Hobson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM & ORDER -The Court AFFRIMS the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in denying Plaintiff's application of disability benefits. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison on 3/7/2025. (klh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TORREY L. H.1
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER of SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 3:23-cv-03737-GCS

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff, through counsel, seeks judicial
review of the final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”).2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging a disability
onset date of June 1, 2020. The claim was denied on June 4, 2021, and upon
reconsideration on October 1, 2021. After holding an evidentiary hearing on August 1,
2022, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied the application on October 5, 2022.

Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum & Order due to privacy
concerns. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.

1

This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See (Doc. 10).

2

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On September 18, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making
the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision subject to judicial review. (Tr. 1, 24). Plaintiff
exhausted administrative remedies and filed a timely complaint with this Court.3
ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff raises the following issues:
1.

The ALJ failed to properly consider the medical opinions.

2.

The RFC is not supported by substantial evidence.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the
applicable statutes. “The [SSA] provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work
because of a physical or mental disability.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1151 (2019).
Disability is the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months.” Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting
from

anatomical,

physiological,

or

psychological

abnormalities

which

are

demonstratable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42

The Court notes that none of the dates provided by Plaintiff in the “Nature of Action and
Prior Proceedings” are correct except for the date of the Appeals Council’s decision.

3

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U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing
significant physical or mental activities, and which is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1572.
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five
questions in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have
a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of
specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform
his former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520.
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the claimant
is disabled. A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a finding of
disability. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Once the claimant shows
an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show
the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001).
It is important to recognize that the scope of judicial review is limited. “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, this Court is not tasked
with determining whether Plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but whether
the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law

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were made. See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The
Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154
(internal citations omitted).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken
into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide
questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v.
Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). While judicial review is deferential, it is not
abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See Parker v.
Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010).
THE DECISION OF THE ALJ
The ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He
determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2025, and
Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of June
1, 2020. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: sleep apnea,
osteoarthritis, degenerative joint disease, asthma, and obesity. (Tr. 26). The ALJ
considered all the Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments, including those not
severe, when he assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 27).
The ALJ did not doubt the existence of the problems Plaintiff described. However,
the ALJ’s primary concern was the severity of those problems. The ALJ found that

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Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments significantly limit the ability to perform
basic work activities as required by SSR 85-28.” (Tr. 27). Even so, the ALJ determined: “I
have considered all of the claimant’s impairments, singly and in combination, and find[]
that they do not meet or medically equal any of the listings found in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1, including listings 1.17, 1.18, and 3.03. No treating or examining
physician has recorded findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed
impairment, nor does the evidence show medical findings that are the same or
equivalent to those of any listed impairment.” (Tr. 27).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) but with the following exceptions: claimant can only
occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Claimant can
never balance, occasionally stoop, and never kneel, crouch, or crawl. Claimant may only
frequently reach overhead with either upper extremity. Claimant may not perform jobs
that involve concentrated exposure to extremes of cold or heat, wetness, humidity, or
fumes, odors, dust, gases, poor ventilation etc. Claimant should be allowed a regular
work break approximately every 2 hours (1st break 15 minutes, 2nd break 30 minutes,
3rd break 15 minutes.” (Tr. 28).
As to the medical opinions, the ALJ specifically found:
The opinions by the State agency medical consultants are only partially
persuasive. They found the claimant capable of light work with
lifting/carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; standing
or walking for 6 hours in [] an 8-hour workday; sitting for 6 hours in an 8-hour
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workday; frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, and
crouching; occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, kneeling, and
crawling; frequent overhead reaching with the bilateral upper extremities; and
should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, wetness,
humidity, pulmonary irritants, and hazards (1A:11-14; 5A:4-5). Their opinion
is somewhat consistent with and supported by the medical evidence of record.
The environmental restriction of avoiding concentrated exposure to hazards
is unsupported by any diagnosis or medical findings and seems unrelated to
any medically determinable impairment; therefore, it is eliminated from the
residual functional capacity contained herein. The State consultants cited
asthma as the only basis for the environmental restrictions but do not relate
how asthma would warrant a limitation with respect to hazards, such as
machinery and heights. I have further reduced the claimant to a sedentary
residual functional capacity, which is more consistent with the evidence of
record, the claimant’s severe impairments, the claimant’s testimony, and the
statement of Dr. McCarthy. Furthermore, sedentary work is a subset of light
work, which suggests that the State agency’s opinion is partially persuasive.
Dr. McCarthy noted that “In regards to his efforts to file for disability, I do
think he has a problem which keeps him from working. That problem is his
severe hip arthritis. If he is not able to obtain hip replacement, then he certainly
would be a candidate for disability. He cannot work on this hip. He cannot be
up and functioning. If he is able to have his left hip replaced, that may change
his function. However, he has barriers still to overcome in order to get his hip
replaced.” (16F:6). Dr. McCarthy did not assess any functional limitations;
however, his statement suggests that the claimant could not return to a job
that required him to be on his feet for most of the day i.e., his former
occupations. His conclusion is consistent with and supported by the evidence,
including imaging demonstrating severe osteoarthritis, a stable right total hip
arthroplasty, and physical examinations showing limited range of motion in
the hips. The claimant has a limited education and has always done manual
unskilled work; therefore it is not likely that sedentary jobs were considered.
Based on Dr. McCarthy’s statement and the supportive medical records of the
claimant, I have reduced the claimant to a sedentary residual functional
capacity. As the claimant’s orthopedic surgeon, he is in a better position to
determine whether the claimant could work on his feet for most of the day
than the State agency consultants.
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the
longitudinal record. Medical examinations do not demonstrate an inability to
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carry out basic work activities. The record as a whole is consistent with the
residual functional capacity above.
(Tr. 31).
Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. (Tr.
31-32). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful
adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Tr.
33). As such, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.
THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in preparing
this Memorandum & Order. The Court finds the ALJ’s summary of the record in his
decision, when compared with the points raised by Plaintiff, is sufficiently
comprehensive and, therefore, there is no need to summarize it again here.
DISCUSSION
A.

Medical Evidence
As of March 27, 2017, ALJs are no longer mandated to “defer or give any specific

evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant's] medical
sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); see also Albert v. Kijakazi, 34 F.4th 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2022)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920); Mesha C. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 6451, 2023 WL 2663569, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2023). Instead, ALJs will consider “supportability, consistency, the
relationship of the treater with the claimant, specialization, and other factors that tend to

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support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding.” Bethany
G. v. Kijakazi, Case No. 20-cv-50483, 2023 WL 2683501, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
2023) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (c)). Consistency and supportability are the most
important factors and courts “will not vacate or reverse an ALJ's decision based solely on
a failure to expressly list every checklist factor, [but courts] do expect the ALJ to analyze
the treating source's medical opinion ‘within the multifactor framework delineated’ in
the regulation.” Id. (quoting Ray v. Saul, No. 20-2802, 861 Fed. Appx. 102, 105 (7th Cir.
June 30, 2021) (citations omitted)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Supportability measures how much the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source support the opinion. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1). In other words, supportability addresses the extent to which the
medical opinion is explained by the provider and supported by objective findings.
Consistency assesses how a medical opinion squares with other evidence in the record.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). Simply stated, consistency addresses the extent to which a
medical opinion is consistent with the record, including both medical and nonmedical
sources.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ insufficiently explained his reasons to not adopt the
state agency consultants’ opinions that Plaintiff was capable of light work. Plaintiff
further asserts that the ALJ insufficiently explained his reason not to adopt Dr.
McCarthy’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to work. Plaintiff now alleges that the ALJ

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failed to discuss the consistency or supportability of the opinion. The Court disagrees
with Plaintiff.
The ALJ considered the opinions of Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon Dr. McCarthy
and two state agency DDS physicians, Frank Mikell and Calixto Aquino. The ALJ noted
that the state agency physicians found Plaintiff “capable of light work” and listed their
relevant findings as to his ability to perform light work. (Tr. 31). As to Dr. McCarthy, the
ALJ determined his conclusions were consistent and supported by the medical evidence,
but he noted that Dr. McCarthy statements suggest that the conclusion that Plaintiff is
unable to work is related to Plaintiff’s former jobs; not to a sedentary job. Specifically, as
to Dr. McCarthy’s findings, the ALJ stated: “Dr. McCarthy did not assess any functional
limitations; however, his statement suggests that the claimant could not return to a job
that required him to be on his feet for most of the day, i.e., his former occupations. His
conclusion is consistent with and supported by the evidence, . . . .” (Tr. 31). Clearly, the
ALJ’s opinion provides confirmation that he reviewed and considered the applicable
reports by referencing the detailed narratives contained in each. In fact, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff to be more limited than what the state agency physicians found him
to be, and the ALJ restricted him to sedentary work. (Tr. 31). The ALJ based his
determination on Plaintiff’s medical evidence, Plaintiff’s severe impairments, Plaintiff’s
testimony, and Dr. McCarthy’s findings.4 Therefore, by assessing the medical records

4

In May 2021, Dr. Adrian Feinerman performed a consultative examination on Plaintiff
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and using professional opinions to make his determination, the ALJ properly supported
his findings with the entire record.
B.

Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff next contends that the RFC fails to build a logical bridge from the evidence

to the conclusion that Plaintiff can perform sedentary work. The Court rejects this
argument.
The RFC represents “the maximum that a claimant can still do despite [her] mental
and physical limitations.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 675-676 (7th Cir. 2008). See also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (noting that “residual functional capacity is the most you can still
do despite your limitations.”). In other words, the RFC is not the least an individual can
do despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but the most. See Young v. Barnhart, 362
F.3d 995, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). “The RFC
assessment must . . . identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and
assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” SSR 96-8p, FED.
REG. 34474-01 (July 2, 1996).
The [RFC] assessment is based upon consideration of all relevant evidence in
the case record, including medical evidence and relevant nonmedical
evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses of an individual's apparent
finding that he had a cane, that ambulation was normal without an assistive device, that he could
walk fifty feet, and that he had moderate difficulty standing on toes, heels, squatting, and rising.
He also found that upon examination, Plaintiff was able to sit, stand, walk, hear, and speak
normally. (Tr. 29; 921-923). Thereafter, Plaintiff saw Dr. McCarthy for bilateral hip pain in August
2021. An x-ray of the left hip revealed advanced degenerative changes in the left hip with
flattening of the femoral head and cyst formation and complete loss of joint space. The x-ray of
the right hip revealed a stable right total hip arthroplasty. (Tr. 29, 30; 936-937).
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symptomology, an individual's own statement of what he or she is able or
unable to do, and many other factors that could help the adjudicator
determine the most reasonable findings in light of all the evidence.
SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3),
416.945(a)(3).
When determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider all medically determinable
impairments, mental and physical, even those that are non-severe. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); see also Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008).
“[An] ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician's opinion or choose
between the opinions of any of the claimant's physicians.” Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833,
845 (7th Cir. 2007). Rather, “the determination of a claimant's RFC is a matter for the ALJ
alone—not a treating or examining doctor—to decide.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802,
808 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)).
Here, as noted previously, the ALJ’s RFC finding was more restrictive than the
determinations by the non-examining physicians. See Palmer v. Saul, No. 19-1079, 779 Fed.
Appx. 394, 398 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2019). See also Cervantes v. Kijakazi, No. 20-3334, 2021 WL
6101361, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (noting that no medical source opined that the
plaintiff was more limited than the ALJ, “[s]o the ALJ committed no error in the RFC
finding). In a comprehensive discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony, (Tr. 28), and medical
records, including findings from the consultative examiner, state agency physicians, and
Plaintiff’s own orthopedic, Dr. McCarthy, the ALJ explained his reasoning for the RFC
finding of sedentary work. (Tr. 30-31). The ALJ addressed the reported impairments and
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listed his reasoning for why the objective medical evidence supported his conclusions,
which clearly surpasses the need to ‘minimally articulate’ his reasoning.
The ALJ bears “the ‘final responsibility’ for determining a claimant’s residual
functional capacity.” Fanta v. Saul, No. 20-2325, 848 Fed. Appx. 655, 658 (7th Cir. Mar. 15,
2021) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). The Court's “role is to determine whether the
ALJ applied the right standards and produced a decision supported by substantial
evidence.” Jeske v. Paul, 955 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2020). “The ALJ is not required to
address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, but must provide a ‘logical
bridge’ between the evidence and the conclusions so that [the Court] can assess the
validity of the agency's ultimate findings . . . .” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th
Cir. 2010). Additionally, the ALJ is not required to investigate further and/or obtain
medical opinions from plaintiff’s medical providers. See Britt v. Berryhill, 889 F.3d 422,
427 (7th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff’s arguments are little more than an invitation for the Court to reweigh the
evidence. He has not identified any error requiring remand. Even if reasonable minds
could differ as to whether Plaintiff was disabled at the relevant time, the ALJ’s decision
must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, and the Court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ in reviewing the evidence. See Burmester, 920
F.3d at 510, Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012).

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CONCLUSION
After careful review of the record, the Court is convinced that the ALJ committed
no errors of law, and his findings are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
the Court AFFRIMS the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in denying
Plaintiff’s application of disability benefits. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court
to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 7, 2025.

Digitally signed by
Judge Sison
Date: 2025.03.07
15:19:14 -06'00'
___________________________________

GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

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