Boyd v. BJC Memorial Hospital Belleville

Filing 55

ORDER: The 33 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Protestant Memorial Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a Memorial Hospital Belleville is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff Candrice Boyd's claims und er Title VII in Count II and her claims under the IHRA, Title VII, and the ADA in Count III are DISMISSED without prejudice. This case shall proceed on Boyd's claims under Section 1981 in Counts I and II. A scheduling conference shall be set by separate order. Signed by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 3/6/2025. (mlp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CANDRICE BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:23-CV-3961-NJR

PROTESTANT MEMORIAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., d/b/a MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL BELLEVILLE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint filed by Defendant Protestant Memorial Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a
Memorial Hospital Belleville (“Memorial Hospital”). (Doc. 33). Pro se Plaintiff Candrice
Boyd filed a response in opposition (Doc. 46), and Memorial Hospital filed a reply brief
(Doc. 48). 1 For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are derived from the Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) and taken
as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss.
From

August

2018

to

December

2022,

Boyd

was

employed

as

an

echocardiographer at Memorial Hospital. (Doc. 13 at ¶ 2). Boyd, an African American
1 Boyd also filed a Sur-reply (Doc. 49) and a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Response to Sur-reply

(Doc. 52). Defendant has moved to strike these documents. (Docs. 50, 53). The Motion to Strike is
GRANTED, and these documents are STRICKEN. The Court’s Local Rules prohibit the filing of sur-reply
briefs. SDIL-LR 7.1(a)(4) (“Under no circumstances will sur-reply briefs be accepted.”).

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woman, claims that her supervisor, Shelia Revoir-Payne, used offensive racial slurs with
Boyd, asked her offensive questions about her race, and tolerated racial slurs made to
Boyd by other employees. (Id.). Specifically, Revoir-Payne made comments about Boyd’s
hair texture and hairstyles. (Id. at ¶ 14). When the comments and questions persisted,
Boyd indicated she was uncomfortable and told Revoir-Payne she would not answer the
questions. (Id.). Manager Tamela Wielgus observed the harassing statements and did not
intervene, initiate corrective action, or report the events. (Id. at ¶ 15).
In May 2019, Revoir-Payne referred to Boyd and other African American people
using the “N word.” (Id. at ¶ 17). Revoir-Payne also told Boyd, “Your hair is not as kinky
as other blacks,” “You people can do a lot with your hair,” and asked her, “How are you
able to keep your hair straightened?” (Id. at ¶ 19). Boyd told Revoir-Payne that these
statements were racist and expressed concern that Revoir-Payne was creating a hostile
work environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21).
Revoir-Payne also refused to follow the guidelines of the American Registry for
Diagnostic Medical Sonography (“ARDMS”), the agency responsible for licensing Boyd,
by prematurely scheduling patients for transport during Boyd’s shift and not allotting
the required amount of scan time. (Id. ¶ 22-23). Boyd reported the premature patient
transports to Wielgus, but it did not result in any reprimand for Revoir-Payne. (Id. at
¶¶ 24-25). Boyd also told Wielgus about the harassing and racist comments made by
Revoir-Payne, but Wielgus told her “it’s the norm around here.” (Id. at ¶ 26). Boyd
expressed concern that these statements and actions created an abusive and hostile
workplace for Boyd. (Id. at ¶ 28).
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In April 2019, Boyd requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). (Id. at ¶ 31). Boyd was pre-approved for 12 days of FMLA leave per month,
provided she gave at least 12 hours’ notice to Wielgus of her expected leave. (Id. at ¶ 32).
At the same time, a White sonographer was not required to give advance notice of his
leave. (Id. at ¶ 33). After her FMLA leave was approved, Wielgus began refusing
workplace accommodations. (Id. at ¶ 34). For example, Boyd requested advance notice
when she would be temporarily transferred to Defendant’s facility in Shiloh, Illinois. (Id.
at ¶ 35). While other White employees were given this advance notice, Boyd was not. (Id.
at ¶¶ 36-37).
Wielgus continued scheduling patient transports for Boyd every 30 minutes,
violating the 45-minute scan time required by ARDMS. (Id. at ¶ 43). Boyd requested
permission to schedule her own patient transports, but her request was denied. (Id. at
¶¶ 39-40). Other White employees were permitted to schedule their own patient
transports, and Wielgus did not schedule patient scans for White sonographers at the
same rate that she did for Boyd. (Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43). Boyd complained to Rosalee Wilson in
Human Resources about the harassment and discrimination, but Wilson neither
documented the report nor investigated the claim. (Id. at ¶ 44).
On May 12, 2020, Wielgus placed Boyd on a three-month furlough without pay
and selected an untrained White sonographer to replace her. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-53). When Boyd
returned from the furlough, Wielgus tried to coerce her into transferring or quitting. (Id.
at ¶ 54). Around this time, Boyd also learned a White employee was allowed FMLA leave
beyond the 12-month limit and retirement with full benefits. (Id. at ¶¶ 56-57).
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In early 2021, Boyd was in a meeting with Wielgus when an order came in for Boyd
to perform a timed procedure. (Id. at ¶ 57). A White staff nurse left the procedure order
on the printer for 20 minutes until Boyd returned from the meeting. (Id.). A “conflict”
ensued, and the staff nurse accused Boyd of subordination. (Id. at ¶ 58). The nurse gave
a report of the conflict to Wielgus, who then issued a written reprimand to Boyd for
refusing to conduct the procedure for 20 minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-59). Following this
reprimand, Boyd again complained to Wilson in HR about the harassment, retaliation,
and workplace discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 60). Boyd tried to give Wilson a written complaint,
but Wilson would not accept it. (Id. at ¶ 62).
In May 2021, Wielgus transferred Boyd to another department without proper
training or time for her to become familiar with the new procedures and protocols,
despite providing training for White employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 65-66). Boyd also overheard
Wielgus telling White employees to report Boyd as an ineffective employee. (Id. at ¶ 67).
On July 12, 2021, Boyd sustained repetitive motion injuries to her cervical and
thoracic spine as well as her right shoulder while conducting a patient scan. (Id. at ¶ 70).
The injury consisted of a sharp, severe burning and tingling pain extending from her neck
down to her right hand fingertips. (Id. at ¶ 71). Boyd ceased the scan and immediately
called Wielgus to report her injury. (Id. at ¶ 72). Wielgus instructed Boyd to see
Occupational Health Nurse Stacy Geiger. (Id. at ¶ 73). Geiger sent Boyd to the emergency
room. (Id. at ¶ 75).
A CAT scan of Boyd’s cervical spine showed several bulging discs. (Id. at ¶ 77).
She was given pain medication and discharged four hours later with instructions to
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follow up with the company’s Occupational Health doctor. During that follow-up
appointment with Dr. P. Ellinas, a nurse abruptly entered the room and started
questioning the severity and nature of Boyd’s injuries. (Id. at ¶ 79). The nurse informed
Boyd that Wielgus had instructed her to be present during the examination. (Id. at ¶ 80).
Dr. Ellinas referred Boyd to an orthopedic spine physician. (Id. at ¶ 82). Dr. Patricia
Hurford, a workers’ compensation assistant, began treatment of Boyd’s cervical and
thoracic spinal injuries, but she refused to examine Boyd’s right shoulder, telling Boyd to
see a primary care physician. (Id. at ¶ 84). A later MRI through another doctor showed a
right rotator cuff tear. (Id. at ¶ 88). This doctor told Boyd to request that Dr. Hurford refer
her to a specialist. (Id. at ¶ 89). Dr. Hurford ignored Boyd’s complaints about her
numbness, tingling, and right shoulder pain and did not refer Boyd to a specialist. (Id. at
¶¶ 90-96). On September 13, 2022, Boyd again requested a workers’ compensation referral
from Dr. Hurford for her shoulder injury. (Id. at ¶ 96). Dr. Hurford’s office informed Boyd
that treatment for her shoulder injury would not be approved by workers’ compensation.
(Id. at ¶ 97).
Dr. Hurford terminated treatment of Boyd on September 28, 2022, and determined
she had reached maximum medical improvement. (Id. at ¶ 101). That same day, Wielgus
notified Boyd of a return to work date of October 3, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 104). Boyd requested
workplace accommodations due to her untreated shoulder injury and persistent
numbness and tingling in her right hand, but the request was denied. (Id. at ¶¶ 107-08).
Boyd applied for short-term disability benefits on September 30, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 111). On
October 10, 2022, Wilson in HR directed Boyd to file a separate workers’ compensation
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claim for her shoulder injury. (Id. at ¶ 116). She also told Boyd that no further FMLA leave
was available. (Id. at ¶ 117).
Boyd’s primary care doctor referred her to a neurologist and orthopedic specialist
to address her right shoulder injury and spinal injuries. (Id. at ¶ 128). Boyd contacted
Wilson to see if any remote work was available; Wilson’s response was “No!” (Id. at
¶ 129). There were, however, numerous positions on Defendant’s website for which she
qualified. (Id. at ¶ 131). Boyd also discovered her current position was listed on the job
site Indeed. (Id.).
On November 30, 2022, Boyd emailed Wilson and asked for a status update on
accommodations, reinstatement, and approval for referrals to a neurologist and shoulder
specialist. (Id. at ¶ 132). Wilson told Boyd she would forward the matter to occupational
health and “the workcomp people.” (Id. at ¶ 133). On December 1, 2022, Boyd emailed
Wilson and said that any further communications regarding Defendant’s refusal to make
workplace accommodations should go through her attorney. (Id. at ¶ 134). The next day,
Boyd received a letter of termination. (Id. at ¶ 135).
On August 1, 2023, Boyd filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Illinois Department of
Human Rights (“IDHR”). (Doc. 16). In the Charge, Boyd alleged discrimination based on
retaliation and disability beginning December 1, 2022. (Id.). Specifically, the Charge
states:
I was hired with the above reference[d] respondent in August 2018. In or
about July 2021, I was injured on the job and seen by BJC’s company doctor
for my workers compensation injury case. The company denied
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treatment/refused to refer out for all injuries that occurred thereby
extending pain and financial burden and ultimately an illegal ending of my
workers compensation benefits which forced me to file for short-term
disability benefits. In October 2022, BJC Workers Compensation ended my
benefits. Respondent terminated my employment on December 1, 2022. I
believe I was denied benefits, terminated and retaliated against because I
filed a workers compensation claim.
(Doc. 16 at p. 6).
On September 20, 2023, Plaintiff received her Notice of Right-to-Sue. (Doc. 16).
Boyd initiated this action, pro se, on December 18, 2023. (Doc. 1). She amended her
complaint on January 26, 2024, to allege the following claims:
Count I:

Section 1981 – Discrimination and Retaliation on the Basis of Race

Count II:

Title VII and Section 1981 – Discrimination and Retaliation on the
Basis of Race, Harassment, Hostile Work Environment

Count III:

IHRA, Title VII and Title 42 – Discrimination and Retaliation on the
Basis of Race and ADA Accommodations

(Doc. 13).
Memorial Hospital filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on July 18,
2024 (Doc. 33), arguing that Boyd has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to
her Title VII, IHRA, and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims. Memorial
Hospital also asserts that the Complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and, alternatively, fails to allege facts sufficient under Rule
12(b)(6) to plead a claim for retaliation under Title VII or the IHRA. (Id.).
The next day, Boyd filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. 34). The Court granted
the motion and appointed an attorney for Boyd. (Doc. 36). On November 15, 2024,
assigned counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating that after a lengthy meeting
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discussing her case, Boyd indicated her desire to proceed pro se while continuing to
speak with private attorneys. (Doc. 41). The Court granted the motion to withdraw and
gave Boyd additional time to respond to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 44). Boyd filed her
response in opposition on January 2, 2025. (Doc. 46). Memorial Hospital filed a reply brief
two weeks later. (Doc. 48).
DISCUSSION
I.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Memorial Hospital first asserts Boyd’s claims under Title VII, the IHRA, and the

ADA must be dismissed because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before
filing this lawsuit. Specifically, it argues that the claims in the Amended Complaint
encompass allegations outside of those in Boyd’s Charge of Discrimination filed with the
EEOC. While the Amended Complaint raises racial discrimination, harassment on the
basis of race, retaliation on the basis of race, hostile work environment, and disability
discrimination, the Charge alleges that Boyd was denied benefits, terminated, and
retaliated against because she filed a workers’ compensation claim. Furthermore, the
Charge states that the alleged discrimination began on December 1, 2022. Memorial
Hospital contends that Boyd cannot now extend that timeline back to 2018 as alleged in
the Amended Complaint.
In response, Boyd argues that her claims need not mirror the EEOC Charge
verbatim, nor must the EEOC Charge describe every specific claim. Instead, her claims
must be “like or reasonably related to” the allegations in Charge. And here, her
allegations of retaliation and termination arising from her workers’ compensation claim

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provide a factual basis for the EEOC to investigate her discrimination and hostile work
environment claims. Boyd also argues that the continuing violation doctrine allows
consideration of actions that occurred before December 1, 2022.
In reply, Memorial Hospital avers that the factual narrative of Boyd’s Charge is
devoid of any reference to racial discrimination or a hostile work environment and, thus,
the claims in the Amended Complaint are not like or reasonably related to the allegations
in the Charge.
Before a plaintiff may file a Title VII, ADA, or IHRA claim, she must first exhaust
her administrative remedies by filing a Charge of Discrimination and receiving a Right
to Sue letter.2 Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019); Riley v. City of
Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2018) (“An ADA plaintiff must file a charge with the
EEOC before bringing a court action against an employer.”). “After doing so, a plaintiff
filing suit in federal court may bring only those claims that were included in her EEOC
charge, or that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing
out of such allegations.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp., 914 F.3d
560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019) (“In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title VII or
the IHRA that he has included in the original charge filed with the [EEOC] or the IDHR.”).
This requirement allows the agency and the employer to settle the matter and ensures the
employer has adequate notice of the alleged conduct. Id. (citing Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d
687, 691 (7th Cir. 2009)).

2 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing that a charge filed with one is

deemed cross-filed with the other.” Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp., 914 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
McQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F.Supp.2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011)).

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Claims are “like or reasonably related” when (1) “there is a reasonable relationship
between the allegations in the charge and the claims in the complaint,” and (2) “the claim
in the complaint can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the
allegations in the charge.” Id. (quoting Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th
Cir. 1994)). The charge and complaint must at least describe the same conduct and
implicate the same people. Id. “A plaintiff cannot bring a new claim that is ‘inconsistent
with’ the claim in his EEOC charge, even if the new claim ‘involves the same parties and
the same facts as the other claim.’” Id. at 1004-05 (quoting Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 525
F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2008)). There must be a factual relationship between the
discrimination alleged in the charge and in the complaint. Id. at 1005.
In Count II, Boyd brings a claim under Title VII for discrimination and retaliation
on the basis of race, harassment, and hostile work environment. She states that, as an
African American, she is a member of a protected class, she was performing her job in a
manner that was consistent with Defendant’s legitimate business expectations, and
Defendant discriminated against her by harassing her, subjecting her to a hostile work
environment, retaliating against her, and firing her. (Doc. 13 at p. 23). In Count III, she
raises a claim under the IHRA, Title VII, and the ADA for discrimination and retaliation
on the basis of race and her request for ADA accommodations, alleging that Defendant
discriminated against her, retaliated against her, and failed to make medical
accommodations for her. (Id. at p. 24).
In her Charge, however, Boyd only references her injury that occurred in July 2021,
Defendant’s denial of care for her injuries, the termination of her workers’ compensation
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benefits, and that she was “denied benefits, terminated and retaliated against because I
filed a workers’ compensation claim.” (Doc. 16 at p. 6). There is no mention of
discrimination, harassment, a hostile work environment, or retaliation on the basis of race
or her request for ADA accommodations. Nor is there a reasonable relationship between
the allegations in the Charge and the claims in Boyd’s Amended Complaint. Instead, the
sole focus of the Charge is Boyd’s belief that she was denied benefits and fired because
she filed a workers’ compensation claim. This is insufficient to exhaust Boyd’s
administrative remedies.
Because Boyd did not exhaust her claims under Title VII, the IHRA, or the ADA,
those claims in Counts II and III will be dismissed. 3 But, because the filing of a Charge of
Discrimination is not required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Boyd’s claims in
Counts II and III filed under § 1981 survive. See Tyson v. Gannett Co., 538 F.3d 781, 783
(7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing Title VII race discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to file
charge of discrimination on basis of race, but allowing § 1981 claim to stand).
II.

General Pleading Deficiencies
Memorial Hospital next argues that Boyd’s Amended Complaint should be

dismissed because it fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). In other words, the

3 Memorial Hospital alternatively argues that Boyd has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for

retaliation in violation of Title VII or the IHRA. Because these claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the Court need not analyze them under Rule 12(b)(6).

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complaint must allege sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2013). That means “a plaintiff
must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative
reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the
law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Instead, “the plaintiff
must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds
together.” Id. at 404.
Memorial Hospital asserts that Boyd has failed to comply with Rule 8 because her
Amended Complaint is neither direct nor concise, and it is vague as to the causes of action
she is alleging. It also claims she has failed to set forth factual support or a basis for any
claim. Defendant cherry picks a handful of allegations that it asserts are legal conclusions,
and contends that Boyd has failed to give sufficient detail to put it on notice of the alleged
claims against it.
The Court disagrees. Boyd’s Amended Complaint contains a plethora of detailed
factual allegations, each in numbered paragraphs, and is quite well written for a pro se
litigant. While the Court acknowledges that some of her allegations contain legal
conclusions, so do many of the complaints filed by licensed attorneys in this district.
Moreover, the Amended Complaint very plainly sets out the three claims Boyd is raising,
and the factual allegations support those claims.
The Court is also unpersuaded by Memorial Hospital’s attempt to characterize the
Amended Complaint as so incoherent that it violates Rule 10 and must be dismissed.
Memorial Hospital claims that the Amended Complaint “lacks any organization or
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factual declarations for which Defendant can successfully comprehend the facts that
Plaintiff states amount to an alleged wrongful act” and that “Plaintiff’s list of thoughts or
statements range so extensively that it is impossible to ascertain each claim.” Defendant’s
argument is so off the mark that the Court finds it disingenuous. Rule 10 simply provides
that a party must state its claim “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances.” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). That is what Boyd did.
Defendant’s motion is denied on this basis.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed
by Defendant Protestant Memorial Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a Memorial Hospital
Belleville (Doc. 33) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Candrice Boyd’s claims under Title VII in Count II and her claims under
the IHRA, Title VII, and the ADA in Count III are DISMISSED without prejudice.
This case shall now proceed on Boyd’s claims under Section 1981 in Counts I and
II. A scheduling conference shall be set by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 6, 2025
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

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