation
(Id.). Moreover, LBD argues it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for
terminating Wise, and assuming Wise meets her burden, she cannot show that said

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reason for her termination was pretextual (Id.).
I.

Count IV: Race Based Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. §1981
A. Applicable Law
Section 1981 provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll persons...shall have the

same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts...as is enjoyed
by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The phrase “make and enforce contracts”
means “the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.” § 1981(b).
The Seventh Circuit has determined that the legal analysis for discrimination
claims under Title VII and Section 1981 is identical. Smith v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
806 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2015). Indeed, all discrimination cases present the same
basic legal inquiry, and at the summary judgment stage, the proper question to ask
is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the
[plaintiff's] discharge or other adverse employment action.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters.,
Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
One way of proving employment discrimination is the familiar McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework 6. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802–04 (1973). Under this analysis, to establish a prima facie case of

This burden shifting framework was formerly known as the “indirect” method; however, the Seventh
Circuit held that district courts must stop separating “direct” from “indirect” evidence and proceeding
as if they were subject to different legal standards. Ortiz, 834 F.3d 760, 765-766. Instead, all evidence
belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole. Id.
6

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employment discrimination, the employee must show that “(1) she is a member of a
protected class, (2) she was meeting the defendant's legitimate expectations, (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees who
were not members of her protected class were treated more favorably.” Mintz v.
Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2015). If an employee meets each
element of her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. The
burden then shifts back to the employee to show why the employer's explanation is
pretextual. Id.
B.

Discussion

Wise argues that she has made a prima facie claim for race and color
discrimination; therefore, this Court must go through the steps to determine if she
has done so (See Doc. 95). As set forth infra, Wise must show that she belongs to a
protected class; she met all legitimate expectations of her job; she suffered an adverse
employment action; and, another employee who was not in protected class was
treated more favorable.
1. Protected Class
The first prong is generally clear in most cases, as here. Wise can clearly
demonstrate the first element - she is African American. Section 1981 applies to
allegations of discrimination based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); Pourghoraishi v.
Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2006).

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2. Met Expectations
Regarding the second element, Wise cannot show that she was meeting LBD’s
legitimate expectations. In October 2017, she was suspended for a period of 45 days
after executing a contract with Creative Consultants without the prior approval of
the President/CEO or CFO. Upon her return on December 18, 2017, Wise was placed
on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) by Christopher Coleman, the former
CEO and President of LBD who was also African American. The PIP identified the
following four main areas of concern: (1) Lack of understanding of the role and
authority of the VP of Prevention Initiative Programs – 5 subparagraphs; (2) Failure
to follow directives of President/CEO and failure to effectively communicate with
President/CEO – 4 subparagraphs; (3) Management style – 6 subparagraphs; and,
Tardiness to meetings (Doc. 91-3). The PIP also provided Improvement Goals, Specific
Expectations; and Follow-up Updates (Id.). Although the first update was scheduled
for January 18, 2018, Gaston became Interim CEO/President in January 2018 and
he vacated Wise’s PIP on January 11, 2018 (Doc. 91-1).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Wise points to her mostly positive first
performance review from June 2017 (Doc. 95-6). It is important to note; however, that
this review occurred before the issues surrounding the contract with Creative
Consultants. Accordingly, this Court does not find that Wise was meeting LBD’s
legitimate expectations.

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3. Adverse Employment Action
To proceed with a race discrimination, Wise must also show that she suffered
a “materially adverse employment action.” Dass v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060,
1068–69 & n. 9 (7th Cir.2012). An adverse employment action is “some quantitative
or qualitative change in the terms or conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment that
is more than a mere subjective preference.” Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325
F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). “Such changes can involve the [plaintiff's] current
wealth, his career prospects, or changes to work conditions that include humiliating,
degrading, unsafe, unhealthy, or otherwise significant negative alteration in the
workplace.” Boss, 816 F.3d at 917. However, “not everything that makes an employee
unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510
F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911
(7th Cir. 2004)).
Wise also points to a 2017 write-up for tardiness, which was later vacated, as
well as statements made by Coleman calling her an “angry, aggressive black woman”
and insinuating that she did not need any more babies in support her allegations of
racism. This Court finds those arguments unpersuasive.

Indeed, some people

thinking an action is “humiliating” is not enough, on its own, to raise the action to
the level of an adverse employment action. Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc., 885
F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir. 2018). An opinion is not enough. Whether an action is adverse
requires an amount of objectivity, “[o]therwise every trivial personnel action that an
irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a

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discrimination suit.” Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.
1996).
The Seventh Circuit has classified materially adverse employment action into
the following three categories:
“(1) Cases in which the employee's compensation, benefits or other
financial terms of employment are diminished, including cases
where employment is terminated;
(2) Cases in which a nominally lateral transfer without a change in
financial terms significantly reduces the employee's career prospects
by preventing him from using the skills in which he is trained and
experienced; and,
(3) Cases in which the employee is not moved to a different job or
the skill requirements of his present job altered, but the conditions
in which he works are changed in a way that subjects him to
humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthful, or otherwise
significantly negative alteration in his workplace environment—an
alteration that can fairly be characterized as objectively creating a
hardship, the classic case being that of the employee whose desk is
moved into a closet.
Tart v. Ill. Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 475 (7th Cir.2004).
In this case, Wise ultimately lost her job, which is a materially adverse
employment action; however, prior to that and during the time within which she
complained, her salary, compensation and benefits remained the same. Additionally,
Wise’s title changed and she temporarily lost several agencies, but gained all but
back. Assuming arguendo she has satisfied this condition does not automatically
overcome her inability to satisfy the second prong and establish a prima facie case.
4. Similarly Situated Employee Treated More Favorably
As for the fourth and final element, it is the Wise's burden to present

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admissible evidence of a specific employee outside her protected class – African
American – who was treated more favorably, Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324
F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003), and that employee must be “directly comparable to h[er]
in all material respects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th
Cir. 2002). In evaluating whether two employees are directly comparable, the court
must look at all relevant factors, including whether the employees “(i) held the same
job description, (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the
same supervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education, and other
qualifications--provided the employer considered these latter factors in making the
personnel decision.” Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir.
2003).
Wise has not and cannot prove that another similarly situated employee was
treated more favorably than she. Her immediate supervisor, Gaston, the Interim
CEO and President, was African American, as were her three fellow Vice Presidents.
Although she claimed she and the other female VP were underpaid while the male
VPs were overpaid, she does not provide any support for these allegations. She does
not know how much anyone else made. Moreover, she does not assert a claim for
sexual discrimination, so it is irrelevant IF her male counterparts made more, which
we do not even know. Her assertions that the males were treated better than the
females are not dispositive, they are just her unsubstantiated complaints.
Although Wise then attempts to make a case for discrimination within the
same race, she does not provide any evidentiary support for her contention. While her

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complaint asserts racial and color discrimination as her “complexion is medium to
dark 7”, she could not specify whether Coleman, Gaston, Clemons, or the three other
VPs were lighter or darker complected. In fact, plaintiff was rather confusing in her
deposition responses. For example, she had a hard time affirming the race of another,
much less the skin tone.
During her deposition, she specifically stated,
“You keep asking me do I know they were African American. And
what I am saying is they appear to be African American, but I cannot
validate that they are African American.” (Doc. 90-2, p.11).
She also affirmed she was discriminated against based on the color of her skin,
but when asked about others stated,
“When I look at people, I don’t look at whether or not they’re darker
than me or not. That’s the kind of person I am. A lot of other people,
people often do that. They see people and that’s what they see, they
see the different shades and they’re treated differently because of
that. They are communicated differently because of those shades. I
don’t see that. I can’t answer that question because when I look at
people, I don’t see whether or not their shade is darker or lighter
than mine.” (Doc. 20-2, p. 13).
If Wise cannot identify the color of an individual, how can she determine she
was discriminated against for her complexion? Indeed, her spurious claims result in
nonsense.
Because Wise cannot make a prima facie case, there is no burden switching.
However, were this matter to survive the first stage, it would still fail as there was a
legitimate non-pretextual reason for the termination – Wise executed two contracts
without the approval of the President and CEO. She had previously been disciplined
7

Doc. 44, ¶ 15.
Page 17 of 20

for this same conduct, yet she did not learn from the prior mistake in 2017 and
repeated this behavior, placing LBD in a precarious situation. The termination letter
also references ESL 189 withdrawing its AmeriCorps program from LBD, and Wise’s
son was in that program participating in some of the non-allowable program activities
at a site that was under her supervision.
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to race and color
discrimination.
II.

Count VIII: Unlawful Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. §1981
In contrast to claims of discrimination, “[i]n the retaliation context, the

challenged adverse action need not be one that affects the terms and conditions of
employment.” Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 856 (7th Cir. 2016). Rather, to
survive summary judgment on her retaliation claims, Wise must show evidence of
“(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the
employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Abebe v. Health and Hospital
Corporation of Marion County, 35 F.4th 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2022). For purposes of
retaliation, an adverse employment action is one that “well might have ‘dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’
” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
In this case, there is no question that termination is an adverse employment
action. However, the inquiry does not end there. Wise also engaged in statutorily
protected conduct in filing claims with the EEOC and grievances at LBD.
Accordingly, whether she can establish a prima facie showing of retaliation must

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focus on whether the two actions – the termination and the complaints – are causally
connected.
Wise’s first charge of discrimination with the EEOC was dated December 22,
2017 and her grievance letter to Mishayla Clemons was dated December 28, 2017,
both of which occurred after the enactment of her Performance Improvement Plan of
12/17/2017 so there is no support that LBD enacted the PIP in retaliation of her
complaint(s). Additionally, the PIP was vacated 24 days after its enactment so Wise
never had to actually fulfull the conditions of the PIP; therefore, it is not considered
an adverse employment action. See Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., 651
F.3d 664, 677 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Abebe, 35 F.4th 601, 607-608.
The PIP is an important factor though in determining whether there was
retaliation in this case or whether LBD had a legitimate non-pretextual reason for
terminating Wise’s employment. Wise was terminated on August 17, 2018, more than
eight months after her first claim of discrimination. The termination letter provided
numerous grounds in support of said termination, including but not limited to
multiple complaints from subordinates and entering into a contractual relationship
without prior approval of the CEO/President. The termination letter also
acknowledged the prior PIP that was executed on December 18, 2017 wherein she
was specifically directed to “obtain written approval of the President/CEO before
committing or agreeing (whether verbally or in writing) to any services or other
financial obligations on behalf of Lessie Bates Davis Neighborhood House.”
Notwithstanding the directive in the PIP, Wise entered into not one, but two

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contracts on behalf of LBD without the prior approval of the President/CEO. These
contracts were executed on May 17, 2018 and June 7, 2018, respectively, which was
less than six months after the implementation of the PIP. Her conduct was in direct
violation, and some would say in flagrant disregard, of the PIP.
Wise’s second charge to the EEOC was made on July 26, 2019 at which time
she complains about her termination of August 18, 2018 being without cause and
claims none of her male or white co-workers would have been terminated. Her claims
are unsupported and without merit. As such, LBD is also entitled to summary
judgment on Wise’s claim of retaliation based upon her termination in August 2018.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant, Lessie Bates Davis Neighborhood House. Plaintiff has
failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
concerning either her race and/or color discrimination claim or her retaliation claim.
This action is DISMISSED with prejudice and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to close this case and enter judgment accordingly. As such, all pending court dates
are cancelled and vacated and all pending motions are terminated as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 19, 2023

/s/ Stephen P. McGlynn_
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge

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