Villareal v. Connel
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Signed by Judge Stephen P. McGlynn on 1/29/2025. (jaj)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMES VILLAREAL, M22525,
Plaintiff,
vs.
C/O CONNER,
Defendant.
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Case No. 24-cv-1453-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff James Villareal, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) housed at Menard Correctional Center, brought this civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s
allegations relate to an incident of excessive force on March 3, 2024. At the time he filed
the complaint on June 4, 2024, Plaintiff indicated he had not yet received a response to
his grievance. Given the short time between the underlying incident and the date of filing
this suit, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause concerning his exhaustion of
administrative remedies. (Doc. 14). Plaintiff filed two responses, thus discharging his
responsibility to show cause. (Docs. 15, 16).
Background
As the Court previously explained in the Show Cause Order (Doc. 14), Plaintiff
signed and dated his complaint on June 4, 2024, (Doc. 1 at 8), and it was received for filing
by Court on June 6, 2024. While the complaint was pending initial review, Plaintiff filed
a supplement on October 28, 2024, that contained copies of his grievance that had been
returned from the Administrative Review Board on August 5, 2024. (Doc. 13 at 2).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on March 3, 2024, when he was escorted to
segregation for allegedly displaying his genitals to a guard, he was taken into a side room
where he was severely beaten by Defendant Conner. (Doc. 1 at 6). He claimed in the
complaint form that he had submitted a grievance at the prison but had not yet received
a response. (Doc. 1 at 4). He also complained that it was difficult to get grievance forms
from officers in segregation at Menard, and that even if he did get a grievance form it
would never be returned. (Doc. 1 at 5).
In response to the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff indicates that grievances are
difficult to secure, and that grievance processing is slow. (Doc. 15 at 1). He contends he
submitted two grievances and got just one of the two back 90 days after he had submitted
it. He argues that the “rule book” says it should only take 30 days, and if more time is
needed Internal Affairs, the Adjustment Committee, or any investigator may request an
additional 14 days. He states that once he got his grievance back on July 1, 2024, he then
mailed it to the Administrative Review Board in Springfield, and once that was returned
he submitted it to the Court. He argues he believed that he took all the correct steps, and
he asks the Court to accept his lawsuit to stop mistreatment at Menard. (Doc. 15 at 1).
In a second response to the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff references an amended
complaint, and he argues that at least some of his claims should be allowed to proceed
because for some of the claims the grievance process was unavailable. (Doc. 16 at 1).
Specifically, he mentions claims in an amended pleading about policies and customs, and
about administrative decisions made by the Director of IDOC, both items he contends are
not grievable. (Doc. 16 at 2). He then argues that he submitted “various grievances
regarding the customs and practices complained of, excessive force, a failure-to-protect,
denial of medical care, and the disciplinary charges between March 3, 2024, and June 4,
2024.” (Doc. 16 at 3). He claims each grievance was hand delivered to correctional staff,
but grievance officers and counselors failed to comply with IDOC’s grievance procedures
and failed to timely process his grievances. He argues the grievances that were never
processed impede him from being able to comply with the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement. (Doc. 16 at 3-4). He further claims he did not learn of the failure to process
his grievances until after the 60 allotted days had elapsed, on June 2, 2024, which lead to
him filing the present complaint.
Plaintiff contends that claims regarding disciplinary charges were not exhausted
until August 5, 2024, but other claims about customs and practices, excessive force, failure
to protect, and denial of medical care as presented in his amended complaint should be
allowed to proceed. 1 (Doc. 16 at 4). In sum, he argues he should be allowed to proceed
on the custom and policy claims because no administrative remedies were available, and
on his other claims because the administrative remedies were made unavailable by the
non-response to grievances. (Doc. 16 at 5).
1 The grievance that was returned by the ARB on August 5, 2024, and that Plaintiff submitted to the Court
in October of 2024, discussed a disciplinary ticket and Officer Conner’s alleged assault of Plaintiff. (Doc. 13
at 2-4). The Administrative Review Board responded to both aspects of the grievance.
Analysis
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring
a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008).
For a prisoner to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file
complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules
require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does
not properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state
remedies.” Id. at 1024. Although it is generally appropriate to wait for a defendant to
raise an affirmative defense, the Seventh Circuit has noted that “when the existence of a
valid affirmative defense is so plain from the face of the complaint that the suit can be
regarded as frivolous, the district judge need not wait for an answer before dismissing
the suit.” Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff can plead
himself out of court, and if he includes allegations “that show he isn't entitled to a
judgment, he's out of luck.” Early v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.
1992) (citations omitted).
Although a plaintiff need not anticipate or overcome an
affirmative defense like exhaustion, if he alleges facts sufficient to establish that an
affirmative defense applies, “the district court may dismiss the complaint on that
ground.” O'Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015). “A premature
lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice, and the prisoner must file a new suit after
fully exhausting administrative remedies.” Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir.
2020).
Plaintiff’s first response to the Order to Show Cause presents two primary
contentions. First, he argues that there is a rule that governs grievance processing which
should have required the prison to respond to his grievance within 30 days, or with just
a 14-day extension beyond that. The grievance process in the Illinois Department of
Corrections is set forth in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 Ill. Admin. Code 504.800504.870. IDOC regulations provide that “[t]he Grievance Officer shall consider the
grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief
Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the written grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.830(e).
Furthermore, “[t]he Director shall review the findings and recommendations of the Board
and make a final determination of the grievance within six months after receipt of the
appealed grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” Id. § 504.850(e).
Against this backdrop, it is obvious there is no 30-day or 44-day deadline for grievance
processing.
There is an aspirational deadline that the grievance officer reviews a
grievance within 60 days, but even with that, the Director then has an additional six
months, both deadlines tempered by the “reasonably feasible” language. Plaintiff’s
argument that his grievance should have been returned so quickly at the prison is
unavailing and does not excuse his failure to wait for a response.
Second, Plaintiff contends he has never pursued a lawsuit before, and he simply
did what he thought was right. (Doc. 15 at 1). He asks the Court to accept his lawsuit
regardless of exhaustion so that prison officials cannot “get away” with mistreatment.
The PLRA “says nothing about a prisoner's subjective beliefs, logical or otherwise, about
administrative remedies that might be available to him.” Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 F.App'x
594, 596 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a prisoner's alleged lack of knowledge of grievance
procedures does not excuse noncompliance with available administrative remedies). A
lack of familiarity with the grievance rules does not excuse Plaintiff’s early filing of this
lawsuit before he got his grievance back from Springfield. Additionally, to the extent that
Plaintiff asks the Court to simply waive the fact that he sued before finishing his
grievance process, the Court cannot do so because administrative exhaustion is a
mandatory requirement that the Court does not have discretion to waive. See e.g., Id. at
596; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).
In Plaintiff’s second response to the Order to Show Cause, he seemingly concedes
that the fully exhausted grievance he submitted to the Court was returned after he filed
the lawsuit, but he argues he has many other claims in an amended complaint that should
not be dismissed for non-exhaustion. (Doc. 16). He argues he has a claim or claims about
policies or practices overseen by the Director of IDOC, and that these claims center on
administrative decisions which are not grievable. Thus, for these claims, he contends
exhaustion is not possible. As for other claims on excessive force, failure to protect, and
deliberate indifference to his medical needs, he argues that he submitted many individual
grievances on these issues and has not gotten any response. He claims the lack of
response has rendered the grievance process unavailable for these additional claims.
Whatever merit any of these contentions may have, Plaintiff has not submitted an
amended complaint in this matter, so any ruling on these arguments would be
speculative.
Plaintiff cannot proceed in this lawsuit on the premise that he may
theoretically have other claims that are not subject to the exhaustion framework set forth
in the Order to Show Cause.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information to
demonstrate that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. His
lack of understanding of the grievance process, or his plea that the Court excuse his
mistake, are not valid reasons to disregard the fact that he filed this lawsuit on June 4,
2024, but did not exhaust his grievance until August 5, 2024.
Under controlling
precedent, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A
premature lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice, and the prisoner must file a new
suit after fully exhausting administrative remedies.”). However, Plaintiff should be
aware that this dismissal does not prevent him from filing a new lawsuit about his
allegations. If Plaintiff does decide to file a new lawsuit about the claim in this case, or
about any additional claims he may wish to present on the other topics mentioned in his
second response to the Order to Show Cause, he should make sure to wait until he has
received responses to his grievances. He should also be mindful of the statute of
limitations, which generally requires § 1983 claims filed by an Illinois inmate to be filed
within two years of completion of the grievance process. In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
filing this lawsuit.
Disposition
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment
and to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 29, 2025
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
United States District Judge
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