Hathaway et al v. Cintas Corporate Services Inc et al

Filing 128

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 95 MOTION to Dismiss the Express Warranty Claim Asserted in Count V of Plaintiff's' Complaint Pursuant to Federal RUle of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendant Lincoln Electric Company The; DENYING 102 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Lincoln Electric Company The; DENYING AS MOOT 114 MOTION for Oral Argument by Defendant Lincoln Electric Company The. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 9/26/12. (cer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
REX HATHAWAY and
TAMMY HATHAWAY,
Plaintiffs
v.
CINTAS CORPORATE SERVICES, INC.,
CINTAS CORPORATION #2 d/b/a
CINTAS CORPORATION, CINTAS FIRE
PROTECTION AND CINTAS FIRST AID
& SAFETY, THE LINCOLN ELECTRIC
COMPANY, AIR GAS – MID AMERICA,
INC., and AIR GAS – NORTH CENTRAL,
INC.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:10 CV 195

OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Lincoln Electric Company has moved to dismiss Count V of plaintiffs
Rex and Tammy Hathaway’s complaint (DE # 95), and has also moved for summary
judgment on Counts IV and VI of plaintiffs’ complaint (DE # 102.) For the reasons
outlined below, Lincoln’s motion to dismiss is granted, and Lincoln’s motion for
summary judgment is denied.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Plaintiff Rex Hathaway was employed as a welder/plasma torch operator at
Quik Cut, Inc. (“Quik Cut”), a welding/plasma cutting company located in Allen
County, IN. On February 12, 2009, Mr. Hathaway was operating a Pro Cut 80 plasma
cutter, which was manufactured by defendant Lincoln Electric Company (“Lincoln”).
The Pro Cut 80 plasma cutter (“the plasma cutter”) is a machine that is used to cut
through metal and steel. The plasma cutter emits sparks when used to cut metal.
While using the plasma cutter on February 12, Mr. Hathaway’s shirt caught on
fire, which resulted in Mr. Hathaway suffering serious burns to a substantial portion of
his body. The fire was started when sparks from the plasma cutter contacted the shirt
Mr. Hathaway was wearing at the time. The shirt Mr. Hathaway was wearing at the
time of the accident was a 100% cotton shirt provided to Quik Cut by defendant Cintas
Corporate Services #2 d/b/a Cintas Corporation (“Cintas”).
Mr. Hathaway and his wife, Tammy Hathaway, brought suit against several
defendants, including Lincoln. (DE # 1.) In their complaint, plaintiffs brought three
Counts against Lincoln: negligence (Count IV), breach of warranty (Count V), and
products liability (Count VI). (Id.) In 2010, Lincoln moved to dismiss Counts IV and V of
plaintiffs’ complaint. (DE # 23.) The court later issued an order dismissing Count IV in
its entirety and Count V as it related to plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims. (DE # 63.)

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The facts that follow are construed most favorably to plaintiffs, the non-moving
party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998).
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The court denied Lincoln’s motion as it related to the express warranty claim in Count
V. (Id.)
II. LINCOLN’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT V
Lincoln has now moved to dismiss Count V of plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to
state a claim. (DE # 95.) Although Lincoln filed its answer to plaintiffs’ complaint long
before it filed this motion, the motion is still appropriately analyzed under FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 757 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006).
A. Legal Standard
Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under RULE 12(b)(6) of the
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. RULE 8 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE sets forth the pleading
standard for complaints filed in federal court; specifically, that rule requires that a
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8. “The RULE reflects a liberal notice pleading regime,
which is intended to focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on
technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While the federal pleading standard
is quite forgiving . . . ‘the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d
660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir.
2010)); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

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For purposes of deciding defendants’ RULE 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts
plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
B. Analysis
In its motion to dismiss, defendant Lincoln argues that Indiana requires privity
for breach of warranty actions, and because plaintiffs cannot show that they were a
party to the contract for the purchase of the plasma cutter or that plaintiffs were in
privity with a party to the contract for the plasma cutter, plaintiffs’ express warranty
claims must be dismissed. (DE # 96 at 2.) Plaintiffs have not responded to this motion.
The court previously recognized this problem in its December 1, 2010 order
analyzing plaintiffs’ warranty claims. In that order, the court stated:
The court notes that it is possible that this claim should be dismissed for a
reason not addressed by either party. Under Indiana law, an express
warranty is created when a seller presents an affirmation of fact, a promise,
a sample, a model, or a description of goods to the buyer that is made part
of the basis of the bargain between the seller and the buyer. IND. CODE § 261-2-313 (2010). Nothing in the complaint alleges that the Hathaways entered
into any type of bargain or purchase agreement with Lincoln. In order to
have a claim for breach of express warranty, the Hathaways will have to
show that they were in privity of contract with the purchaser of the Plasma
Cutter, Mr. Hathaway’s employer, but none of the allegations in the
complaint show that they will be able to do so. See IND. CODE § 26-1-2-318
(2010); Davidson v. John Deere Co., 644 F. Supp. 707, 713 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
(finding that there is no privity of contract under Indiana law between a
buyer and his employees). However, since Lincoln has not raised this
argument and the parties have not had an opportunity to brief this issue, the
court will not dismiss the claim at this time.
(DE # 63 at 6 n.1.) Nothing has changed since the court issued this order in December of
2010. Plaintiffs have not filed an amended complaint, and thus, plaintiffs still have not
alleged that they entered into any type of bargain or purchase agreement with Lincoln.
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Additionally, plaintiffs have not shown they were in privity of contract with Mr.
Hathaway’s employer, Quik Cut. Because there is no privity of contract between a buyer
and his employees, Davidson, 644 F. Supp. at 713, plaintiffs’ express warranty claims will
be dismissed.
The court previously dismissed plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims in Count V.
(DE # 63 at 6.) Count V is now dismissed in its entirety.
III. LINCOLN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT VI
Lincoln has also moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs remaining claims in
Count VI. (DE # 102.)2
A. Legal Standard
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate–in fact, is mandated–where there are no disputed
issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the
record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” Dempsey
v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).

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Lincoln also seeks summary judgment on Count IV, but as noted above, that
Count has already been dismissed.
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The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that these requirements
have been met; it may discharge this responsibility by showing that there is an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 605
F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). To overcome a motion for
summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts
demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence,
however, is insufficient to fulfill this requirement. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The nonmoving party must show that there is evidence upon
which a jury reasonably could find for him. Id.
The court’s role in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to evaluate the truth
of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.
1994). On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the
evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In
viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe
all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir.
1998); Doe, 42 F.3d at 443. Importantly, the court is “not required to draw every conceivable
inference from the record [in favor of the non-movant]-only those inferences that are

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reasonable.” Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added).
B. Analysis
The parties agree that the Indiana Products Liability Act (“IPLA”) governs
plaintiffs’ remaining claim, Count VI. (DE # 102 at 9; DE # 111 at 3.) The IPLA, Indiana
Code sections 34–20–1–1 through 34–20–9–1, governs all actions brought by a user or
consumer against a manufacturer or seller for physical harm caused by a product,
regardless of the legal theory upon which the action is brought. See IND. CODE
§ 34–20–1–1.
To succeed in an action under the IPLA, a plaintiff must prove the following
elements:
(1) he or she was harmed by a product; (2) the product was sold “in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer”; (3)
the plaintiff was a foreseeable user or consumer; (4) the defendant was in the
business of selling the product; and (5) the product reached the consumer or
user in the condition it was sold.
Bourne v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 452 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting IND. CODE
§ 34–20–2–1); see also Moss v. Crosman Corp., 136 F.3d 1169, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998). “[A]
plaintiff can satisfy the second element-that the product was defective-by showing one
of the following: a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or a failure to warn.” Ritchie v.
Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs,
685 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The second element requires that a plaintiff
show that the product was both in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous.

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Bourne, 452 F.3d at 635-36 (citing Baker v. Heye-America, 799 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003)); see also Rodefer v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., No. IP 01-123-C H/K, 2003 WL
23096486, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 2003) (“Though often merged into the question of
whether a product is defective, the requirement that a product be ‘unreasonably
dangerous’ is a separate element of a products liability claim . . . .”).
In the present case, plaintiffs contend that the plasma cutter Mr. Hathaway was
using when he got injured was defective because it suffered from a manufacturing
defect, because it suffered from a design defect, and because the product lacked
adequate warnings. (DE # 1 at 16-18). In its motion for summary judgment, Lincoln
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ IPLA claims because the
plasma cutter is not unreasonably dangerous. (See DE # 102 at 11, 14.)
For purposes of the IPLA, “unreasonably dangerous” refers to “any situation in
which the use of a product exposes the user or consumer to a risk of physical harm to
an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases the
product with the ordinary knowledge about the product’s characteristics common to
the community of consumers.” IND. CODE § 34-6-2-146; see also Bourne, 452 F.3d at 636.
“[A] product can be ‘dangerous,’ as that term is commonly understood, without being
‘unreasonably dangerous’ for purposes of liability under the [IPLA].” Meyers v. Furrow
Bldg. Materials, 659 N.E.2d 1147, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). “‘The requirement that the
product be in a defective condition focuses on the product itself while the requirement
that the product be unreasonably dangerous focuses on the reasonable expectations of
the consumer.’” Birch v. Midwest Garage Door Sys., 790 N.E.2d 504, 517 (Inc. Ct. App.
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2003) (quoting Smock Materials Handling Co., Inc. v. Kerr, 719 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999)).
Under previous Indiana law, “manufacturers had . . . no obligation to protect
against ‘open and obvious’ dangers in a negligence or ‘defect’ case.” Mesman v. Crane
Pro Servs., 409 F.3d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 2005). “But when the Indiana legislature decided to
codify the state’s products liability law, it omitted the ‘open and obvious’ defense,
replacing it with a defense (usually referred to as ‘incurred risk’) that requires proof
that the user of the product was actually ‘aware of the danger in the product.’”
Id. (citing IND.CODE § 34-20-6-3). Thus, the open and obvious rule is no longer a
complete bar to recovery in Indiana. Bourne, 452 F.3d at 635.
Although Lincoln raised the incurred risk defense as an affirmative defense, it
does not rely on that argument in its motion for summary judgment. Instead, Lincoln
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the plasma cutter was not
unreasonably dangerous. (See DE # 102 at 14.) Lincoln argues that the product was not
unreasonably dangerous because the risk of fire associated with the plasma cutter was
open and obvious. (Id. at 11.) As plaintiffs point out, the fact that a risk was open and
obvious is not conclusive evidence that a product is not unreasonably dangerous.
Mesman, 409 F.3d at 850-51. Obviousness is, however, “a relevant inquiry
because . . . the question of what is unreasonably dangerous depends upon the
reasonable expectations of consumers and expected uses.” Bourne, 452 F.3d at 637.
The Seventh Circuit has stated:

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In some cases, the obviousness of the risk will obviate the need for any
further protective measures, or obviousness may prove that an injured user
knew about a risk but nonetheless chose to incur it. Although obviousness
typically factors in the equation for the jury (it is evidence but “not
conclusive evidence,” Mesman, 409 F.3d at 851), there are some cases where
the case is so one-sided that there is no possibility of the plaintiff’s recovery.
See Moss, 136 F.3d at 1173-76.
Id. (some citations omitted).
“The question whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is usually a question
of fact that must be resolved by the jury.” Heye-America, 799 N.E.2d at 1140. That question,
however, may be decided as a matter of law under certain circumstances, “especially if the
alleged danger is open and obvious, as with the risk that a lighter will start fires, the risk
that a running lawnmower blade will injure a hand stuck underneath the mower, and the
risk that a BB gun will injure.” Bourne v. Marty Gilman, Inc., No. 1:03–CV–1375, 2005 WL
1703201, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 20, 2005), aff’d 452 F.3d at 638-39.
In support of its argument that the plasma cutter was not unreasonably dangerous,
Lincoln directs the court to evidence that plaintiff Rex Hathaway, along with Mr.
Hathaway’s coworkers that had used the plasma cutter, knew that they had to protect
themselves from the sparks emitted from the plasma cutter to prevent fires and burns.
(DE # 102 at 3-7.) Lincoln argues that “the hazards cannot be said to go beyond that
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased or used the Pro Cut 80 with the
ordinary knowledge about the Pro Cut’s characteristics . . . “ (Id. at 12.) Thus, Lincoln likens
the facts of this case to several cases holding that products were not unreasonably
dangerous as a matter of law because of the obvious danger involved in the use of the
products. See, e.g., Bourne, 452 F.3d at 637 (finding that goal post that caused injury after
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being torn down at football game not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law); Moss,
136 F.3d at 1174-75 (BB gun not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law); Welch v.
Scripto-Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810, 814-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that a lighter is
not unreasonably dangerous and noting that “[t]he ordinary consumer of a lighter is an
adult and the ordinary adult consumer contemplates the risks posed by a lighter, including
the dangers associated with children who play with lighters.”).
In response, plaintiffs argue that the plasma cutter is unreasonably dangerous as the
risk of fire associated with the plasma cutter is not obvious. (DE # 111.) Specifically,
plaintiffs argue that because Mr. Hathaway (DE # 112-1 at 3), and his coworkers (DE # 1124 at 3; DE # 112-3 at 5), were able to safely use the plasma cutter by wearing 100% cotton
shirts, the risk of fire was not open and obvious. (DE # 111 at 4-5.)
In Corbin v. Coleco Industries, Inc., a Seventh Circuit case applying Indiana law, the
plaintiff was injured after diving head first into a four foot above-ground swimming pool.
748 F.2d 411, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1984). The plaintiff hit his head on the bottom of the pool, and
was paralyzed from the injury. Id. at 413. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the pool,
and the manufacturer claimed that it could not be held liable on plaintiff’s failure to warn
claim because the danger of diving into four feet of water was open and obvious. Id. at 417.
The district court ruled for the defendant on that issue, but the Seventh Circuit reversed,
stating:
Whether a danger is open and obvious depends not just on what people can
see with their eyes but also on what they know and believe about what they
see. In particular, if people generally believe that there is a danger associated
with the use of a product, but that there is a safe way to use it, any danger
there may be in using the product in the way generally believed to be safe is
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not open and obvious.
Id. at 417-18. In ruling that summary judgment was not appropriate on the open and
obvious issue, the court noted that if people generally believe that they can safely dive into
shallow water by executing a flat, shallow dive, “then it cannot be said, as a matter of law,
that the risk of . . . injury from diving into shallow water is open and obvious.” Id.
The Indiana Court of Appeals has subsequently adopted the reasoning of Corbin. For
example, in Cole v. Lantis Corp., the plaintiff, an employee who helped load cargo onto
aircrafts, was injured using a loader he was required to use in performing his job. 714
N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). There was a gap of approximately eighteen inches
between the edge of the loader and the airplanes that plaintiff would load the cargo onto.
Id. The plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of the loader after he slipped and
fell through the gap between the loader and an airplane and suffered serious injuries. Id.
The manufacturer argued that the loader was not unreasonably dangerous because plaintiff
was aware of the risk of falling, and thus the danger was open and obvious. Id. at 198.1
The trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the open and obvious
rule.2 The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, citing to an Indiana case which cited Corbin,
and noted that the plaintiff had been moving cargo over the gap for over a year before he
fell, and that he had apparently developed a generally safe method of moving cargo

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The Mesman court questioned whether the Indiana Supreme Court would follow the
Cole opinion. Mesman, 409 F.3d at 851. That decision, however, did not question the
portion of Cole the court relies on in this opinion.

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As noted above, that rule used to be a complete bar to recovery in Indiana.
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without falling. Id. at 199. The court concluded that the question of whether the loader was
unreasonably dangerous was a question of fact for a jury to decide. Id. at 200.3
Plaintiffs cite to this line of cases and argue that Mr. Hathaway and other Quik Cut
employees had developed a method of using the plasma cutter safely by wearing 100%
cotton shirts and following good work practices. (DE # 111 at 4-6; DE # 112-3 at 5;
DE # 112-4 at 3-4) Additionally, plaintiffs point to the fact that Mr. Hathaway had used the
plasma cutter without incident over fifty times prior to the accident that gave rise to this
lawsuit. (DE # 112-1 at 3.) Defendant Lincoln does not respond to this argument in its reply
brief.

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The Cole court summarized other Indiana and Seventh Circuit cases that reached
similar conclusions:
[Schooley v. Ingersoll Rand, Inc., 631 N.E.2d 932, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)]
(although the danger of moving a large steel plate without safety chains
was obvious, whether the rule would apply to bar plaintiff’s recovery was
a question of fact for the jury where moving the plate was part of
employee’s job and the plate had been moved safely on many other
occasions); [FMC Corp. v. Brown, 526 N.E.2d 719, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)]
(even though the danger of electrocution posed by a power line was
obvious to the operators of a crane, whether the open and obvious rule
would apply to preclude recovery was a factual question for the jury where
the operators often performed repairs near power lines and could have
reasonably believed that it was safe to do so); [McDonald v. Sandvik Process
Systems, Inc., 870 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1989)] (although the danger posed
by a moving slicing blade was obvious, whether the open and obvious rule
would apply to bar recovery was a question of fact where employees had
developed a generally safe method of tightening the blade while the
machine was running)[.]
Cole, 714 N.E.2d at 199.
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Mr. Hathaway used this plasma cutter over fifty times before the date in question
without his shirt ever going up in flames, like it did on February 19. Additionally, several
of Mr. Hathaway’s coworkers testified that the way in which plaintiff was operating the
plasma cutter is considered to be safe. Lincoln has presented no evidence showing that
similar accidents occurred at Quik Cut, or anywhere else. Cf. Hughes v. Battenfeld
Glouchester Eng’g Co., No. TH-01-0237, 2003 WL 22247195, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2003)
(“The evidence presented in this case is easily contrasted with that in Cole . . . . Though
[plaintiff] had used the Secondary Treater Nip Station for several years without incident,
there is evidence that other . . workers were not so fortunate. There had been three other
‘lost time injuries’ on the exact same line.”). The deposition testimony Lincoln included in
its motion for summary judgment indicates the opposite is true. (DE # 102-7 at 2.)
Additionally, there was evidence presented that cotton clothing is the industry standard
for welding and plasma cutting (DE # 102-2 at 5), which indicates that people in the
industry generally believe that cotton clothing protects plasma cutters from the risk of fire.
Corbin, 748 F.2d at 417-18.
Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the plasma cutter was
unreasonably dangerous. Thus, a question of fact remains as to whether the plasma cutter
was unreasonably dangerous, and defendant Lincoln has not met its initial burden on
summary judgment. Because Lincoln’s only argument in its motion for summary judgment
is that the plasma cutter was not unreasonably dangerous,4 Lincoln’s motion for summary
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Lincoln may also be attempting to argue that products with inherent dangers,
which Lincoln contends the plasma cutter has, need not have warnings regarding those
dangers. (DE # 102 at 12.) Lincoln cites no case law in support of this argument. The
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judgment is DENIED (DE # 102.) Lincoln’s motion for oral argument is DENIED AS
MOOT. (DE # 114.)
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Defendant Lincoln Electric’s motion to dismiss Count V of plaintiffs’ complaint
is GRANTED. (DE # 95.)
2. Defendant Lincoln Electric’s motion for summary judgment on Count VI of
plaintiffs’ complaint is DENIED. (DE # 102.)
3. Defendant Lincoln Electric’s motion for oral argument is DENIED AS MOOT.
(DE # 114.)
SO ORDERED.
Date: September 26, 2012
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

court “is not required to scour the party’s various submissions to piece together
appropriate arguments[,]” Little v. Cox’s Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1995),
and it will not do so here.