Seger v. People of the State et al

Filing 4

ORDER: #1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241 filed by Petitioner Logan S. Seger is DENIED. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case on the Court's docket. Signed by Judge Stephen P. McGlynn on 5/8/2024. (trf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LOGAN S. SEGER,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 24-CV-01226-SPM

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Petitioner Logan S. Seger is a state defendant presently housed at Alton
Mental Health Center in Illinois. (See Doc. 1, p. 1). He filed the instant Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his placement in a
mental health facility for restoration of competency to stand trial in a state criminal
case in St. Clair County, Illinois. (Id.); see People v. Seger, 23-CF-613 (Ill. Cir. Ct.).
Seger requests for the Court to “[d]rop the question of fitness,” release him from
custody, declare a “mistrial citing non-vote of jury,” and drop all charges against him
for “failure to uphold habeas corpus.” (Doc. 1, p. 12). The case is now before the Court
for a preliminary review of the Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 1(b) of the same
provides this Court with the authority to apply these Rules to other habeas corpus
cases. See id.

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First, while Seger brought the instant Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
it is clear that he is not in federal custody nor has he been indicted under federal law.
(See Doc. 1). Section 2241(c) states that:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an
Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a
court or judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States . . . .
Seger is in a state mental health facility pending restoration of his competency to
stand trial in a state misdemeanor disorderly conduct case—thus, he is not detained
under the authority of the United States or in violation of federal law. (See Doc. 1, p.
1); see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). A state prisoner may challenge his or her detention “only
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see id. § 2241(c)(3), and only via 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. See Cook v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Section 2254(b)(1)
requires state prisoners to exhaust all available state court remedies before filing a
Section 2254 petition, whereas Section 2241 contains no such exhaustion
requirement. Had Congress intended to make Section 2241 available to state
prisoners, it would likely have required, in the interests of comity, that state
prisoners challenging the execution of their state-imposed sentences first exhaust
their remedies in the state courts.”)).

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Even though Seger styled and labeled the instant filing as a § 2241 petition,
“it is the substance of the petition, rather than its form” that determines whether it
is considered under § 2241 or § 2254. Cook, 321 F.3d at 278 (quoting James, 308 F.3d
at 166). Therefore, the Court is not constrained to consider the Petition as brought
under § 2241 if it appears that it should have been brought under § 2254. See Cook
at 277–78.
However, Seger is required to clear two procedural hurdles before the Court
may reach the merits of his Petition within the framework of § 2254: exhaustion of
remedies and procedural default. Bolton v. Akpore, 730 F.3d 685, 694–96 (7th Cir.
2013). Before seeking habeas relief, a petitioner is required to bring his claim(s)
through “one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process”
because “the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair
opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented
to the federal courts.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2254(c). Under the Illinois two-tiered appeals process, petitioners such as
Seger must fully present their claims not only to an intermediate appellate court, but
also to the Illinois Supreme Court, which offers discretionary review in cases such as
this one. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c);
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 604(e).
If a petitioner has pursued his state-court remedies to exhaustion, the claims
may nevertheless be barred by procedural default. See Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d
505, 514 (7th Cir. 2004). “[W]hen the habeas petitioner has failed to fairly present to
the state courts the claim on which he seeks relief in federal court and the opportunity
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to raise that claim in state court has passed, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted
that claim.” Id. A fairly presented claim “must place before the state court both the
controlling law and the operative facts in a manner such that the state court was
sufficiently alerted to the federal constitutional nature of the issue to permit it to resolve the issue on that basis.” Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 530 (7th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A petitioner may be excused from procedural
default only “if the petitioner can show both cause for and prejudice from the default
or can demonstrate that the district court’s failure to consider the claim would result
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Bolton, 730 F.3d at 696.
Reading Seger’s Petition as arguing that his right to due process has been
violated,1 he cannot file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 as
a state prisoner without providing details on the exhaustion of state remedies. While
Seger claims that he has pursued the grounds raised in his Petition on appeal,2 he
does not provide any facts about the status or outcome of any of these purported
appeals. (See Doc. 1, pp.7–9). He seems to indicate that he (erroneously) regards the
instant Petition as his appeal. (See id., p. 12). Notably, Illinois Supreme Court Rule
604(e) provides that “[t]he defendant or the State may appeal to the Appellate Court
from an order holding the defendant unfit to stand trial or be sentenced.”

While Seger does not discuss any alleged constitutional infirmity, he clearly challenges the fact or
duration of his confinement. See Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1999) (petition for
habeas corpus may be used only to challenge the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement).
2 The Court notes that Seger indicates earlier in his Petition that he has not appealed his current
mental health hold via checking the boxes labeled “No” in response to whether or not he appealed
the decision at issue. (See Doc. 1, pp. 3–4).
1

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While § 2254(b)(1)(B) permits a prisoner to sidestep the exhaustion
requirement where “there is an absence of available State corrective process . . . or
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant,” Seger had not provided details on this front, either. Because Seger has not
demonstrated the required of exhaustion of available state remedies pursuant to §
2254, the Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction to address his claims.
Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition.” Therefore, Seger’s Petition must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Logan S. Seger’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this case is
DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Clerk
of Court is DIRECTED to close this case on the Court’s docket.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts instructs the district court to “issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 28 U.S.C.
2253(c)(2) provides that a certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
To meet this standard, the petitioner “must have a constitutional claim (or an
underlying procedural argument on which a constitutional claim depends), and he
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must ‘demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment
of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” United States v. Fleming, 676 F.3d
621, 625 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 281 (2004)); see
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Seger has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. Having thoroughly reviewed the record before the Court, the undersigned
concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the disposition of this case debatable
or wrong. Accordingly, this Court DENIES issuance of a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

May 8, 2024
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge

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