Chang v. Crabill
Filing
20
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Brett Crabill. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 6/21/2011. (lns)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JUDY CHANG, individually and as
Mother and Legal and Natural
Guardian of R.C.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BRETT CRABILL,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 1:10 CV 78
OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant Brett Crabill’s motion to dismiss the
complaint filed by the plaintiff, Judy Chang, and her son R.C. (DE # 9.) For the reasons
that follow, the motion is denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 24, 1998, Crabill married Chang, a citizen of Taiwan. (Compl. ¶ 7; DE # 9
¶ 2.) On August 2, 1999, Crabill prepared and signed Affidavits of Support (Form I-864)
which accompanied his petitions requesting that Chang and her son, R.C., be granted
permanent resident status in the United States. (Compl. ¶ 8.) The Affidavits stated:
I agree to provide the sponsored immigrant(s) whatever
support is necessary to maintain the sponsored immigrant(s)
at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal poverty
guidelines. I understand that my obligation will continue until
my death or the sponsored immigrant(s) have become U.S.
citizens, can be credited with 40 quarters of work, depart the
United States permanently, or die. . . .
1
I understand that, under section 213A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), as amended, this
affidavit of support constitutes a contract between me and the
U.S. Government. This contract is designed to protect the
United States Government, and State and local government
agencies or private entities that provide means-tested public
benefits, from having to pay benefits to or on behalf of the
sponsored immigrant(s), for as long as I am obligated to
support them under this affidavit of support. I understand that
the sponsored immigrants . . . are entitled to sue me if I fail to
meet my obligations under this affidavit of support . . . .
(Compl. Ex. A at 4-5, Ex. B at 4-5.)
The petitions were granted, and Chang and R.C. became permanent residents of
the United States on or about October 22, 1999. (Compl. ¶ 10.) On or about September
15, 2000, Crabill divorced Chang. (Compl. ¶ 12.) No children were born to Crabill and
Chang during the marriage. (DE # 8-7 ¶ 7.) After divorce proceedings concluded in the
Circuit Court of Whitley County, Indiana, that court issued a divorce decree1 stating:
“No request was made by the respondent [Chang] for spousal maintenance or support
of any kind.” (DE # 8-7 ¶ 8.) No maintenance or child support was awarded.
Chang and R.C. filed suit in this court on March 19, 2010, alleging that Crabill
had failed to provide support as required by the Affidavits of Support since May 1,
2000. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Chang and R.C. requested a judgment in the amount equal to 125%
of the federal poverty guideline from May 1, 2000, to the present, plus interest and
attorneys’ fees, and an order for specific performance to financially support plaintiffs
under the terms of the Affidavit. (Compl. 2-3.) Crabill moved to dismiss the complaint,
The court may take judicial notice of public records without converting a
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d
686, 691 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
1
2
arguing that the divorce decree bars any claim for support under the Affidavits of
Support. (DE # 9.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Crabill has moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under RULE 12(b)(6) of the
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. RULE 8 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE sets forth the pleading
standard for complaints filed in federal court; specifically, that rule requires that a
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8. “The RULE reflects a liberal notice pleading regime,
which is intended to focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on technicalities
that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “While the federal pleading standard is quite
forgiving, . . . the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660,
662-63 (7th Cir. 2011); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).
In deciding whether to dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged in the
pleadings and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, such as public
records. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (7th
Cir. 1997). When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must construe it in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and
draw all inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Reger Development, LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,
595 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).
3
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Support for Chang
1.
Crabill’s Support Obligations in Light of Divorce
To the extent that Crabill argues that his obligation to provide support for Chang
under the Affidavit of Support terminated upon Chang and Crabill’s divorce, the
argument is rejected. Numerous courts have held that a sponsor’s obligations under an
Affidavit of Support do not terminate upon divorce. See, e.g., Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04
CV 253, 2005 WL 1290658 (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2005); Cheshire v. Cheshire, No. 3:05-cv-453,
2006 WL 1208010, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2006); Hrachova v. Cook, No. 5:09-cv- 95-OcGRJ, 2009 WL 3674851 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2009); Skorychenko v. Tompkins, No. 08-cv-626,
2009 WL 3126379, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 28, 2009). As the Hrachova court summarized,
“[t]he view that divorce does not terminate the obligation of a sponsor has been
recognized by every federal court that has addressed the issue.” 2009 WL 3674851, at *3.
The court finds no merit in any argument Crabill may be attempting to make that the
Affidavit he signed regarding Chang is unenforceable given the termination of Chang
and Crabill’s marriage.
2.
Collateral Estoppel / Issue Preclusion
Crabill also argues that the principle of collateral estoppel applies to bar Chang’s
claim. In determining the effect of a state court judgment in federal court, the federal
court is to apply the collateral estoppel principles of the state that entered the prior
judgment – in this case, the State of Indiana. Rekhi v. Wildwood Indust. Inc., 61 F.3d 1313,
1316-17 (7th Cir. 1995). In Indiana, “[c]ollateral estoppel—also referred to as issue
4
preclusion—bars the subsequent litigation of an issue necessarily adjudicated in a
former suit.” MicroVote Gen. Corp. v. Ind. Election Comm'n, 924 N.E.2d 184, 197 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010).
However, “[c]ollateral estoppel does not extend to matters that were not
expressly adjudicated or to matters that can be inferred from the prior adjudication only
by argument.” Id. Further, “[t]he primary consideration in the use of collateral estoppel
is whether the party against whom the former adjudication is asserted had ‘a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the
circumstances’ to permit the use of issue preclusion in the subsequent action.” Id. (citing
Bartle v. Health Quest Realty VII, 768 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)); MH Equity
Managing Member, LLC v. Sands, 938 N.E.2d 750, 756 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Collateral
estoppel does not extend to matters that were not expressly adjudicated or to matters
that can be inferred from the prior adjudication only by argument.”).
In this case, the state court divorce decree stated that no request was made by
Chang for “spousal maintenance or support of any kind.” (DE # 8-7 at 1.) This
statement is ambiguous at best, and it would require both argument and inference to
find that the divorce court adjudicated the issue of immigrant support under the
Affidavit of Support. Further, it can hardly be said that Chang had a full and fair
opoprtunity to litigate the issue of support under the Affidavit. Accordingly, collateral
estoppel does not apply.
5
3.
Res Judicata / Claim Preclusion
Crabill also argues that the principle of res judicata should prevent Chang from
suing him under the Affidavit of Support. The Seventh Circuit has held that courts are
to “apply state res judicata principles when the earlier action in question was decided in
state court.” Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545, 548 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011). The
parties’ divorce proceeding was decided in Indiana state court, so the court will apply
Indiana’s principles of res judicata.
Under Indiana law, the doctrine of res judicata (a term used interchangeably by
the Indiana courts with the term “claim preclusion”2) serves to prevent the litigation of
matters that have already been litigated. Dev. Servs. Alts., Inc. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs.
Admin., 915 N.E.2d 169, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Res judicata is applicable when a final
judgment on the merits has been rendered and acts to bar a subsequent action on the
same claim between the same parties. Id. When res judicata applies, all matters that
were or might have been litigated are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in
the prior action. Id.
Res judicata or claim preclusion applies when the following four factors are
present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was, or
could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in
Crabill also moves to dismiss on the basis of the doctrine of “merger,” which he
admits is identical to the concept of claim preclusion. (DE # 10 at 3.) Regardless of
whether Crabill labeled the doctrine res judicata, claim preclusion, or merger, the
argument that the doctrine applies to bar Chang’s claim fails for the reasons set forth in
this section of this opinion.
2
6
the former action was between parties to the present suit or their privies. TacCo Falcon
Point, Inc. v. Atlantic Ltd. Partnership XII, 937 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The
parties really only dispute the third element; specifically, the parties disagree as to
whether the issue of support under the Affidavit of Support was or could have been
adjudicated during the parties’ divorce proceedings.
Res judicata is a defense for which Crabill will ultimately possess the burden of
proof at trial, not Chang. Kulavic v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 1 F.3d 507, 517 (7th
Cir.1993); Lake Monroe Reg. Waste Dist. v. Waicukauski, 501 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986). “[C]omplaints need not anticipate and attempt to plead around defenses.” United
States v. Northern Trust Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004). True, “[a] litigant may
plead itself out of court by alleging (and thus admitting) the ingredients of a defense,”
U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003), but a plaintiff’s
omission of facts from her complaint which would ultimately defeat an affirmative
defense does not justify dismissal. Id.; Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 n.1 (7th Cir.
2006).
In this case, the pleadings and the state court divorce decree, of which the court
may properly take judicial notice, are grossly lacking facts indicating that any claims for
support under the Affidavits of Support were actually considered by the state court.
True, the principle of res judicata will still bar a later action if the claim could have been
litigated in the prior action. Crabill argues that Chang could have brought up the issue
of immigrant support during their divorce proceedings, while Chang argues that it
would not have been possible for her to have raised the issue during their divorce
7
proceedings because the cause of action was unknown to her at the time. For the
reasons set forth below, an examination of the pleadings and matters of which the court
may take judicial notice reveals a lack of facts on this issue, warranting denial of
Crabill’s motion to dismiss.
Under Indiana law, res judicata cannot operate to bar a cause of action which had
not yet accrued at the time of the prior action. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 308 N.E.2d 429,
432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (addressing spousal support claim). Determining the date of
accrual begins with basic principles of Indiana contract law.3 In determining when a
claim of breach of a written contract accrues, Indiana follows the “discovery rule.”
Strauser v. Westfield Ins. Co., 827 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Under the
discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of
ordinary diligence could have discovered that the contract had been breached. Id.; Del
Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Whether a party acted
with the appropriate diligence to discover that the contract had been breached is a
question of fact, unless the undisputed or admitted facts allow a ruling on the issue as a
matter of law. Griffin v. Axsom, 525 N.E.2d 346, 347-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); see also
Herron v. Anigbo, 897 N.E.2d 444, 450 (Ind. 2008) (discussing “reasonable diligence”
standard in context of medical malpractice claims).
The parties do not dispute that the Affidavit of Support is a contract on which
Chang may sue in the event of a breach. Indeed, the Affidavits, which Crabill signed,
make this exceedingly clear: “I understand that, under section 213A of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (the Act), as amended, this affidavit of support constitutes a
contract between me and the U.S. Government. . . I understand that the sponsored
immigrants . . . are entitled to sue me if I fail to meet my obligations under this affidavit
of support . . . .” (Compl. Ex. A at 4-5, Ex. B at 4-5.)
3
8
Thus, unless Chang knew of or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have
discovered Crabill’s breach before the divorce proceedings, her claim had not yet
accrued, and it was not a cause of action that “could have been litigated” during the
divorce proceedings for res judicata purposes. The divorce decree does not even
mention the Affidavit of Support or any duty Crabill had to support Chang based on
her immigrant status. The only other facts that the court may consider in the context of
this RULE 12(b)(6) motion are those contained in the complaint, and in it Chang says
nothing about when she learned about the existence of the Affidavit of Support or when
she learned that Crabill had failed to meet his obligations thereunder.
Nor was she required to. Chang was not required to anticipate the defense of res
judicata and include facts to counter it in her complaint. Northern Trust, 372 F.3d at 888;
Gypsum, 350 F.3d at 626; Hollander, 457 F.3d at 691 n.1. The fact that the pleadings and
the state court divorce decree lack facts regarding the date of accrual does not require
dismissal of Chang’s complaint, but rather denial of Crabill’s RULE 12(b)(6) motion.
Though Crabill may be able to discover and present evidence to support a res judicata
defense at a later time, Chang’s pleadings are sufficient to survive Crabill’s motion to
dismiss today.
B.
Support for R.C.
Up until this point, the court has been addressing Crabill’s arguments as they
relate to his promise to provide immigrant support for his ex-wife, Chang. But Crabill
also signed an Affidavit promising to provide immigrant support for Chang’s minor
child, R.C., the other plaintiff in this case. (R.C. is not Crabill’s biological child, but
9
Crabill signed an Affidavit of Support on his behalf in order for R.C. to obtain
permanent resident status in the United States.) In his motion to dismiss, Crabill argues
(somewhat half-heartedly) that the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata
should bar R.C.’s claims for support. Crabill’s arguments as to R.C. warrant little
discussion.
There are numerous legal holes in Crabill’s argument regarding R.C.; the court
addresses only a few here. It is clear that the issue of support for R.C. under the
Affidavit of Support was never actually litigated during Chang and Crabill’s divorce
proceedings, so the principle of collateral estoppel is inapplicable. MicroVote, 924 N.E.2d
at 197 (“[c]ollateral estoppel does not extend to matters that were not expressly
adjudicated or to matters that can be inferred from the prior adjudication only by
argument”). Res judicata might apply if R.C. could have raised the issue during Chang
and Crabill’s divorce proceedings, but the court finds such an argument tenuous. R.C.
was not even a party to the divorce proceedings, and his rights to support of any kind
were never at issue.4 The divorce was between Chang and Crabill, and based on the
divorce decree, R.C. played no role in proceedings whatsoever, other than the fact that
the divorce decree noted his existence and the fact that he was not fathered by Crabill.
(DE # 8-7 at 1.)
In the State of Indiana, justice disfavors a child support order against a husband
who is not the child’s father. Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 1990). Chang
did not seek child support for R.C. during divorce proceedings, and she would have
had no basis for doing so.
4
10
Further, even if Chang could be considered R.C.’s “representative” for purposes
of seeking support under the Affidavit, the court will not hold that Chang was expected
to assert a claim for immigrant support for R.C., whom Crabill did not father, during
proceedings involving the termination of Chang’s marriage to Crabill. Crabill has
provided no caselaw showing that any court has done what Crabill asks this court to
do, nor could the court locate any such authority in its own reasearch. Crabill’s
arguments as to R.C. are rejected.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the plaintiffs’ complaint presents plausible claims for support pursuant
to Affidavits of Support.5 Defendant Crabill’s motion to dismiss (DE # 9) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: June 21, 2011
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Chang encourages the court to consider her sworn affidavits, attached as
exhibits to her response and sur-reply briefs, in which she attests that she did not know
that she had a cause of action under the Affidavit of Support until she heard that a
friend had been successfully sued under such an affidavit. The court may not consider
this affidavit without converting Crabill’s RULE 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for
summary judgment under RULE 56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). The court declines to
convert the present motion into a RULE 56 motion; the parties are free to collect evidence
through the discovery process and move for summary judgment on their own accord.
5
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?