Taylor v. Illinois et al

Filing 44

ORDER DENYING 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on the various factual issues identified in the attached Order, summary judgment for Defendant is inappropriate and must be denied. Resolving these issues will require an evidentiary hearing. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). If Defendant wants to continue to pursue the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, he must request a Pavey hearing within 14 days of this Order. If no request is made, the Court will enter a scheduling order for discovery on the merits of this case. Alternatively, the parties may request that this case be referred for alternative dispute resolution. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 3/5/2025. (klh2)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RAPHAEL TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROGER SULLIVAN,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:22-CV-2837-MAB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is currently before the Court on the motion for summary judgment on
the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendant Roger Sullivan (Doc. 34). To date, Plaintiff
Raphael Taylor has not filed a response to the motion. Despite the lack of opposition from
Plaintiff, there are evident issues of fact that preclude the Court from awarding summary
judgment to Defendant, and Defendant’s motion is therefore denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Raphael Taylor, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he sought protective
custody at Shawnee Correctional Center and “feared for his life[,] because inmates and
correctional officers were trying to force [him] to join a homosexual cult.” (Doc. 18; see
also Doc. 25). The pertinent factual allegations are that Plaintiff was housed at Shawnee
Correctional Center from April 14, 2022, through April 27, 2023 (Doc. 34-1). Plaintiff
alleges that on or around June 14, 2022, Plaintiff requested protective custody because
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inmates and officers were actively trying to force him to join a homosexual cult (Doc. 18,
p. 5; see also Doc. 25, p. 3). In order to join the cult, Plaintiff would have to have sex with
a male officer or inmate or be photographed with an officer or inmate’s penis in his mouth
(Doc. 18, p. 7). According to Plaintiff, he spoke with Internal Affairs and was informed
that he was being placed in protective custody (Doc. 18, pp. 5–6). Plaintiff was kept on
protective custody status from June 14, 2022, through November 10, 2022 (Id.).
Once out of protective custody, Plaintiff alleges that on December 8, 2022,
Defendant Roger Sullivan, who is a correctional officer at Shawnee, another officer, and
an inmate went to his cell “like they were trying to scare me.” (Doc. 18, p. 7). But “after
Sullivan saw that I wasn’t afraid of them he closed [the] cell” and then began harassing
Plaintiff “everyday after” (Id.). For example, Defendant Sullivan entered his cell and
ripped up his clothes, broke his tablet, and stole some of his court documents (although
Plaintiff did not learn Sullivan was responsible until later) (Id. at pp. 7–8). On another
occasion, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sullivan purposely made him 30 minutes late
for a call pass to the law library (Id. at p. 8). And Plaintiff alleges that Sullivan and some
other officers took him to segregation in December 2022 under false pretenses in order to
cover up Sullivan’s actions and scare him into not “fil[ing] charges on . . . Sullivan” (Id.).
Following a threshold review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, he was permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel
and unusual punishment against Defendant Sullivan for attempting to force Plaintiff to
engage in homosexual behavior, to pose for inappropriate photographs, and/or to join a
homosexual cult or religion (Doc. 25).
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On March 18, 2024, Defendant Sullivan filed a motion for summary judgment on
the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 34). He acknowledges there are grievances that specifically
allege some type of wrongdoing on his part but argues they are insufficient to exhaust
Plaintiff’s claims against him for one reason or another (Doc. 34, p. 15).
Defendant Sullivan initially neglected to provide Plaintiff with the requisite Rule
56 Notice advising him of the consequences of failing to respond to the motions for
summary judgment and the necessity of supporting his response with affidavits or other
documentary evidence, but Defendant did so after prompting from the Court (Doc. 36;
see also Doc. 35). See Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1996); Timms v. Frank, 953
F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982). Shortly
thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion indicating that he had yet to receive a copy of the Merit
Review Order (which had been entered in October 2023 (Doc. 25)) and questioning the
authority of the Illinois Attorney General's Office to represent Defendant Sullivan (Doc.
37). Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of exhaustion was temporarily stayed and a hearing was set to sort through whether
Plaintiff had received any of the documents filed in the case since the Merit Review Order
was issued in October 2023 (Doc. 39). Following the hearing, the Clerk of Court mailed
Plaintiff a copy of the Merit Review Order, as well as Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment with all of the supporting exhibits and the Rule 56 Notice (Doc. 41).
Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment was reset to
September 6, 2024 (Doc. 41). That deadline has come and gone, and Plaintiff has yet to
file a response or a motion seeking additional time to do so.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not to determine
the truth of the matter, and the court does not “weigh conflicting evidence, resolve
swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's version of the facts is
most likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir.
2021). Instead, the court’s task is to view the record and draw all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and decide if there is a genuine material
dispute of fact that requires a trial. Stewart, 14 F.4th at 760; Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine
Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, “a nonmovant fails to respond
to a motion for summary judgment, the movant ‘still ha[s] to show that summary
judgment was proper given the undisputed facts,’ with those facts taken as usual in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 2011)).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit
about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011).
Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.
Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903 (citations omitted). In order for a prisoner to properly exhaust his
or her administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the
place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
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F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Failure to
do so means failure to exhaust. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004).
As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the three-step
grievance process outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code to exhaust his claims. 20
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017). Inmates first submit their grievance to their
counselor. Id. at § 504.810(a).1 After receiving the counselor’s response, they must submit
the grievance to the grievance officer, who tenders a recommendation to the warden, who
then provides the inmate with a written decision. Id. at § 504.830(e). Id. If the inmate is
unsatisfied with the warden’s decision, the inmate can appeal to the Administrative
Review Board (“ARB”) for a final determination by the Director of the IDOC. Id. at §
504.850(a), (d), (e).
An inmate may also request that a grievance be handled as an emergency by
submitting the grievance directly to the warden. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. If the
warden finds that an emergency exists, then the grievance will be handled on an
expedited basis. Id. On the other hand, if the warden determines that the grievance should
not be handled on an emergency basis, the inmate is notified and must resubmit the
grievance through the standard grievance process.” Id.
DISCUSSION
In this case, Plaintiff failure to respond to Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment is deemed an admission that Defendants’ version of the facts is true. SDIL-LR

1 There are exceptions to this rule, none of which apply here. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.810, 504.830 (2017).

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56.1(g) (“All material facts set forth in a Statement of Material Facts . . . shall be deemed
admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.”). The Court
thus credits Defendant’s uncontroverted facts so long as they are properly supported by
evidence in the record. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877,
884 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Defendant’s facts are also supplemented by
additional facts the Court came across in its review of the evidence that were relevant to
the issue at hand.
The records demonstrate that Plaintiff was a prolific grievance writer (see Doc. 342 through 34-11). According to Defendant, Plaintiff submitted approximately two dozen
grievances in 2022 and 2023 that are “tangentially” related to his claims in this case (Doc.
34, pp. 3–11). Of those grievances, Defendant claims there are four that specifically allege
some type of wrongdoing on his part but are insufficient to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims
against him for one reason or another (Doc. 34, p. 15). After reviewing the evidence,
however, the Court believes there is at least one additional grievance in which Plaintiff
complained about conduct that he now claims Defendant Sullivan was responsible for.
Each grievance will be discussed in turn below.
A. Emergency Grievance #2023-1-32, dated December 28, 2023
According to Defendant, this is the first grievance that specifically mentions him
(Doc. 34, pp. 9, 15; Doc. 34-2, pp. 61–63; Doc. 34-6, pp. 6–9). The evidence demonstrates,
and Defendant concedes, this grievance went through every step of the grievance process
before being denied on the merits by the ARB (see Doc. 34, p. 9; see also Doc. 34-6, pp. 6–
9). The Court thus finds this grievance was fully exhausted. Defendant argues that this
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grievance is nevertheless insufficient to exhaust Plaintiff’s claim against him because it is
“irrelevant,” as “the issues considered in that grievance are not germane to the issues of
Plaintiff’s current suit” (Doc. 34, p. 15). The Court is not persuaded.
In this grievance, Plaintiff complained that Defendant Sullivan caused him to
miss thirty minutes of law library “in retaliation for a lawsuit that [he] filed against
I.D.O.C.” (Doc. 34-6, pp. 8–9). This same incident is one of the many ways Plaintiff alleged
in the complaint that Defendant harassed him (see Doc. 19, p. 8). Therefore, this grievance
specifically relates to one of the events underlying Plaintiff’s claim in this action.
B. Emergency Grievance #2023-1-31, dated December 30, 2022
This is the second grievance that specifically mentions Defendant Sullivan (Doc.
34, pp. 9–10, 15; see Doc. 34-2, pp. 31–34; Doc. 34-5, pp. 7–13). The evidence demonstrates,
and Defendant acknowledges, this grievance went through every step of the grievance
process before the ARB issued a decision on the merits (see Doc. 34, pp. 9–10; see also Doc.
34-5, pp. 7–13). The Court thus finds this grievance was fully exhausted. However,
Defendant once again argues that this grievance is irrelevant (Doc. 34, p. 15). And once
again, the Court is not persuaded.
In this grievance, Plaintiff complained about numerous things, including that an
officer went in his cell and broke his tablet, cut up his clothing, and took his court
documents (Doc. 34-5, pp. 12–13). He also complained that Defendant Sullivan and other
officers took him to segregation even though he did not violate any IDOC rules (Id.).
These are some of the very same ways that Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that
Defendant harassed him (see Doc. 19, pp. 7–8). This grievance covers some of the events
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underlying Plaintiff’s claim in this action.
C. Emergency Grievance #2023-2-62, dated February 2, 2023
This is the third grievance that specifically mentions Defendant Sullivan (Doc. 34,
pp. 11, 15-16; see Doc. 34-2, pp. 43–44). In this grievance, Plaintiff alleged that he was
released from restrictive housing on February 2, 2023, and Defendant Sullivan tried to
put him in a cell with another inmate even though he told Sullivan that “it is in my file
that I can not [sic] have a cellmate” and that he was “suspost [sic] to be in protective
custody.” (Doc. 34-2, pp. 43, 44). Plaintiff said Sullivan “became hostile” with him and
eventually issued him an erroneous ticket for refusing housing (Id.).
The warden declined to process the grievance on an emergency basis (see Doc. 342, pp. 43, 44). According to Defendant, ‘it does not appear” that Plaintiff re-submitted this
grievance “to a grievance counselor” through the regular grievance process, thus
implying the grievance is unexhausted (Doc. 34, pp. 11, 15 (citing Doc. 34-2, pp. 43–44)).
However, the grievance plainly shows that after the warden deemed the grievance to be
a non-emergency, the counselor responded to it (see Doc. 34-2, p. 43), which suggests
Plaintiff did in fact resubmit the grievance through the regular grievance process.
Additionally, the grievance officer’s report to the aforementioned emergency grievance
#2023-1-31 seems to indicate that it was also in response to six other grievances, including
#2023-2-62 (see Doc. 34-5, p. 10). Indeed, the grievance officer’s report addresses issues
that were not contained within emergency grievance #2023-1-31 but were part of the
other six grievances listed. The same goes for the ARB’s response to grievance #2023-131 (see Doc. 34-5, p. 7). In particular, the ARB’s response addresses Plaintiff’s complaint
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of “having a cellmate, wants PC,” (Doc. 34-5, p. 7), which is never mentioned in
emergency grievance #2023-1-31 but is one of the complaints in grievance #2023-2-62. For
these reasons, the Court believes an issue of fact exists to whether this grievance was fully
exhausted.
D. Emergency Grievance #2023-2-98, dated February 10, 2023
This is the fourth grievance that specifically mentions Defendant Sullivan (Doc.
34, pp. 10–11, 16; see Doc. 34-2, pp. 11–14; Doc. 34-5, pp. 3–6). In this grievance, Plaintiff
complains that he received a ticket in January 2023 and was given segregation and a
month of C-grade “to keep me on the C-grade unit with Sargent Sullivan who keep
making homosexual justs [sic] at me trying to for [sic] me to join a homosexual cult” (Doc.
34-5, p. 6). Plaintiff further alleged that “on February 3, 2023[,] Sargent Sullivan had
another c/o write me a ticket because I told him that I’m not suspost [sic] to have a cell
mate” (Id.).
The warden determined this grievance did not present and emergency, and
Plaintiff resubmitted it back through the normal grievance process (see Doc. 34-5, p. 5).
His counselor responded in late March 2023 and Plaintiff then sent the grievance on to
the grievance officer (see id.). Before he got a response, however, Plaintiff was transferred
out of Shawnee and sent to Lawrence on April 27, 2023 (Doc. 34-1, p. 1). The grievance
officer reviewed the grievance on June 30, 2023, approximately three months after
receiving it (Doc. 34-5, p. 4). The warden then denied and/or mooted the grievance on
July 12, 2023, because “issues regarding PREA allegations have been addressed and
individual is no longer at Shawnee CC” (Id.). Plaintiff appealed to the ARB, where his
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appeal was received on August 17, 2023 (Id. at p. 3). The ARB returned the grievance
without further redress because it was untimely as it was received “30 days past date of
Chief Administrative Officer’s decision.” (Id.).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s untimely appeal to the ARB means that this
grievance was not fully exhausted (Doc. 34, pp. 10–11, 16). Based on the record, however,
the Court finds that an issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff’s appeal was indeed
untimely. The record indicates that the grievance office at Plaintiff’s new facility
(Lawrence) received the decision from the warden at Shawnee on August 11, 2023, which
is exactly 30 days after the decision was issued and the deadline for Plaintiff to appeal to
the ARB (Doc. 34-5, p. 4). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a) (“The appeal must be received
by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date of the [warden’s]
decision.”) This begs the question as to whether the warden’s decision was provided to
Plaintiff in time for him to place his appeal in the mail to the ARB and for the ARB to
receive it before the 30 day-deadline elapsed. As such, there is an issue of fact as to
whether Plaintiff’s appeal was properly denied as untimely by the ARB.
E. Other Grievances
The Court notes there is at least one other grievance mentioned by Defendant in
his brief that directly relates to Plaintiff’s allegations in this case: emergency grievance
#2022-12-189, dated December 20, 2022 (Doc. 34-2, pp. 53–56). In this grievance, Plaintiff
complained that an officer or inmate, whose identity he did not know, went into his cell
and broke his tablet (Doc. 34-2, pp. 53–56). Plaintiff later alleged in his complaint that it
was Defendant Sullivan. Plaintiff initially said in the grievance that his tablet was broken
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“in retaliation for a lawsuit that [he] filed against IDOC, but he later said it was because
he did not “what [sic] to join there [sic] homosexual cult” (Id.).
Defendant seemed to think this grievance was unexhausted (see Doc. 34, p. 9
(“[T]he section for an individual to appeal to the ARB is left incomplete”)), however, the
Court, in its own review of the records, came across Plaintiff’s appeal to the ARB (see Doc.
34-6, pp. 2–5). The ARB denied the grievance on the merits (see id.), meaning it was fully
exhausted.
To the extent that Defendant did not consider whether this grievance was
sufficient to exhaust any aspect of Plaintiff’s claim because Defendant was not expressly
named in it, the Court notes there are situations in which the failure to name the target of
a grievance is excused, particularly when the inmate expressly indicates that they do not
know the who was responsible for the conduct at issue. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §
504.810(c) (requiring grievance to include “the name of each person who is the subject of
or who is otherwise involved in the complaint” but explaining “[t]his provision does not
preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not
known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the
individual as possible.”); Glick v. Walker, 385 F. App'x 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining
that “the identification requirement in the first sentence [of the regulation] is softened by
the second sentence, which clarifies that prisoners need identify names only to the extent
practicable.”).
Based on the various factual issues identified in this Order, summary judgment
for Defendant is inappropriate and must be denied. Resolving these issues will require
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an evidentiary hearing. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). If Defendant
wants to continue to pursue the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, he must request a Pavey hearing within 14 days of this Order. If no request is
made, the Court will enter a scheduling order for discovery on the merits of this case.
Alternatively, the parties may request that this case be referred for alternative dispute
resolution.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 5, 2025
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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