Martin v. Engelman
Filing
84
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 77 Supplemental MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Darrick Engelman, DENYING AS MOOT 73 MOTION in Limine by Defendant Darrick Engelman. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of defendant Darrick Engelman. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 10/22/2013. (lhc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DERRICK C. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DARRICK ENGELMAN,
Defendant.
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No. 1:10 CV 109
OPINION AND ORDER
Derrick C. Martin, a pro se plaintiff, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Darrick Engelman, an officer from the Fort Wayne Police Department,
violated his rights in connection with his arrest on July 9, 2009. Summary judgment was
previously granted to defendant on Martin’s claims challenging his arrest and the
search of his residence. (DE # 56.) The sole remaining claim is whether the seizure of
Martin’s 1986 Chevy Monte Carlo violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
(See id. at 12.) With the court’s permission, defendant has filed a supplemental motion
for summary judgment on this claim. (DE # 77.)
I.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties makes
summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355,
358 (7th Cir. 2010). A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion
may not rely merely on allegations or denials in his or her own pleading, but rather
must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her
case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential element on which he or
she bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey v. Johnson,
457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
II.
Facts
The court previously summarized the facts surrounding Martin’s arrest as
follows:
On June 30, 2009, defendant Detective Engelman was contacted by a
confidential informant (“CI”) who advised him that the CI could purchase
crack cocaine from a man the CI referred to as “Chuck,” later identified as
Charles Smith. That afternoon, the CI paid Smith for approximately 2.9
grams of cocaine. On July 1, 2009, the CI made a second controlled purchase
from Smith on Lewis Street. Prior to the buy, undercover surveillance
detectives went to the area and observed Smith and his vehicle at 1124 East
Lewis Street. When the CI arrived, Smith exited the porch of 1124 East Lewis
Street and completed the transaction with the CI through the window of the
CI’s vehicle. Smith then walked back to the porch of 1124 East Lewis Street.
Thereafter, the CI produced to Detective Engelman the approximately 3.9
grams of cocaine the CI purchased from Smith.
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Detectives remained in the area after this transaction, and observed
Smith exit the porch of 1124 East Lewis Street and conduct what appeared to
be “open air” drug transactions in front of the house. Detective Engelman
states that the Fort Wayne Police Department had also received two recent
phone tips regarding 1124 East Lewis, in which the caller said that several
black males were dealing drugs from the residence and that there was
unusually high vehicle and foot traffic at that location.
Based on his investigation, on July 6, 2009, Detective Engelman
prepared an affidavit to apply for a search warrant for 1124 East Lewis Street,
in which he set forth the details of the July 1, 2009, controlled drug
transaction in front of 1124 East Lewis, along with additional information
obtained in the investigation. An Allen Superior Court judge issued a search
warrant for 1124 East Lewis, authorizing the police to search for:
Cocaine and derivatives thereof, firearms, cellular phones (and
internal phone/text message logs related to drug trafficking),
records of drug transactions and/or other financial
information related to drug transactions, and any United States
currency used to purchase controlled substances by the Fort
Wayne Police Department prior to the execution of this
warrant, which constitutes evidence of alleged drug
transactions and illegal possession of said controlled
substances.
On July 9, 2009, Fort Wayne police officers served this search warrant
at 1124 East Lewis Street, and searched the residence. Officers found a loaded
Taurus .45 caliber handgun and approximately 66.7 grams of marijuana in
the southeast bedroom. The police also had Martin’s vehicle towed away.
When asked whether he lived at the residence, Martin said that he did, and
admitted that the southeast bedroom was his, though he denied ownership
of the handgun and the marijuana. Martin was placed under arrest for
charges including felony Possession of Marijuana and was eventually
charged with possession of marijuana and being a serious violent felon in
possession of a handgun. Martin went to trial on the charges against him and
was found not guilty on April 6, 2010.
(DE # 56 at 4-6) (internal citations omitted).
The following additional facts pertain to the seizure of Martin’s vehicle. Officer
Gary Griffith is a canine officer employed by the Fort Wayne Police Department.
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(DE # 77-2, Griffith Aff. ¶ 2.) His canine partner is “Bullet,” a drug-detecting dog
certified by the North American Police Work Dog Association. (Id.) Bullet has received
training and certification in drug searches, including vehicle searches. (Id.) On July 9,
2009, Officer Griffith was requested to assist Fort Wayne Police in executing a search
warrant at the 1124 East Lewis Street residence. (Id. ¶ 3.) When they arrived at the
scene, it was requested that Bullet conduct an exterior sniff search around a red 1986
Chevy Monte Carlo. (Id.) The Monte Carlo was parked on the street in front of the
Lewis Street residence, and was registered to Martin. (Id.; DE # 77-1, Martin Dep. Tr. at
27.) Officer Griffith gave Bullet the command to search the vehicle, and upon doing so
she alerted to the odor of narcotics near the drivers side trunk area. (DE # 77-2, Griffith
Aff. ¶ 4.) He directed Bullet to continue her search, and in doing so she again alerted to
the odor of narcotics near the trunk area. (Id.) Officer Griffith informed another officer
on the scene about Bullet’s positive responses for narcotics in the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 5.) Bullet
then conducted a search inside the residence and alerted to the odor of narcotics in a
second floor bedroom. (Id. ¶ 6.) Officer Griffith was later informed that marijuana was
found in the bedroom where Bullet had alerted. (DE # 77-2, Report at 6.)
Martin’s vehicle was towed by police on the date of his arrest. (DE # 77-3,
Inventory Form.) Martin was released on bond a few days later, but he did not try to
retrieve the car because he did not have any money. (DE # 77-1, Martin Dep. Tr. at 27.)
He was subsequently re-arrested for a pretrial release violation, and he remained in
custody until April 6, 2010, when he was acquitted on the underlying criminal charges.
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(Id. at 28, 37-39.) He retrieved his car from the police tow lot on August 25, 2010. (Id. at
28; DE # 77-3, Inventory Form.)
III.
Analysis
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant to search
personal property, but under the “automobile exception,” the warrantless search of a
vehicle is permitted in various situations, including when there is probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 346-47 (2009); see also United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“Cars, however, are exempted from the warrant requirement provided officers have
probable cause to believe the car contains contraband.”). Probable cause for a search
exists when “based on the known facts and circumstances, a reasonably prudent person
would believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be
searched.” Richards, 719 F.3d at 754. Probable cause does not require information
sufficient to support a conviction, and instead, “[a] fair probability of discovering
contraband is enough.” Id. at 755.
Warrantless seizures of property are also permitted in certain circumstances.
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992). Police may seize a vehicle without a warrant
if they have probable cause to believe the vehicle is subject to seizure, such as where the
vehicle was used in the commission of a crime and is subject to forfeiture under state
law. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 561 (1999); see also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
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429 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1977) (Fourth Amendment did not prohibit warrantless seizure of
cars subject to tax liens from public street). This exception to the warrant requirement is
premised on a recognition of “the need to seize readily movable contraband before it is
spirited away.” White, 526 U.S. at 565.
Here, defendant argues that the seizure of Martin’s vehicle was proper, based in
part on Bullet’s positive alerts to the odor of narcotics.1 (DE # 77.) In his response,
Martin appears to claim that Officer Griffith and Bullet were not actually present on the
scene. (DE # 80-1.) However, he does not make this assertion in the form of an affidavit
or under penalty of perjury, nor does it appear to be based on his own personal
knowledge. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4). Instead, he argues as follows: “The plaintiff,
Derrick C. Martin filed in the past a motion to add the Fort Wayne Police Department,
the City of Fort Wayne, and the officers that were there at the time of the raid and Gary
Griffith wasn’t on any of the affidavits as a witness to this incident.” (DE # 80-1.) His
argument appears to be that since he was not previously made aware of Officer
Griffith’s presence on the scene, the officer must not have been there. He does not attach
1
Defendant also argues that Martin consented to the seizure of his car by
voluntarily giving Detective Engelman the keys. (DE # 78 at 4.) However, Martin
disputes that he gave the officer his keys, and instead asserts that the officer took them
out of his pocket when he was handcuffed. (DE # 80-1 at 1.) Defendant argues that this
assertion contradicts Martin’s deposition testimony (DE # 83), but the transcripts before
the court do not bear this out. Instead, as is reflected in the transcripts, Martin stated
only “he asked me to see the keys and he went out there, started the car up, and drove
it to the flatbed.” (DE # 77-1, Martin Dep. Tr. at 27.) His assertion that the officer took
the keys from him is not inconsistent with this testimony. Accordingly, Defendant has
not established an entitlement to summary judgment on this ground.
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any documentation to support his argument, and it is unclear what “affidavits” he is
referring to. He has not pointed to any evidence suggesting that defendant engaged in
wrongdoing or somehow hid Officer Griffith’s presence from him during these
proceedings.2 Officer Griffith attests unequivocally that he was present during this
incident, and Martin does not offer a contrary version of events under oath and based
on his own personal knowledge. He cannot defeat summary judgment with
“speculation” or “innuendo.” See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 986 (7th Cir. 2009).
Turning to the merits, the crux of Martin’s argument is that Detective Engelman
acted improperly in seizing his vehicle without a warrant. (DE # 80-1 at 3.) However, as
outlined above, the lack of a warrant is not critical; instead, the inquiry is whether the
officer had probable cause for the seizure. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71; White, 526 U.S. at
565. On this point, the record shows that Martin’s vehicle was parked in plain view, on
a public street, and in front of a residence where multiple drug buys had occurred
under police surveillance. Martin was found inside the residence when the police were
executing a search warrant, and drugs were found in the bedroom Martin
acknowledged was his. As a result, he was being arrested for drug offenses. Martin
2
Because this case involves a pro se party, all discovery was required to be filed.
N.D. IND. L.R. 26-2(a)(2)(A). The docket reflects that the only discovery propounded by
Martin was a request for production asking for Engelman’s tax returns and other
documents. (See DE # 48.) Engelman objected to this request as untimely since
discovery had closed a month earlier. (Id.) Martin did not move to compel a response
and so the discovery was never answered.
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reported that his car was fully operable, and a drug-detecting dog twice alerted to the
trunk area of the car for the odor of narcotics.
Based on these circumstances, Detective Engelman had probable cause to search
the vehicle for drug evidence. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 346-47; see also United States v.
Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 640-42 (7th Cir. 2004) (police had probable cause to search
defendant’s vehicle, based in part on positive alert by trained police dog, even though
defendant did not have access to the vehicle at the time of his arrest). The officer also
had probable cause to believe the vehicle was subject to immediate seizure as having
been used in the commission of a drug offense. See White, 526 U.S. at 561 (Fourth
Amendment did not require police to obtain warrant before seizing automobile from
public place when they had probable cause to believe it had been used in criminal
activity); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1241 (7th Cir. 1990) (warrantless seizure of
vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment where police had probable cause to
believe vehicle was subject to forfeiture under state law as having been used in the
commission of a drug offense); see also IND. CODE § 34–24–1–1 (authorizing forfeiture of
a vehicle used to transport drugs or to otherwise facilitate the commission of a drug
offense). Based on the record, the seizure of Martin’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Detective Engelman further argues that even if the seizure was improper, he is
entitled to qualified immunity. (DE # 78 at 9.) The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct
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does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224, 229 (1991). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once the defense
has been raised, it becomes the plaintiff’s burden to defeat it. Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d
629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008). In the context of a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation,
“qualified immunity affords an added layer of protection” for “officers who reasonably
but mistakenly believe that probable cause exists.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d
706, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2013).
Here, Martin does not respond to Detective Engelman’s qualified immunity
defense, nor does he point to any case where a Fourth Amendment violation was found
to have occurred under similar circumstances. (See DE ## 80, 82.) Under the facts of this
case, Detective Engelman had at least an arguable basis for believing the car was subject
to search and seizure because it contained drug evidence or had otherwise been used in
the commission of a drug offense. See Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir.
2013) (qualified immunity provides shelter for officers who have at least “arguable”
probable cause). Therefore, Detective Engelman is entitled to summary judgment. As a
final matter, because the case will not be proceeding to trial, defendant’s motion in
limine will be denied as moot. (See DE # 73.)
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IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s supplemental motion for summary
judgment (DE # 77) is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor
of defendant Darrick Engelman. Defendant’s motion in limine (DE # 73) is DENIED as
moot.
SO ORDERED.
Date: October 22, 2013
s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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