Harper v. Hart et al

Filing 46

ORDER: For reasons explained, Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) is DENIED without prejudice. Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 8/28/2024. (kgk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EAZS A. HARPER, B83567,
Plaintiff,
vs.
C/O HART,
C/O BENT,
NURSE MORGAN,
ANTHONY WILLS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 24-cv-1157-DWD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Eazs A. Harper, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC), brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations
of his constitutional rights at Menard Correctional Center (Menard). (Doc. 6). In the
Complaint and related Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2), Plaintiff alleges that
on April 3, 2024, he was severely beaten by staff at Menard, and he claims he has yet to
receive needed medical care. The Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on several claims
and directed the Defendants to respond to the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (Doc.
8). Defendants have now responded (Doc. 22), both sides have filed supplemental
materials (Docs. 24, 45), and the Court has conducted an evidentiary hearing. Based on
the available evidence, the Court now finds it appropriate to deny the Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) without prejudice.

Background
The facts are more fully recounted in the Court’s earlier Order (Doc. 8. Upon
arrival at Menard on April 3, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to a caged area
where Defendants C/O Bent and C/O Hart handcuffed him to a gate and sprayed him
with two cans of mace or chemical spray. They also kicked and punched his whole body.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Morgan is a nurse who refused any medical care for his
injuries. Although the Court dismissed claims against Defendant Anthony Wills for his
personal role in the allegations, Wills remains a party to the case to address the injunctive
relief because as Warden of Menard he is the appropriate party to implement any
injunctive relief. (Doc. 8). The Court narrowed the scope of the Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. 2) to Plaintiff’s need for medical care, and any risk posed by ongoing
interactions with Defendants Hart and Bent.

(Doc. 8).

After receiving written

submissions from both sides (Docs. 20, 22, 24), the Court scheduled a hearing (Doc. 24).
July 17, 2024, Hearing
At the hearing, the Defendants presented testimony from Connie Dolce, the
Director of Nursing at Menard. Ms. Dolce indicated, and records confirm, that Plaintiff
was assessed by medical staff on June 21, 2024. (Doc. 45 at 10-12). The treating provider
noted that Plaintiff was being seen for his self-reports of injuries he sustained on April 3,
2024. (Doc. 45 at 10). Plaintiff reported injuries to his mid-to-lower back, his left ring
finger, his right middle finger, his right knee, and his scalp. The provider noted no visible
injuries, swelling, baldness on the scalp, or other perceivable issues. (Id. at 10-12).
Despite these findings, the provider recommended x-rays of the spine, hands, and knee

to rule out any issues that may not be visible. (Doc. 45 at 10). Dolce testified that per
Plaintiff’s medical chart he refused the x-rays on June 27, 2024.
Plaintiff countered that he was not offered x-rays, and that he would not have
refused them. Plaintiff also testified that because months had lapsed from the date of
injury until the date when he was medically examined, many of his injuries were no
longer visible.
The parties and Court agreed at the hearing that Plaintiff would be offered an
opportunity for x-rays within 30 days of the hearing, and that a notice and the results of
the x-rays would be filed with the Court. (Doc. 33). On August 6, 2024, Defendants
notified the Court (Doc. 42) that the x-rays had occurred, and on August 16, 2024, they
filed the x-ray results. The results show no acute fractures or dislocations to any of the
examined areas (both hands, right knee, thoracic spine). (Doc. 45-1 at 1-2).
Analysis
To seek a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: a likelihood of success
on the merits of his claim; no adequate remedy at law; and, irreparable harm without the
injunctive relief. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). As for the first
requirement, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any likelihood of success—
in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM General Corp. v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court must also decide
whether an adequate remedy at law exists and whether the plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm without injunctive relief. Irreparable harm is harm which cannot be
repaired. Graham v. Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Irreparable

harm is harm which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, atoned for. The injury
must be of a particular nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.”). The
Court must then weigh “the balance of harm to the parties if the injunction is granted or
denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction on the public interest.” Id.; Korte v.
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). “This equitable balancing proceeds on a slidingscale analysis; the greater the likelihood of success of the merits, the less heavily the
balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s favor.” Korte, 735 F.3d at 665.
An injunction that seeks an affirmative act by the respondent is a mandatory
preliminary injunction and should be sparingly issued. Mays, 974 F.3d at 818.

If

injunctive relief is warranted, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that the
injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the
harm . . . ,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(2).
Here, the Court finds that there is no basis to grant preliminary injunctive relief
because Plaintiff does not have any present injuries that have been substantiated by
medical examinations. To the contrary, the medical examination and x-rays did not
reveal any acute or underlying injuries that necessitate present treatment. The Court’s
primary concern in this matter has been Plaintiff’s physical well-being, and the evidence
simply does not support the notion that any relief needs to be granted to preserve the
status quo while this case is litigated. Plaintiff contended at the hearing on the motion
that because significant time passed from the date of the incident until the medical
examinations, visible confirmation of his injuries had diminished. While this may be true

and while the lack of injury is confirmed by the medical assessment, the lack of visible or
detectable injuries bolsters the notion that immediate temporary relief is not needed. On
the other hand, it does not necessarily diminish Plaintiff’s ability to further pursue the
merits of his claims.
One final topic is worth mention. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief related to his
ongoing placement in proximity to Defendants Hart and Bent. The parties disagreed
about if Plaintiff was still near these two individuals in their written briefs submitted
before the hearing. The Court’s primary concern about this issue was that Plaintiff
contended Bent and Hart were actively continuing to bar his access to medical care. Now
that Plaintiff has attended multiple appointments and has undergone the x-rays, the
concern about access to medical care has been alleviated and the concern about his
proximity to Bent and Hart has been mitigated. Thus, the Court does not find injunctive
relief related to Bent and Hart to be necessary at this time.
In sum, the Court finds that injunctive relief is not needed to preserve the status
quo for this litigation.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
(Doc. 2) is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 28, 2024
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge