Hoopes et al v. Gulf Stream Coach Inc et al
Filing
47
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING approval of the proposed stipulated protective order submitted by the parties [45,Ex.B). Signed by Magistrate Judge Roger B Cosbey on 7/17/12. (jcp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
NATHAN HOOPES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GULF STREAM COACH, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 1:10-CV-365
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a stipulation by the parties seeking approval of a proposed protective
order. (Docket # 45, Ex. B.) As the proposed order is deficient in several respects, it will be
DENIED.
First, the order is overly broad and vague. It seeks to protect “materials that are broadly
denoted ‘trade secrets,’ . . . [which] could include manufacturing processes, engineering, testing
and design of the recreational vehicle and its components, pricing, dealer lists and the like.”
(Proposed Order at 3.) The order further informs that “[t]his list is not exhaustive or exclusive,
but illustrative.” (Proposed Order at 3.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) allows the Court to enter a protective order for
good cause shown. See Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d
943, 946 (7th Cir. 1999). Under Cincinnati Insurance, a protective order must only extend to
“properly demarcated categor[ies] of legitimately confidential information.” Id.; see also MRS
Invs. v. Meridian Sports, Inc., No. IP 99-1954-C-F/M, 2002 WL 193140, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6,
2002) (rejecting proposed protective order because categories of protected information were
overly broad and vague); Cook Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 206 F.R.D. 244, 248-49 (S.D. Ind.
2001); Andrew Corp. v. Rossi, 180 F.R.D. 338, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Here, the term “trade
secrets” is not defined and, even if it were, the phrase “broadly denoted” preceding its use
compounds the term’s vagueness. Furthermore, the list of materials denoted in the order is
overly broad since it is illustrative and not exclusive.
Moreover, the proposed order, which is not expressly limited to the discovery phase of
the proceedings, makes no effort to specify why the purported protected materials are
confidential. “[M]erely asserting that a disclosure of the information ‘could’ harm a litigant’s
competitive position is insufficient; the motion must explain how.” Shepard v. Humke, IP 011103-C-H/K, 2003 WL 1702256, at *1 (S.D. Ind. March 28, 2003) (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2002)).
And finally, Cincinnati Insurance specifies that a protective order may only issue if the
order “makes explicit that either party and any interested member of the public can challenge the
secreting of particular documents.” 178 F.3d at 946. Here, the proposed order contains no such
language.
“Obtaining a protective order in an appropriate case need not be a[n] onerous task. But
such an order may not issue absent an appropriate showing of good cause, as well as adherence
to the other limitations the Seventh Circuit has emphasized apply to such orders.” Shepard, 2003
WL 1702256, at *2. Of course, the parties may submit a revised protective order consistent with
the requirements of Rule 26(c)(7) and Seventh Circuit case law, but what has been submitted
thus far is inadequate.
For these reasons, the Court hereby DENIES approval of the proposed stipulated
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protective order submitted by the parties (Docket # 45).
SO ORDERED.
Enter for this 17th day of July, 2012.
S/ Roger B. Cosbey
Roger B. Cosbey,
United States Magistrate Judge
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