Kraemer v. USHealth Advisors, LLC

Filing 36

ORDER. For the reasons explained in the attached Memorandum & Order, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is DENIED. The stay of discovery is LIFTED The Final Pretrial Conference and Jury Trial are RESET for November 5, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., and November 16, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., respectively, both in the East St. Louis Courthouse before Judge David W. Dugan. Within 21 days, the p arties are DIRECTED to meet, confer, and report on a proposed scheduling and discovery order, which shall be submitted to [e-mail] for the Court's review. The parties are also DIRECTED to use the correct form for the proposed scheduling and discovery order. (Doc. 14-1). Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 11/25/2024. (jnh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID KRAEMER, individually and )
on behalf of all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
USHealth Advisors, LLC, a Texas )
company,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. 3:24-cv-275-DWD

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Class
Action Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 26). Plaintiff filed
a Response in Opposition, and Defendant filed a Reply in Support, of that Motion to
Dismiss. (Docs. 30 & 34). For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant, a wholly owned national subsidiary of US Health Group, markets and
sells health insurance plans to consumers in the United States. (Doc. 25, pg. 4). Defendant
allegedly solicits business by providing its agents with consumer leads, sales scripts or
templates, and an automatic dialer system, which “gives employees the ability to send
automated text messages through an ‘SMS drip campaign’ ” and allows the “dial[ing] [of]
consumer phone numbers automatically.” (Doc. 25, pgs. 4-5, 12). Consumers allegedly
“receive scheduled text messages that are sent en masse by one of Defendant’s
employees.” (Doc. 25, pgs. 4-5). Further, Plaintiff alleges many of the leads are “bad” or

“poor,” as the agents do not have consent to contact the consumers. (Doc. 25, pgs. 4, 6-7).
Plaintiff was allegedly exposed to this misconduct because, “[t]hroughout 2023,
[he]…received calls and text messages from…Defendant soliciting insurance quotes for
somebody name Randy,” despite “not know[ing] who Randy is and…t[elling] the callers
and texters that he is not Randy and…ask[ing] for the calls to stop.” (Doc. 25, pgs. 14-30).
Therefore, on behalf of himself and two proposed classes, Plaintiff filed this action
against Defendant under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(c)(5), alleging vicarious liability related to Defendant’s agents’ placing of phone
calls and sending of text messages, without consent, to telephone numbers on the DoNot-Call Registry. (Doc. 25, pgs. 1, 4, 9, 11, 14, 30-36). Plaintiff further alleges Defendants’
agents repeatedly send text messages to consumers, despite receiving, and confirming
the receipt of, a “stop” communication. (Doc. 25, pgs. 1, 9, 12, 14-19, 21-22, 24-29).
Notwithstanding consumer complaints, Defendant also allegedly failed to “institute[]
proper procedures to prevent consumers from continuing to receive solicitations.” (Doc.
25, pgs. 9-10, 12). Plaintiff defines the proposed classes as follows:
Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four
years prior to the filing of this action through trial (1) Defendant, or an agent
calling on behalf of the Defendant, called/texted more than one time,
(2) within any 12-month period, (3) where the person’s telephone number
had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days,
(4) for substantially the same reason that Defendant called/texted Plaintiff.
Internal Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who
from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification
(1) the Defendant called/texted more than one time, (2) within any 12
month period (3) for substantially the same reason Defendant called/texted
Plaintiff, (4) including at least once after the person requested that they stop
calling and/or sending text messages.
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(Doc. 25, pg. 30).
As relief for Defendant’s alleged misconduct, Plaintiff seeks declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief. (Doc. 25, pgs. 1, 35-36).
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Class Action Complaint
is filed under Rule 12(b)(6), which provides for challenges to a complaint based upon the
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. See Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer,
796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d
732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)). To survive such a motion, which tests the sufficiency of the
complaint but not its merits, the plaintiff must allege enough facts to state a claim that is
facially plausible. Kloss v. Acuant, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012)); Fosnight v. Jones,
41 F.4th 916, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). Facial plausibility means enough facts are pled to draw reasonable inferences
as to liability. Fosnight, 41 F.4th at 922 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
A pleading need not allege “detailed factual allegations,” but it must state enough facts
to lift the claim above the speculative level. Kloss, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 876 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals” of the elements, supported by conclusions, do not
suffice. Trivedi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 609 F. Supp. 3d 628, 631 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pled

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facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences for the plaintiff. Id. (quoting Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)); accord Kloss, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 874-75.
Substantively, the TCPA authorizes the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) to regulate telemarking. See 47 U.S.C. § 227; U.S. v. Dish Network LLC, 75 F. Supp.
3d 916, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2014). Section 227(c)(5), which is invoked by Plaintiff, creates a
private right of action to protect residential telephone subscribers’ rights, providing:
A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the
regulations prescribed under this subsection may, if otherwise permitted
by the laws or rules of court of a State bring in an appropriate court of that
State—
(A) an action based on a violation of the regulations prescribed
under this subsection to enjoin such violation,
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a
violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation,
whichever is greater, or
(C) both such actions.
It shall be an affirmative defense in any action brought under this
paragraph that the defendant has established and implemented,
with due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively
prevent telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations
prescribed under this subsection. If the court finds that the defendant
willfully or knowingly violated the regulations prescribed under this
subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of
the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount
available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.
47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).
To support a “Do-Not-Call” claim under § 227(c)(5), a plaintiff must “allege facts
allowing a reasonable inference that she ‘received more than one telephone call within

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any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations.’ ”
Toney v. Quality Resources, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 727, 746 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(c)(5)). A seller who does not initiate the calls may be vicariously liable, based on
agency principles, for violations of § 227(c) committed by its agents or third parties. Id. at
742 (citing 2013 FCC Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd. 6582-83 ¶¶ 24-26, 28); accord Showers v. Pelican
Inv. Holdings Grp., LLC, No. 23-cv-2864, 2024 WL 4350309, *5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2024).
A. The Do-Not-Call Registry Class
One regulation prescribed under § 227(c), and adopted by the FCC, is
§ 64.1200(c)(2) of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which states as follows:
(c) No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to:
…
(2) A residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her
telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do
not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal
Government. Such do-not-call registrations must be honored indefinitely,
or until the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone
number is removed by the database administrator. Any person or entity
making telephone solicitations (or on whose behalf telephone solicitations
are made) will not be liable for violating this requirement if:
(i) It can demonstrate that the violation is the result of error and that as part
of its routine business practice, it meets the following standards:
(A) Written procedures. It has established and implemented written
procedures to comply with the national do-not-call rules;
(B) Training of personnel. It has trained its personnel, and any entity
assisting in its compliance, in procedures established pursuant to the
national do-not-call rules;
(C) Recording. It has maintained and recorded a list of telephone
numbers that the seller may not contact;
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(D) Accessing the national do-not-call database. It uses a process to
prevent telephone solicitations to any telephone number on any list
established pursuant to the do-not-call rules, employing a version of the
national do-not-call registry obtained from the administrator of the registry
no more than 31 days prior to the date any call is made, and maintains
records documenting this process.
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2); see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (stating, with three exceptions not at
issue here, “ ‘telephone solicitation’ means the initiation of a telephone call or message
for the purpose of encouraging the purchase…of…property, goods, or services, which is
transmitted to any person”); Dish Network LLC, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 920 (discussing how
“[t]he resulting overlapping regulations prohibit three types of telemarketing practices,”
including “calling a person whose telephone number is registered on the Registry”).
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant notes Plaintiff specifically identifies 13 sets of
text messages, but no telephone calls, allegedly received from Defendant. (Doc. 26, pgs.
1-2). Defendant argues those text messages do not each have a well-pleaded,
nonconclusory, and nonspeculative connection to Defendant. (Doc. 26, pgs. 2-3, 12-14).
Defendant notes it is only mentioned in or connected to 6 of the 13 text messages. (Doc.
26, pgs. 2, 12-14). Therefore, Defendant argues Plaintiff assumes any text message, stating
the sender’s name and relating to health insurance, were sent by Defendant. (Doc. 26,
pgs. 2, 12-14). Further, Defendant argues a prior owner of Plaintiff’s telephone number,
not Plaintiff himself, registered the telephone number on the Do-Not-Call Registry, and
Plaintiff did not make a Do-Not-Call request in response to any text message connected
to Defendant. (Docs. 26, pgs. 2-3, 9-10, 14-15; 34, pgs. 2-4). Even if he had taken the latter
action, though, Defendant states it did not recontact Plaintiff. (Doc. 26, pgs. 15-16).
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In his Response, Plaintiff indicates Defendant “misstates the law” by arguing only
those who personally register their telephone numbers on the Do-Not-Call Registry may
invoke § 227(c)(5) of the TCPA. (Doc. 30, pg. 1). According to Plaintiff, once a telephone
number is added to the Do-Not-Call Registry, the registration must be honored
indefinitely, unless it is cancelled by the consumer of the telephone number. (Doc. 30, pg.
1). Therefore, in this case, regardless of who requested the addition of the telephone
number to the Do-Not-Call Registry, Plaintiff argues Defendant was required to honor
the registration “indefinitely” because it was never cancelled. (Doc. 30, pgs. 2-4).
Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged he “received more than one telephone call
within any 12-month period by or on behalf of” Defendant “in violation of the regulations
prescribed under” § 227(c)(5). See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5); Toney, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 746. While
Plaintiff does not include the same level of specificity for the alleged telephone calls as he
does for the text messages, the Court finds the allegations of the First Amended Class
Action Complaint, when taken together and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,
plausibly state a claim to relief under § 227(c)(5) and § 64.1200(c)(2). See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(c)(5); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2); Toney, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 746; Kloss, 462 F. Supp. 3d at
876; Fosnight, 41 F.4th at 921-22. As noted above, Plaintiff alleges, “[t]hroughout 2023,
[he]…received calls and text messages from…Defendant soliciting insurance quotes for
somebody name Randy,” despite “not know[ing] who Randy is and…t[elling] the callers
and texters that he is not Randy and…ask[ing] for the calls to stop.” (Doc. 25, pg. 14).
Plaintiff then provides screen shots of telephone solicitations, i.e., text messages, allegedly
received from Defendant. (Doc. 25, pgs. 14-19, 22, 24-29). The text messages, allegedly
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sent to Plaintiff despite Defendant’s receipt and confirmation of “stop” communications,
include references to “health options” or “health coverage,” a healthcare “Marketplace,”
“private PPO plans,” “bcbs” and “cigna” plans, “short-term and private” “marketplace
options,” “U.H.C and B.C.B.S options,” and admissions that “I am with US Health
Group” or “USHA.” (Doc. 25, pgs. 14-19, 22, 24-29). Indeed, Defendant admits it is
mentioned in or connected to at least 6 of 13 text messages. (Doc. 26, pgs. 2, 12-14).
On one occasion, in response to an inquiry from “USHA” about whether he
“want[ed] medical dental vision or all three,” Plaintiff responded, “No duck off.” (Doc.
25, pg. 18). On two other occasions, Plaintiff responded “No” or “Stop” to inquiries about
“U.H.C and B.C.B.S options” or “quotes,” after which he was told “I’ll remove you from
my contact list” or “[y]ou have successfully been unsubscribed.” (Doc. 25, pgs. 19, 28). In
light of these allegations, Plaintiff has done more than enough to put Defendant on notice
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which is all that is required at this stage.
Further, another member of this Court recently addressed the argument, asserted
by Defendant in this case, that a telephone subscriber must personally register his or her
telephone number on the Do-Not-Call Registry. See Showers, 2024 WL 4350309 at *7. It is
notable at the outset, though, that Plaintiff alleges he did try “to register [his cell phone
number] on the [Do-Not-Call Registry]” when he acquired his cell phone number, “but
he found that the number was already registered” by its prior user. (Doc. 25, pg. 14). And,
as set forth by the regulation itself, “do-not-call registrations must be honored
indefinitely, or until the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone
number is removed by the database administrator.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2).
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In any event, in Showers, Chief Judge Rosenstengel declined to dismiss a plaintiff’s
claim under § 64.1200(c) based on that argument, reasoning the defendants’ out-of-circuit
authority was unpersuasive since they were inserting an adverb, i.e., “personally,” into
the regulatory text, i.e., “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her
telephone number on the national do-not-call registry,” that was not used by the FCC.
See Showers, 2024 WL 4350309 at *7. Since the regulatory text requires that a telephone
subscriber register his or her phone number on the Do-Not-Call Registry, Chief Judge
Rosenstengel found there was no requirement that an individual “personally” register
the telephone number. Id. (quoting Moore v. Healthcare Sols Inc., No. 21-cv-4919, 2022 WL
17487823, *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2022)). Similar reasoning was applied by Judge Seeger in
Moore:
Th[e] argument [that a telephone subscriber must personally register the
telephone number] rests on an unduly strict reading of the regulation. The
text refers to a subscriber ‘who has registered’ a telephone
number. [Citation]. [Defendant] reads that provision to mean a subscriber
‘who has [personally] registered’ a particular number. In effect, [Defendant]
is attempting to inject an adverb that is nowhere to be seen.
Nothing in the text ascribes any importance to the person who registered the
number. The focus is on whether the number was registered, not who did
the registration. The regulation protects numbers, not particular people.
That’s why the Registry includes numbers, not names.
…
The most natural reading of the regulation prohibits unwanted calls to a
number. It is natural to read the statute to protect a number, not simply the
person who registered the number.
That reading of the regulation seems to fit with the breadth of the statutory
text, too. The statute greenlights a claim by a ‘person who has received more
than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the
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same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.’
[Citation]. It protects a ‘person’ who ‘received more than one telephone
call.’ [Citation]. It doesn’t seem to matter who registered the number.
Anyone on the receiving end of the call can turn the tables and file suit.
Moore, 2022 WL 17487823 at *5.
The Court finds this reasoning from Showers and Moore persuasive; thus, it will not
dismiss Plaintiff’s claim based on the fact that his telephone number was purportedly
registered on the Do-Not-Call Registry by a prior telephone subscriber. See Showers, 2024
WL 4350309 at *7; Moore, 2022 WL 17487823 at *5; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2);
see also Abrahamian v. loanDepot.com LLC, No. 23-cv-728, 2024 WL 1092442, *2 (D. Ariz.
March 13, 2024) (“The Court finds the complete language of the implementing regulation
more instructive. [Citation]. Though the regulation states that it applies to a ‘residential
telephone subscriber who has registered his or her number’ on the DNC Registry, it goes
on to require that DNC registrations ‘must be honored indefinitely, or until the
registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone number is removed by the
database administrator.’ [Citation]. The Court reads this language to mean that as phone
numbers change hands, the DNC Registry may not always reflect which consumers
requested to be included. Therefore, the Court finds that the language includes the term
‘indefinitely’ to remove the ambiguity of which numbers should be protected.”).1
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for the
Do Not Call Registry Class is DENIED.

1But see Rombough v. Robert D. Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 22-cv-15, 2022 WL 2713278, *2-3 (N.D.

Iowa June 9, 2022).

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B. The Internal Do-Not-Call Registry Class
Another regulation prescribed under § 227(c), and adopted by the FCC, is
§ 64.1200(d), which states: “No person or entity shall initiate…any call for telemarketing
purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted
procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive such calls made
by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). The minimum standards
include the following:
(1) Written policy. Persons or entities making…calls for telemarketing
purposes must have a written policy, available upon demand, for
maintaining a do-not-call list.
(2) Training of personnel. Personnel…who are engaged in any aspect of
telemarketing must be informed and trained in the existence and use of the
do-not-call list.
(3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or entity
making…any call for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such a
call is made) receives a request from a residential telephone subscriber not
to receive calls from that person or entity, the person or entity must record
the request and place the subscriber’s name, if provided, and telephone
number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is made. Persons or
entities making such calls (or on whose behalf such calls are made) must
honor a residential subscriber’s do-not-call request within a reasonable time
from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed 30 days
from the date of such request. If such requests are recorded or maintained
by a party other than the person or entity on whose behalf the call is made,
the person or entity on whose behalf the call is made will be liable for any
failures to honor the do-not-call request. A person or entity making…any
call for telemarketing purposes must obtain a consumer’s prior express
permission to share or forward the consumer’s request not to be called to a
party other than the person or entity on whose behalf a call is made or an
affiliated entity.
(4) Identification of callers and telemarketers. A person or entity
making…any call for telemarketing purposes must provide the called party
with the name of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on
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whose behalf the call is being made, and a telephone number or address at
which the person or entity may be contacted. The telephone number
provided may not be a 900 number or any other number for which charges
exceed local or long distance transmission charges.
(5) Affiliated persons or entities. In the absence of a specific request by the
subscriber to the contrary, a residential subscriber’s do-not-call request
shall apply to the particular entity making the call (or on whose behalf a call
is made), and will not apply to affiliated entities unless the consumer
reasonably would expect them to be included given the identification of the
caller and (for telemarketing calls) the product being advertised.
(6) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A person or entity making…any call for
telemarketing purposes must maintain a record of a consumer’s request not
to receive further calls. A do-not-call request must be honored for 5 years
from the time the request is made.
Id.
Again, in the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant notes Plaintiff specifically identifies
13 sets of text messages, but no telephone calls, that were allegedly received from
Defendant. (Doc. 26, pgs. 1-2). Without well-pleaded, nonconclusory, and nonspeculative
allegations, however, Defendant argues Plaintiff simply requests that the Court assume
it solicited the sale of health insurance with telephone calls before implementing the DoNot-Call procedures required by law, i.e., a written policy, personnel training, and the
recording and honoring of requests within 30 days. (Doc. 26, pgs. 2, 10-12).
In his Response, Plaintiff argues he repeatedly requested that the agents stop
contacting him on behalf of Defendant. (Doc. 30, pg. 5). At this stage in the proceedings,
Plaintiff argues the allegation that Defendant did not honor his opt-out requests is
sufficient for the Court to infer that Defendant did not adequately maintain the policies
and procedures required by the TCPA. (Doc. 30, pgs. 5-6). Plaintiff suggests this is true

12

even if Defendant outsourced the responsibility for solicitations to its agents or a third
parties. (Doc. 30, pg. 6). Plaintiff emphasizes, in this case, he made six separate “stop”
requests to agents acting on behalf of Defendant. (Doc. 30, pg. 6). Nevertheless, Plaintiff
alleges he continued to receive text messages from Defendant’s agents. (Doc. 30, pg. 6).
Here, again, Plaintiff has adequately alleged he “received more than one telephone
call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of” Defendant “in violation of the
regulations prescribed under” § 227(c)(5). See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5); Toney, 75 F. Supp. 3d
at 746. By extension, although the Court has already recognized Plaintiff did not include
the same level of specificity for the alleged telephone calls as he did for the alleged text
messages, the Court finds the allegations of the First Amended Class Action Complaint,
on the whole and viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, plausibly state a claim to relief under
§ 227(c)(5) and § 64.1200(d). See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d); Toney, 75 F.
Supp. 3d at 746; Kloss, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 876; Fosnight, 41 F.4th at 921-22. More specifically,
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant, by virtue of its telephone calls and text messages,
must have failed to institute the minimum standards for the “procedures for maintaining
a list of persons who request not to receive such calls” under § 64.1200(d). See 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(d). The repeated nature of the telephone calls and texts messages, as alleged by
Plaintiff and despite the “stop” communications, render the claim facially plausible and
provide notice under Rule 8(a)(2). See Kloss, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 876; Fosnight, 41 F.4th at
921-22; see also Moore v. Pro Custom Solar LLC, No. 21-cv-4395, 2022 WL 1092186, *5 (N.D.
Ill. April 12, 2022) (denying motion to dismiss § 64.1200(d) claim where, inter alia, the
plaintiff continued to receive calls from the defendant after asking to be placed on its
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internal do-not-call list and receiving written notice that the request was granted, as to
suggest the defendant’s staff was not trained in implementing its do-not-call policy).
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for the
Internal Do Not Call Registry Class is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. The stay of
discovery is LIFTED. The Final Pretrial Conference and Jury Trial are RESET for
November 5, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., and November 16, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., respectively. Within
21 days, the parties are DIRECTED to meet, confer, and report on a proposed scheduling
and discovery order, which shall be submitted to [e-mail] for the
Court’s review. The parties are also DIRECTED to use the correct form for the proposed
scheduling and discovery order. (Doc. 14-1).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 25, 2024

s/ David W. Dugan

__________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

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