In Re; George R. Ripplinger, Jr.

Filing 7

ORDER denying 6 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 6/15/2021. (drr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
In re:
GEORGE R. RIPPLINGER, JR.

Case No. 3:21-MC-00045-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff George Raymond Ripplinger, Jr.’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 6). For the reasons set forth below, Ripplinger’s Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.
BACKGROUND
On March 2, 2021, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued an Order suspending
George R. Ripplinger, Jr. from the practice of law and directing that no application for
reinstatement shall be entertained by the Supreme Court of Missouri for a period of one
year from the date of the order. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Pursuant to Local Rule 83.3(c)(2), this Court
directed Mr. Ripplinger to Show Cause in writing why it should not impose identical
discipline. 1
Ripplinger filed a response. (Doc. 4). In that Response to Show Cause, Ripplinger
“recognize[s] this Court’s authority to impose reciprocal discipline and [he] [ ] [was]

Local Rule 83.3(c)(2)(ii) provides: “an order to show cause directing that the attorney inform this Court
within 30 days after service of that order upon the attorney, personally or by mail, of any claim by the
attorney predicated upon the grounds set forth in (4) below that the imposition of the identical discipline
by the Court would be unwarranted and the reasons why.”
1

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willing to accept this Court’s verdict” (Doc. 4, p. 2) (emphasis added). The Court entered an
order of reciprocal discipline similar to the Supreme Court of Missouri, and explained its
reasoning. On June 11, 2021, Ripplinger filed the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 6).
DISCUSSION
Ripplinger filed his motion within 28 days of the entry of judgment, thus the Court
may construe it as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). “A Rule 59(e)
motion will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes: ‘(1) that the court
committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence
precluded entry of judgment.’” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting Blue v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012). “The
rule does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it
certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that
could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.” Moro
v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996).
Indeed, reconsideration of an interlocutory order is proper where the Court has
misunderstood a party, where the Court has made a decision outside the adversarial
issues presented to the Court by the parties, where the Court has made an error of
apprehension (not of reasoning), where a significant change in the law has occurred, or
where significant new facts have been discovered. Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese
Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). “Such problems rarely arise and the motion
to reconsider should be equally rare.” Id. at 1192 (citation omitted).
Ripplinger does not argue any of the above, but instead submits additional
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“factual background for each of the three violations referenced in the charges.” (Doc. 6,
p. 1). Ripplinger continues explaining that “[he] [does] not believe that these
transgressions deserve a sanction by this Court or any other Court more severe than a
reprimand or, as the Illinois Supreme Court agreed, a censure.” (Id. at p. 12).
Ripplinger has failed to provide anything to change the fact that he failed to meet
his burden under the local rule to overcome imposing reciprocal discipline. Under Local
Rule 83.3(c)(4), the Court shall impose the identical discipline unless the respondentattorney demonstrates, or the Court finds, one of four exceptions. The Court
acknowledged that Ripplinger argued that the procedure in Missouri was “so lacking in
notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process.” SDIL-LR
83.3(c)(4). Ripplinger even noted that he responded to Missouri’s Show Cause Order, and
“[t]here was no communication from the [C]ourt about briefing or oral argument”
(Doc. 4, p. 2). Ripplinger does not contest whether he argued a different exception
applied, or that the Court made an error. Accordingly, Ripplinger’s Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 15, 2021
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

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