Harvey v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM & ORDER - The Court AFFRIMS the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in denying Plaintiff's application of disability benefits. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison on 3/10/2025. (klh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOLEAN H.1
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER of SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 3:24-cv-00839-GCS

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff, through counsel, again seeks
judicial review of the final agency decision denying her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
On June 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging a disability onset
date of January 1, 2016, due to back problems, nerve damage, and other conditions.

Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum & Order due to privacy
concerns. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.

1

This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See (Doc. 12).

2

This is Plaintiff’s third complaint seeking judicial review of the denial of her application
for DIB. See Jolean D. H. v. Commissioner of Social Security, Case No. Case 3:19-cv-01248-RJD and
Jolean H. v. Commissioner of Social Security, Case No. 3:21-cv-00598-RJD.

3

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During Plaintiff’s November 23, 2020, hearing, she amended her onset date to April 7,
2017. Plaintiff’s claim was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
on October 26, 2018. The Appeals Council affirmed that decision in October 2019.
Thereafter, Plaintiff sought judicial review of that decision in this District Court. See Jolean
D. H., Case No. 3:19-cv-01248-RJD; Doc. 1. On June 15, 2020, Magistrate Judge Daly
entered an Order remanding Plaintiff’s claim to the Commissioner of Social Security for
rehearing. Id. at Doc. 24.
Pursuant to Magistrate Judge Daly’s Order, the ALJ held a hearing to consider
Plaintiff’s maximum residual functional capacity, to obtain evidence from a medical
expert related to the functional limitations, if necessary, to further evaluate Plaintiff’s
alleged symptoms and to provide rationale in accordance with the disability regulations;
and to obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the
assessed limitations on Plaintiff’s occupational base. After that rehearing, the ALJ issued
another unfavorable decision; the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review;
and Plaintiff again sought judicial review of that decision in this District Court. See Jolean
H., Case No. 3:21-cv-00598-RJD; Doc. 1. On March 30, 2023, Magistrate Judge Daly
remanded Plaintiff’s claims finding that the ALJ’s failure to consider whether Plaintiff’s
ailments equaled Listing 1.04 required remand and that without the input of a medical
expert, the ALJ’s conclusion as to Plaintiff’s limitations was not supported by the record.
Despite those findings, Magistrate Daly also found that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s

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subjective complaints was adequately supported. Id. at Doc. 36.
In accordance with Magistrate Daly’s March 30, 2023, Memorandum and Order,
an ALJ held another hearing on November 8, 2023. Thereafter, on November 30, 2023, the
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request
for review. Thus, Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies and filed a timely
complaint with this Court. During all these proceedings, Plaintiff was represented by
counsel.
ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff raises the following issues:
1.

The RFC is not supported by substantial evidence.

2.

The ALJ did not properly evaluate Plaintiff’s pain.

3.

The ALJ did not properly consider opinion evidence.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the
applicable statutes. “The [SSA] provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work
because of a physical or mental disability.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1151 (2019).
Disability is the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months.” Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42
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U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting
from

anatomical,

physiological,

or

psychological

abnormalities

which

are

demonstratable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing
significant physical or mental activities, and which is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1572.
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five
questions in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have
a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of
specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform
his former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520.
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the claimant
is disabled. A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a finding of
disability. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Once the claimant shows
an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show
the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001).
It is important to recognize that the scope of judicial review is limited. “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial

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evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, this Court is not tasked
with determining whether Plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but whether
the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law
were made. See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The
Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154
(internal citations omitted).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken
into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide
questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v.
Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). While judicial review is deferential, it is not
abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See Parker v.
Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010).
THE DECISION OF THE ALJ
The ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He
determined Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements through December 31, 2020,
and Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of
April 7, 2017. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: cervical
degenerative disc disease, lumbar degenerative disc disease, sacroiliitis, osteoarthritis,
left foot arthritic changes and spurs, obesity, myofascial pelvic floor dysfunction,

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pudendal neuralgia, and obstructive sleep apnea. (Tr. 1511). The ALJ considered all the
Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments, including those not severe, when he
assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
The ALJ did not doubt the existence of the problems Plaintiff described. However,
the ALJ’s primary concern was the severity of those problems. The ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments significantly limit the ability to perform
basic work activities as required by SSR 85-28.” (Tr. 1511).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except she should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She would
need to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights. She would
need to avoid concentrated exposure to noise. Specifically, the claimant can tolerate a
moderate noise level as defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations (SCO).”
(Tr. 1516).
After a review of the evidence, a comparison of the physical and mental demands
of relevant work to the RFC, and the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ
found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 1526). However, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled because she was able to do other jobs that exist
in significant number in the national economy.

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THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in preparing
this Memorandum & Order. The Court finds the ALJ’s summary of the record in his
recent decision, along with Magistrate Judge Daly’s recitation of the evidence in her
March 30, 2023, Memorandum and Order4, when compared with the points raised by
Plaintiff, are sufficiently comprehensive. Therefore, there is no need to summarize it
again here.
DISCUSSION
The RFC
Plaintiff contends that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence in that the
ALJ gave partial weight to the state agency physicians’ rationale because updated
imaging was not reviewed by the agency physicians.5 Further, Plaintiff contends that the
ALJ gave no weight to medical expert Dr. Mary Schwieters’s opinion that Plaintiff could
perform medium work and that the ALJ failed to inquire about Plaintiff’s physical
limitations from the other medical expert, Dr. Golub, at the hearing. 6 Thus, Plaintiff

4

See Jolean H., Case No. 3:21-cv-00598-RJD, Doc. 36, p. 5-11.

Both state agency physicians, Dr. Smith and Dr. Mitra, found Plaintiff capable of light
work. (Tr. 1524).

5

Specifically, Dr. Golub testified: “[t]he imaging through that period of time and the
electrodiagnostic testing performed during that time period does not support severe disease. The
Claimant did have subjective complaints, but the axial spine was – did not show severe or marked
foraminal stenosis, did not show significant nerve root compressive disease that you would
generally see in someone with significant anatomic axial spine issues. . . . But I am sure that the
extreme morbid obesity is likely to have contributed to her clinical symptoms. They are not

6

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contends that the lack of discussion of how the evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC
requires remand. Defendant counters the ALJ complied with Magistrate Judge Daly’s
order by obtaining two medical expert’s input on the significance of imaging that state
agency Drs. Smith and Mitra did not review. Specifically, Defendants maintain that once
these experts confirmed that the imaging did not indicate extreme worsening of Plaintiff’s
condition, the ALJ was permitted to rely on part of the state-agency physicians’
assessments. The Court agrees with Defendant and rejects Plaintiff’s argument.
The RFC represents “the maximum that a claimant can still do despite [her] mental
and physical limitations.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 675-676 (7th Cir. 2008). See also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (noting that “residual functional capacity is the most you can still
do despite your limitations.”). In other words, the RFC is not the least an individual can
do despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but the most. See Young v. Barnhart, 362
F.3d 995, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). “The RFC
assessment must . . . identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and
assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” SSR 96-8p, FED.
REG. 34474-01 (July 2, 1996). As the relevant regulations state:

supported by significant anatomic electrodiagnostic testing where further – that would indicate
a meeting or listing – a meeting or equaling a listing.” (Tr. 1577-78).
Regarding listing 1.04, Dr. Golub further testified: “[t]hey – by changing this listing in the
way they did, they’re still stressing the fact you need to show a compressive disease that is
consistent with the neuroanatomic position of the compression. It’s not here.” (Tr. 1582).
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The [RFC] assessment is based upon consideration of all relevant evidence in
the case record, including medical evidence and relevant nonmedical
evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses of an individual's apparent
symptomology, an individual's own statement of what he or she is able or
unable to do, and many other factors that could help the adjudicator
determine the most reasonable findings in light of all the evidence.
SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3),
416.945(a)(3).
The ALJ bears “the ‘final responsibility’ for determining a claimant’s residual
functional capacity.” Fanta v. Saul, No. 20-2325, 848 Fed. Appx. 655, 658 (7th Cir. Mar. 15,
2021) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). When determining the RFC, the ALJ must
consider all medically determinable impairments, mental and physical, even those that
are non-severe. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); see also Craft, 539 F.3d at 676.
However, “[an] ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion or
choose between the opinions [of] any of the claimant's physicians.” Schmidt v. Astrue, 496
F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). In fact, the ALJ is not even required to investigate further
and/or obtain medical opinions from plaintiff’s medical providers so long as there is
sufficient information in the record for the ALJ to make a decision. See Britt v. Berryhill,
889 F.3d 422, 427 (7th Cir. 2018). Rather, “the determination of a claimant’s RFC is a matter
for the ALJ alone—not a treating or examining doctor—to decide.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745
F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)).
The Court's “role is to determine whether the ALJ applied the right standards and
produced a decision supported by substantial evidence.” Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 595-

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596 (7th Cir. 2020). “The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or
testimony presented but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and the
conclusions so that [the Court] can assess the validity of the agency's ultimate findings.”
Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, the ALJ’s RFC finding was more
restrictive than the determinations by the non-examining physicians, treating physicians,
and the retained medical experts. See Palmer v. Saul, No. 19-1079, 779 Fed. Appx. 394, 398
(7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2019). See also Cervantes v. Kijakazi, No. 20-3334, 2021 WL 6101361, at *3
(7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (noting that no medical source opined that the plaintiff was more
limited than the ALJ, “[s]o the ALJ committed no error in the RFC finding). In a
comprehensive discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony and medical records, including
findings from the state agency physicians, and Plaintiff’s own provider (who declined to
endorse Plaintiff’s account that she could not perform sedentary work), and the retained
medical experts, the ALJ explained his reasoning for the RFC finding of sedentary work.
(Tr. 1524-26). The ALJ addressed the reported impairments and listed his reasoning for
why the objective medical evidence supported his conclusions, which clearly surpasses
the need to ‘minimally articulate’ his reasoning. The Court, thus, finds no error in the
ALJ’s RFC formulation.
Plaintiff’s Pain
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ neglected to analyze the factors required under SSR
16-3p, in that he did not clarify whether these activities aligned with or contradicted the

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alleged limitations.7 Defendant counters that three medical experts who have evaluated
Plaintiff’s functioning, including one that reviewed the entire record, agreed that Plaintiff
underestimated her functioning. The Court agrees with Defendant.
The ALJ is “in the best position to determine a witness’s truthfulness and
forthrightness . . . [and thus, the] court will not overturn an ALJ’s credibility
determination unless it is ‘patently wrong.’” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310–311 (7th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504–505 (7th Cir. 2004)). But, when
the credibility determination rests on “objective factors or fundamental implausibilities
rather than subjective considerations [such as a claimant's demeanor], appellate courts
have greater freedom to review the ALJ's decision.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th
Cir. 2000). When making the credibility determination, “an ALJ must adequately explain
his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.” Pepper v.
Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)
(superseding SSR 96-7p). 8 Additionally, while an ALJ is not required to provide a

The Court notes that Magistrate Judge Daly previously found the prior ALJ’s explanation
reasonable as to why Plaintiff had underestimated her limitations. See Jolean D. H., Case No. 3:19cv-01248-RJD; Doc. 36, p. 16-17. The ALJ’s explanation mirrors the prior ALJ’s findings on this
issue. The undersigned agrees with Judge Daly’s decision and finds there is no evidence to
warrant a different result here.

7

SSR 96-7p referred to a claimant’s “credibility,” but SSR 16-3p removed that term to
“clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of the individual’s character.”
SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at * 1 (Mar. 16, 2016). Instead, ALJs are reminded to “consider all of
the evidence in an individual’s record when they evaluate the intensity and persistence of
symptoms after they find that an individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that
could reasonably be expected to produce those symptoms,” as consistent with the regulations. Id.

8

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complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence, reversal and
remand is required where the ALJ “provides nothing more than a superficial analysis[.]”
Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2004). As such, an ALJ cannot simply state that
an individual’s allegations have been considered or that the individual’s allegations are
not credible. Rather, the ALJ must “give[] specific reasons for [a credibility] finding,
supported by substantial evidence.” Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009).
The process for evaluating a claimant’s symptoms is organized around two major
steps. First, the claimant must provide objective medical evidence of a medically
determinable impairment or combination of impairments that reasonably could be
expected to produce the alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)-(b). Second, after
the claimant satisfies the first step, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the extent to which
the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c). In evaluating allegations of pain, adjudicators are directed to consider
whether the symptoms are “consistent with the objective medical [evidence] and other
evidence in the individual’s record.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2 (Mar. 16,
2016). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (explaining that the agency considers both
“objective medical evidence and other evidence” in evaluating whether an impairment
affects activities of daily living and the ability to work).

Under either SSR version, the outcome of this case would be the same.
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Objective medical evidence is merely one factor to be considered, and an ALJ is
not free to “disregard an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence does not
substantiate the degree of impairment-related symptoms alleged by the individual.” SSR
16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *5 (Mar. 16, 2016). Other factors that the ALJ should examine
include “daily activities, allegations of pain, aggravating factors, types of treatment
received and medication taken, and ‘functional limitations.’” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d
503, 517 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-(4)). An ALJ may not
disregard subjective complaints “solely because they are not substantiated by objective
medical evidence.” Hall v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015); Vanprooyen v. Berryhill,
864 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir.
2009)). See also Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[p]ain
is always subjective in the sense of being experienced in the brain.”). “[P]ain alone can be
disabling . . . [therefore] [t]estimony of severe pain cannot be disregarded simply because
it is not supported by objective medical evidence.” Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 684, 688 (7th
Cir. 2016). An ALJ's “failure to adequately explain his or her credibility finding . . . is
grounds for reversal.” Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015).
Here, the ALJ again conducted a thorough analysis of Plaintiff’s medical history
and objective medical findings, specifically noting that despite Plaintiff’s complaints of
extreme pain, Plaintiff’s treating sources failed to support the intensity, persistence, and

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limiting effects of her alleged symptoms. (Tr. 1516-26). The ALJ again observed that
Plaintiff testified in June 2018 that she rode a horse for an hour in 2017, demonstrating a
conflict with her description of virtual immobility. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff, after
multiple remands, still did not have a treatment doctor to substantiate her alleged
limitations. (Tr. 1518, 1525). 9 Further, as mentioned by Defendant, in August 2023,
medical expert Dr. Schwieters, after reviewing the entire record, opined that Plaintiff had
a more robust functioning in that she could lift up to 50 pounds in addition to standing
and/or walking for 6 hours per day. (Tr. 1882-83, 1889). Thus, the ALJ’s assessment of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints was adequately supported and explained.
Opinion Evidence10
As of March 27, 2017, ALJs are no longer mandated to “defer or give any specific
evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior

The ALJ specifically noted: “[i]n this case, there was no evidence of treating source
support for the claimant’s allegations. Dr. Jerabek partially completed and signed a form titled
‘Residential Functional Capacity Report’ that was apparently created and submitted into
evidence by claimant’s representative. In the form, Dr. Jerabek, provided only medical diagnoses,
including the following: disk herniation-lumbar spine, spinal stenosis-cervical region, foraminal
stenosis – cervical and lumbar region, paresthesia-bilateral legs, and muscle spasms – bilateral
lower extremities. Dr. Jerabek had no response to the second question about whether her
subjective complaints were credible. Since Dr. Jerabek went on to answer further questions, the
omission appears intentional (Ex. 22F). There is an absence of any other documentation from Dr.
Jerabek or other treating or consulting sources, in support the claimant allegations that she is
unable to perform basic work activities.” (Tr. 1525).

9

Here, Plaintiff’s original application was filed before March 27, 2017. The applicable
regulation provides in part:

10

Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these
sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,
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administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant's] medical
sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); see also Albert v. Kijakazi, 34 F.4th 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2022)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920); Mesha C. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 6451, 2023 WL 2663569, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2023). Instead, ALJs will consider “supportability, consistency, the
relationship of the treater with the claimant, specialization, and other factors that tend to
support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding.” Bethany
G. v. Kijakazi, Case No. 20-cv-50483, 2023 WL 2683501, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
2023) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (c)). Consistency and supportability are the most
important factors and courts “will not vacate or reverse an ALJ's decision based solely on
a failure to expressly list every checklist factor, [but courts] do expect the ALJ to analyze

longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective
to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone
or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations. If we find that a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature
and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling weight.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
If the ALJ decides not to give the opinion controlling weight, he is to weigh it applying
the factors set forth in § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). Supportability and consistency are two important
factors to be considered in weighing medical opinions. In a nutshell, “[t]he regulations state that
an ALJ must give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight if two conditions are met: (1)
the opinion is supported by ‘medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
[,]’ and (2) it is ‘not inconsistent’ with substantial evidence in the record.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602
F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2010). Under either the prior regulations (20 C.F.R. § 404.1527) or the current
regulations (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c), the outcome is the same as there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s determination. In fact, as stated previously, Plaintiff’s own treating physician
did not answer a question regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities.
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the treating source's medical opinion ‘within the multifactor framework delineated’ in
the regulation.” Id. (quoting Ray v. Saul, No. 20-2802, 861 Fed. Appx. 102, 105 (7th Cir.
June 30, 2021) (citations omitted)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Supportability measures how much the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source support the opinion. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1). In other words, supportability addresses the extent to which the
medical opinion is explained by the provider and supported by objective findings.
Consistency assesses how a medical opinion squares with other evidence in the record.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). Simply stated, consistency addresses the extent to which a
medical opinion is consistent with the entire record, including both medical and
nonmedical sources.
As to this issue, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to adequately explain how the
medical evidence supports the ultimate RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ
misinterpreted the medical evidence and failed to include substantial expert input.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is rehashing previous arguments and that the ALJ
discussed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, noted abnormalities on exam, and accounted
for Plaintiff’s obesity and back conditions. The Court agrees with Defendant. Based on
the findings and analyses supra, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument. As stated
previously, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to less work than found by the physicians, including
the expert physicians hired by the ALJ on review.

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Plaintiff’s arguments are little more than an invitation for the Court to reweigh the
evidence. She has not identified any error requiring remand. Even if reasonable minds
could differ as to whether Plaintiff was disabled at the relevant time, the ALJ’s decision
must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, and the Court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ in reviewing the evidence. See Burmester, 920
F.3d at 510, Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012).
CONCLUSION
After careful review of the record, the Court is convinced that the ALJ committed
no errors of law, and his findings are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
the Court AFFRIMS the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in denying
Plaintiff’s application of disability benefits. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court
to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 10, 2025.
Digitally signed by
Judge Sison
Date: 2025.03.10
15:53:31 -05'00'
___________________________________

GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

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