Brown v. Jay County Sheriff's Department
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DIRECTS the clerk to unseal the original complaint; DENIES 32 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Vicki Wickelman, Joseph G Hibbard, Matt Simmons; LIFTS the stay in this case. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 8/27/2012. (kjm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JASON B. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATT SIMMONS, JOSEPH G. HIBBARD,
and VICKI WICKELMAN,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:10-CV-304 JD
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants.
In the motion, they assert that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. In the
alternative, they seek partial summary judgment based on issue preclusion. The plaintiff, Jason B.
Brown, a pro se prisoner, is proceeding on a claim that Deputy Matt Simmons and Correctional
Officer Joseph Hibbard used excessive force against him on September 1, 2008, while he was being
held at the Jay County Jail. He also alleges that Correctional Officer Vicki Wickelman did not
intervene to stop them.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” the evidence which “demonstrate[s] the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
“Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by
“citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or show “that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). To establish a genuine issue of
fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial, not “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” First
Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Secs. Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails
to establish the existence of an essential element on which it bears the burden of proof at trial,
summary judgment is proper. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that
a failure to prove one essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court must avoid the temptation to
“make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the
facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). Summary
judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits or a vehicle for resolving factual disputes.
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Instead, the court’s sole task in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether
there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. If a reasonable
factfinder could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Id.
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A. Statute of Limitations
This case began when Brown mailed a Standard Form 95 to the clerk’s office in Fort Wayne.
ECF 1. Standard Form 95 was approved by the Office of Management and Budget for filing claims
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. This particular form was pre-printed
for filing claims with the USDA, APHIS, FMD, BCT in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Those acronyms
stand for the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
Financial Management Division, Billings and Collections Team. This case has nothing to do with
the Department of Agriculture and it does not involve a tort claim against the United States of
America. Clearly this was not the correct form to use to file a civil rights lawsuit against officers at
the Jay County Jail. Nevertheless, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). “[C]ourts are supposed to analyze a litigant’s claims and not just the legal theories
that he propounds - especially when he is litigating pro se.” U.S. v. Norfleet, 684 F.3d 688, 690, (7th
Cir. 2012) (citing Erickson, other citations omitted). Thus, the clerk properly accepted this filing as
a complaint and opened this case.
Because Brown used the wrong form, it was not obvious whom he was attempting to sue.
The first page of the filing does not include a place to name a defendant because the form was not
designed for filing a lawsuit in federal court. Thankfully the clerk did not list the Department of
Agriculture as a defendant, even though that would have been one possible interpretation of the
form. Rather, it appears that the clerk found a sentence near the end of Brown’s handwritten
description of his claim: “I have sworn deposition statements and video taped evidence in support
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of all these allegations I have brought forth against: Jay County Sheriff’s Department, Portland,
Indiana 47371.” ECF 1 at 4. Based on that sentence, it was reasonable for the clerk to have identified
the Jay County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant. The clerk cannot be faulted for not listing any
other defendants at that time. But upon closer examination, it is clear that Brown named Deputy
Matt Simmons, Correctional Officer Joseph Hibbard, and Correctional Officer Vicki Wickelman in
the original filing. He also described what they did and sufficiently set forth adequate facts to state
a claim against each of them. Liberally construed, all three were named as defendants in the original
filing.
Because of the numerous problems with the original filing, the court concluded that it would
be best to provide Brown with a complaint form and require him to file an amended complaint. ECF
3. Though the court struck the original filing, that did not terminate this case. Rather, the amended
complaint was merely a means of permitting the plaintiff to clearly state his claims without the
confusion caused by having “inartfully pleaded” his case. It was also a way of unambiguously
requiring Brown to file an amended complaint. Brown was cautioned that if he did not do so by
October 7, 2010, that his case would be dismissed. Id. On October 6, 2010, the clerk received the
amended complaint from Brown. ECF 4. In it he again identified Deputy Matt Simmons,
Correctional Officer Joseph Hibbard, and Correctional Officer Vicki Wickelman as defendants. He
also more clearly explained the same claims against each of them which he had presented in his
original filing.
In their memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion, the defendants
acknowledge that the original filing in this case was docketed before the expiration of the statute of
limitations. ECF 33 at 2. They seek summary judgment because the amended complaint was
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submitted after it. Because the names of Defendants Deputy Matt Simmons, Correctional Officer
Joseph Hibbard, and Correctional Officer Vicki Wickelman were not placed on the docket sheet
until after the filing of the amended complaint, they argue that the amended complaint does not meet
the requirements for relation back pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
It is unfortunate that the docket sheet did not include their names originally, but it is the
filing, not the docket entry, that must control the relation back analysis. See Rule 15(c)(1) (“An
amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . (B) the
amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set
out . . . in the original pleading . . ..”) (emphasis added). When the complaint was stricken, the clerk
sealed it from public view. Because the language of the original complaint is necessary to the
resolution of this motion, the clerk will be directed to unseal that filing.
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) imposes additional requirements when an amended complaint “changes the
party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted,” but as explained, the original
filing named Deputy Matt Simmons, Correctional Officer Joseph Hibbard, and Correctional Officer
Vicki Wickelman as defendants. Therefore those additional provisions are inapplicable to this case.
Thus, because the original filing was made before the expiration of the statute of limitations and
because it included the same claims against the same defendants, the claims against Deputy Matt
Simmons, Correctional Officer Joseph Hibbard, and Correctional Officer Vicki Wickelman are not
barred by the statute of limitations.
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B. Issue Preclusion
Alternatively, the defendants seek partial summary judgment based on issue preclusion. The
defendants argue that the “plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to criminal recklessness. The conduct
which forms the factual basis of this recklessness involved kicking a door open to a holding cell,
nearly hitting Deputy Simmons in the face.” ECF 33 at 5. The defendants argue that consequently,
“[i]n any subsequent litigation in this matter, plaintiff Brown is precluded from denying that his
conduct in kicking open the door, nearly hitting Deputy Simmons in the face, precipitated the
incident of which he now complains.” Id. at 6. As evidence in support of this argument, the
defendants have provided a copy of the Information charging Brown with Criminal Recklessness
(ECF 34-1), the Judgment of Conviction and Order on Sentence (ECF 34-2), and the signed Plea
Agreement (ECF 34-3).
Brown does not dispute the accuracy of these documents. However, summary judgment is
not appropriate here because the defendants have not provided any evidence that kicking the door
was proximately connected to the alleged excessive use of force, much less that it precipitated it.
Though the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Brown kicked a door and created a substantial
risk to Deputy Simmons on September 1, 2008, there is no evidence showing whether the kicking
occurred before, during, or after the alleged excessive use of force. Without more information, it
would be impossible to find that the kicking “precipitated the incident.” Moreover, unless the
temporal relationship between the kicking of the door and the alleged excessive use of force were
relevant to the criminal recklessness conviction, issue preclusion would not preclude litigation of
the timing of these events because it would not have been at issue in the prior proceeding. See
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 853 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Issue preclusion . . . bars successive
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litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination
essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.”
(quotation marks and citations omitted).) Therefore the motion for partial summary judgment based
on issue preclusion will be denied.
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court:
(1) DIRECTS the clerk to unseal the original complaint (ECF 1);
(2) DENIES the motion for summary judgment (ECF 32); and
(3) LIFTS the stay in this case.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
August 27, 2012
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court
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