Totton v. Hughes et al

Filing 18

Order for Service of Process: Plaintiff may proceed on Claim 1 against Defendants Cammarillo and Robinson. By contrast, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants Brookhart, Deimel, Germak, and Williams, so the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE these parties. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA protective order. Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 3/11/2025. (kgk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAMEIAN TOTTON, Y49642,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DEANNA BROOKHART,
MICHAEL DEIMEL,
STEPHAN GERMAK,
JULIA CAMMARILLO,
JASMINE ROBINSON,
WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 23-cv-2353-DWD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Dameian Totton, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) currently detained at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at
Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence).

Upon initial review, the Court rejected

Plaintiff’s claims as insufficient for a variety of reasons. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff has now filed
a timely amended complaint concerning similar issues. (Doc. 16).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) is now before the Court for preliminary
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to
screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by

law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,
the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Amended Complaint
On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff was escorted to segregation after he was accused
of possessing dangerous contraband, among other things. (Doc. 16 at 8). He claims that
at the time he was designated as “seriously mentally ill” (SMI), a designation which
should have invoked various procedures.

Specifically, he claims that per an

Administrative Directive, Defendant Williams was responsible for notifying the mental
health staff of his disciplinary issues so that they could prepare a form weighing in on
the impact of his mental health on the disciplinary incident and the potential punishment.
(Doc. 16 at 8-9). Williams neglected this duty, and he alleges that as a result he spent 70
days in segregation before his disciplinary ticket was overturned because the procedures
for an SMI inmate were not followed. Plaintiff also faults Defendants Brookhart, Deimel
and Germak for failing to realize when reviewing the outcome of his disciplinary
proceedings that the proper procedures were not followed. (Doc. 16 at 9). Plaintiff alleges
that the 70 days in segregation caused “atypical and significant hardships” that left him
“emotionally and mentally distressed.” (Doc. 16 at 9-10).
Plaintiff further claims that he notified Defendant Brookhart via two grievances
that he had serious mental health needs, and that his mental health needs were not being
met in the segregation setting. He claims his mental health deteriorated after repeated
requests for mental health care were denied. Specifically, he alleges that he began to bang

his head on the wall, which caused swelling. (Doc. 1 at 11). He also experienced
increased depression, slept for 12-14 hours per day, neglected basic self-hygiene, ate less,
had bipolar episodes, and experienced suicidal ideation.

He faults Brookhart for

exhibiting deliberate indifference to his needs by not providing him mental health care
in response to his grievances.
Additionally, Plaintiff explains that every Friday while he was in segregation,
Defendants Camarillo and Robinson (behavioral health staff) conducted weekly mental
health rounds. (Doc. 1 at 10). He claims he repeatedly told these two, “I’m not okay, I’m
anxious mentally & emotionally distressed, losing my mind, I need help[.]” He also
asked for one-on-one mental health attention and mental health group services, but the
Defendants indicated there was nothing that they could do for him because the facility
lacked a mental health professional. Plaintiff alleges that Camarillo and Robinson turned
a blind eye to his situation and failed to intervene to provide needed services. (Doc. 16
at 10-11).
In support of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff submitted disciplinary documents
and a single grievance. (Doc. 16 at 15-23).
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court will designate the
following claim:
Claim 1:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Cammarillo and Robinson for refusing mental
health services for 70 days while Plaintiff was in
segregation.

The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).
Analysis
The Court already extensively analyzed Plaintiff’s Due Process claims upon
review of his initial complaint and concluded that he failed to state a claim because the
duration of his time in segregation was relatively short, he did not sufficiently describe
atypical and significant hardships, and the prison’s Administrative Directive about
discipline for SMI inmates did not create a freestanding liberty interest.

(Doc. 9).

Although he has significantly reduced the allegations in his amended complaint about
the disciplinary situation, he still named Defendants Williams, Germak, Deimel and
Brookhart in relation to this issue and re-stated some of his allegations about the
disciplinary situation.

Factually, nothing has changed about the basis of these

allegations, and the extensive analysis contained in the Court’s earlier Order (Doc. 9) is
still applicable. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Williams, Germak, Deimel,
and Brookhart related to discipline.
Plaintiff also presents his allegations against Brookhart again concerning her
alleged deliberated indifference to his grievances about his mental health. As with the
disciplinary claim, the Court previously considered these allegations against Brookhart

in great detail and concluded that Plaintiff’s assertions were insufficient to suggest
Brookhart was on notice of a serious mental health issue and deliberately turned a blind
eye to that issue. Plaintiff’s allegations and evidence (a grievance) against Brookhart have
not changed, so this claim is still insufficient.
Finally, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has newly alleged that he told
Defendants Robinson and Cammarillo on a weekly basis that he was in dire need of
mental health care. He claims he requested one-on-one sessions and group therapy, but
was told he would not receive those services due to a lack of staffing. He claims that his
mental health significantly deteriorated during his time in segregation, which included
self-harming behavior, bipolar episodes, and increased depression. At this preliminary
juncture, these assertions are sufficient to proceed. However, the Court notes that
generally, an inmate cannot recover compensatory damages under the PLRA solely for
mental or emotional distress. Here, Plaintiff suggests that as a result of his mental distress
he banged his head against the wall, which caused swelling. See e.g., Rasho v. Elyea, 856
F.3d 469, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that an inmate had alleged a sufficient physical
injury for purposes of the PLRA by alleging he engaged in at least one incident of selfmutilation after being moved out of the behavioral health unit). He also discusses a
variety of other impacts such as failing to keep up hygiene, refusing to eat, and sleeping
significant portions of the day. For now, the Court will treat these impacts as sufficient
to make out a claim which may warrant monetary damages.

Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 1)
survives against Defendants Julia Cammarillo and Jasmine Robinson. By contrast, the
Amended Complaint is insufficient to state a claim against Defendants Deanna
Brookhart, Michael Deimel, Stephan Germak, and Williams, and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to TERMINATE these parties.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Cammarillo and
Robinson: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these
forms, a copy of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 16), and this Memorandum and Order to
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign
and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from
the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service
on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,
to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be
maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant need only respond to the issues stated in this
Merits Review Order.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later
than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with
this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in
dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case
because it will involve the exchange of medical or mental health records.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 11, 2025

/s David W. Dugan
________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your
lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,
the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will
likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,
but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants
have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important
information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles
that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but
it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening
only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some
relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged
actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is
the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.