Maize v. Shellhardt et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, the Court DISMISSES this case without prejudice. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 1/29/2025. (jdh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JENNIFER MICHELLE MAIZE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 24-cv-01659-JPG
ERIK SHELLHARDT et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court for case management purposes. Finding that the
Plaintiff has failed to give good cause why this suit should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, and that the Plaintiff has failed to prosecute their case, the Court hereby DISMISSES this
case without prejudice.
The Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 3, 2024, for alleged constitutional
deprivations stemming from her arrest, search, and seizure in Madison County, Illinois. (Doc. 1).
The Plaintiff sought dismissal of three pending cases against her, a temporary restraining order,
and money damages. The Court recognized eight counts alleging violations of the Plaintiff’s
rights under the Fourth, Eighth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, however, only the
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Teresa Tucker for alleged violations of her Fourth
Amendment rights survived screening. (Doc. 8). Consequently, all other defendants and claims
were dismissed.
The Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Tucker conducted a warrantless, baseless, and
humiliating body cavity search while processing her on or around May 8, 2022. Additionally, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant performed this search in the presence of male officers, who
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taunted and humiliated her during the search. The Plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to
objectively unreasonable conditions when she was placed in an attorney’s closet and denied
food, water, medication, restroom access, and clothing for twenty-four hours from May 8-9,
2024, while officers taunted and humiliated her.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable body cavity searches. A court
evaluates the constitutionality of a search by “balancing . . . the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711,
716 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). As part of this
evaluation, the court considers “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id. The
“more intrusive the search, the closer the governmental authorities must come to demonstrating
probable cause for believing that the search will uncover the objects for which the search is being
conducted.” Id. at 716 (citations omitted). The Fourth Amendment also protects arrestees from
conditions of confinement that are objectively unreasonable and cause harm, Currie v. Chhabra,
728 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2013); this protection extends to deprivation of crucial needs, such as
food, water, and restroom access.
On September 23, 2024, the Court ordered service of process on Defendant Tucker.
(Doc. 8). On November 25, 2024, Defendant Tucker answered the complaint. (Doc. 15). On
December 5, 2024, this case was assigned to CJRA Track B. The parties were ordered to submit
a joint proposed scheduling and discovery order within twenty-eight days of that date—no later
than January 2, 2025. However, no such joint report was filed. Mail to the Plaintiff was returned
as undeliverable on December 16, 2024. (Doc. 16). The Court ordered the parties to show cause
within seven days—no later than January 9, 2025—why the Court should not dismiss this case
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for failure to prosecute. This filing too was returned as undeliverable. (Doc. 20). The Plaintiff did
not, and still has not, updated her address.
Having received no response to the initial order to show cause, on January 15, 2025, the
Court once again ordered the parties to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss this
case for failure to prosecute. The Court warned the Plaintiff, in no uncertain terms, that failure to
respond within seven days—no later than January 22, 2025—would result in dismissal of this
suit for failure to prosecute; one week has passed since that order was entered with still no word
from the Plaintiff.
Dismissal is an appropriate sanction for failure to prosecute, including failing to submit a
discovery order. As a federal court in the Central District of Illinois summarized:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides, in relevant part: “If the
plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a
defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that
“Rule 41(b) serves not only to protect defendants but also to aid courts in
keeping administrative control over their own dockets and to deter other
litigants from engaging in similar dilatory behavior. The rule is an
expression of an inherent power . . . necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.” 3 Penny Theater Corp. v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 812 F.2d 337, 340 (7th
Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) provides, in
relevant part, that if a party fails “to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where
the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the
following: . . . (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;”.
Thus, sanctions are appropriate under Rule 37(b)(2) when a party fails to
comply with discovery orders and when the district court finds “willfulness,
bad faith or fault” to justify the sanction. Downs v. Westphal, 78 F.3d 1252,
1257 (7th Cir. 1996). The “fault” required to sustain dismissal under Rule
37 does not refer to the “non-complying party's subjective motivation” but
to the lack of reasonableness “which eventually culminated in the
violation.” Langley by Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 514 (7th
Cir. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted).
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Willis v. Williams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141474 at *2-4 (Ill. C.D., Oct. 26, 2011). The Court’s
authority to dismiss civil suits for failure to prosecute extends to prisoner cases alleging
violations of their civil rights. See Lucien v. Breweur, 9 F.3d 26, 26 (7th Cir. 1993).
Here, the Plaintiff is aware of her obligation to keep the Court updated on her
whereabouts and to notify the Court if her address changes; a failure to do so manifests at-least
an implication that the Plaintiff no longer wishes to prosecute their case. As the Court warned in
its order to show cause, the Court finds that this suit is subject to dismissal for failure
to prosecute.
CONCLUSION
Finding that the Plaintiff has twice failed to respond to an order to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution—despite being repeatedly warned that their
case would be dismissed and being aware of her obligation to keep her address up to date—the
Court hereby DISMISSES this case without prejudice and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to
enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 29, 2025
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE
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