Goodpaster v. Materials Handling Equipment Corp

Filing 136

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 129 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Defendant ECP American Steel LLC. Plaintiff DIRECTED to fully respond to ECP American Steel LLC's Second Request for Admissions and Second Set of Interrogatories by 7/22/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roger B Cosbey on 7/8/13. (cer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DAWSON GOODPASTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATERIALS HANDLING EQUIPMENT
CORP., et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 1:09-CV-00059

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion to compel filed by Defendant ECP American
Steel, LLC (“ECP”), requesting that the Court compel Plaintiff Dawson Goodpaster to fully
respond to its Second Request for Admissions and Second Set of Interrogatories. (Docket # 129.)
Goodpaster responded to the motion on July 1, 2013 (Docket # 133), and oral argument was held
and concluded one week later. (Docket # 134.) For the following reasons, ECP’s motion to
compel will be GRANTED.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On March 9, 2009, Goodpaster filed this case against his former employer, Defendant
Materials Handling Equipment Corp. (“Materials”), advancing claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and state wage laws. (Docket # 1.)
The Court conducted a scheduling conference on May 4, 2009, setting a discovery deadline of
December 1, 2009. (Docket # 14.)
In May 2010, Defendant Grabill Bank ostensibly received all of Material’s assets and
simultaneously transferred them to ECP. (Docket # 49.) Goodpaster then amended his complaint
on October 27, 2010, naming ECP and Grabill Bank as additional Defendants. (Docket # 49.)

The Court conducted another scheduling conference on February 23, 2011, at which it reopened
discovery solely on the issue of successor liability, setting a discovery deadline of June 10, 2011.
(Docket # 65.) The Court subsequently extended this discovery deadline three times, all per
Goodpaster’s request, and discovery closed on September 26, 2011. (Docket # 66-67, 70-74.)
On December 15, 2011, ECP filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket # 80.) The
Court on October 24, 2012, granted ECP’s motion with respect to Goodpaster’s state law wage
claim but denied it as to his age discrimination claim. (Docket # 111.) On November 14, 2012,
ECP moved to certify the Court’s Order for interlocutory appeal (Docket # 114), but the Court
denied the motion on March 18, 2013 (Docket # 120).
On April 18, 2013, the District Judge conducted a status conference and set a trial date of
September 30, 2013. (Docket # 125.) During the conference, ECP requested an opportunity to
engage in limited discovery on Goodpaster’s age discrimination claim since its prior discovery
was limited solely to the issue of successor liability. (Docket # 125.) Accordingly, on April 29,
2013, ECP served to Goodpaster its Second Request for Admissions, Second Request for
Production of Documents, and Second Set of Interrogatories. (Mot. to Compel Disc. ¶ 4.)
On May 30, 2013, ECP received Goodpaster’s objections and responses to the discovery
request. (Mot. to Compel Disc. ¶ 5.) Goodpaster asserted a “categorical objection” to the Second
Request for Admissions and Second Set of Interrogatories, emphasizing that the discovery
period was closed. (Mot. to Compel Disc. ¶ 5.) On June 26, 2013, after its attempts to resolve
the matter with Goodpaster were unsuccessful, ECP filed the instant motion to compel. (Docket
# 129.)

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B. Applicable Legal Standard
The decision to reopen discovery rests within the broad discretion of the Court. See Ty,
Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2003 WL 21294667, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Reytblatt v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, No. 86 C 385, 1991 WL 140920, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits discovery into “any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .” For the purpose of discovery, relevancy will be
construed broadly to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other
matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Chavez v. Daimler
Chrysler, 206 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)).
C. Discussion
Here, ECP explains that the original discovery period had already closed by the time it
was named as a Defendant in this action. The Court then reopened discovery solely for the
limited purpose of permitting a motion for summary judgment on the issue of successor liability;
ECP’s summary judgment motion, however, was ultimately denied. Consequently, ECP has not
had an opportunity to conduct discovery about the basic facts underlying Goodpaster’s age
discrimination claim, and it contends that it needs these facts to defend itself at trial.
Goodpaster objects to ECP’s request to perform additional discovery. He emphasizes
that his age discrimination claim is not complex and that the materials he filed in opposition to
summary judgment are all that exist, aside from those protected by the attorney-client privilege
or work-product doctrine. As he sees it, there is “nothing to supplement” concerning discovery
since the case is quickly approaching trial. (See Docket # 134.) He contends that granting ECP’s

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motion to compel would, in effect, allow ECP a “second bite of the age discrimination apple.”
(Pl.’s Resp. 5.)
Goodpaster’s objections, however, are unpersuasive, as ECP has never had a “first bite”
at discovery on the underlying discrimination claim. Indeed, Goodpaster does not dispute that it
named ECP after the close of the original discovery period. To reiterate, Rule 26(b)(1) permits
discovery into “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . .,”
and Goodpaster does not suggest that the discovery ECP seeks is irrelevant. Nor does he argue
that the requested discovery is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or overly burdensome.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
And considering that its motion seeking an interlocutory appeal was denied in March
2013, ECP has not unduly delayed in seeking this additional discovery and in filing the motion
to compel. See Banks v. CBOCS West, Inc., No. 01 C 0795, 2004 WL 723767, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 1, 2004) (citation omitted) (“As a general rule, if a moving party has unduly delayed in
filing a motion for an order compelling discovery, a court may conclude that the motion is
untimely.”).
Moreover, to the extent Goodpaster contends that the requested discovery seeks materials
protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine, he may produce a privilege
log that lists each separate document he claims to be beyond discovery. See, e.g., Muro v. Target
Corp., No. 94 C 6267, 2006 WL 3422181, at *1, 6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2006).
For all of these reasons, the Court will GRANT ECP’s motion to compel.
D. Conclusion
The motion to compel filed by Defendant ECP (Docket # 129) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is

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DIRECTED to fully respond to ECP’s Second Request for Admissions and Second Set of
Interrogatories on or before July 22, 2013.
SO ORDERED.
Enter for July 8, 2013.
S/Roger B. Cosbey
Roger B. Cosbey,
United States Magistrate Judge

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