Rose v. State of Illinois et al

Filing 59

ORDER granting 49 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated in the attached Order, the Motion is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison on 3/10/2025. (orw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GARRETT ROSE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RAVEN DEVAUGHN,1
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:22-cv-02534-GCS

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
In this suit for injunctive relief, Garrett Rose, a former employee of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), claims that the Illinois Department of Central
Management Services (“CMS”) seeks to garnish his wages without due process of law.
Defendant Raven DeVaughn, as Director of CMS, insists that she is entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiff has failed to establish an actual or imminent due process
violation that is ripe for review and because Plaintiff has omitted a necessary party to this
litigation, the Illinois Comptroller. Plaintiff states that he consents to the entry of
summary judgment against him on the condition that judgment is limited to CMS’
attempts to collect Plaintiff’s debt alleged in the Complaint and is without prejudice in

Defendant Anthony Pascente is no longer Director of the Illinois Department of Central
Management Services (“CMS”). (Doc. 54, p. 1 n.1). In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d), the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendant Anthony Pascente
from this case and substitute Raven DeVaughn, in her capacity as the acting director of CMS, in
his stead.

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regard to future attempts by CMS to enforce its claim against Plaintiff. For the reasons
stated below, summary judgment will be granted for Defendant.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence and reasonable
inferences establish the following facts relevant to the pending motion:
Plaintiff was employed as a correctional officer at the IDOC from February 2017 to
June 9, 2022, when he was terminated for repeatedly failing to wear a face mask. (Doc. 1,
p. 2). On September 22, 2022, Plaintiff received a letter from CMS notifying Plaintiff that
he owed $1,195.92 to the State due to the failure to withhold medical and dental insurance
premiums from his paychecks from March 16, 2022, through May 31, 2022. (Doc. 1-2, p.
1). The letter warned Plaintiff that if he failed to pay the amount owed by October 25,
2022, CMS would notify “the Illinois Office of the Comptroller . . . to begin involuntary
withholding.” Id.
On October 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the State of Illinois, CMS,
and Anthony Pascente, in his official capacity as the Director of CMS, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).2 (Doc. 1, p. 1). In it, Plaintiff
requested the Court declare that he had a “constitutionally protected property interest in
his wages” and that Defendants “may not cause any portion of his wages to be withheld
. . . without giving Plaintiff notice and a hearing.” Id. at p. 4. He also requested the Court

On September 26, 2023, the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment’s provision of
sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Illinois and CMS. (Doc. 39, p. 6).
Accordingly, the Court dismissed them. Id. at p. 12.
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permanently enjoin Defendants “from taking any steps to cause any part of Plaintiff’s
wages to be withheld.” Id.
On September 26, 2023, the Court found that Plaintiff could proceed on his claim
for injunctive relief against the Director of CMS and that he had sufficiently stated a claim
for a violation of due process to survive dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (Doc. 39).
On March 1, 2024, Defendant DeVaughn filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
and Memorandum in Support. (Doc. 49, 50). Defendant DeVaughn argues that she is
entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to establish an actual or
imminent due process deprivation and because he failed to include the Illinois
Comptroller as a necessary party to this litigation. Id.
In response, Plaintiff filed a Conditional Consent to Entry of Summary Judgment
(“Conditional Consent”). (Doc. 51). The Conditional Consent provides:
Given the sworn statements, [Plaintiff] does not reject entry of a summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants, but will object to judgment if it
provides that the judgment is with prejudice with regard to any attempts
by the Defendants to attempt to enforce its claim against the Plaintiff in the
future and is limited to the attempt to collect the alleged indebtedness
identified in the Complaint.
Id. at p. 1.
Defendant DeVaughn responded in opposition to the Conditional Consent. (Doc.
54). Accordingly, the Court considers whether Defendant Vaughn is entitled to entry of
summary judgment in her favor, and, if so, whether Plaintiff’s claims against her ought
to be dismissed without prejudice.

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LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and affidavits “show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c)); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The
movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material
fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Santaella v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). This Court must
consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving factual disputes
in favor of the nonmovant. See Regensburger v. China Adoption Consultants, Ltd., 138 F.3d
1201, 1205 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
See also Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “we are not
required to draw every conceivable inference from the record . . . we draw only the
reasonable inferences.”) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also
appropriate if a plaintiff cannot make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. While the Court may not weigh evidence or engage in factfinding,
it must determine if a genuine issue remains for trial. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d
645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, a nonmoving party may not
simply rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific
evidence that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof
at trial. See Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 670–671 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 276 (citing
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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). No issue remains for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. “[I]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative,
summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249–250 (citations omitted); accord Starzenski
v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174,
178 (7th Cir. 1994). In other words, “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture
will not suffice.” Trade Finance Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009)
(internal citation omitted). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (finding that “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant]”). Instead, the nonmoving party must present “definite, competent
evidence to rebut the motion.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir.
2000) (internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendant DeVaughn contends that she is entitled to summary judgment because
Plaintiff has not established a genuine dispute of material fact that he experienced an
actual or imminent due process violation. (Doc. 49, 50). Defendant DeVaughn also argues
that Plaintiff’s failure to join the Illinois Comptroller as a necessary party is fatal to his
case. Id.
Plaintiff concedes that “[g]iven the sworn statements, [he] does not reject entry of
a summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.” (Doc. 51, p. 1). However, Plaintiff states
that he “will object to judgment if it provides that the judgment is with prejudice with
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regard to any attempts by the Defendants to attempt to enforce its claim against the
Plaintiff in the future and is limited to the attempt to collect the alleged indebtedness
identified in the Complaint.” Id. In essence, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant summary
judgment for Defendant and dismiss his claims without prejudice, so that he is not
prohibited from bringing a claim if CMS seeks to collect his debt in the future. Upon
review of the record, the Court agrees with the parties that Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment.
Plaintiff has failed to allege an actual or imminent due process violation. In order
to establish a genuine dispute that his due process rights were violated, Plaintiff must
show that “(1) he had a constitutionally protected property interest, (2) he suffered a loss
of that interest amounting to a deprivation, and (3) the deprivation occurred without due
process of law.” LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F. 3d 937, 943–944 (7th
Cir. 2010). Plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated because CMS’s notice
letter warned that if he did not pay his debt by October 25, 2022, the Illinois Comptroller
would “be notified to begin involuntary withholding” with no mention of Plaintiff’s right
to a hearing. (Doc. 1-2, p. 1). Based on that belief, Plaintiff initiated this action on October
31, 2022, six days after the date CMS claimed it would notify the Illinois Comptroller to
begin involuntary withholding. (Doc. 1).3 Over two years have since passed, and Plaintiff

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim that he “believed that he had no other option
apart from filing the instant lawsuit to contest the letter’s invocation of ‘involuntary
withholding’” is refuted by an excerpt of an email chain between Plaintiff and a supervisor at his
current employer. (Doc. 50, p. 6). In that email, Plaintiff thanks his supervisor for offering to
“fight” an attempt by CMS to collect his debt. (Doc. 50-4, p. 5). The Court disagrees with
Defendant that this email demonstrates Plaintiff did not believe that a lawsuit was the only way
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has not provided any evidence that the Illinois Comptroller has attempted to garnish his
wages. And, as Defendant points out, even if CMS sought to collect the debt now, the
Illinois Comptroller would not be able to garnish Plaintiff’s wages because he is
employed by an Illinois municipality, not the State. (Doc. 50-1, p. 2). The Illinois
Comptroller is limited to involuntary withholding from State of Illinois salaries, Illinois
lottery winnings, and Illinois state tax refunds paid by the State of Illinois. Id. Plaintiff
does not dispute this. (Doc. 51, p. 1).
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence indicating that CMS has attempted to
garnish his wages or otherwise collect his debt. A “claim for a violation of due process
requires that the claimant possess a protected liberty or property interest that potentially
could be abridged.” Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 575 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Morales–
Ramirez v. Reno, 209 F.3d 977, 983 (7th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff admits that he has not shown
an actual or potential due process violation. (Doc. 51, p. 1). Accordingly, summary
judgment must be granted for Defendant.4
Plaintiff, however, also argues that summary judgment ought to be granted
without prejudice. In his Conditional Consent, Plaintiff alludes to “attempts by the

to seek relief from a garnishment action. And, even if the email did prove what Defendant claims,
Defendant fails to identify how it relates to a material dispute in this case.
As summary judgment is granted based on Plaintiff’s failure to establish a genuine
dispute that his due process rights were violated, the Court need not address Defendant’s
argument that Plaintiff failed to join the Illinois Comptroller, which Defendant claims is a
necessary party to this dispute. This is because Illinois law provides the Comptroller?not the
Director of CMS?the authority to garnish wages. (Doc. 50, p. 10-11). The Court notes that the
State Comptroller Act provides that the Illinois Comptroller “upon notification” deducts
payments. 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/10.05.
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Defendants to attempt to enforce its claim against the Plaintiff in the future.” (Doc. 51, p.
1). He wants the Court to limit its judgment to “the attempt to collect the alleged
indebtedness identified in the Complaint.” Id. If the Court does not limit its judgment,
Plaintiff states he “will object.” Id. As stated above, however, Defendant has not
attempted to collect Plaintiff’s debt. (Doc. 50-1, p. 2). To the extent Plaintiff wants the
Court to protect hypothetical claims he may have against Defendant in the future, the
Court declines to do so.
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Pierre v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 29 F.4th 934, 937
(7th Cir. 2022) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). As part of that requirement, cases must
be ripe for adjudication. “Cases are unripe when the parties point only to hypothetical,
speculative, or illusory disputes as opposed to actual, concrete conflicts.” Lehn v. Holmes,
364 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 975 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.
1992). The ripeness doctrine “prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .” Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-105 (1977); see also Sweeney v. Raoul, 990 F.3d 555, 559-560 (7th
Cir. 2021). Plaintiff’s request that the Court enter judgment on his claims without
prejudice for the sole purpose of preserving his right to litigate a hypothetical future
action is the precise kind of entanglement the ripeness doctrine prohibits. The Court will
determine Plaintiff’s right to bring claims in the future concerning due process violations
if and when he brings those claims. Until then, such claims are unripe. See, e.g., Sweeney,
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990 F.3d at 560 (explaining that “ripeness is ‘peculiarly a question of timing[]’”) (quoting
Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corporations, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974)).
By consenting to summary judgment, Plaintiff effectively admits that his claims
lack merit, and no reasonable jury could find in his favor. Plaintiff could have voluntarily
dismissed his claims without prejudice in the sixteen months between filing the case and
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). But
Plaintiff did not. He allowed the case to proceed to summary judgment despite knowing
that he lacked evidence to support his claims. Plaintiff is not entitled to dismissal of his
claims without prejudice simply because of the litigation strategy that was chosen.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
49) is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 10, 2025.

Digitally signed by
Judge Sison
Date: 2025.03.10
14:09:47 -05'00'

___________________________________
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

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